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OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

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FROM  THE  LIBRARY  OF 
FRANK  J.  KLINGBERG 


f    A^XtxtxtC        Ijs: 

II 


MODERN 
RUSSIAN  HISTORY 


This  work  has  been  translated 
from  the  original  Russian    by 

ALEXANDER   5.   KAUN 

who  is  also  the  author  of  the 

last   chapters  dealing   with   the 

reign  of  Nicolas  II. 


MODERN 
RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

Being  an  authoritative  and  detailed  history  of  Russia 
from  the  Age  of  Catherine  the  Great  to  the  Present 

By  ALEXANDER  KORNILOV 

Professor  at  the 
Poliiechnicum  of  Peter  the  Great  in  Petrograd 

Volume  One 


The  Borzoi 

ALFRED  A.  KNOPF 

New  York  MCMXVl 


COPYRIGHT,  1916,  BY 
ALFRED  A.  KNOPF 


PRINTED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


College 
Library 


PREFACE 

v,t 

This  "  History  of  Russia  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  "  is 
based  upon  a  course  of  lectures  which  I  have  been  delivering 
since  1909  before  the  senior  students  of  the  Politechnicum  of 
Peter  the  Great  in  Petrograd.  It  appears  now  in  three  parts, 
of  which  the  first,  beside  two  introductory  chapters  that  con- 
tain a  rapid  sketch  of  the  developmental  process  of  the  Rus- 
sian state  and  people  before  the  nineteenth  century,  pre- 
sents the  general  evolutionary  course  of  national  and  political 
life  in  Russia  in  the  first  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  up 
to  the  accession  of  Nicolas  I.  The  second  part  contains  a  gen- 
eral survey  of  the  internal  life  in  Russia  during  the  reign  of 
Nicolas  I  and  during  the  first,  reformatory,  period  of  the  reign 
of  Alexander  II  (to  the  year  1866).  The  third  part  deals 
with  the  history  of  Russia  in  the  last  thirty-five  years. 

I  consider  it  my  duty  to  mention  with  the  deepest  gratitude 
the  late  Professor  V.  O.  Kluchevsky,  in  whose  works  I  have 
found  enormous  aid  for  the  formation  of  my  own  views  on  the 
course  of  Russian  history  in  modern  times. 

THE  AUTHOR. 

Petrograd,  January,  1912. 


1327422 


CONTENTS 

PART  I 
CHAPTER  I     .  t.,     .     .      -3 

The  aim  and  the  contents  of  the  book. —  The  method  of 
its  structure. —  General  characteristics  of  the  socio-political 
process  of  development  of  the  Russian  people  and  state  up  to 
the  eighteenth  century. —  The  struggle  for  territory,  and  its 
socio-political  results. —  The  main  features  of  the  new  de- 
velopmental process  in  Russian  history,  as  it  began  to  ap- 
pear by  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

CHAPTER  II 23 

The  situation  of  Russia  on  the  eve  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, at  the  end  of  Catherine's  reign. —  State  boundaries. — 
The  importance  of  Catherine's  territorial  acquisitions. — 
Means  of  communication. —  Population. —  Its  racial  composi- 
tion.—  Its  order-  and  class-composition. —  The  conditions  of 
various  peasant-classes. —  Urban-classes. —  The  clergy. —  The 
nobility. —  The  Intelligentzia  and  the  masses. —  The  develop- 
ment of  education  in  Russia  and  the  origin  of  the  Intelligent- 
zia.—  The  ideology  of  the  masses. —  The  schism. —  The  gov- 
ernment and  its  organs. —  The  financial  conditions  in  the 
eighteenth  century. —  General  conclusions. 

CHAPTER  III 50 

The  reign  of  Paul  I. —  His  place  in  history. —  Biographi- 
cal facts. —  The  general  character  of  Paul's  governmental 
activity. —  The  peasant  question  under  Paul. —  His  attitude 
towards  other  classes. —  Society's  attitude  towards  Paul. — 
The  financial  state  during  his  reign,  and  his  foreign  policy. 
—  Results  of  his  reign. 

CHAPTER  IV 64 

The  reign  of  Alexander  I. —  Its  division  into  periods. — 
Biographical  facts. —  His  education. —  His  marriage. —  His 
position  under  Catherine  and  Paul. 

CHAPTER  V 77 

Alexander's  accession. —  His  purpose,  and  the  degree  of 
his  equipment. —  His  first  collaborators,  and  his  early  meas- 


CONTENTS 

urea. —  The  work  of  the  Unofficial  Committee. —  Its  composition. 

—  Discussion  of  political  reforms. —  The  peasant  question. — 
The    formation    of    ministries    and    the    reformation    of    the 
Senate. —  The  results  of  the  Committee's  works. 

CHAPTER  VI 96 

Moods  and  political  views  of  society  at  the  beginning  of 
Alexander's  reign. —  Important  periodicals  in  the  years  1802- 
1805. —  The  condition  of  the  masses. —  The  law  of  Free  Farm- 
ers, 1803. —  The  peasant  reform  in  Ostsee  district  in  1804  and 
1805. — Growth  of  population. —  Colonisation  of  the  south- 
ern provinces. —  The  Jewish  question. —  The  Government's 
attitude  towards  sects. —  Russian  finances  and  financial  pol- 
icy in  1801-1805. —  The  problem  of  state  reforms  in  1803. — 
Educational  activity  of  the  government  in  1802-1805. 

CHAPTER  VII 114 

The    second    period    of    Alexander's    reign     (1805-1807). 

—  Russia's    international    position    at    the    beginning    of    the 
nineteenth   century. —  Rupture   with   Napoleon. —  Czartoryski's 
plans  and  Alexander's  attitude  towards  the  Poles  in  1805. — 
The  failure  of  the  campaign  of   1805. —  The  war  of  1806- 
1807. —  The  defeat  of  Prussia. —  Great  preparations  in  Rus- 
sia for  the  war  with  Napoleon. —  The  winter  campaign  of 
1807. —  The    exhaustion    of    Russia's    military    forces. —  The 
treaty  of  Tilsit. —  Alliance  with  Napoleon,  keen  disappoint- 
ment in  Russia. —  The  character  of  the  opposition. 

CHAPTER  VIII 130 

Alexander's  resolution  to  resume  internal  reforms  in  1809. 
Speransky. —  The  plan  of  state  reorganisation. —  Steps  to  its 
realisation:  establishment  of  the  State  Council  and  reorgani- 
sation of  the  ministries. —  The  ukase  about  service-examina- 
tions.—  The  desperate  condition  of  Russian  finances  in  1809- 
1810. —  Speransky's  financial  plan.  Karamzin's  address  on 
Ancient  and  New  Russia. —  The  fall  of  Speransky. —  The  con- 
ditions of  popular  education. —  The  establishment  of  academic 
societies. 

CHAPTER  IX 146 

The  immediate  causes  of  the  war  of  1812. —  Rupture  with 
Napoleon. —  The  comparative  forces  of  the  antagonistic  arm- 
ies and  the  plan  of  the  campaign. —  The  general  course  of  the 
war. —  The  mood  of  the  Russian  army  and  people. —  Napo- 
leon's position  before  and  after  Moscow. —  The  repulsion  of 
the  invader. —  Alexander's  triumph. —  The  transference  of  the 


CONTENTS 

war  into  Western  Europe. —  The  campaign  of  1813-1814. — 
The  deposition  of  Napoleon.  The  congress  in  Vienna. — 
Alexander's  plans  in  regard  to  Poland  and  Prussia. —  Tal- 
leyrand's intrigues  and  friction  among  allies. —  The  solution 
of  the  Polish  question. —  Condition  of  affairs  in  the  Duchy  of 
Warsaw  and  the  question  of  its  future  organisation. —  Alex- 
ander's mystic  mood  and  the  idea  of  the  Holy  Alliance. 

CHAPTER  X 165 

Alexander's  return  to  Russia  in  1815. —  The  Polish  constitu- 
tion of  1815. — Russian  affairs  in  1812-1815. —  Misery  and 
material  sacrifices  of  the  population. — -The  cost  of  the  war 
and  the  degree  of  devastation. —  Russian  finances. —  The  up- 
heaval of  the  national  spirit. —  The  state  of  industry  and  com- 
merce in  1812-1815. —  The  influence  of  the  returning  army 
on  society. —  Spread  of  enlightenment  in  the  country. —  The 
hopes  of  the  society  in  Alexander. —  His  mood  in  1816. — 
Cares  for  army  maintenance  in  connection  with  the  foreign 
policy. —  The  idea  of  military  settlements,  its  origin  and  real- 
isation. Arakcheiev. —  His  characteristic.  The  course  of 
affairs  in  the  Committee  of  Ministers  and  the  revelation  of 
abuses  in  1816. —  The  role  of  Arakcheiev  in  the  Committee 
of  Ministers  and  in  other  institutions. 

CHAPTER  XI 181 

The  role  of  the  State  Council  during  the  wars  of  1812-1815. 
The  restoration  of  its  significance  with  the  return  of  Admiral 
Mordvinov  into  its  body. —  Mordvinov's  activity  and  the  fi- 
nancial measures  of  1816-1820. —  The  tariffs  of  1816  and  of 
1819  and  their  bearing  on  the  course  of  paper  money  and  on 
the  factory  industry  in  Russia. —  The  growth  of  factories 
during  Alexander's  reign. —  The  peasant  question  in  1816- 
1820. —  The  liberation  of  the  serfs  in  the  Ostsee  district  and 
the  attitude  of  the  government  and  society  towards  the  peas- 
ant question  in  Russia. —  The  development  of  education  after 
1812. —  The  role  of  the  universities. —  The  infiltration  of  mys- 
tic currents. —  The  Biblical  Society. —  The  ministries  of  re- 
ligion and  of  popular  education. —  Prince  Golitzyn  and  his 
adherents:  Sturdza,  Magnitzky,  and  Runich. —  The  breaking 
up  of  the  universities. —  Journalism  after  1815  and  the  posi- 
tion of  the  press. —  The  role  of  the  ministry  of  police. —  Alex- 
ander's mood  in  1818-1820. —  His  speech  in  the  Polish  diet, 
iSiS. 

CHAPTER  XII 196 

The  appearance  of  secret  societies  after  the  Napoleonic 
wars. —  The  Union  of  Salvation.  Its  constitution. —  Pestel 


CONTENTS 

and  Muraviov. —  Muraviov's  opposition  and  the  reorganisa- 
tion of  the  Union  of  Salvation  into  the  Union  of  Prosperity. 

—  Its  constitution,  organisation,  and  activity  along  the  four 
"  branches." —  Political  questions  among  the  members  of  the 
Union. —  Outburst  of  indignation  against  Alexander  in  1817. 

—  The  question  of  a  republic  in  1820. —  The  influence  of  the 
"  Semionov-affair,"    of    the    second    Polish    diet,    and    of    the 
Neapolitan    revolution    on    Alexander's    mood. —  The   suspen- 
sion  of   the    Union  of   Prosperity.    "  The   Southern    Society." 

—  The  activity  of  Pestel  and  other  members. —  The  Vassilkov 
Board. —  The   society   of    United    Slavs. —  The   Northern    So- 
ciety.—  The  Constitution  of  N.  Muraviov  and  the  "  Russian 
Justice"  of  Pestel. 

CHAPTER  XIII 209 

Alexander's  mood  and  activity  after  1820. —  His  agreement 
with  Metternich. —  The  role  of  the  Holy  Alliance  at  that 
time. —  The  Greek  insurrection,  and  Alexander's  attitude. — 
Alexander's  internal  policy  1820-1825. —  Withdrawal  of  re- 
forms.—  The  reign  of  obscurantism. —  Fotiy  and  the  dismis- 
sal of  Golitzyn. —  The  reason  for  the  hesitation  in  the  Gov- 
ernment's persecutions. —  Alexander  and  the  Polish  constitu- 
tion.—  Financial  affairs.—  The  tariff  of  1822  and  the  ap- 
pointment of  Kankrin  as  minister  of  finance. 

SUMMARY  AND  GENERAL  VIEW  ON  THE  EPOCH. 

PART  II 
CHAPTER  XIV 223 

The  reign  of  Nicolas  I. —  The  conditions  of  his  accession. 

—  The     question     of     throne-succession. —  The     unpublished 
manifesto  of  Alexander  about  the  abdication  of  Constantine. — 
Confusion  and  interregnum  from  the  death  of  Alexander  to 
December  14,  1825. —  Negotiations  between  Nicolas  and  Con- 
stantine.—  Accession    of    Nicolas. —  The    insurrection    of    De- 
cember 14. —  Its  suppression. —  Personality  of  Nicolas  I. —  His 
biography. —  Investigation    of   the   secret   societies. —  The   ex- 
ecution of  the   Decembrists,  and  the   results  of   Nicolas'   ac- 
quaintance with  them. —  The  influence  of  Karamzin   on  the 
Tzar. 

CHAPTER  XV 241 

The  division  of  Nicolas'  reign  into  periods. —  First  period 
(1825-1831). —  Nicolas'  assistants:  Kochubey,  Speransky, 
Kankrin,  Benckendorf,  Dibich,  Paskevich. —  The  Committee  of 
December  6,  1826;  its  composition  and  purpose;  its  activity. 


CONTENTS 

—  The  peasant  question. —  The  military  settlements. —  Sper- 
ansky's  codificatory  work.  The  formation  of  the  Third  De- 
partment of  H.  M.'s  Private  Chancery. —  The  tendency  of  the 
ministry  of  education. —  Attitude  towards  the  Polish  con- 
stitution.—  International  policy. —  The  war  with  Turkey, 
1828-29. —  The  end  of  the  first  period. 

CHAPTER  XVI 252 

The  second  period. —  Conservative  principles  in  foreign 
policy. —  The  Eastern  question. —  The  meeting  in  Muenchen- 
graetz. —  The  leading  principles  in  the  internal  policy. —  The 
legislative  work. —  Speransky's  activity  in  preparing  and  is- 
suing the  Code  of  Laws. —  The  significance  of  the  event. — 
The  peasant  question. —  The  condition  of  the  people. —  The 
material  factors  that  had  brought  about  the  abolition  of 
serfdom. —  The  activity  of  the  Government. —  Secret  com- 
mittees.—  The  work  of  Kankrin  and  Kiselev  in  managing 
the  state-peasants. —  The  establishment  of  the  ministry  of 
state  estates. —  Kiselev's  work  for  the  management  of  the 
bonded  peasants. —  The  law  of  1842  about  the  bondage- 
peasants. —  Inventory-taking  in  the  Western  region. —  The 
law  of  May  26,  1846,  concerning  Poland. 

CHAPTER  XVII 266 

The  development  of  industry  under  Nicolas  I. —  The  fate 
of  some  industrial  branches. —  The  competition  of  Polish 
industry.  Complaints  of  merchants. —  Kankrin's  activity. — 
His  principles  and  policy. —  Protectionism  and  its  influence  on 
industry  and  commerce. —  The  decrease  in  the  growth  of  the 
military  budget. —  The  cost  of  the  war  of  1827-31. —  The 
beverage-reform. —  The  financial  reform  of  1839-43. —  The 
role  of  Nicolas  in  the  introduction  of  that  measure. —  Kan- 
krin's cares  for  the  betterment  of  cultural  conditions. 

CHAPTER  XVIII 279 

The  system  of  popular  education  under  Nicolas. —  The 
Tzar's  views. —  The  ministry  of  Uvarov. —  His  principles. — 
The  decrees  of  December  28,  1828. —  The  university-decree  of 
1835. —  The  university  of  Moscow  under  Stroganov. —  The 
position  and  development  of  the  Intelligentzia  under  Nicolas. 
—  The  significance  of  the  catastrophe  of  December  14. — 
Two  channels  of  ideas:  the  German  and  the  French. —  The 
decay  of  the  latter,  and  the  growth  of  the  first. —  Schellingian- 
ism  in  Russia. — "  Mnemosina." — "  The  Lovers  of  Wisdom  " 
and  "The  Moscow  Messenger." — Polevoy's  "The  Moscow 
Telegraph." — Nadezhdin's  "Telescope." — The  idealists  of 
the  3<>ies. —  The  circle  of  Stankevich. —  Bakunin  and  Bielin- 


CONTENTS 

sky. —  The  evolution  of  Bielinsky. — "The  Annals  of  the 
Fatherland"  and  "The  Contemporary." — "The  Muscov- 
ite." and  the  system  of  "official  nationalism." — The  Slavo- 
philes and  the  Westerners  in  the  4O-ies. —  Socialism  and 
"left"  Hegelianism. —  Provincial  society  in  the  4O-ies. — 
Sects  during  Nicolas  I. 

CHAPTER  XIX 299 

The  European  revolutions  of  1848  and  their  influence  on 
the  mood  of  Nicolas  I. —  The  third  period  of  his  reign. — 
Foreign  policy. —  The  manifesto  of  March  14,  1848. —  The 
Hungarian  campaign. —  Internal  policy. —  The  peasant  ques- 
tion.—  Measures  against  the  press  and  the  universities. — 
Other  repressions.—  The  dismissal  of  Uvarov. —  Prince 
Shirinsky-Shikhmatov. —  The  position  of  the  Intelligentzia 
after  1848. —  The  circle  of  Petrashevsky. —  Incidents  with 
Samarin,  Aksakov,  Turgeniev,  Dostoievsky. —  The  prohibi- 
tion of  Slavophile  publications. —  The  Kiev  Federalists. —  The 
general  mood  of  the  Intelligentzia. —  The  war  of  1853-56. — 
The  inevitable  crisis. —  The  death  of  Nicolas. —  General  con- 
clusions about  the  reign  of  Nicolas. 


PART  ONE 


MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

CHAPTER  I 

I  SUPPOSE  that  for  every  conscious  man,  whether  he 
adheres  to  the  idealistic  or  to  the  materialistic  point  of 
view,  his  own  life  becomes  meaningful  and  significant 
only  after  he  has  found  for  himself  a  place  in  that  collective 
labour  and  struggle  of  humanity  by  which  "  man  liveth."  Of 
course,  in  defining  one's  place  in  social  life  a  person  is  guided 
primarily  by  the  general  Weltanschauung  he  has  already  formed 
and  adapted.  I  do  not  pretend  to  influence  my  readers  in  this 
respect  in  one  direction  or  another,  but  I  presume  that  it  is  of 
great  value  for  every  man,  even  for  one  with  a  quite  definite  out- 
look upon  life,  to  acquire  a  clear  conception  about  that  historical 
process  in  one  of  whose  stages  he  is  destined  to  live  and  act 
consciously.  I  shall  not  enter  here  into  a  discussion  of  the  role 
of  the  individual  in  history.  However  negligible  this  role  may 
appear  in  the  eyes  of  those  who  profess  the  point  of  view  of 
economic  materialism,  yet,  I  think,  not  even  they  will  deny  the 
need  of  orientation  in  surrounding  phenomena  for  one  who  in- 
tends to  be  a  social  worker  and  a  conscientious  citizen. 

In  order  to  orient  ourselves  in  the  process  of  a  nation's  evolv- 
ing life,  particularly  in  that  stage  of  the  process  in  which  we 
are  to  act,  we  must  clearly  conceive  this  process  by  studying 
all  the  circumstances  amidst  which  it  is  taking  place.  And  one 
can  know  the  circumstances  of  the  evolutionary  process  of  any 
human  society,  naturally,  by  learning  its  history. 

3 


4  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

A  few  words  about  the  contents  of  this  course  and  the  method 
of  its  structure.  Under  the  history  of  Russia,  I  understand 
the  process  of  the  development  of  the  Russian  state.  The  state, 
as  it  is  generally  known,  consists  of  three  elements:  the  terri- 
tory, the  population  settled  in  that  territory,  and  the  supreme 
power  which  unites  the  population  into  a  political  whole.  From 
the  point  of  view  of  political  science  all  these  elements  are  tanta- 
mount and  equivalent  in  the  sense  that  all  of  them  are  equally 
necessary  for  the  formation  of  the  modern  idea  of  state.  But 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  historian  the  inner  significance 
of  the  three  elements  is  far  from  being  homologous.  For  the 
historian  the  subject  of  history  is  always  man,  human  society, 
people.  The  state  itself  is  doubtless  the  product  of  human 
activity,  of  human  life.  It  is  undisputable  that  the  territory 
exists  for  the  population  and  not  vice  versa,  and  at  present  it 
is  likewise  beyond  dispute  that  the  state-power  exists  for  the 
people,  and  not  the  people  for  the  state-power;  furthermore, 
that  the  state-power  is  the  product  of  human  activity  and  life 
in  a  larger  degree  than  is  the  territory;  for  whereas  the  latter 
is  a  self-sufficient  quantity  regardless  of  its  population,  the 
state-power  is  a  direct  product  of  human  activity.  Conse- 
quently for  us  the  subject  of  the  historical  process  expressed  in 
the  creation  and  development  of  a  commonwealth  is  human 
society  —  a  people ;  in  this  case  the  people  that  have  created 
the  Russian  state. 

We  conceive  the  population  composing  a  state  as  a  nation  of 
a  definite  territory  united  by  one  supreme  power.  The  Rus- 
sian state  is  composed,  as  we  know,  not  only  of  Russian  people 
in  the  proper  ethnological  sense  of  the  word,  but  of  a  large  num- 
ber of  tribes  and  nationalities  of  which  some  have  become  partly 
Russified  and  some  have  preserved  their  national  physiognomy 
in  a  more  or  less  full  measure.  On  the  other  hand,  beside  this 
so  to  say  vertical  subdivision  into  races,  the  population  of  the 
Russian  state  may  be  classified  also  horizontally,  into  various 


INTRODUCTION  5 

orders  and  classes,  differing  juridically,  economically,  and  so- 
cially. Finally,  we  must  distinguish  out  of  the  common  na- 
tional mass  the  so-called  intelligentzia,  the  intellectual  body 
composed  of  men  of  various  orders  and  classes,  standing  apart 
by  virtue  of  their  education  and  consciousness  of  ideals  as  well 
as  by  their  aim  not  only  to  build  up  consciously  their  own  life, 
but  to  exercise  their  influence  on  the  life-structure  of  the  whole 
nation  according  to  their  ideas  and  views. 

Concerning  the  vertical  subdivision  of  the  population  (into 
races),  I  must  say  at  the  outset  that  in  this  necessarily  brief 
course  I  shall  not  be  able  to  trace  the  development  of  each 
nationality  separately,  but  shall  expound  mainly  the  history  of 
the  Russian  people,  touching  the  history  of  other  parts  of  the 
population  only  inasmuch  as  certain  events,  problems,  and  proc- 
esses in  the  development  of  particular  nationalities  concern  the 
interests  of  the  Russian  state  in  general.  From  this  point  of 
view  I  shall  discuss  the  general  problem  of  nationalism  and  non- 
Russian  elements  in  the  state,  as  well  as  the  various  local  events, 
conflicts,  and  questions  that  have  arisen  or  developed  during 
the  nineteenth  century  in  the  midst  of  diverse  nationalities. 

As  to  the  horizontal  subdivision  (i.e.,  into  orders,  classes, 
intelligentzia,  etc.),  I  feel  obliged  to  give,  difficult  as  it  may  be, 
a  possibly  full  exposition  of  the  history  of  the  whole  nation,  not 
of  one  class  or  another,  nor  of  the  educated  society  only,  but 
indeed  of  the  entire  people,  else  the  aim  of  my  course,  as  I 
stated  it  in  the  beginning,  would  not  be  attained. 

Such  is  the  subject-matter  of  this  course.  A  question  may 
arise,  whether  I  shall  analyse  the  external  or  the  internal  his- 
tory of  the  Russian  state  and  people;  whether  I  shall  expound 
mainly  the  social,  cultural  history  of  Russia,  or  the  so-to-speak 
external  pragmatic  history  of  the  Russian  state.  Of  what  I 
have  already  said  you  may  probably  expect  an  exposition  not  of 
the  external  history  of  Russia,  but  of  its  social,  cultural,  inner 
history.  This  does  not  mean,  of  course,  that  we  shall  abso- 


6  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

lutely  ignore  the  international  relations  and  situation  of  Russia, 
which  have  always,  and  particularly  in  the  nineteenth  century, 
influenced  to  a  great  extent  the  internal  processes  in  which  we 
are  interested.  It  means  only  that  we  shall  occupy  ourselves 
not  with  battle  courses,  not  with  heroic  deeds  and  biographies 
of  generals,  not  with  the  skill  of  diplomats,  but  with  the  general 
trend  of  world  events  and  with  those  results  that  have  been 
reflected  upon  the  internal  life  of  the  Russian  state.  As  to  the 
socio-political  process  through  which  the  Russian  people  and 
state  have  passed  during  the  nineteenth  century,  we  shall  study 
it  thoroughly  in  all  respects,  i.e.,  in  the  economic,  by  which  I 
have  in  mind  the  development  of  national  wealth  as  well  as  the 
conflict  of  class  interests ;  in  the  political  —  the  history  of  state 
institutions,  of  the  people's  attitude  towards  the  state-power, 
of  the  interrelations  of  orders  and  classes,  and,  in  general,  of 
the  political  evolution  and  struggle;  and  in  the  ideational,  by 
which  I  mean  the  enlightenment-movement  and  the  develop- 
ment of  the  national  ideology.  One  may  conclude  from  the 
aforesaid  that  I  intend  to  give  not  a  pragmatic  (in  the  narrow 
sense  of  the  word)  exposition  of  historical  events  and  of  in- 
dividual acts,  but  a  general  picture  of  the  development  of  cul- 
ture and  socio-political  life  in  Russia  during  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury. Yet  I  must  beg  to  observe  that  although  I  do  not  intend 
to  offer  a  pragmatic  history  proper,  this  course  is  expounded 
not  in  form  of  general  deductions  and  conclusions  in  regard 
to  the  character  and  direction  of  the  forces  active  in  the  process 
under  observation,  but  in  the  form  of  a  minutely  elaborate  pic- 
ture of  the  general  course  of  events,  as  they  have  taken  place 
in  reality.  Hence  I  shall  endeavour  to  relate  clearly  and  spe- 
cifically all  the  big  historical  facts  in  their  chronological  con- 
nection with  reality,  striving  to  clarify  at  the  same  time  their 
interrelation  and  their  role  in  that  socio-political  process  which 
interests  us.  I  should  like,  at  any  rate,  to  give  in  this  course 
not  a  finished  system  of  conclusions,  not  an  established  theory, 


INTRODUCTION  7 

but  chiefly  carefully  studied  facts  and  a  clear  understanding  of 
their  mutual  relation  and  of  their  importance  in  the  develop- 
ment of  Russia. 

Therefore  if  I  should  employ  the  term  "  pragmatic  history  " 
in  a  somewhat  broader  sense,  in  contradistinction  from  that  his- 
tory without  proper  names,  without  events  and  dates,  from  that 
algebraic  history  to  which  some  sociologists  reduce  the  purpose 
of  cultural  history  and  historical  sociology,  then  in  this  ex- 
panded sense  the  exposition  of  my  course  may  be  called  prag- 
matic. I  think  this  inevitable  in  a  case  where  there  are  as  yet 
but  a  few  well-established  data,  and  particularly  where  the 
course  comprises  not  the  history  of  mankind  as  a  whole,  and 
not  even  the  history  of  one  nation  through  all  its  extent,  but  the 
history  of  one  century  of  one  nation. 

Before  approaching  the  history  of  the  nineteenth  century  I 
must  characterise  at  least  in  most  general  terms  the  whole 
socio-political  process  of  Russian  development,  of  which  the 
nineteenth  century  presents  only  one  stage.1 

The  first  nine  centuries  of  Russian  history,  if  we  start  from 
the  early  chronicles  to  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century,  or 
the  first  eleven  centuries,  if  we  reckon  from  the  supposed  be- 
ginning of  the  distribution  of  the  northeastern  Slavic  tribes  (i.e., 
approximately  from  the  seventh  century),  had  been  occupied  in 
the  main  with  the  settling  process  of  the  tribes  that  have  even- 
tually formed  the  Russian  nationality,  and  with  the  formation 
of  a  national  territory.  The  first  historical  data  concerning 
the  origin  of  the  Russian  state  go  back  to  the  ninth  century. 
After  the  centre  of  the  then  political  life  had  been  established 
in  Kiev,  the  Dnieper-Russ  in  the  tenth  century  began  to  blos- 
som luxuriously  as  a  formative  military-commercial  state  which, 

1  For  a  more  detailed  and  thorough  study  of  Russian  political  and 
social  development  I  recommend  two  excellent  works:  V.  O. 
Kluchevsky,  "Course  of  Russian  History"  in  4  parts,  and  P.  N. 
Miliukov,  "History  of  Russian  Culture"  in  3  parts.  (The  first 
work  has  been  translated  by  Hogarth.) 


8  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

as  all  states  of  a  similar  type,  had  based  its  rising  culture  and 
wealth  on  military  plunder,  on  widely  developed  slavery,  and 
on  an  armed,  well-scattered  trade  in  slaves  and  other  objects 
of  military  booty.  But  this  developing  state  was  not  destined 
to  become  a  firm  and  enduring  political  body.  Towards  the 
end  of  the  twelfth  century  under  the  pressure  of  the  steppe- 
invaders,  the  Kiev  principality  fell  into  decay,  and  the  popula- 
tion that  had  peacefully  settled  on  the  banks  of  the  Dnieper 
and  had  attempted  to  establish  there  an  agricultural  state  be- 
came a  prey  of  wild  marauders.  The  constantly  recurring  at- 
tacks of  the  steppe-raiders  caused  the  growing  migration  of  the 
Dnieper-Russians  into  the  Susdal  district  of  the  Volga  and  its 
tributary,  Oka,  where  at  present  we  find  the  provinces  of  Mos- 
cow, Yaroslavl,  Vladimir,  Kostroma,  and  Nizhni-Novgorod. 
There  the  climate  was  more  severe,  and  the  soil  less  fertile, 
but  the  farmer  could  safely  settle  among  the  scattered  peaceful 
Finnish  tribes. 

This  region  had  become,  according  to  the  expression  of  Pro- 
fessor Kluchevsky,  the  cradle  of  the  Great  Russian  tribe  which 
had  formed  during  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  centuries.  In 
the  second  half  of  the  twelfth  century  it  became  the  political 
centre  of  Russian  life,  and  an  attempt  was  even  made  to  create 
a  consolidated  monarchy.  The  attempt  was  undertaken  by 
Prince  Andrey  Bogoliubsky,  and  was  followed  up  by  Vsevolod 
Big  Nest;  both  had  failed,  however.  The  dissensions  of  the 
Princes  had  not  ceased,  Russ  had  not  been  ready  yet  to  accept 
a  monarchical  rule,  and  in  the  meantime  the  Mongols  invaded 
the  land,  which  they  held  for  three  hundred  years.  The  ap- 
panage system  was  firmly  established  in  the  devastated  land 
for  two  centuries,  a  period  of  incessant  strifes  and  internecine 
warfare.  At  the  same  time  the  land  was  constantly  pressed 
and  robbed  by  preying  neighbours:  from  the  east  and  the  south 
the  Tartars,  from  the  northwest,  the  Lithuanians,  the  Poles, 
the  Livonian  Knights,  the  Swedes.  From  the  year  1228  to 


INTRODUCTION  9 

1462,  i.e.,  for  the  period  of  two  hundred  and  thirty-four  years, 
the  land  had  borne,  according  to  Professor  Kluchevsky's  cal- 
culation, ninety  internal  wars  among  the  Princes  and  one  hun- 
dred and  sixty  foreign  invasions.  Yet  during  that  trying  period, 
under  the  shadow  of  the  Tartar  yoke,  the  Great  Russian  tribe 
had  become  definitely  formed  and  strengthened  in  the  incessant 
struggle  with  nature  and  men,  and  synchronously  in  its 
consciousness  had  grown  and  matured  the  need  of  a  firm  and 
single  state-power  which  could  unite  the  people,  and  with  thus 
united  forces  repulse  the  enemies.  For  this  reason  when  after 
a  series  of  favourable  circumstances  the  principality  of  Moscow 
had  succeeded  in  establishing  a  strong  dynasty  capable  of  the 
unification  of  Russia,  all  the  classes  of  society  with  the  higher 
clergy  and  boyars  at  their  head  willingly  upheld  the  ambitions 
of  the  Moscow  Princes.  Ivan  Kalita  and  his  successors  accom- 
plished that  for  which  Andrey  Bogoliubsky  had  striven  in  vain ; 
by  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  century,  at  the  accession  of  Ivan 
III,  there  were  present  in  the  Grand  Principality  of  Moscow 
all  the  elements  of  a  state  united  by  a  strong  single  power,  al- 
though it  had  not  yet  been  completely  free  from  foreign  rule. 

But  that  state,  if  it  was  to  endure  and  grow,  was  confronted 
with  enormous  tasks  that  demanded  for  their  fulfilment  cen- 
turies of  time,  heroic  self-sacrifice,  and  a  tremendous  strain  upon 
all  national  forces.  First  of  all  it  had  to  acquire  complete 
political  independence,  and  to  throw  off  definitely  the  already 
weakened  Tartar  yoke.  The  achievement  of  this  task  was  fa- 
cilitated by  the  internal  dissensions  of  the  Golden  Horde,  which 
finally  brought  its  dissolution. 

Much  more  difficult  was  the  accomplishment  of  the  other 
tasks,  the  consolidation  and  unification  of  the  Russian  lands, 
and  the  strengthening  and  protection  of  the  national  territory. 
Both  aims  were  interdependent,  and  rooted  in  the  consciousness 
of  the  people. 

The  situation  of  the  young  Moscow  state  in  the  fifteenth  cen- 


10  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

tury  was  precarious.  A  glance  at  the  map  will  make  this 
clear.2  From  the  east  and  the  south,  even  after  the  over- 
throw of  the  Tartar  rule,  Moscow  had  been  threatened  by  con- 
stant invasions  and  raids  of  nomad-hordes  which  were  grouped 
after  the  fall  of  the  Golden  Horde  in  three  Tzardoms,  three 
rapacious  restless  nests,  that  of  Kazan,  of  Astrakhan,  and  of 
Crimea.  On  the  west  and  southwest  was  consolidated  at  that 
time  the  strong  kingdom  of  Poland-Lithuania,  which  had  ab- 
sorbed the  remnants  of  the  Dnieper-Russ  and  of  the  West-Russ, 
and  had  threatened  to  swallow  up  the  other  Russian  territories. 
The  frontiers  of  that  formidable  neighbour  almost  touched 
Moscow  in  the  fifteenth  century.  To  the  northwest  of  Mos- 
cow lay  the  dominions  of  its  ardent  foe  and  rival,  the  Grand 
Duke  of  Tver;  on  the  north  the  Moscow  territories  bordered 
and  merged  with  the  territories  and  colonies  of  Great  Lord 
Novgorod,  the  city-republic  in  which  the  masses  strove  for 
union  with  Moscow,  while  the  upper  classes  intrigued  against 
Moscow  with  Lithuania  and  Poland.  Finally  in  the  very  cen- 
tre of  the  Muscovite  state  lay  territories  that  were  appanages 
of  the  Princes  of  Rostov  and  Yaroslav.  These  last  were  peace- 
fully annexed  to  Moscow  by  Ivan  III.  The  enormous  domin- 
ions of  Novgorod,  the  principality  of  Tver,  Pskov,  Oriol,  and 
Riazan  (the  last  as  late  as  1520)  were  ultimately  annexed  after 
stubborn  righting. 

The  Tartar  yoke  was  overthrown  in  1480,  but  the  subjuga- 
tion of  the  Volga-Tartars  took  place  only  in  the  second  half 
of  the  sixteenth  century,  and  up  to  that  time  Ivan  III,  Vassily 
III,  and  Ivan  IV  had  to  undertake  not  less  than  ten  expedi- 
tions against  the  Tzar  of  Kazan  to  keep  off  his  raids.  Kazan 
was  conquered  in  1552,  Astrakhan  in  1556,  but  the  Khan  of 
Crimea  preserved  his  formidable  sway  over  the  whole  south 
of  Russia  until  the  eighteenth  century.  More  than  once  dur- 
ing the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  the  Crimean  Tar- 

2  See  the  map  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 


INTRODUCTION  11 

tars  appeared  at  the  walls  of  Moscow,  on  which  occasions  they 
captured  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  and  women  and  rilled 
the  Eastern  slave-markets  with  Russian  captives. 

The  protection  of  Russian  frontiers  from  Lithuania,  and  the 
reconquest  of  old  Russian  territories  from  Lithuania  and  Po- 
land had  occupied  the  whole  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries,  and  were  properly  accomplished  only  at  the  end  of 
the  eighteenth  century.  During  the  reign  of  Alexis  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  left  shore  of  Ukraina  brought  the  first  long  peace 
with  Poland  (1667);  but  the  ancient  lands  that  had  formed 
parts  of  the  Dnieper-Russ  were  restored  to  Russia  only  after 
the  division  of  Poland  under  Catherine  II.  By  straining  the 
nation's  forces  to  the  uttermost  Peter  the  Great  succeeded  at 
the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century  in  conquering  Lifland, 
Estland,  and  Ingermanland  from  Sweden  and  thus  joined  the 
Baltic  coast  to  Russia.  It  was  only  after  the  conquest  of  Crimea 
and  the  division  of  Poland,  i.e.,  towards  the  end  of  the  eight- 
eenth century,  that  the  tasks  which  were  put  forth  by  the  nat- 
ural course  of  events  in  the  time  of  Ivan  III,  could  be  consid- 
ered accomplished.  Only  since  Russia  had  pushed  its  boundaries 
towards  the  Black  and  the  Caspian  seas  on  the  south  and 
towards  the  Baltic  on  the  west,  could  the  formation  of  the  state 
territory  of  the  great  Tzardom  be  considered  finished,  at  least 
in  its  general  features,  and  there  came  at  last  the  time  when  the 
powers  and  means  of  the  country  could  be  concentrated  toward 
the  satisfaction  of  the  needs  of  the  people  themselves. 

At  what  expense  was  this  formation  of  a  state-territory  ac- 
complished, and  what  were  the  socio-political  consequences  of 
this  centuries-long  process? 

We  know  that  in  modern  times  a  few  months'  warfare  swal- 
lows up  the  budget  of  a  whole  year.  In  the  past  the  state 
budgets  were  not  large,  and  the  governments  did  not  spend  any 
big,  in  the  modern  scale,  sums  for  either  preparation  or  manage- 
ment of  wars;  but  the  very  wars  were  not  less  but  more 


12  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

devastating  and  ruinous  than  those  of  the  present.  Whereas 
now  the  enemy's  attack  is  aimed  mainly  at  armies,  war-vessels, 
and  armed  fortresses,  in  those  days  the  devastation  of  the  land 
was  inevitable,  the  civil  population  suffered  mutilation  and  tor- 
tures and  enslavement,  cattle  were  slaughtered  or  carried  away, 
buildings  were  set  afire,  property  was  destroyed  or  plundered. 
Russ  suffered  such  consequences  of  war  not  only  from  raids 
of  savage  hordes,  not  only  from  Lithuanian  invasions,  but  from 
their  own  Orthodox  Christian  brethren  in  times  of  internecine 
wars  among  the  Princes,  and  especially  during  the  struggles  of 
the  Muscovites  with  their  most  stubborn  opponents,  Tver  and 
Novgorod.  The  annals  of  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centu- 
ries abound  in  descriptions  of  bloody  murders,  atrocities,  and 
systematic  ravages  promulgated  by  the  armies  of  the  Muscovite 
princes  in  the  towns  and  villages  of  the  Grand  Principality  of 
Tver  and  in  the  territories  of  Great  Novgorod,  until  these 
lands  had  finally  been  brought  under  the  dominion  of  the  "  Col- 
lectors of  Russian  Soil."  It  is  needless  to  mention  the  havoc 
and  chastisements  inflicted  by  the  Tartar  invasions  which 
occurred  periodically  during  the  fifteenth,  sixteenth  and  seven- 
teenth centuries,  particularly  on  the  part  of  the  Crimean  Tar- 
tars. The  human  loss  on  battlefields  was  not  so  great  as  the 
loss  in  men,  women,  and  children  who  were  captured  and  sold 
into  slavery  by  the  Mongols.  In  order  to  protect  the  frontiers 
from  the  steppe  hordes  the  Government  had  to  construct  abatis 
and  outposts  for  hundreds  of  versts  along  the  southern  border, 
from  the  shores  of  Oka  and  its  tributaries  about  Riazan  far 
to  the  west.  Beside  this  it  had  to  mobilise  every  spring  thou- 
sands of  soldiers  for  the  defence  of  that  frontier.3  With  the 

3  According  to  the  testimony  of  Fletcher,  the  English  ambassador 
to  Russia  in  the  sixteenth  century,  the  yearly  mobilisation  for  the  south- 
ern frontier  amounted  to  65,000  men.  Professor  Kluchevsky  gives  the 
same  number.  P.  N.  Miliukov  quotes  the  figures  of  the  southern 
army  in  the  seventeenth  century  as  considerably  smaller  than  those  of 
Fletcher.  At  any  rate  the  fact  of  yearly  mobilisations  of  many 


INTRODUCTION  13 

view  of  protection  from  the  steppe  raiders  the  Government  of 
Moscow  built  more  and  more  new  cities,  continuously  pushing 
the  chain  of  outposts  farther  to  the  south,  settling  military  colo- 
nies there  which  were  to  serve  as  a  living  fence.  Thus  the 
colonisation  of  the  fertile  steppe  region  to  the  south  of  Moscow 
went  on.  In  the  same  time  in  the  west  a  stubborn  struggle 
had  taken  place  against  Lithuania,  Poland,  the  Livonian 
Knights,  and  the  Swedes.  From  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  to  the 
end  of  the  sixteenth  century  there  were  three  great  wars  with 
Sweden  and  seven  long  exasperating  wars  with  Poland  and  its 
temporary  ally,  the  Livonian  Order.  These  wars  occupied  on 
the  whole  fifty  years.  According  to  contemporaries  the  num- 
ber of  Russian  men  in  operation  reached  at  times  two  hundred 
to  three  hundred  thousand,  while  the  entire  population  of  the 
Muscovite  state  at  that  time  did  not  exceed  several  million  souls 
of  both  sexes.  National  wealth  was  exclusively  natural,  hence 
a  pecuniary  upkeep  of  the  army  was  out  of  question.  In  the 
words  of  Professor  Kluchevsky,  the  Muscovite  Government 
possessed  a  single  capital  acquired  during  the  "  Collection  of 
Russian  Soil  " —  enormous  stretches  of  land,  partly  peopled  by 
peasants,  partly  waste. 

This  capital  was  put  into  circulation  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  large  "  serving  "  class  which  grew  out  of  proportion.  From 
this  resulted  at  first  the  "  estate  system,"  and  later  the  "  bondage 
system."  *  The  upkeep  of  the  serving  class  had  become  the 
dominant  interest  in  the  Muscovite  state  at  the  expense  of  all 
other  national  interests,  and  it  required  the  sacrifice  of  all  the 

thousands  for  the  protection  of  the  southern  frontier  from  the  Tar- 
tars has  been  documentally  established. 

*  For  the  history  of  the  "  estate "  and  "  bondage "  systems  the 
author  recommends  a  number  of  works  which  are  unfortunately  in- 
accessible to  non-Russian  readers.  The  English  reader  will  find 
helpful  chapters  on  the  question  in  the  first  two  volumes  of  Klu- 
chevsky's  History,  in  the  first  volume  of  J.  Mavor's  "  An  Economic 
History  of  Russia,"  and  in  M.  Kovalevsky's  "  Russian  Political  In- 
stitutions."—  TRANSLATOR. 


H  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

live  forces  of  the  land.  The  inevitable  constant  and  durable 
strain  of  all  the  means  of  the  country  which  was  sparsely  popu- 
lated and  forced  to  protect,  guard,  and  extend  the  already  too 
far  extended  boundaries,  resulted  in  the  compulsion  of  the  whole 
populace  to  bear  state-service  in  one  way  or  another.  The 
idea  of  general  service,  and  its  concomitant  idea  of  "  binding  " 
the  classes,  were  consequences  of  such  a  state  of  affairs.  This 
continuous  mobilisation  of  all  the  national  forces  for  the  forma- 
tion and  strengthening  of  the  state  territory  brought  along 
another  political  result  —  the  enormous  increase  of  the  central 
authority.  Under  the  stress  of  foreign  invasions  and  internal 
strifes  and  dissensions  the  Russian  people  as  far  back  as  in  the 
fourteenth  century  had  extended  a  helping  hand  to  the  Mus- 
covite princes  in  their  struggle  for  a  dictatorship  over  the 
disunited  country.  But  with  the  course  of  events  the  interests 
of  the  central  power  fell  more  and  more  in  line  with  the  inter- 
ests of  the  serving  class,  for  whose  sake  the  supreme  authorities 
did  not  hesitate  to  sacrifice  the  freedom  of  the  peasants.  The 
serving  men  in  their  turn  helped  the  central  power  to  break 
down  the  boyar  class  who  attempted  to  maintain  certain  po- 
litical prerogatives. 

The  larger  part  of  the  arable  soil,  in  the  centre  of  the  state, 
on  the  west,  south,  and  southeast,  had  become  the  possession 
of  the  serving  class,  as  military  benefices  or  as  hereditary  estates. 
In  the  interests  of  this  class  the  peasants  were  gradually  bound 
to  their  land,  and  given  over  to  their  masters  into  personal 
bondage,  partly  in  fact,  and  partly  juridically. 

In  the  meantime  wars  and  military  needs  did  not  diminish, 
but  on  the  contrary  continually  increased.  The  life  and  death 
struggle  with  the  western  neighbours  forced  Russia  to  follow 
closely  their  standard  of  military  organisation.  Expensive  fire- 
arms and  foreign  instructors  had  to  be  imported  in  large  num- 
bers, to  cite  one  instance.  This  sort  of  militarism  demanded 
not  only  the  maintenance  of  the  serving  class,  but  a  consider- 


INTRODUCTION  15 

able  expenditure  of  money,  for  which  again  the  nation's  strength 
had  to  be  strained  to  the  utmost.  In  quest  of  financial  sources 
there  arose  and  gradually  took  root  a  peculiar  fiscal  system 
based  on  the  idea  of  general  tyaglo  or  tax,  which  in  the  absence 
of  local  state  institutions  necessitated  the  mutual  guarantee 
system  within  each  taxable  group,  and  later  the  fixation  of  those 
groups  as  classes  in  the  Muscovite  state.  This  process  took 
place  in  the  rural  as  well  as  in  the  urban  population. 

By  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century  this  process  of 
the  formation  of  state-classes  and  of  the  socio-political  structure 
of  the  Russian  commonwealth  was  practically  accomplished 
in  its  general  features.  At  the  same  time  the  strain  of  the 
national  means  and  forces  had  reached  its  apogee,  though  the 
task  of  fixing  and  strengthening  the  national  territory  was 
far  from  completion.  Until  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury, despite  the  tenacious  struggles,  the  work  of  consolidating 
the  Russian  lands  in  the  west  had  not  progressed,  and  the  west- 
ern frontier  still  remained  extremely  precarious  and  indefinite. 
In  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  the  Muscovite  state 
could  hardly  resist  the  aggressive  moves  of  the  Polish-Lithuanian 
kingdom  and  of  Sweden.  At  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth 
century  by  the  peace  of  Stolbovsk  the  outlet  into  the  Baltic  Sea 
was  affixed  to  Sweden,  and  this  at  the  time  when  Russian  over- 
sea commerce  had  become  especially  important  and  was  badly 
needed,  since  the  natural  wealth  could  no  longer  satisfy  the 
growing  needs  of  the  state. 

Towards  the  time  of  the  reign  of  Peter  the  Polish-Lithuanian 
kingdom,  owing  to  internal  causes,  had  begun  to  lose  its  power, 
and  thus  Russia  was  enabled  to  concentrate  its  western  forces 
on  the  struggle  with  Sweden.  This  struggle,  lasting  two 
whole  decades  and  complicated  by  a  hard  war  with  Turkey, 
almost  drained  the  nation. 

Peter  finally  succeeded  in  fulfilling  his  task,  or  rather  the 
task  bequeathed  to  him  by  the  preceding  centuries:  Sweden 


16  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

was  defeated,  Ingria,  Korelia,  and  Estland,  conquered  by  Ivan 
III  and  subsequently  lost  by  Ivan  IV,  were  reannexed  together 
with  Lifland,  thus  giving  Russia  the  coveted  outlet  to  the  Bal- 
tic. Petersburg  was  founded.  Russia,  hardly  known  to  the 
West  in  the  time  of  Ivan  III,  became  a  European  Power,  while 
its  ancient  rival,  Poland,  descended  to  the  degree  of  a  second- 
rate  state  patronised  by  its  neighbours  and  rent  by  internal  dis- 
sensions. 

Peter's  success  in  his  conflict  with  Sweden  has  borne  enor- 
mous consequences  for  Russia,  but  that  success  was  gained  at 
a  terrible  price.  According  to  Miliukov,  Russia  paid  for  her 
promotion  to  a  European  Power  with  the  ruination  of  the 
country.  Indeed  such  an  impoverishment,  such  a  drainage  of 
national  means  and  sources,  Russia  had  not  experienced  even 
during  the  Interregnum  period.5  For  the  war,  for  the  con- 
struction of  Petersburg,  for  the  building  of  the  navy,  there  were 
needed  not  only  enormous  financial  means,  but  also  men.  Long 
before  —  early  in  the  seventeenth  century,  the  forces  of  the  serv- 
ing class  proving  insufficient  for  carrying  on  the  struggle  with 
the  western  neighbours,  standing  regiments  were  formed  of 
the  Streltzy  (musketeers),  and  later  Reiter  (cavalry)  and  dra- 
goons, and  artillery  of  a  foreign  model.  These  armies  were 
composed  not  only  of  the  nobility  and  their  retinues,  but 
also  of  new  cadres  specially  recruited  from  the  population  in 
time  of  war.  Under  Peter,  beginning  with  1701,  the  recruit- 
ments had  become  a  yearly  contribution  of  the  people,  not  only 
for  the  ranks  of  the  reformed  army,  but  also  for  the  construc- 
tion of  Petersburg  and  for  other  state  works.  These  recruit- 
ments and  the  enormously  increased  taxes  were  responsible  for 
the  fact  that  during  the  period  of  time  between  the  eighties 
of  the  seventeenth  century  and  the  twenties  of  the  next  century 
one-fifth  of  Russian  households  disappeared.  One  part  of 

8  From  the  death  of  Boris  Godunov  — 1605  —  to  the  accession  of  the 
first  Romanov  —  in  1613. —  TRANSLATOR. 


INTRODUCTION  17 

this  unusual  human  loss  was  a  direct  victim  of  war,  another 
part  consisted  of  those  who  fled  from  the  burden  of  unbearable 
taxation.  It  is  possible,  even  probable,  that  the  actual  depopu- 
lation during  those  thirty  years  was  less ;  a  part  of  the  dissolved 
households  had  doubtless  been  somehow  redistributed  among 
the  remaining  households,  but  at  any  rate  the  fact  of  the 
destruction  of  twenty  per  cent,  of  those  units  is  beyond  ques- 
tion. 

Peter's  government  had  simultaneously  to  fight  his  enemies 
and  to  preserve  the  land  from  total  ruination.  It  had  to 
sharpen  its  wits  in  hunting  the  fugitive  citizen  who  tried  to 
evade  the  immense  state  burdens,  and  at  the  same  time  it  had 
to  seek  means  for  the  upholding  and  developing  of  industry 
and  trade  in  the  impoverished  country.  In  the  first  decade  of 
the  eighteenth  century  two  hundred  thousand  labour-men  were 
drawn  out  of  the  sparse  population,  and  at  least  half  of  them 
had  perished.  The  state  budget  exceeded  many  times  that  of 
the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century,  and  three  quarters  of  it 
went  for  the  upkeep  of  the  army  and  navy,  while  all  the  other 
needs  of  the  great  state  had  to  be  satisfied  with  the  remaining 
one-fourth.  All  the  poll-taxes  from  the  non-exempt  classes, 
which  at  that  time  formed  the  lion's  share  of  the  state  income, 
were  exclusively  spent  on  the  maintenance  of  the  army;  all  the 
indirect  taxes,  on  the  navy  expenditures.  In  his  struggle  with 
fugitives  and  evaders  Peter  had  definitely  fixed  the  bondage 
system,  and  had  equalised  the  bonded  peasants  with  the  Khol- 
cpy*  while  the  brunt  of  the  heavy  military  duty  was  borne  no 
longer  by  the  serving  class  alone,  but  by  the  tax-paying  popula- 
tion. Military  service  had  become  an  additional  heavy  burden 
on  the  back  of  the  people. 

Such  was  the  strain  of  national  resources  under  Peter.  Yet 
his  success  proved  permanent.  In  spite  of  the  profligacy  and 
disorderliness  of  his  incapable  and  casual  successors  up  to  Cath- 

6  Personal  property  of  the  owner,  practically  slaves. — TRANSLATOR. 


18  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

erine  II,  and  owing  to  a  large  extent  to  happy  conjectures  in 
foreign  affairs,  the  national  borders  established  by  Peter  re- 
mained and  even  somewhat  extended  to  the  south  and  south- 
west. 

By  the  time  of  Catherine  II  Poland  was  quite  ripe  for 
dissolution,  and  Russia  received  without  much  effort  not  only 
the  ancient  regions  that  had  formed  parts  of  Dnieper-Russ,  but 
also  Lithuania  and  Curland.  Turkey  likewise  grew  steadily 
weaker,  and  after  two  successful  wars  Russia  conquered  at 
length  Crimea,  its  old  menace,  and  the  northern  coast  of  the 
Black  Sea.  On  the  southwest  its  border  line  was  the  river 
Dniester,  on  the  south,  the  Black  Sea,  on  the  southwest,  the 
rivers  Kuban  and  Terek.  The  international  situation  of  the 
great  empire  was  mightier  and  more  brilliant  than  that  of  any 
contemporary  European  Power. 

The  task  of  forming  and  strengthening  the  national  terri- 
tory, which  had  stood  before  the  Russian  nation  since  Ivan  III 
and  which  had  absorbed  and  drained  all  its  forces  and  means 
during  many  centuries,  could  at  length  be  considered  accom- 
plished. 

That  moment  appeared  to  be  the  turning  point  in  the  develop- 
ment of  Russia.  A  quite  new  historical  process  began  and 
with  it  modern  Russian  history.  If  before  Catherine  the  main 
slogan  of  the  state-power  had  been  the  consolidation  of  the  old 
lands,  the  protection  of  the  national  territory,  and  the  imperial 
aggrandisement,  during  her  reign  new  tendencies  appeared  in  the 
consciousness  of  the  nation  and  of  the  Government  itself.  The 
chief  aim  of  the  state  was  no  longer  the  expansion  of  the  coun- 
try, but  the  well-being  of  the  subjects.  Catherine  definitely 
formulated  that  principle  at  her  very  accession  to  the  throne. 
In  her  desire  to  acquire  the  love  and  loyalty  of  her  subjects 
she  declared  in  one  manifest  after  another  her  intention  to  de- 
vote all  her  time  and  energy  to  the  improvement  of  internal 
conditions  rather  than  to  promote  external  grandeur. 


INTRODUCTION  19 

We  may  regard  critically  the  fulfilment  of  her  promises, 
though  it  is  impossible  to  deny  the  great  cultural  importance 
of  her  reign,  but  it  is  worth  noticing,  at  any  rate,  the  change 
in  the  formulation  of  the  fundamental  state  problems. 

Under  Peter  all  national  forces  were  still  directed  toward 
territorial  formation;  from  Catherine  on  problems  of  national 
welfare,  of  material  and  spiritual  well-being,  were  moved  to  the 
foreground.  Alongside  with  these  began  the  gradual  unbind- 
ing of  the  classes  that  had  been  bound  during  the  territorial 
struggles.  The  process  of  unbinding  was  slow  and  long,  grow- 
ing complicated  and  obstructed  by  a  mass  of  concomitant  phe- 
nomena and  circumstances,  but  it  began  at  once,  as  soon  as  there 
came  a  possibility  of  releasing  the  strain  of  the  nation's  forces  in 
the  incessant  struggle  for  territory.  Then,  concurrently  with 
the  unbinding  of  classes  began  the  general  liberation  of  the  peo- 
ple from  oppression  and  burdens  that  had  been  accumulated 
through  centuries  of  tension,  and  finally  the  gradual  loosening 
of  the  basis  of  the  supreme  dictatorship,  which  originated  in  the 
time  of  the  Muscovite  Tzars  owing  to  the  constant  perils  of 
struggle. 

This  complex  process  of  the  unbinding  of  classes,  of  the  lib- 
eration of  the  people,  and  of  the  relaxation  of  the  monarchical 
power,  becomes  the  history  of  Russia  in  the  nineteenth  century. 
Its  culmination  is  taking  place  in  our  own  days,  but  its  starting 
point  belongs  to  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  to  the  mo- 
ment when  the  lasting  struggle  for  the  formation  of  the  national 
territory  came  to  an  end. 

At  first  the  questions  of  popular  welfare  and  enlightenment 
came  to  the  front.  In  fact  those  questions  were  not  new. 
The  idea  of  the  nation's  welfare  and  even  of  its  enlightenment 
was  not  foreign  to  the  pre-Petrine  Muscovite  governments, 
but  this  idea  was  completely  pushed  to  the  background 
by  current  urging  needs  in  the  tense  struggle  for  territory. 

We  should  be  quite  unjust  to  Peter  if  we  did  not  acknowledge 


20  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

that  he  was  particularly  interested  in  the  weal  and  education 
of  his  people.  But  that  mighty  titan,  engulfed  more  than  any 
of  his  predecessors  in  territorial  struggle,  was  able  to  give  but 
little  attention  to  popular  needs,  and  even  that  by  fits  and 
starts.  Owing  to  the  demands  and  exactions  of  the  exhaust- 
ing, all  absorbing  struggle,  the  questions  of  internal  welfare 
had  in  his  eyes  a  dependent,  subservient  importance.  Hence 
even  those  measures  which  he  undertook  for  the  encouragement 
of  commerce  and  industry,  and  for  the  dissemination  of  educa- 
tion, had  an  official,  technical  character.  The  Petrine  factories 
and  foundries  served  in  the  main  fiscal  interests,  and  produced 
primarily  things  that  were  needed  for  the  equipment  of  the 
army  and  navy.  The  Petrine  schools  were  chiefly  professional, 
technical,  e.g.,  those  of  navigation,  of  artillery,  of  engineering, 
and  the  lower  "  cipher  "  schools.  Even  the  Theological  Acad- 
emy he,  evidently,  had  intended  to  turn  into  a  peculiar  poli- 
technicum  which  would  furnish  men  for  clerical  service,  for 
civil  offices,  and  for  military,  architectural,  and  medical  pro- 
fessions. 

Under  Catherine  the  questions  of  common  weal  and  enlight- 
enment were  placed  in  principle  above  all  other  tasks.  Unfor- 
tunately common  weal  was  conceived  in  a  quite  peculiar  way; 
in  its  conception  one  felt  the  influence  of  the  preceding  his- 
torical process  under  which  the  socio-political  structure  of  the 
nation  had  been  formed.  Moreover,  Catherine  herself  per- 
haps exaggerated  her  dependence  on  the  nobility  who  had  ele- 
vated her  to  the  throne  and  whose  support  she  sought  and  main- 
tained. For  this  reason  she  was  bound  to  regard  the  problems 
of  popular  welfare  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  nobles,  which 
view  she  skilfully  tried  to  combine  with  the  theoretical  teach- 
ings borrowed  from  the  coryphaei  of  European  political  thought 
in  the  eighteenth  century.  In  the  first  years  of  her  reign  Cath- 
erine dreamt  somewhat  naively  to  establish,  in  her  expres- 


INTRODUCTION  21 

sion,  the  "  beatitude  "  of  the  people  by  the  aid  of  a  rational 
legislation.  In  her  summons  to  the  famous  Legislative  Com- 
mission she  outlined  a  programme  of  an  all-embracing  national 
reorganisation  along  lines  chiefly  adapted  from  Montesquieu  and 
Beccaria. 

No  direct  results  followed  from  the  work  of  that  Commis- 
sion which  was  dissolved  one  year  and  a  half  after  its  assem- 
bling, and  Catherine,  disappointed  in  the  possibility  of  promul- 
gating the  grand  reform  in  that  way,  made  use  of  the 
Commission's  discussions  that  reflected  the  opinions  of  various 
groups  of  the  population,  and  started  on  the  way  of  partial 
solution  of  separate  internal  problems.  She  had  endeavoured 
to  establish  legal  principles  in  the  life  of  the  people,  in  the 
relations  of  the  classes  to  one  another  and  to  the  Government, 
and  her  legislators  codified  for  the  first  time  the  principle  of 
personal  and  property  security  of  the  citizens. 

Catherine  succeeded  in  carrying  through  some  measures  for 
the  protection  of  public  health  and  for  the  security  of  public 
alimentation.  Finally  she  succeeded  in  seriously  stimulating 
the  work  of  popular  enlightenment  and  in  placing  on  a  firm 
basis  the  internal  organisation  of  the  classes  and  the  formation 
of  local  administrations  in  the  provinces  and  districts. 

The  class-unbinding  began  from  the  nobility,  and  owing  to 
the  actual  prevalence  of  that  class  no  practical  measures  were 
undertaken  for  the  unbinding  of  the  peasants,  but  on  the  con- 
trary the  legal  condition  of  the  peasants  on  the  nobles'  estates 
grew  worse,  and  the  bondage-right  reached  its  culminating  point. 
Yet  at  the  same  time  the  abnormality  of  the  bondage  system 
was  admitted  in  principle,  and  it  was  then  that  the  idea  of 
serf -liberation  began  to  circulate  publicly,  not  without  the  in- 
fluence of  the  Empress.  The  abolition  of  excessive  repressions 
and  regulations  in  regard  to  commerce  and  industry,  and 
the  granting  of  civil  rights  and  guarantees  to  the  third  estate, 


22  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

were  also  ripening  during  that  period.  Towards  the  end  of 
Catherine's  reign  the  status  and  general  tendencies  of  the  fur- 
ther development  of  the  Russian  state  and  people  were  marked 
in  quite  definite  features. 


CHAPTER  II 

UNABLE  to  trace  here  in  detail  the  development  of  Rus- 
sia under  Catherine,  I  shall  endeavour  only  to  formu- 
late in  brief  terms  the  conditions  of  the  country  at  the 
time  of  Catherine's  death,  i.e.,  at  the  very  end  of  the  eighteenth 
century. 

The  state  boundaries  differed  from  those  of  the  present  day 
only  in  these  instances:  of  Finland  not  more  than  the  province 
of  Viborg  formed  a  part  of  the  Russian  Empire;  the  kingdom 
of  Poland  proper  had  not  yet  belonged  to  the  tzars;  Bessarabia 
was  still  a  Turkish  possession ;  of  the  Caucasus  the  province  of 
Stavropol  and  parts  of  the  districts  of  Kuban  and  Terek  be- 
longed to  Russia;  the  Central  Asiatic  possessions  and  the  Amur 
region  were  not  conquered  till  far  into  the  nineteenth  century. 
Thus  the  territory  of  European  Russia  included  all  the  ancient 
Russ-lands  for  which  centuries  of  struggle  had  taken  place,  and 
its  well-protected  boundaries  expanded  northward,  westward, 
and  southward  to  four  seas  that  wash  the  shores  of  the  Rus- 
sian plain  in  Europe. 

The  international  position  of  Russia  was  such  that  not  only 
could  no  anxiety  arise  concerning  the  safety  of  its  frontiers, 
but,  enjoying  the  status  of  a  great  Power  and  exploiting  the 
weakness  of  its  neighbours,  the  Empire  was  able  to  wield  a  tre- 
mendous influence  upon  the  international  relations  of  the  whole 
civilised  world.  During  the  second  half  of  her  reign  Catherine 
occupied  herself  with  definite  plans  for  the  expulsion  of  the 
Turk  from  Europe  and  the  restoration  of  the  Greek  Empire; 
the  imperial  crown  was  to  be  placed  on  the  head  of  Catherine's 
grandson,  Constantine. 

23 


24  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

From  the  economic  viewpoint  Catherine's  territorial  acquisi- 
tions had  an  enormous,  one  may  say  a  colossal,  significance  for 
the  future  development  of  Russia.  The  conquest  of  black-soil 
expanses  in  the  south  and  southwest,  and  the  resultant  estab- 
lishment of  perfect  safety  on  the  southern  frontier  and  the  in- 
tensive colonization  of  those  lands,  have  brought  a  new  factor 
of  great  importance  into  the  economic  state  of  the  country. 

Thenceforward  Russia  became  an  agricultural  country  not 
only  by  name,  but  one  of  Europe's  granaries,  in  fact.  In- 
deed, already  in  1779  the  corn  export  from  the  chief  ports  (ex- 
cept those  of  Ostsee,  i.e.,  the  Baltic)  exceeded  the  export  of 
1776  more  than  ten  times.  In  spite  of  the  rapid  spread  of  agri- 
culture in  the  South,  the  prices  on  grain  remained  quite  firm, 
owing  to  the  development  of  the  grain-trade,  which  circum- 
stance in  its  turn  encouraged  further  growth  of  agriculture  in 
the  South  simultaneously  with  its  increasing  colonization. 

As  to  means  of  communication,  of  great  importance  in  the 
eighteenth  century  had  been  the  waterways,  particularly  the 
canals  that  connected  the  river-systems,  two  of  which  —  the 
Vyshnevolotzk  and  the  Ladoga  —  had  been  constructed  under 
Peter.  Catherine  had  considerably  improved  the  Vyshnevolotzk 
system  connecting  Volga  with  the  Baltic  Sea.  Other  canals 
planned  and  partly  opened  during  her  reign,  as  those  of  Siask, 
Novgorod,  Beresina,  Schluesselburg,  the  Oginsky,  and  Maryin- 
sky,  were  completed  under  Paul  and  Alexander  in  the  nine- 
teenth century.1 

The  population,  whose  decrease  was  reported  after  the  first 
census  in  1724,  grew  continually  in  the  second  half  of  the 
eighteenth  century  when  the  strain  for  territorial  struggle  had 

1  The  adequate  work  of  increasing  and  improving  the  water-ways  be- 
gan properly  in  1782,  when  by  the  advice  of  Sivers  a  special  body  of 
hydraulicians  was  established  in  the  department  of  water-way  com- 
munications. Cf.  the  historical  sketch  of  the  development  of  that  de- 
partment for  the  century  (1798-1898)  issued  in  Petrograd  by  the  Min- 
istry of  Ways  of  Communications  in  1898. 


GROWTH  OF  THE  POPULATION  25 

ceased.  In  1763  (the  third  census)  the  population  of  both 
sexes  did  not  exceed  twenty  million;  at  the  end  of  Catherine's 
reign  the  same  regions  had  twenty-nine  million,  and  with  the 
newly  acquired  territories  the  total  population  amounted  to 
thirty-six  million  (according  to  the  figures  of  Academic 
Storch).  The  racial  composition  of  the  nation  was  even  then 
quite  varicoloured,  if  we  may  judge  by  the  description  of  Rus- 
sian nationalities  in  those  days  made  by  a  contemporary, 
Georgy,  who  gave  no  numbers,  however,  nor  information  about 
the  degree  of  Russification  in  one  case  or  another.  Certainly 
the  numerical  prevalence  of  Russians,  even  of  the  Great  Rus- 
sian tribe,  was  more  decisive  at  that  time  than  now,  for  the 
Empire  had  not  yet  absorbed  the  populations  of  Poland,  the 
Caucasus,  Finland,  and  Bessarabia.  Catherine  favoured  foreign 
immigration  and  encouraged  the  colonization  of  New  Russia 
and  the  Saratov  province  by  Germans  and  western  and  south- 
ern Slavs.  She  issued  about  fifty  ukases  inviting  back  Russian 
fugitives  who  had  fled  abroad  on  account  of  religious  persecu- 
tions and  other  oppressions;  on  their  return  and  settlement  they 
received  considerable  privileges. 

In  regard  to  the  order-  and  class-composition  of  the  popula- 
tion, we  may  form  some  idea  from  the  figures  worked  out  by 
Academic  Storch  on  the  basis  of  the  fourth  census,  1783.  The 
male  population  in  Russia,  not  counting  that  of  the  then  con- 
quered provinces,  amounted  to  12,838,529  souls.2  Of  them: 

Landowners'  private  peasants 6,678,239 

State-peasants    4,674,603  I        ~ 

One-yarders  [Free-holders]  and  freedmen..    773,6565  5l 

Burghers    293>743 

Merchants    107,408 

Tax-exempted,  i.e.,  nobles,  clergy,  and  state-officials..      310,880 


12,838,529  males. 


2  Till  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  census  considered  only 
the  male  population,  since  the  Government  was  interested  in  the  num- 


26  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

Total  rural  population  12,126,498  or  94.5  per  cent. 

Total  urban  population 401,151  or     3.1  per  cent. 

Total  privileged  classes  310,880  or    2.4  per  cent. 

Of  the  rural  population  about  45  per  cent,  were  state-peas- 
ants and  one-yarders  (free-holders),  and  about  55  per  cent, 
landowners'  bondage-peasants.  The  development  of  the  serf- 
dom-institution reached  at  that  time  its  climax.  Legally  the 
serfs  had  no  rights  whatever.  The  landowners  concentrated 
in  their  hands  not  only  the  right  to  dispense  freely  with  the 
labour  of  their  bonded-peasants,  whom  they  could  transfer  from 
the  soil  to  house-service,  could  sell  singly  and  with  the  families, 
could  lend  to  others  into  service,  whose  status  they  could  change, 
assigning  them  to  factories,  etc.;  they  also  had  the  power  to 
punish  them:  by  putting  them  into  domestic  or  other  prisons, 
by  appointing  them  to  perform  some  extra  work,  and  by  in- 
flicting upon  them  corporal  punishment  (rods,  whips,  knuts) 
for  relatively  unimportant  transgressions  and  even  just  for 
"  insolent "  behaviour. 

From  the  time  of  Empress  Elizabeth,  landowners  were  per- 
mitted to  hand  over  their  "  insolent  "  serfs  to  the  Government 
for  exile  to  Siberia.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however  terrible  that 
word  may  sound  to  us,  to  many  serfs  the  exile  appeared  as  a 
liberation  from  unendurable  suffering.  But  under  Catherine 
the  landowners  were  allowed  to  exile  their  serfs  to  hard-labour 
prisons  as  well.  The  masters  had  from  old  days  appropriated 
the  right  to  interfere  with  the  family  life  of  their  serfs,  to 
marry  them  by  force,  to  dispense  with  their  property.  Abuses 
and  maltreatment  reached  unbelievable  dimensions.  At  the 
same  time  the  serfs  were  forbidden  to  complain  against  their 
masters,  except  in  cases  of  state  treason.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  serfs  did  not  quietly  accept  such  a  state  of  affairs,  and  they 
reacted  to  their  most  heavy  oppressions,  not  only  by  sending 

her  of  taxpayers  exclusively.    We  can  only  approximately  construct  the 
total  number  of  the  population  by  multiplying  the  given  figures  by  two. 


THE  SERFS  27 

complaints  to  the  Government,  but  also  by  uprisings,  assassina- 
tions of  landowners  and  their  managers,  and  by  flights.  At 
times,  particularly  at  every  accession  of  a  new  monarch,  ru- 
mours circulated  among  the  peasants  about  fantastic  liberation- 
ukases;  then  the  unrest  would  embrace  considerable  territories, 
and  would  only  be  quelled  by  military  repressions,  executions, 
whipping,  and  exile. 

At  Catherine's  accession  about  150,000  peasants  took  part 
in  disturbances.  But  the  chief  elemental  and  formidable  pro- 
test against  serfdom,  which  grew  to  enormous  dimensions 
threatening  the  existence  of  the  state,  burst  out  in  1773  in  the 
Pugachov-insurrection. 

The  condition  of  the  serfs  depended  upon  whether  they  were 
barshchina-peasants  or  obrok-pay'mg  peasants.  The  first  had  to 
do  obligatory  labour  for  the  lord,  usually  three  days  in  the 
week.  But  this  custom  had  not  become  a  law  until  the  time 
of  Paul  I,  and  in  some  cases  the  masters  exacted  from  their 
serfs  more  than  three  days  labour.  Besides  the  field-work  the 
peasant  had  to  perform  various  winter  services  for  his  owner, 
and  paid  natural  tribute  in  the  form  of  fowls,  sheep,  pigs,  ber- 
ries, and  mushrooms,  while  the  women  had  to  bring  a  certain 
amount  of  flax  and  hemp  yarn  and  texture,  and  even  home- 
spun cloth. 

On  the  o£ro£-estates  the  entire  plough-land,  and  at  times 
also  the  forest,  were  given  over  to  the  peasant  community 
who  were  obliged  to  pay  a  certain  amount  of  money  or  kind 
according  to  the  arbitrary  will  of  the  owner.  The  obrok-peas- 
ants  were  better  off  than  their  barshchina-brothers,  for,  al- 
though they  had  to  pay  very  often  exorbitant  tribute,  they 
enjoyed  a  certain  degree  of  freedom  and  self-government.  By 
the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  number  of  o£ro£-estates 
had  increased  in  connection  with  the  development  of  industry 
and  commerce,  so  that  in  the  northern,  not  black-soil  provinces, 
they  exceeded  half  of  the  estates,  amounting  in  the  province 


28  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

of  Yaroslavl  to  78  per  cent.,  in  Nizhni-Novgorod  to  82  per 
cent.,  in  Kostroma  to  85  per  cent.,  in  Vologda  to  83  per  cent. ; 
while  in  the  fertile  black-soil  region  their  number  was  very 
slight  and  did  not  exceed  8  per  cent,  in  the  governments  of 
Kursk  and  Tula. 

The  state-peasants  presented  a  variegated  mass.  Not  less 
than  two-sevenths  of  them  were  formerly  church-peasants  who 
were  secularised  and  managed  by  an  Economic  Collegium,  for 
which  reason  they  had  been  known  as  Economical  peasants. 
About  one-seventh  of  the  state-peasants  constituted  the  Court- 
serfs.  Catherine  had  considerably  improved  their  lot  by  sup- 
planting barshchina  with  obrok  in  the  court  estates,  the  pay- 
ments being  made  quite  moderate;  they  had  another  advantage 
over  landowners'  peasants  in  that  they  could  not  be  sold  with- 
out their  soil.  At  the  beginning  of  Catherine's  reign  there 
were  in  the  northern,  central,  and  eastern  provinces  over  half 
a  million  male  state-peasants,  including  the  so-called  "  Tzar's 
peasants"  (about  62,000),  who  belonged  to  various  members 
of  the  Imperial  family,  and  the  "  Stable  peasants,"  who  per- 
formed very  hard  labour  for  the  court  stables. 

Then  followed  the  groups  of  the  Fiscal  peasants,  whose 
labour  was  exploited  for  various  state  needs.  There  were 
about  330,000  male  persons  assigned  to  factories,  state  (241,- 
253)  and  private  (70,965).  They  were  known  as  "  Posses- 
sional  peasants,"  and  they  carried  on  a  vigorous  fight  for  their 
privileges  as  compared  with  the  bonded  peasants.  The  factory 
owners  strove  to  enslave  not  only  the  "  ascribed  "  peasants, 
but  even  the  free,  hired  labourers.  In  the  same  class  we 
must  consider  the  peasants  ascribed  to  the  admiralty  forests 
(112,357)  and  the  coachmen  (about  50,000)  who  were 
settled  at  important  highways  for  the  maintenance  of  post- 
stations. 

All  these  groups  of  Fiscal  peasants,  though  not  bonded  pri- 
vate slaves  in  the  sense  that  they  could  not  be  sold  without 


THE  PEASANTS  29 

soil,  still  were  state-serfs  by  the  character  of  their  rights  and 
labour. 

A  greater  freedom  and  independence  among  the  Fiscal  peas- 
ants was  enjoyed  by  the  "  black-ploughmen  "  in  the  North,  who 
paid  the  state  definite  money-obroks  and  taxes,  and  filled  certain 
natural  obligations  of  a  public  nature;  they  had  a  compara- 
tively broad  form  of  self-government.  In  the  seventies  of  the 
eighteenth  century  there  were  more  than  627,000  such  peas- 
ants. Another  free  group  of  rural  population  in  the  South 
and  in  some  central  provinces  presented  the  "  Freeholders " 
and  the  "  Old  service  serving  people,"  who  were  not  only 
free  from  bondage,  but  at  times  possessed  bonded  serfs.  They 
were  formed  from  among  the  lower  ranks  of  those  who  had 
borne  frontier  service  for  the  Muscovite  state  and  had  re- 
ceived in  possession  small  portions  of  free  land.  Storch  placed 
their  figures,  together  with  the  figures  of  some  other  free  rural 
groups  of  an  indefinite  character,  close  to  773,656  males  at 
the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  total  number  of  peasants  in 
the  eighteenth  century  amounted  to  about  94.5  per  cent,  of  the 
population.  For  this  reason  Russia  has  of  old  been  known  as 
an  exclusively  agricultural  country.  But  this  definition  cannot 
be  accepted  without  some  reserve  for  the  eighteenth  century. 
The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  not  all  persons  classed  as  peasants 
were  agriculturists.  First  of  all  we  must  exclude  not  less  than 
10  per  cent,  of  peasants  of  the  Fiscal  groups,  who  were  as- 
cribed to  various  factories;  then  the  o£ro£-peasants,  who 
formed  at  least  one-half  of  the  landowners,'  court-,  and  Eco- 
nomical peasants,  could  not  be  considered  as  pure  agriculturists, 
since  a  large  part  of  them,  especially  in  the  industrial,  not 
black-soil  provinces,  did  not  earn  a  living  from  agriculture. 
Finally  various  branches  of  home-industry  were  considerably 
developed  even  among  the  agricultural  population  in  certain 
regions.  Generally  speaking,  commerce  and  small  industry  had 


30  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

been  very  popular  in  the  Muscovite  state  as  well  as  in  Imperial 
Russia;  until  the  acquisition  and  settlement  of  the  black-soil 
South  the  grain  produced  in  the  original  Russian  provinces 
was  hardly  sufficient  for  the  provision  of  the  local  population. 

The  eighteenth  century  marked  a  considerable  growth  of 
the  urban  population  which  had  developed  rather  slowly  up  to 
that  time.  Whereas  from  1630  to  1724,  i.e.,  for  almost  a  whole 
century,  the  number  of  city-dwellers  increased  from  292,000  to 
328,000,  in  the  period  between  1724  and  1796  the  number  in- 
creased almost  four  times,  reaching  1,301,000.  The  merchant- 
class  that  formed  a  part  of  the  urban  population  had  also  in- 
creased, consisting  of  240,000  members  towards  the  end  of 
Catherine's  reign;  their  business  had  grown  complex  and  large 
in  view  of  the  development  of  industry  and  foreign  trade.  In 
pre-Petrine  Russ  there  hardly  existed  any  factories  or  big  in- 
dustry; the  largest  transactions  consisted  in  buying  up  and  re- 
selling the  products  of  small  kustarny-industry  (home  work). 
Under  Peter  the  Government  gave  a  mighty  stimulus  for  the 
development  of  factories  and  mills  which  were  necessary  for 
the  production  of  army  and  navy  equipment.  The  Government 
founded  factories  and  assigned  to  them  peasants  who  became 
the  property  of  the  factory-owners,  even  if  the  latter  were  not 
of  noble  origin.  (Only  nobles  were  allowed  to  own  serfs. — 
TR.)  Later  the  factories,  together  with  the  ascribed  working- 
men  established  by  the  Government,  were  given  over  to  private 
persons. 

Considerable  capital  accumulated  earlier  through  commerce 
was  attracted  by  Peter  towards  manufacturing  industry'.  Al- 
though Catherine  in  her  desire  to  favour  the  nobility  patronised 
small  industry,  factories  grew  rapidly  during  her  reign  and 
made  use  of  free  hired  workers  alongside  with  the  ascribed 
peasants.  The  nobles  were  hostile  to  this  development.  It 
was  to  their  interest  to  uphold  the  small  peasant  industry  and 
commerce  which  enabled  them  to  draw  enormous  obroks  from 


MANUFACTURING  INDUSTRIES  31 

their  peasants.  In  the  commission  appointed  by  Catherine  for 
the  discussion  of  this  question  the  struggle  between  the  two 
classes  burst  forth  for  the  first  time.  Ultimately  the  nobles, 
with  the  aid  of  the  Empress,  prevailed  against  the  merchants. 
The  Government  began  to  observe  strictly  that  the  merchants 
should  not  possess  peasants  illegally;  while  the  nobles  began 
to  build  their  own  factories  based  exclusively  on  bondage- 
labour. 

The  number  of  factories  and  mills  increased  from  984  to 
3,161  (not  counting  the  mines)  under  Catherine,  according  to 
Tugan-Baranovsky.  The  figures  of  Lappo-Danilevsky,  on  the 
other  hand,  show  that  their  number  grew  from  500  to  2,000 
during  her  reign.  At  any  rate  the  number  of  the  most  im- 
portant factories  and  mills  increased  not  less  than  40  per  cent. 
The  foreign  trade  was  greatly  enhanced  by  the  abolition  of 
various  limitations  and  regulations  introduced  in  the  first  half 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  also  by  the  opening  of  credit  associa- 
tions, by  the  development  of  merchant  marines,  establishment 
of  consulates  abroad,  and  by  the  conclusion  of  foreign  trade- 
agreements.  The  export  grew  from  thirteen  million  to  fifty- 
seven  million  rubles,  and  the  import  increased  from  eight  mil- 
lion to  thirty-nine  million  rubles  during  the  reign  of  Catherine. 
These  facts  were  largely  due  to  Catherine's  first  two  tariffs, 
the  quite  liberal  one  of  1776,  and  that  of  1782,  which  was 
slightly  protectionist. 

The  legal  position  of  the  merchants  was  changed  by  Cath- 
erine who  had  exempted  them  from  the  poll-tax  and  taxed 
them  instead  with  I  per  cent,  of  their  capital,  the  amount  of 
capital  to  be  "  conscientiously  "  declared  by  the  merchants  them- 
selves. The  merchants  valued  highly  this  reform  which  freed 
them,  as  they  said,  from  "  a  state  of  slavery."  Yet  the  obliga- 
tion of  performing  fiscal  duties  was  not  removed  from  the 
merchants  (except  those  of  the  first  guild.  Russian  merchants 
are  to  this  day  classified  into  three  grades  or  guilds,  according 


32  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

to  their  wealth  and  privileges. —  TR.),  thus  retaining  a  some- 
what subjected  character  for  this  class. 

The  charter  granted  to  cities  originated  municipal  self-gov- 
ernment among  the  urban  population.  It  was  divided  into  six 
classes,  and  each  sent  representatives  to  the  dty-Duma.  Those 
were: 

1.  Merchants  (of  three  guilds). 

2.  Tzekhs,  i.e.,  trade  groups  and  artisans. 

3.  Townspeople. 

4.  Houseowners. 

5.  Prominent  citizens. 

6.  Foreign  merchants  and  free  artisans. 

Catherine's  municipal  regulations  remained  in  power  until 
the  reforms  of  Alexander  II. 

The  secularisation  of  the  church  lands  changed  the  status 
of  the  clergy  radically.  Together  with  the  estates  were  freed 
from  the  power  of  the  bishops  more  than  30,000  lower  clerks 
who  had  been  bondmen  to  their  superiors.  This  reform,  as 
Lappo-Danilevsky  justly  remarks,  has  deprived  the  church  of 
its  position  of  an  independent  corporation  within  the  state; 
the  higher  clergy  has  lost  a  part  of  its  power  and  importance, 
while  the  lower  parish-clergy  has  been  freed  from  a  peculiar 
bondage. 

As  I  said  above,  the  most  conspicuous  change  under  Catherine 
took  place  in  regard  to  the  legal  position  of  the  nobility.  Prac- 
tically, the  "  unbinding  "  of  the  nobles  had  begun  even  before 
her  accession,  by  the  ukase  of  Peter  III  of  February  18,  1762,* 

8  Many  events  in  Russian  modern  history  are  known  by  their  dates, 
e.g.,  the  insurrection  of  December  14  (1825).  Since  Russia  still  employs 
the  Julian  calendar  the  dates  throughout  this  book  are  of  the  Old  Style. 
The  Gregorian  calendar  is  in  advance  of  the  Julian  n  days  in  the  eight- 
eenth century,  12  days  in  the  nineteenth,  and  13  days  in  the  twentieth 
century. —  TR. 


THE  NOBILITY  33 

which  released  the  nobles  from  obligatory  service.  The  charter 
granted  them  in  1785  summarised  all  their  privileges,  allowed 
self-government  for  the  nobility  of  each  province,  exempted 
them  from  corporal  punishment,  and  gave  them  the  right  to 
bring  petitions  concerning  social  questions  and  needs.  The 
nobles  had  the  exclusive  property  right  to  their  peopled  estates, 
to  the  soil,  its  surface  and  depth. 

The  statute  about  the  provinces  in  1775  had  made  the  nobles 
the  ruling  local  class.  Thus  the  nobility,  although  exempted 
from  obligatory  service,  still  retained  the  privileges  of  state- 
service  and  the  important  right  of  electing  provincial  officials. 
After  the  introduction  of  the  statute  more  than  10,000  men 
were  elected  to  provincial  and  district  offices.  In  this  way  the 
landowner,  beside  being  actually  an  independent  monarch  on 
his  estate,  had  acquired  after  Catherine's  reform  an  enormous 
socio-political  influence  on  national  life  through  his  power  of 
electing  officials  for  important  provincial  boards  and  courts. 

In  order  to  become  an  all-powerful  political  class  and  in- 
fluence the  fate  of  the  Russian  people  and  state,  the  nobility 
needed  one  more  thing  —  limitation  of  the  monarchical  au- 
tocracy and  their  participation  in  legislation  and  state  administra- 
tion. This  they  failed  to  obtain.  Catherine  had  guarded  skil- 
fully and  successfully  the  inviolability  of  absolutism  both  from 
the  constitutional  aspirations  of  the  nobles,  whose  typical  rep- 
resentative was  the  famous  historian,  Prince  Shcherbatov,  and 
from  the  assaults  of  the  aristocracy  in  the  person  of  Nikita 
Panin,  and,  of  course,  from  the  "  arrogant "  ambitions  of  the 
constitutionalists-democrats,  such  as  Radishchev. 

To  summarise  all  that  has  been  said  about  the  class-composi- 
tion of  the  Russian  people  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
—  we  have  seen  that  94.5  per  cent,  constituted  peasantry,  eco- 
nomically a  variegated  mass  and  by  no  means  an  exclusively 
agricultural  class,  while  juridically  it  presented  a  series  of 
grades  and  groups,  from  the  totally  disabled  landowners'  bond- 


34  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

men  to  the  comparatively  free  groups  of  the  black-ploughmen 
in  the  North  and  the  freeholders  in  the  South.  Alongside  with 
the  latter  groups  stood  the  lower  ranks  of  the  urban  population, 
about  300,000  male  persons,  or  2^  per  cent.  Above  them  stood 
the  merchants —  107,000  or  less  than  I  per  cent,  of  the  popula- 
tion. Next  came  the  parish-clergy  freed  from  the  bishop- 
bondage  by  the  secularisation  act  of  1764.  The  clergy  consti- 
tuted not  more  than  i  per  cent,  of  the  population.  Finally, 
superior  to  all  classes  by  their  privileges  and  wealth  loomed  the 
nobles,  numerically  not  more  than  I  per  cent,  of  the  popula- 
tion, or  \1/^  to  il/2  per  cent.,  if  we  include  the  personal  (not 
hereditary)  noblemen  and  the  officials.  This  was  the  one 
class  that  had  become  during  the  eighteenth  century  not  only 
completely  "  unbound,"  but  had  acquired  important  rights  and 
privileges. 

It  behooves  us  now  to  characterise  the  mental  state  of  the 
people.  In  this  respect  we  must  bear  in  mind  the  division  of 
the  nation  into  the  intelligentzia  and  the  people,  the  schism  that 
had  begun  in  Peter's  days  and  still,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  exists 
at  present. 

In  ancient  Russ  there  was  no  such  division.  In  Kiev-Russ 
general  culture  evidently  grew  synchronously  with  material 
wealth,  a  culture  quite  high  for  those  days,  though  the  opinions 
of  the  investigators  differ  on  this  question.  However  it  might 
be,  that  Kiev-Byzantine  culture  was  not  handed  over  to  the 
next  epoch,  but  disappeared  almost  entirely  during  the  Tartar 
invasion,  the  internecine  appanage-wars,  and  other  internal 
troubles. 

During  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries,  when  the  Mus- 
covite state  had  already  been  formed,  ignorance  was  almost 
general.  In  this  respect  we  have  authentic  information;  for 
instance,  the  testimony  of  Gennady,  the  bishop  of  Novgorod, 
about  the  frequent  consecration  of  illiterates  as  priests  by  force 
of  necessity.  The  Muscovite  Government  had  taken  but  a  few 


EDUCATION  35 

timid  steps  toward  the  education  of  the  people ;  it  feared  West- 
ern heresies,  and  its  enlightening  measures  had  been  paralysed 
by  the  reactionary  efforts  of  the  obscurantists  who  reigned 
supreme,  especially  at  the  court  of  Tzar  Feodor.  Beginning 
with  Peter  the  Government  undertook  some  serious  measures 
for  spreading  education  among  the  people.  As  I  have  remarked 
before,  the  characteristic  peculiarity  of  Peter's  educational  meas- 
ures had  been  their  definitely  practical  nature:  he  needed  tech- 
nically educated  men  to  help  him  in  his  gigantic  struggle,  and 
with  this  view  he  established  schools.  There  were  opened 
forty-two  "  cipher "  or  primary  schools  with  an  attendance 
of  about  two  thousand  pupils  of  various  classes;  Peter  had 
no  class-scruples  when  his  great  task  was  concerned.  According 
to  Miliukov  the  composition  of  the  pupils  was  as  follows: 
45  per  cent,  children  of  the  clergy;  19.6  per  cent,  soldiers' 
children;  18  per  cent,  children  of  prik  ax-clerks,  more  than  10 
per  cent,  of  commoners,  4^  per  cent,  of  towns-people,  and 
only  2l/2  per  cent,  from  the  nobility.  In  1716  Peter  ordered 
the  nobles  to  send  their  children  not  to  the  "  cipher  "-schools 
but  to  higher  special  institutions;  in  the  lower  classes  of  the 
latter  there  were  many  commoners  also. 

Peter's  successors  were  indifferent  to  education,  and  the  peo- 
ple were  no  longer  forced  to  send  their  children  to  the  "  cipher  "- 
schools.  In  1732  under  Empress  Anna  the  "  cipher  "-schools 
were  partly  supplanted  by  the  so-called  Garrison-schools  for 
the  regiments;  although  these  schools  were  organised  primarily 
for  soldiers  they  had  nevertheless  a  general  cultural  importance. 

Under  Peter  originated  also  the  diocesan  schools;  in  1727 
there  were  forty-six  of  them  with  three  thousand  pupils.  Some 
of  them  were  soon  reorganised  into  provincial  seminaries.  In 
Catherine's  time  there  were  eleven  thousand  students  in  the  dio- 
cesan schools  and  about  six  thousand  in  the  twenty-six  semi- 
naries. 

Peter  also  restored  the  Moscow  theological  academy  which 


36  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

was  established  by  Tzar  Feodor  after  the  Kiev  model  with  the 
aid  of  the  two  Greeks,  the  brothers  Likhud,  and  had  fallen 
into  decay  subsequently  by  reason  of  persecution.  In  restoring 
it  Peter  had  peculiar  purposes,  as  I  have  mentioned  before:  he 
expected  the  academy  to  produce  all  sorts  of  specialists,  to  be 
a  kind  of  a  politechnicum.  For  the  nobility  Peter  founded  the 
schools  of  navigation,  of  engineering,  and  of  artillery.  Under 
Anna  to  these  three  schools  was  added  another,  the  "  Szlakhta 
Corpus,"  which  had  become  in  course  of  time  the  highest  and 
most  favourite  school  for  children  of  the  nobles.  Peter  made 
the  first  experiment  with  establishing  a  university  at  the  Acad- 
emy of  Sciences;  he  imported  professors  from  abroad,  but 
their  number  exceeded  that  of  the  students,  who  had  to  be 
forcibly  recruited  from  among  the  academies  and  seminaries. 
More  successful  proved  the  Gymnasium  opened  at  the  Acad- 
emy: in  1728  it  had  more  than  two  hundred  students,  mostly 
from  the  commoners. 

Such  were  the  main  facts  of  Peter's  educational  activity. 
His  schools,  in  spite  of  their  professional  character,  had  a  great 
cultural  significance;  they  were  secular,  free  from  the  former 
fear  of  heresy  and  novelty,  and  they  brought  up  and  created 
the  first  generation  of  the  Russian  intelligentzia.  That  intelli- 
gentzia, having  donned  European  garments,  differed  from  the 
people  no  longer  in  appearance  only;  it  was  at  that  time  that 
the  moral  schism  between  the  people  and  the  intelligentzia  began 
and  it  has  continued  to  our  day.  The  newly-formed  intelli- 
gentzia produced  as  early  as  in  the  thirties  of  the  eighteenth 
century  a  brilliant  expounder  of  new  ideas  and  views  in  the 
person  of  Tatishchev,  historian,  author,  and  active  adminis- 
trator. And  in  the  forties  began  the  glorious  career  of  the 
great  Russian  scholar  and  reformer  of  the  Russian  language, 
Lomonosov. 

The  young  intelligentzia  had  feathered  quite  rapidly.  By 
the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  reading  of  books  became 


THE  INTELLIGENTZIA  37 

general,  particularly  of  novels,  translated  in  most  cases;  some- 
what later  there  appeared  original  novels.  Under  Elizabeth 
a  European  theatre  was  founded,  and  later  the  first  literary 
periodical,  The  Monthly  Writings,  issued  at  the  Academy  of 
Sciences  under  the  editorship  of  Mueller.  In  1755  began  to 
appear  the  first  private  magazine,  published  by  Sumarokov. 

Finally,  in  1755,  Shuvalov  founded  the  university  of  Mos- 
cow with  two  gymnasia  (one  for  nobles,  another  for  com- 
moners). True,  the  new  university  did  not  become  at  once 
the  disseminator  of  education  in  the  country,  and  in  the  be- 
ginning it  appeared  to  be  as  much  a  failure  as  Peter's  uni- 
versity; but  Shuvalov  did  not  become  discouraged  and  planned 
a  wide  net  of  schools  for  a  systematic  spread  of  knowledge, 
at  least  among  the  nobility. 

With  Catherine  the  work  of  education  received  a  definite 
turn.  Enlightenment  had  come  to  be  considered  necessary  for 
its  own  sake,  with  the  aim  of  ennobling  man  and  developing 
"  good  morals,"  rather  than  producing  useful  men  for  the  state. 
On  the  other  hand  the  need  for  education  was  found  equal  for 
all  classes.  For  some  time  Catherine  even  advocated  the  educa- 
tion of  women  as  tantamount  in  importance  to  that  of  men. 
At  the  end  of  her  reign  Emperor  Joseph  sent  to  Russia  by  her 
request  the  experienced  pedagogue  Yankovich-de  Mirievo,  a 
Serb  by  origin,  who  introduced  the  Austrian  system  of  schools. 
Austrian  text-books,  considered  the  last  word  in  pedagogy  at 
that  time,  were  translated  and  distributed  among  the  teachers 
of  the  new  schools. 

In  the  second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century,  particularly 
after  the  Seven  Years'  War,  the  second  generation  of  Russian 
intelligentzia  began  to  manifest  an  independent  striving  for  edu- 
cation and  for  working  out  its  own  ideology.  These  strivings 
were  enhanced  by  the  growing  contact  with  Western  Europe 
and  the  constant  influx  of  Western  ideas,  through  two  channels : 
the  ideas  of  French  encyclopedists,  materialists,  and  such  thinkers 


38  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

as  Voltaire,  Montesquieu,  Rousseau,  and  Mably,  on  one  hand, 
and  the  ideas  of  the  German  idealists  —  Masons  (the  Mar- 
tinists  and  Rosenkreizers).  They  were  represented  by  Novikov 
and  Schwarz  who  organised  the  famous  "  Friendly  Society " 
which  rendered  great  services  in  the  work  of  disseminating  en- 
lightenment and  awakening  self-consciousness  in  Russian  society. 

Catherine  had  not  expected  such  a  rapid  and  independent 
development  of  public  opinion;  in  the  early  years  of  her  reign 
she  had  considered  the  necessity  of  cultivating  social  feelings 
through  literature.  With  this  view  she  undertook  in  1769  the 
publication  of  the  magazine  Motley.  But  this  attempt  to 
direct  public  opinion  by  the  aid  of  a  literary  organ  had  con- 
vinced her  that  the  public  was  far  more  advanced  than  she 
had  supposed:  Motley  was  forced  to  resent  the  attacks  of 
other  magazines,  which  went  considerably  further  and  assumed 
more  independence  than  the  Empress  desired. 

Under  Catherine  permission  was  given  to  establish  private 
printing-houses,  and  owing  to  the  labours  of  Novikov  and 
Schwarz  the  publication  of  books  advanced  rapidly.  During 
the  eighteenth  century  there  were  issued,  according  to  Sipov- 
sky's  figures,  9,513  books;  of  them  6  per  cent,  in  the  reign  of 
Peter  (i.e.,  24  years),  6.7  per  cent,  during  the  forty  years  be- 
tween Peter  and  Catherine,  84^  per  cent,  during  the  thirty- 
four  years  of  Catherine's  reign,  and  2^2  per  cent,  during  the 
four  years  of  Paul's  reign.  Book-publishing  had  reached  its 
apogee  in  the  eighties  of  the  eighteenth  century,  before  the 
crash  of  Novikov's  "  Friendly  Society  "  and  his  other  under- 
takings in  the  nineties,  when  Catherine,  under  the  influence 
of  the  terrors  of  the  French  Revolution,  fell  into  a  reactionary 
mood.4 

*  Miliukov  distributes  Sipovsky's  figures  in  periods  of  ten  and  five 
years: 

1698-1710   149  books ;  yearly,     12  books. 

1711-1720   248  books ;  yearly,     25  books. 


BOOK  PUBLISHING  39 

The  growth  of  social  consciousness  manifested  itself  in  the 
differentiation  of  public  circles;  this  was  conditioned,  on  one 
hand,  by  the  difference  in  the  channels  through  which  entered 
the  Western  ideas  (the  materialistic  —  French,  and  the  idealis- 
tic—  German),  and,  on  the  other  hand,  by  the  growing  class- 
consciousness.  A  by  no  means  negligible  role  was  played  in  this 
regard  by  the  foreign  travels  of  young  nobles,  and  particularly 
by  their  long  life  abroad  during  the  Seven  Years'  War. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  development  of  the  Russian  intelli- 
gentzia by  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  had  reached  con- 
siderable dimensions,  if  we  consider  the  state  of  Russian  society 
at  the  beginning  of  that  century.  As  to  the  ideology  of  the 
masses,  we  must  analyse  it  separately  in  view  of  the  schism 
which  I  have  already  mentioned. 

For  the  first  six  centuries  after  the  Christianisation  of  Rus- 
sia the  people  were  quite  indifferent  to  the  teachings  of  Christi- 
anity, and  the  clergy  represented  Christian  enlightenment  only 
as  long  as  they  came  from  Byzantium.  After  the  transference 
of  the  centre  from  Kiev  to  the  northeast  and  the  subsequent 
Mongol  conquest  of  Russ,  connections  with  Byzantium  weak- 
ened and  the  influx  of  their  priests  had  ceased ;  the  native  Rus- 
sian clergy  gradually  descended  in  their  cultural  status  to  the 
level  of  the  masses,  instead  of  lifting  them  up. 

1721-1725  182  )  yearly,     36  books. 

1726-1730  33   )     X5  yearly,       7  books. 

1731-174x5  140  books ;  yearly,     14  books. 

1741-1750  149  books;  yearly,     15  books. 

1751-1760  233   books;  yearly,     23  books. 

1761-1770  1050  books ;  yearly,   105  books. 

1771-1775  633  )    bks.  yearly,   126  books. 

1776-1780  833   {1466  yearly;   166  books. 

1781-1785  986   )  yearly,   197  books. 

1786-1790  1699  f  2  i5*  yearly,  366  books. 

1791-1795  1494  j  266o  yearly,  299  books. 

1796-1800  1166  )  yearly,  233  books. 

In  the  number  9513  were  not  included  liturgical  books,  newspapers, 
and  magazines. 


40  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

In  the  first  six  centuries  after  the  conversion  Russia  had  be- 
come, to  use  Miliukov's  happy  expression,  "  Holy  Russ,  the  land 
of  numerous  churches  and  incessant  chimes,  the  land  of  long 
'  standing  '  services,  pious  prostrations  and  severe  fasts,  as  it  had 
been  pictured  by  the  foreign  travellers  of  the  sixteenth  and 
seventeenth  centuries."  In  the  sixteenth  century,  and  par- 
ticularly in  the  seventeenth,  there  appeared  in  Russia  for  the 
first  time  a  fermentation  of  ideas,  which  was  caused  by  the  in- 
filtration of  certain  Western  heresies  and  also  by  the  correction 
of  the  liturgical  books  and  ceremonies  after  the  Greek  model. 
This  correction  of  books  and  customs  brought  about  the  Schism 
which,  combined  with  the  bloody  disturbances  of  a  socio- 
political nature  that  took  place  at  that  time,  stirred  the  minds 
of  the  masses  to  such  an  extent  that  the  Schismatic  movement 
could  not  only  not  be  eradicated  by  ruthless  persecutions,  but 
on  the  contrary  actually  throve  because  of  them. 

By  Catherine's  time  the  Schismatics  had  already  gone  through 
a  period  of  bloody  persecutions;  with  the  new  reign  began  a 
policy  of  comparative  toleration.  This  toleration  brought  about 
the  internal  differentiation  of  the  Schismatics  into  various  sects, 
which  process  went  on  alongside  with  the  formation  of  nu- 
merous other  religious  sects  among  the  people.  The  latter 
developed  mainly  in  the  nineteenth  century,  and  we  shall  have 
to  return  to  this  subject  later.  To  estimate  the  number  of 
Schismatics  in  the  eighteenth  century  is  impossible.  Their  ma- 
jority officially  figured  as  Orthodox;  many  others  avoided  regis- 
tration, and  the  number  of  Schismatics  grew  and  developed 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  Government.  In  the  middle  of 
the  nineteenth  century  the  officers  of  the  General  Staff  pub- 
lished the  results  of  an  investigation  of  the  country,  in  which 
the  official  number  of  Schismatics  was  declared  to  be  806,000 
as  against  56,000,000  of  Orthodox;  but  the  same  publication 
explained  that  the  figures  did  not  correspond  with  the  facts, 


THE  SCHISMATICS  41 

and  that  the  actual  number  of  Schismatics  was  not  less  than 
8,000,000,  i.e.,  15  per  cent,  of  the  population.  At  the  end  of 
the  eighteenth  century  the  percentage  was  hardly  lower.  At 
any  rate  we  may  say  that  during  that  epoch  whatever  was  alive 
and  creative  in  the  people  went  over  to  the  side  of  the  Schism, 
and  if  we  want  to  follow  up  the  movement  of  the  nation's 
thought  we  shall  have  to  look  for  it  chiefly  among  the  Schis- 
matics, and  later  among  the  other  sects  that  had  formed  during 
the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries,  for  within  the  "  spirit- 
ual fence  "  of  the  official  church  there  remained  for  the  most 
part  the  passive  and  indifferent  elements  of  the  masses. 

I  have  characterised  the  position  of  the  population  by  its 
classes  and  the  educational  stage  of  the  country  at  the  end  of 
the  eighteenth  century;  it  remains  for  me  now  to  examine  the 
position  of  the  sovereign-power  on  the  eve  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  I  have  pointed  out  that  in  the  Muscovite  state  that 
power  had  become  despotic  under  the  influence  of  the  territorial 
struggle;  true,  the  character  of  the  supreme  power  had  vacil- 
lated more  than  once  even  under  the  Muscovite  tzars,  espe- 
cially under  the  Romanovs  who  had  ascended  the  throne,  not 
by  force  of  heritage,  but  by  election,  after  the  deliverance  of 
the  country  from  foreign  enemies  by  the  aid  of  the  extreme  up- 
heaval of  the  nation's  powers.  Whenever  the  finances  were 
in  straits  the  sovereign-power  was  forced  to  appeal  to  the  peo- 
ple, by  summoning  the  zemski  sobory  (assemblies  of  the  men  of 
the  land).  On  the  other  hand,  the  boyars  (higher  nobility) 
and  the  Boyars'  Duma  that  had  been  established  in  Moscow  had 
attempted  to  strengthen  and  broaden  their  influence  on  legis- 
lation and  on  the  national  administration.  Those  attempts 
were  finally  frustrated,  and  under  Peter  the  autocratic  despotism 
had  reached  its  climax  and  even  received  an  official  theoretic 
sanction  in  "  The  Truth  of  the  Monarchical  Will,"  written 
by  Feofan  Prokopovich  when  Peter  ordered  him  to  find  reasons 


42  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

justifying  the  Tzar's  elimination  of  his  son  Alexis  from  the 
throne  succession.5  This  document,  based  mainly  on  the  theory 
of  the  English  Monarchist  Hobbes,  was  later  incorporated  in 
the  Complete  Code  of  Laws,  as  an  act  of  the  Government. 
Although  Peter  had  always  endeavoured  to  popularise  the  idea 
of  legality  among  his  subjects  and  had  preferred  the  collegiate 
principle  to  the  individualistic,  as  a  guarantee  against  the  wil- 
fulness  of  the  officials,  his  personal  power  he  considered  as 
absolutely  unlimitable. 

Under  Peter's  weak  successors  there  had  been  more  vacilla- 
tions in  the  position  of  the  sovereign  power,  and  once,  at  the 
accession  of  Empress  Anna  Joannovna,  the  ambitious  courtiers 
almost  succeeded  in  limiting  the  autocracy  in  favour  of  a  secret 
oligarchical  council,  and  later  in  favour  of  the  Senate.  But 
their  effort  failed  in  view  of  the  opposition  of  the  provincial 
nobles  who  happened  to  assemble  at  that  time  in  Moscow. 
Upon  the  request  of  the  provincial  nobility  Anna  Joannovna 
publicly  tore  to  pieces  the  limiting  "  Points,"  to  which  she  had 
previously  consented. 

Catherine  believed  in  the  principle  of  unlimited  autocracy, 
yet  she  admitted  the  need  of  mitigating  the  despotism  of  the 
sovereign  authority.  Theoretically  she  tried  to  distinguish  be- 
tween a  just  monarchy  and  a  despoty;  in  practice  she  alleviated 
the  governmental  cruelties  that  had  been  customary,  especially 
under  Peter,  and  mitigated  judicial  penalties.  She  advocated 
autocracy  as  an  indispensable  form  of  government  in  the  vast 
Russian  Empire  composed  of  variegated  parts.  It  is  curious 
to  note  that  she  instructed  her  grandson  Alexander  with  the 
help  of  the  Republican  La  Harpe  in  principles  of  liberalism  and 
conscious  acknowledgement  of  the  rights  of  man  and  citizen. 

5  The  reader  will  find  a  powerful  treatment  of  this  incident  and  of 
that  epoch  in  general  in  Merezhkovsky's  novel  "  The  Anti-Christ  or 
Peter  and  Alexis."  Merezhkovsky's  fiction  is  of  great  historical  value, 
based  as  it  is  on  original  documents. —  TR. 


THE  ADMINISTRATION  43 

As  to  the  administrative  organs,  the  old  Muscovite  local 
units  that  were  formed  for  lack  of  a  powerful  central  authority 
began  to  decay  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
Peter's  impetuous  policy  dealt  the  old  organs  a  death  blow  be- 
fore, occupied  as  he  had  been  with  foreign  wars  and  travels,  he 
could  supplant  them  with  new  ones.  In  1711,  leaving  for  the 
war  with  Turkey,  he  hastily  organised  the  Senate,  which  was 
to  act  in  the  place  of  the  absent  Monarch  in  internal  affairs. 
Since  those  absences  were  frequent  and  lengthy  the  authority 
of  the  Senate  was  considerable. 

When  the  war  cares  had  somewhat  diminished  there  came 
to  the  front  the  question  of  conserving  and  maintaining  the 
army.  As  a  result  of  this  exigency  it  was  quartered  through- 
out the  country  which  was  for  this  purpose  divided  into  eight 
gubernn  or  provinces.  The  entire  provincial  administration 
was  adapted  to  the  satisfaction  of  a  single  need  —  the  main- 
tenance of  the  army. 

For  several  years  there  were  no  intermediary  departments 
between  the  Senate  and  the  provincial  administration.  In  1715 
Peter,  somewhat  released  from  cares  of  war,  betook  himself 
to  carry  out  internal  reforms.  Instead  of  the  decayed  prikazy 
(boards)  he  established  after  the  Swedish  model  collegia,  which 
corresponded  to  the  present  ministries  with  the  difference  that 
in  the  Collegium  the  power  was  not  in  the  hand  of  a  single 
minister,  but  in  the  hands  of  from  three  to  twelve  persons. 
There  were  nine,  and  later  twelve  Collegia;  at  first  they  were 
subjected  to  the  supervision-  of  the  Senate. 

Under  Peter's  successors  the  position  of  the  Senate  as  the 
highest  administrative  organ  had  changed:  though  the  Senate 
was  not  abolished,  it  became  subservient  to  the  Supreme  Secret 
Council,  and  later  to  the  Cabinet  (under  Anna) — institutions 
composed  of  favourites  and  temporary  rulers  who  used  their  per- 
sonal influence  to  rise  above  the  Senate.  Then,  beside  these 
casual  institutions,  some  Collegia  —  the  Military,  the  Naval, 


44  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

the  Foreign  —  were  exempted  from  subjection  to  the  Senate 
and  placed  on  the  same  level  with  it. 

Elizabeth  had  partly  rehabilitated  the  Senate,  but  the  three 
above-mentioned  Collegia  remained  independent.  Owing  to 
Elizabeth's  dislike  for  tedious  state  affairs  the  Senate  assumed 
during  her  reign  even  more  authority  than  under  Peter. 

At  her  accession  Catherine,  imbued  with  the  philosophical 
tendencies  of  the  "  enlightenment  epoch,"  intended  to  grant 
Russia  an  ideal,  rational  legislation.  With  this  aim  she  sum- 
moned the  Code  Commission.  She  soon  grew  disappointed  in 
her  hope  of  reorganising  at  once  the  legislation,  and  she  started 
out  on  a  gradual  reform  of  the  administration  from  below, 
guided  by  the  complaints  against  provincial  disorders,  which 
had  been  discussed  by  the  Code  Commission.  As  a  result  she 
worked  out  an  adequate  plan  of  the  province-reform.  She  had 
transferred  to  the  local  administration  a  considerable  part  of 
the  power  that  had  been  in  the  hands  of  the  central  Collegia. 
There  were  established  local  Fiscal  Chambers  as  branches  of 
the  Chamber-Collegium  (corresponding  to  the  present  Ministry 
of  Finance).  Then  all  Collegia,  except  the  first  three,  were  dis- 
missed, and  all  local  administrative  and  financial  management 
passed  into  the  hands  of  the  Fiscal  Chambers;  all  police  powers 
were  concentrated  in  the  Provincial  Boards;  care  for  public 
health  and  general  safety  was  in  the  hands  of  Provincial  Boards 
of  Public  Safety,  but  the  latter  received  no  appropriations,  and 
their  activity  remained  only  on  paper.  All  the  power  in  the 
new  institutions  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  provincial  nobility, 
who  had  been  granted  the  right  to  elect  the  officials,  while 
these  were  elected  mainly  from  among  the  nobility  themselves. 

Having  reformed  the  provinces  Catherine  did  not  succeed, 
however,  in  adequately  reorganising  the  central  institutions. 
The  abolished  Collegia  were  not  succeeded  by  anything  perma- 
nent. The  Senate  appeared  again  to  be  the  single  supervising 
and  administering  body ;  but  in  reality  the  only  power  was  in  the 


CATHERINE'S  PROVINCE-REFORM  45 

hand  of  the  Procurator-General  of  the  Senate,  who  had  the  right 
to  report  personally  to  the  Empress  on  all  the  questions  that 
came  before  the  Senate.  He  played  the  part  of  a  prime-minister 
and  minister  of  justice  (to  this  day  the  Minister  of  Justice  is  at 
the  same  time  the  Procurator-General)  and  minister  of  finance 
combined.  The  position  of  the  Senate  was  deplorable.  Beside  the 
Procurator-General  Catherine  intrusted  with  important  func- 
tions various  individuals,  her  favourites,  or  some  persons  who 
had  won  her  confidence.  Such  a  state  of  affairs,  the  absence  of 
a  definite  central  power,  and  the  cupidity  and  insolence  of  the 
favourites,  had  led  to  flagrant  abuses,  sheer  robbery  and  spolia- 
tion of  the  State  treasury  on  a  gigantic  scale.  Besides,  the  coun- 
try remained  without  any  code  of  laws,  since  Catherine  had  not 
carried  through  her  original  intention  of  granting  a  "  rational  " 
legislation;  judges  and  administrators  used  their  own  discre- 
tion in  choosing  for  their  decisions  some  legal  basis  out  of  the 
mass  of  laws,  ukases,  and  decrees  that  filled  the  bureaucratic 
archives.  It  can  be  easily  understood  what  a  broad  field  for 
abuse  such  conditions  offered.  The  question  of  codification 
passed  into  the  nineteenth  century. 

Concerning  the  finances  in  the  eighteenth  century  we  may 
say  that  in  general  the  means  of  the  Government  were  ex- 
tremely meagre.  I  have  already  pointed  out  how  Peter  had 
to  scheme.  During  his  reign  the  disproportion  between  the 
growing  requirements  of  the  State  and  the  paying  capacity 
of  the  nation  had  completely  drained  the  land,  and  considerably 
decreased  the  population. 

In  the  meantime  the  budget  grew  with  unbelievable  rapidity. 
Before  the  accession  of  Peter,  in  1680,  the  expenses  of  the  State 
did  not  exceed  one  million  and  a  half  rubles  (one  must  remem- 
ber that  the  ruble  was  worth  fifteen  to  seventeen  times  more 
than  at  present) ;  in  1724  they  were  eight  and  a  half  million 
rubles  (the  ruble  equal  to  our  nine  to  ten  rubles),  consequently 
in  forty-four  years  the  nominal  budget  had  increased  six-fold. 


46  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

Even  if  we  should  take  into  account  the  fall  in  the  value  of  the 
ruble  for  that  period  and  translate  both  budgets  in  our  money, 
there  will  still  be  an  increase  of  the  budget  about  three  and 
a  half  times.6 

Under  Peter's  immediate  successors,  in  spite  of  the  court's 
profligacy  and  its  desire  to  spend  without  limit,  the  budget 
did  not  increase  very  much  because  there  were  no  draining  wars. 
During  those  forty  years  (from  Peter  to  Catherine)  it  only 
doubled. 

Upon  her  accession  Catherine  found  the  finances  terribly  en- 
tangled. At  that  time  the  Seven  Years'  War  was  taking 
place,  in  which  Russia,  for  some  unknown  purpose,  participated ; 
the  soldiers  had  not  received  pay  for  a  whole  year.  When  the 
Empress  appeared  before  the  Senate  she  was  informed  that  there 
was  need  for  the  immediate  expenditure  of  fifteen  million  rubles, 
but  that  the  Treasury  was  empty.  Catherine  made  skilful  use 
of  the  exigency  and  demonstrated  her  magnanimity  in  the  op- 
portune moment  by  granting  immediately  a  considerable  sum 
of  money  from  the  Imperial  Private  Cabinet  for  the  state  needs ; 
whereby  she  at  once  gained  popularity. 

Then  she  carried  out  a  very  happy  reform  —  the  lowering 
of  the  salt-tax;  in  order  to  acquire  national  sympathy  which 

6  In  comparing  the  financial  budgets  of  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries  one  must  bear  in  mind  the  change  in  the  purchas- 
ing power  of  the  silver  ruble  and  later  of  the  surrogates  (copper 
coins  under  Peter,  assignations  under  Catherine).  From  the  begin- 
ning of  the  sixteenth  century  down  to  our  time  the  value  of  the  ruble 
has  almost  steadily  fallen  for  two  reasons:  the  cheapening  of  silver 
(ab.  15-18  times),  and  the  decrease  in  the  weight  of  the  coin  (7 
times).  The  silver  ruble  of  the  fifteenth  century  was  equivalent  to 
our  100-130  rubles,  toward  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century  it  fell 
to  24-25  of  our  present  rubles;  at  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  to  12,  but  at  the  end  of  that  century  it  rose  to  17  rubles; 
under  Peter  it  fell  to  9,  and  toward  the  end  of  Catherine's  reign  to  5 
present  rubles.  Regardless  of  this,  the  course  of  the  copper  money 
and  of  the  assignations  had  been  fluctuating  in  its  turn,  depending 
on  the  size  of  the  issue  and  the  general  trade-conjunctures. 


FINANCIAL  REFORMS  47 

she  needed  badly  in  her  abnormal  position,  Catherine  decided 
to  cut  down  considerably  that  most  exasperating  tax,  at  the 
same  time  assigning  300,000  rubles  from  her  Cabinet-money  to 
cover  the  possible  deficit.  But  the  lowering  of  the  tax  brought 
an  increase  in  consumption  (especially  for  fisheries),  and  as  a 
result  the  income  of  the  fiscal  salt  monopoly  even  increased. 

But  despite  her  first  successful  steps  Catherine  had  after  all 
not  introduced  a  regulated  financial  system;  the  financial  condi- 
tions remained  almost  as  deplorable  as  before.  True  there  was 
not  such  a  strain  on  the  nation's  strength  as  under  Peter,  and 
the  country's  industry  grew  fast  and  profitable  owing  to  the 
economic  advantages  of  the  conquered  territories.  In  emergency 
cases  when  large  expenditures  appeared  necessary  (beginning 
with  the  first  Turkish  war),  Catherine  made  use  of  the  Assig- 
national  bank,  founded  before  her  accession.  No  foreign  loans 
had  existed  yet.  During  the  Seven  Years'  War  Elizabeth  at- 
tempted to  transact  a  foreign  loan  of  only  two  million  rubles, 
but  her  attempt  suffered  a  complete  fiasco.  By  the  aid  of  the 
Assignational  bank  Catherine  had  received  a  means  for  making 
quite  large  internal  loans.  At  first  this  operation  proved  suc- 
cessful. In  1769  there  were  issued  assignations  for  17,841,000 
rubles,  and  their  course  remained  at  par,  i.e.,  the  paper-ruble 
was  equivalent  to  the  silver  one.  The  subsequent  loans,  com- 
paratively small  in  size,  also  passed  fairly  well.  Even  when 
after  the  declaration  of  the  second  Turkish  war  there  was  is- 
sued a  loan  for  53,000,000  rubles,  almost  equal  to  the  then 
yearly  budget,  the  course  of  the  assignations  did  not  fall  in  a 
marked  way;  the  total  amount  of  assignations  at  that  time  had 
reached  one  hundred  million  rubles  at  the  course  of  ninety-seven 
silver  kopecks  for  one  assignation-ruble.  But  the  next  issues 
caused  a  growing  fall  of  the  course.  During  the  whole  reign  of 
Catherine  assignations  were  issued  for  one  hundred  and  fifty- 
seven  million  rubles,  and  at  the  end  the  course  had  fallen  below 
seventy  kopecks.  Such  a  state  of  affairs  threatened  the  State 


48  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

with  bankruptcy  in  the  future.  At  the  same  time  expenses 
continued  to  grow  with  great  rapidity.  During  her  reign  the 
state  expenditures  had  increased  (nominally)  five-fold;  at  her 
accession  they  equalled  sixteen  and  a  half  million;  at  her  death 
—  seventy-eight  million. 

This  financial  situation  was  made  worse  by  the  terrible 
thievery  of  the  higher  officials,  which  aroused  a  cry  of  despair 
in  the  letter  of  the  young  Grand  Duke  (later  Emperor)  Alex- 
ander to  La  Harpe:  "  What  takes  place  is  beyond  conception; 
all  rob,  you  can  hardly  meet  an  honest  person." 

We  may  make  a  resume  of  all  that  we  have  said  about  the 
position  of  Russia  at  the  end  of  Catherine's  reign  in  the  fol- 
lowing fundamental  points: 

1.  On  the  eve  of  the  nineteenth  century  Russia  presented 
a  powerful  state  united  by  a  single  strong  authority  on  an 
enormous  and  definite  territory,  with  firm  and  safe  borders, 
containing  a  population  of  thirty-six  million.     This  population, 
though  composed  of  various  races,  was  dominated  by  the  prev- 
alence of  the  Russian  nationality. 

2.  In  regard  to  the  class-composition  of  that  political  organ- 
ism, its  differentiation  into  separate  fixed  or  "  bound  "  classes 
and  orders  had  come  to  an  end  at  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  as  a  result  of  a  long  process.     Under  the  influence  of 
new  national  conditions,  and  mainly  because  of  the  cessation  of 
the  former  territorial  struggle,  the  higher  classes  had  begun 
to  "  unbind,"  while  the  liberation   of  the  lower  strata,  the 
peasantry,  had  come  to  be  considered,  at  least  in  principle,  as 
a  question  :o  be  solved  in  the  more  or  less  near  future. 

3.  Mentally  the  population  was  divided  at  the  beginning 
of  the  eighteenth  century  into  the  intelligentzia  and  the  masses. 
Among  the  latter  arose  a  strong  fermentation  of  ideas,  caused 
by  the  stirring  effect  of  the  Schism.    The  intelligentzia  had  been 
from  the  very  start  a  body  consisting  if  not  of  all  classes,  at 
least  of  various  orders  and  classes,  and  it  appeared  as  the  most 


SUMMARY  49 

active,  progressive,  and  conscious  element  in  the  state;  ideas 
of  limiting  the  autocratic  power  and  of  demanding  greater 
freedom  had  already  begun  to  develop  among  that  body  in  the 
fifteenth  century. 

4.  About  that  time  began  to  appear  some  elements  of  the 
future  capitalism  —  the  centralisation  of  the  merchants'  capital 
and  the  first  experiments  in  its  application  to  big  industry ;  then 
also  originated  the  struggle  between  the  interests  of  the  land- 
owning class  of  nobles  and  the  representatives  of  the  commer- 
cial-industrial capital. 

5.  The  supreme  power  remained  autocratic,  but  the  autoc- 
racy was  manifested  in  milder  forms.     As  to  the  administra- 
tion itself  Catherine  had  succeeded  in  organising  the  local  pro- 
vincial governments  quite  firmly  along  lines  rather  rational  for 
those  days,  but  she  had  not  reorganised  the  central  Government, 
and  by  the  end  of  her  reign  there  was  complete  chaos  in  the 
central  management  of  the  state  affairs. 

A  weak  place  in  the  organisation  of  the  Russian  state  was 
its  financial  system  and  the  national  economy  in  general. 


CHAPTER  III 

ON  the  border-line  between  the  eighteenth  and  nine- 
teenth centuries  took  place  the  four  years'  reign  of 
Paul  I.  This  period,  until  recently  under  the  seal 
of  censorship,  has  always  aroused  public  curiosity,  as  something 
mysterious  and  forbidden,  while  the  attention  of  historians, 
psychologists,  biographers,  dramatists,  and  novelists  has  nat- 
urally been  attracted  by  the  original  personality  of  the  crowned 
psychopath  and  by  the  exceptional  circumstances  under  which 
his  drama  was  enacted  and  ended  so  tragically. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  our  attitude  towards  historical 
events,  this  reign  has  but  a  secondary  importance.  Though  it 
lies  between  two  centuries  and  separates  the  "  age  of  Catherine  " 
from  the  "  age  of  Alexander,"  it  can  by  no  means  be  considered 
as  a  transitional  period.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  historical 
process  of  the  development  of  the  Russian  people,  which  in- 
terests us,  that  reign  appears  as  a  sudden  intrusion,  as  an  un- 
expected squall  that,  coming  from  the  outside,  confused  every- 
thing, caused  a  temporary  topsy-turvy  in  the  national  life,  but 
which  could  not  have  interrupted  for  long  or  radically  changed 
the  natural  course  of  the  functioning  process.  In  view  of  this 
nature  of  Paul's  reign,  Alexander  upon  his  accession  had  noth- 
ing else  to  do  but  erase  everything  committed  by  his  father, 
and  having  healed  the  not  deep,  but  painful  wounds  inflicted  by 
him  upon  the  state-organism,  to  proceed  further  from  the  point 
at  which  Catherine's  age-weakened  and  shaky  hand  had  stopped. 

For  us  the  reign  of  Paul  is  interesting  not  on  account  of  its 
tragi-comic  phenomena,  but  because  of  the  changes  that  took 
place  in  the  position  of  the  people  during  that  time,  and  the 

50 


PAUL  I  51 

mental  movement  among  the  public  aroused  by  the  governmental 
terror.  Still  more  important  for  us  are  the  international  rela- 
tions conditioned,  on  one  hand,  by  Paul's  idiosyncrasies,  and  on 
the  other,  by  the  great  events  that  had  taken  place  in  Western 
Europe. 

I  do  not  intend  therefore  to  give  here  a  detailed  biography 
of  Paul ;  those  interested  in  it  will  turn  to  Schilder's  great  work, 
or  to  the  brief  compilation  of  that  work,  issued  by  Shumigor- 
sky.  For  our  purposes  proper  the  following  brief  biographical 
facts  will  suffice.  Paul  was  born  in  1754,  eight  years  before 
Catherine's  accession.  His  childhood  passed  under  most  ab- 
normal conditions:  Empress  Elizabeth  took  him  away  from 
his  parents  immediately  after  his  birth,  and  placed  him  into 
an  unhealthy,  hot-house  atmosphere  of  a  variety  of  nurses  and 
governesses.  Later  he  fell  under  the  care  of  Count  Nikita 
Panin,  a  man  of  great  distinction  for  that  time.  He  was  a 
wise  statesman,  but  not  a  conscientious  pedagogue,  and  did  not 
pay  sufficient  attention  to  his  task. 

Catherine  had  no  confidence  in  Panin,  but  she  feared  to  dis- 
miss him  in  view  of  the  rumours  that  she  intended  to  remove 
Paul  altogether,  and  she  yielded  to  the  public  opinion  that  Paul 
would  be  safe  as  long  as  he  remained  under  Panin's  care.  The 
grown-up  Paul  inspired  no  affection  in  Catherine;  she  did  not 
admit  him  to  state  affairs,  and  even  removed  him  from  the 
military  department  for  which  he  felt  a  special  inclination. 
Paul's  first  marriage  was  unhappy  and  of  short  duration;  his 
wife,  who  died  during  her  confinement,  aggravated  still  more 
the  tense  relations  between  Paul  and  his  mother.  When  he 
married  for  the  second  time,  Catherine  assigned  the  new  couple 
Gatchina  where  they  were  to  lead  a  private  life.  Their  chil- 
dren Catherine  treated  as  Elizabeth  had  treated  hers,  i.e.,  she 
took  them  from  their  parents  immediately  after  their  birth 
and  educated  them  herself.  Paul's  removal  from  state  affairs, 
and  his  impertinent  treatment  by  the  favourites  of  the  Em- 


52  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

press,  especially  by  Potiomkin,  poured  oil  on  the  fire  and  aroused 
in  Paul  hatred  for  all  the  court  of  Catherine.  For  thirty  years 
he  waited  impatiently  for  the  moment  when  he  would  begin 
to  reign  and  exercise  his  own  power. 

We  must  add  that  towards  the  end  of  Catherine's  reign  Paul 
began  to  suspect  that  his  mother  would  deprive  him  of  the  throne, 
and  we  know  that  such  a  plan  had  indeed  been  considered  but 
failed  of  realisation  only  because  Alexander  refused  to  ascend 
the  throne  before  his  father,  thus  frustrating  Catherine's 
intentions. 

On  his  accession  Paul  gave  vent  to  the  hatred  that  had  accumu- 
lated in  his  mind  against  all  his  mother's  acts.  Having  no  defi- 
nite plan  of  action  and  not  even  a  clear  conception  of  state  mat- 
ters and  needs,  Paul  began  to  set  aside  indiscriminately  whatever 
his  mother  had  enacted.  In  some  respects  he  restored  old  forms. 
For  instance  he  reinstalled  some  Collegia,  but  gave  them  no 
proper  authority,  while  their  old  authority  had  passed  over  to 
the  Fiscal  Boards.  He  had  invented  a  plan  for  the  reorganisa- 
tion of  the  entire  central  administration;  but  in  fact  the  plan 
consisted  in  the  abolishment  of  all  state  institutions  and  the  con- 
centration of  the  whole  administration  in  the  hands  of  the  Tzar 
—  an  unrealizable  plan.  His  particular  effort  was  expressed  in 
the  abolition  of  all  the  rights  and  privileges  granted  by  Catherine 
to  certain  classes.  Thus  he  withdrew  the  charters  given  to  cities 
and  to  the  nobility,  and  not  only  abolished  the  rights  of  the  nobles 
for  offering  petitions  concerning  their  needs,  but  even  set  aside 
the  exemption  of  the  nobles  from  corporal  punishment  by  court 
decisions.1 

There  exists  a  view  that  Paul,  negatively  inclined  towards 

1  Let  us  remark  that  there  were  some  just  revocations  of  Cather- 
ine's measures  under  Paul.  Such  were:  The  liberation  of  Novikov 
from  Schluesselburg,  the  recall  of  Radishchev  from  his  exile,  and  the 
solemn  release  with  special  honours  of  Kosciusco  and  the  other  cap- 
tive Poles  who  had  been  kept  in  Petrograd. 


PAUL  AND  THE  PEOPLE  53 

privileges  for  the  upper  classes,  favoured  the  liberation  of  the 
people  from  the  oppression  of  the  landowners.  He  might  have 
had  some  good  intentions,  but  we  can  hardly  ascribe  to  him  any 
seriously  thought  out  system  in  this  regard.  In  support  of  that 
proposition  one  usually  brings  forward  the  Manifesto  of  April  5, 
1797,  which  established  Sunday  rest  and  three  days-barshchina; 
but  the  Manifesto  is  not  quite  correctly  interpreted.  Only  holi- 
day-work for  the  landowner  was  categorically  forbidden,  and 
there  was  an  additional  "  supposition  "  that  three  days-barshchina 
might  be  sufficient  for  the  upkeep  of  the  landowner's  estate. 
The  very  form  of  expressing  that  desideratum,  in  the  absence 
of  any  sanction,  shows  that  there  was  no  law  establishing  a 
three  days-barshchina,  although  later  it  came  to  be  so  inter- 
preted. Furthermore  one  must  mention  that  in  Little  Russia, 
for  instance,  the  three  days-barshchina  was  not  favourable  for 
the  peasants,  since  there  had  prevailed  a  custom  for  two  days- 
barshchina.  Another  law  issued  by  Paul  upon  the  request  of 
Bezborodko,  prohibiting  the  sale  of  bondsmen  without  soil,  af- 
fected only  Little  Russia  (Bezborodko's  birth-place,  Tr.). 

Paul's  attitude  towards  peasant-disturbances  and  their  com- 
plaints against  oppressions  by  their  landowners,  is  quite  charac- 
teristic. At  his  accession  there  burst  out  disturbances  in  thirty- 
two  provinces.  Paul  sent  for  their  suppression  enormous  regi- 
ments under  the  command  of  Fieldmarshal-General  Prince  Riep- 
nin,  who  rapidly  quelled  the  unrest  by  the  employment  of  ruthless 
means.  At  the  suppression  of  twelve  thousand  peasants  of  the 
landowners  Apraksin  and  Prince  Golitzin  in  the  province  of 
Oriol,  a  regular  battle  took  place,  in  which  the  peasants  lost 
twenty  dead  and  about  seventy  wounded.  Riepnin  ordered  the 
dead  peasants  buried  outside  of  the  cemetery  fence  and  put  an 
epitaph  over  their  grave:  "  Here  lie  criminals  before  the  Lord, 
the  Tzar,  and  the  landowners,  justly  punished  according  to 
God's  law."  The  houses  of  those  peasants  were  destroyed  and 
levelled  with  the  ground.  Paul  not  only  approved  of  these 


54  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

measures,  but  issued  a  special  manifesto  on  January  29,  1797, 
in  which  he  threatened  with  similar  punishments  all  peasants 
who  would  not  strictly  obey  their  masters. 

In  another  instance  certain  house-serfs  in  Petrograd  had  at- 
tempted to  complain  before  Paul  of  their  cruel  oppression. 
Without  investigating  the  case,  Paul  ordered  the  peasants  led 
out  on  the  public  square  and  flogged  with  the  knut  "  as  much  as 
their  owners  will  desire." 

Thus  Paul  was  hardly  guilty  of  a  serious  effort  to  improve  the 
condition  of  the  peasants.  He  considered  the  landowners  as 
gratis-police-chiefs,  and  deemed  the  peace  of  the  country  secure 
as  long  as  Russia  had  100,000  such  police-chiefs.  He  was  not 
averse  to  increasing  that  number,  granting  Fiscal  peasants  to  pri- 
vate persons  with  a,  generous  hand :  in  four  years  he  gave  away 
530,000  Fiscal  peasants  of  both  sexes  to  various  landowners  and 
officials,  earnestly  arguing  that  he  did  so  for  the  good  of  the 
peasants,  and  for  the  improvement  of  their  lot,  which  was  not 
true.  Consider  that  Catherine,  who  had  lavishly  rewarded  her 
favourites  and  other  persons  with  peasants,  gave  out  in  all  800,- 
ooo  peasants,  while  Paul  distributed  in  four  years  530,000. 

Of  all  classes  the  clergy  had  most  reasons  to  be  satisfied  with 
Paul,  who  as  a  religious  person  and  as  one  who  assumed  to  be 
the  head  of  the  Church,  cared  for  the  welfare  of  the  clergy ;  but 
even  in  that  case  the  results  were  at  times  strange.  Some  of  his 
cares  had  an  ambiguous  character,  so  that  the  Metropolitan 
Platon,  Paul's  early  religious  instructor  and  greatly  respected 
friend,  was  forced  to  join  those  who  protested  against  certain  of 
his  measures.  The  protest  concerned  the  introduction  of  a  queer 
novelty  —  the  bestowing  of  orders  upon  the  clergy.  Platon 
thought  that  from  the  canonic  point  of  view  the  rewarding  of 
church-ministers  by  lay  authorities  was  not  to  be  allowed.  The 
Metropolitan  besought  Paul  on  his  knees  not  to  honour  him  with 
the  order  of  Andrey  the  First  Called,  but  finally  he  had  to  submit 
and  accept  it.  This  incident  may  appear  unimportant  in  itself, 


RELIGION  AND  EDUCATION  55 

but  it  is  characteristic  of  the  attitude  of  Paul  towards  the  class 
which  he  had  particularly  respected. 

Of  a  greater,  positive  importance  was  Paul's  relation  to  reli- 
gious schools,  for  which  he  did  a  good  deal ;  he  appropriated  for 
them  a  considerable  sum  of  money  from  the  income  of  the  secu- 
larised church-estates.  Here  we  should  note  also  Paul's  toler- 
ant attitude  towards  non-Orthodox  and  even  non-Christian 
churches,  especially  his  favourable  relation  towards  Catholicism. 
The  reason  lies  perhaps  in  his  personal  religiousness  and  high 
estimate  of  clerical  duties;  as  to  the  Catholic  church,  there  Paul's 
place  in  the  Order  of  the  Knights  of  Malta  played  an  important 
role.  He  not  only  accepted  the  supreme  protectorate  of  that 
order,  but  even  permitted  a  special  priorate  of  it  to  open  in 
Petrograd.  This  circumstance,  which  was  due  to  the  Tzar's 
quaint  fantasies,  had  very  important  consequences  on  the  course 
of  international  relations,  as  we  shall  see  later. 

Another  prominent  fact  in  the  sphere  of  church  affairs  under 
Paul  was  his  rather  tolerant  attitude  towards  the  Schismatics. 
In  this  respect  he  followed  the  policy  of  Catherine,  the  traces  of 
whose  reign  he  had  so  energetically  tried  to  destroy  with  all  his 
other  measures.  Upon  the  request  of  Platon  the  Tzar  consented 
to  take  an  important  step,  namely  to  permit  public  worship  to 
those  old  believers  who  did  not  belong  to  the  so  called  pernicious 
sects,  who  were  thus  for  the  first  time  equalised  with  other  non- 
Orthodox  creeds. 

As  to  Paul's  treatment  of  secular  education,  his  activity  in 
that  direction  was  most  reactionary,  one  may  say  destructive. 
Even  at  the  end  of  Catherine's  reign  private  printing-houses  were 
forbidden,  so  that  the  publishing  of  books  had  greatly  decreased ; 
but  under  Paul,  particularly  in  his  last  two  years,  the  number 
of  published  books  was  reduced  to  a  negligible  quantity,  while 
the  nature  of  the  books  had  also  changed  —  there  were  issued 
exclusively  books  for  schools  or  of  some  practical  contents.3  The 

2  The    first   volume    of    Storch's    work,    Gemaelde    des   Russischen 


56  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

import  of  books  published  abroad  was  entirely  prohibited  at  the 
end  of  his  reign,  and  from  the  year  1800  everything  printed 
abroad,  regardless  of  contents,  even  music-notes,  had  no  access 
into  Russia. 

Of  still  greater  importance  was  another  measure  —  the  recall 
of  Russian  students  from  foreign  universities  (there  were  65  in 
Jena,  and  36  in  Leipzig) ,  and  the  forbidding  of  Russian  youths 
to  go  abroad  for  educational  purposes. 

In  his  hatred  for  revolutionary  ideas  and  for  liberalism  in  gen- 
eral, Paul  persecuted  with  the  stubbornness  of  a  maniac  every 
manifestation  of  free  tendencies.  Hence  his  war  against  round 
hats  and  top-boots  which  had  been  worn  in  France,  against  frock- 
coats  and  tricoloured  ribbons.  For  these  crimes  peaceful  citi- 
zens were  severely  persecuted,  officials  were  dismissed,  private 
persons  were  arrested,  many  were  exiled  from  the  capital.  Simi- 
lar punishments  were  inflicted  upon  those  who  failed  to  observe 
the  prescribed  etiquette  upon  meeting  the  Tzar  (at  the  sight  of 
the  Imperial  carriage  passers-by  were  required  to  stop  and  remain 
on  their  knees  until  the  Despot  had  passed  them.  Tr.)  In  view 
of  that  etiquette  the  people  considered  a  meeting  with  the  Tzar 
as  a  great  calamity;  at  the  sight  of  his  approach  they  tried  to 
hide  themselves  in  courtyards,  behind  fences,  and  so  forth.  The 
number  of  persons  exiled  and  imprisoned  for  utter  trivialities 
reached  thousands,  and  there  were  15,000  (or  more  than  12,000, 
according  to  other  sources)  such  persons  rehabilitated  by  Alexan- 
der upon  his  accession. 

The  yoke  of  Paul's  regime  was  felt  most  heavily  by  the  army, 
from  the  orderlies  to  the  generals.  Endless  mustering,  severe 
penalties  for  the  slightest  fault  in  the  front-line,  senseless  ways 
of  instruction,  most  uncomfortable  uniforms,  which  proved  par- 

Reichs,  appeared  in  Riga  in  1797,  while  the  other  volumes  had  to  be 
printed  abroad;  yet  Storch  was  a  persona  grata  at  the  court  —  he 
occupied  the  position  of  personal  reader  to  the  Empress  Maria 
Feodorovna,  and  had  his  first  volume  dedicated  to  Paul. 


PAUL  AND  THE  ARMY  57 

ticularly  annoying  during  the  marching,  which  was  required  to 
be  of  almost  as  high  a  standard  as  the  art  of  ballet ;  finally  the 
compulsory  wearing  of  locks  and  braids  that  were  smeared  with 
lard  and  powdered  with  flour  or  brick-dust  —  all  these  compli- 
cated the  difficulty  of  military  service  which  lasted  at  that  time 
twenty-five  years.  The  officers  and  generals  had  to  fear  for 
their  fate  hourly,  since  the  slightest  imperfection  of  any  of  their 
subordinates  might  provoke  the  most  cruel  consequences,  in  case 
the  Emperor  was  in  bad  humour.  (Paul  was  a  devout  worship- 
per of  the  Prussian  system  of  militarism.  Tr.) 

Such  were  some  of  the  terrors  of  Paul's  regime.  It  is  inter- 
esting to  read  the  opinion  of  the  staunch  conservative  and  advo- 
cate of  autocracy,  N.  M.  Karamzin,  in  his  "  Paper  on  Ancient 
and  Modern  Russia,"  which  he  presented  in  1811  to  Alexander  I 
as  an  argument  against  the  projected  liberal  reforms.  Though 
antagonistic  to  the  liberal  Emperor,  he  thus  characterised  the 
reign  of  Paul :  "  Paul  ascended  the  throne  at  a  time  very  favour- 
able for  autocracy,  when  the  terrors  of  the  French  Revolution 
had  cured  Europe  of  the  dreams  about  civil  liberty  and  equality  ; 
but  what  the  Jacobines  had  done  for  the  republic  Paul  did  for  the 
autocracy :  he  forced  hatred  against  its  abuses.  In  his  miserable 
fallacy  of  mind,  and  because  of  his  numerous  personal  bitter  ex- 
periences he  wished  to  be  an  Ivan  IV  (The  Terrible.  Tr.)  ;  but 
the  Russians  had  already  had  Catherine  II,  had  known  that  the 
monarch  not  less  than  the  subjects  was  bound  to  fulfil  his  sacred 
duties,  the  neglecting  of  which  destroys  the  ancient  covenant  be- 
tween rule  and  obedience  and  hurls  the  people  from  the  heights 
of  civilism  into  the  chaos  of  individual  natural  rights.  The  son 
of  Catherine  could  have  both  remained  a  strict  monarch  and 
deserved  the  gratitude  of  his  country ;  but  to  the  great  astonish- 
ment of  the  Russians  he  began  to  dominate  by  force  of  general 
terror  (ising?),  following  no  statutes  save  his  own  whims;  he 
considered  us  not  as  subjects,  but  as  slaves ;  executed  for  no  guilt, 
rewarded  for  no  merits,  deprived  punishment  of  shame,  reward  — 


58  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

of  its  glory,  humiliated  ranks  and  ribbons  by  lavishing  them 
without  limit;  he  frivolously  destroyed  results  of  years-long 
state-wisdom  out  of  hatred  for  his  mother's  enactments;  he  killed 
in  our  army  the  heroic  spirit  cultivated  by  Catherine,  and  sup- 
planted it  with  corporalship.  The  heroes  who  had  been  accus- 
tomed to  victories,  he  taught  how  to  march ;  reverted  the  nobility 
from  military  service ;  while  despising  the  soul,  he  respected  caps 
and  collars ;  although  of  a  natural  human  inclination  to  do  good, 
he  nourished  himself  on  the  gall  of  evil :  day  after  day  he  invented 
means  for  terrifying  people,  and  was  himself  afraid  most  of  all ; 
he  had  intended  to  erect  for  himself  an  inaccessible  palace  —  and 
erected  a  tomb  .  .  .  Let  us  note,"  Karamzin  added,  "  a  curious 
feature:  in  the  opinion  of  foreigners  the  Russians  were  afraid 
even  to  think  during  that  reign  of  terror ;  nay !  they  spoke  openly, 
became  silent  only  out  of  ennui  and  frequent  repetition,  confided 
in  one  another  and  were  not  deceived.  A  spirit  of  sincere 
brotherhood  reigned  in  the  capitals ;  the  common  misfortune  had 
united  all  hearts,  and  the  magnanimous  indignation  against  the 
abuses  of  the  Crown  had  drowned  the  voice  of  personal  safety." 
Analogous  information  may  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Wiegel 
and  Grech,  also  avowed  conservatives. 

We  must,  however,  say  that  the  "  magnanimous  indignation  " 
was  not  expressed  in  any  action.  The  public  had  not  even  tried 
to  demonstrate  its  attitude  towards  Paul  through  some  general 
protest;  it  hated  in  silence,  but  that  general  mood  gave  the  few 
conspirators  of  the  coup  d'etat  of  March  u,  1801,  sufficient  en- 
couragement for  the  removal  of  Paul. 

The  economic  condition  of  the  country  could  not  have  altered 
considerably  under  Paul,  in  view  of  the  brief  duration  of  his 
reign;  as  to  the  financial  position  of  Russia,  it  had  depended 
largely  upon  his  foreign  policy  and  the  whimsical  changes  that 
had  taken  place  in  it  during  his  time.  Paul  began  with  a  con- 
clusion of  peace  with  Persia  and  the  revocation  of  the  recruit- 
ment-conscription decreed  by  Catherine;  he  declined  to  send 


PAUL  AND  FINANCE  59 

an  army  of  forty  thousand  men  against  the  French  republic,  to 
which  Catherine  had  consented  owing  to  the  pleadings  of  the 
British  ambassador,  Witworth,  and  recalled  the  Russian  vessels 
that  had  been  sent  to  help  the  English  fleet.  Then  he  started  on 
the  extinguishing  of  the  Assignational  loan.  The  Government 
decided  to  withdraw  a  portion  of  the  issued  assignations ;  in  the 
presence  of  Paul  there  took  place  a  solemn  burning  of  assigna- 
tions for  the  sum  of  six  million  rubles.  Thus  the  total  amount 
of  issued  assignations  fell  from  157  million  to  151  million,  i.e., 
a  decrease  of  less  than  4  per  cent.,  but  even  that  slight  difference 
was  significant  as  indicating  the  Government's  intention  to  pay 
debts  rather  than  accumulate  them.  At  the  same  time  steps 
were  taken  for  the  strengthening  of  the  course  of  the  silver 
money;  a  permanent  weight  of  the  silver  ruble  was  established, 
to  be  equivalent  to  the  weight  of  four  francs.  Then  of  great 
importance  was  the  restoration  of  the  liberal  custom-tariff  of 
1782,  a  measure  taken  by  Paul  not  because  of  his  belief  in  free 
trade  but  from  his  desire  to  annul  the  tariff  introduced  by  Cath- 
erine in  1793. 

The  new  tariff  helped  to  develop  national  trade.  For  big 
industry  a  great  service  was  played  by  the  discovery  of  coal  in 
the  basin  of  the  Donietz.  This  discovery,  made  in  southern 
Russia,  a  region  poor  in  forests,  immediately  influenced  the  con- 
ditions of  industry  in  the  New-Russia  district.  Of  great  signifi- 
cance for  the  growth  of  internal  trade  relations  and  for  the 
transportation  of  certain  products  to  ports  was  the  opening  of 
new  canals  under  Paul;  some  of  them  had  been  begun  under 
Catherine.  The  Oginsky  Canal  connecting  the  basin  of  the 
Dnieper  with  the  river  Niemen  was  begun  in  1797  and  finished 
in  the  same  reign;  a  canal  was  dug  (by  Sivers)  around  lake 
Ilmen;  one  of  the  lake  Ladoga  canals,  the  Siassky,  was  started; 
the  works  for  the  Maryinsky  canal  were  continued.  Under 
Paul  was  also  established  a  free-port  system  in  the  Crimea, 
which  proved  an  enlivening  stimulus  for  the  South. 


60  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

But  the  improvement  of  economic  conditions  in  the  country 
did  not  endure  long,  and  the  national  finances  soon  experienced 
new  vacillations.  In  1 798  the  peaceful  course  of  events  was  sud- 
denly interrupted.  At  that  time  Napoleon  Bonaparte  on  his  way 
to  Egypt  captured  the  island  of  Malta.  The  island  had  an 
impregnable  fortress,  but  the  Grand  Master  of  the  Order  for 
some  unknown  reason  (treason  was  even  suspected)  surrendered 
it  without  battle,  removed  the  archives  and  treasures  and  de- 
parted for  Venice.  The  Petrograd  priorate  declared  him  de- 
posed, and  some  time  after,  to  the  general  astonishment,  Paul, 
the  head  of  the  Orthodox  church,  accepted  the  title  of  Grand 
Master  of  that  Catholic  order,  subject  to  the  Pope.  There 
exists  a  theory  that  in  Paul's  mind  that  strange  step  was  con- 
nected with  a  fantastic  undertaking  —  the  ubiquitous  eradication 
of  revolutions  by  way  of  uniting  all  the  nobles  of  the  world 
under  the  Maltian  order.  Whether  this  was  so,  is  hard  to  say ; 
but  certainly  the  idea  was  not  realised.  Having  declared  war 
against  France,  and  being  unwilling  to  fight  single-handed,  Paul 
assisted  Pitt  in  creating  a  strong  coalition  against  the  Republic. 
He  entered  into  an  alliance  with  Austria  and  England,  then  into 
the  coalition  came  the  Sardinian  kingdom  and  even  Turkey, 
which  had  suffered  from  Napoleon's  invasion  into  Syria.  Fol- 
lowing the  counsel  of  the  emperor  of  Austria,  Paul  appointed 
Suvorov  commander  of  the  allied  armies  of  Russia  and  Austria. 
Suvorov  had  been  under  ban,  and  stayed  in  his  estate  surveyed  by 
the  police;  he  disliked  Paul's  military  changes,  and  had  let  him 
feel  it  through  masqued  jokes  and  frolics,  for  which  he  paid 
with  disgrace  and  exile.  But  now  Paul  appealed  to  Suvorov  in 
his  own  name  and  in  the  name  of  the  emperor  of  Austria. 
Suvorov  accepted  the  commandership  with  joy.  His  campaign 
was  signified  by  brilliant  victories  over  the  French  in  Northern 
Italy  and  by  the  famous  crossing  of  the  Alps.  But  when 
Northern  Italy  had  been  cleared  of  the  French  Austria  was 
satisfied  and  refused  to  support  Suvorov  in  his  further  plans. 


PAUL  AND  NAPOLEON  61 

Suvorov  was  unable  to  carry  through  his  plan  of  proceeding  to 
Paris.  This  "  Austrian  treachery  "  caused  the  defeat  of  General 
Rimsky-Korsakov's  regiment  by  the  French.  Paul  was  infu- 
riated and  recalled  his  army,  thus  bringing  to  an  end  the  war  with 
France.  At  the  same  time  the  Russian  corps  sent  to  Holland 
against  the  French  was  not  adequately  supported  by  the  British, 
who  failed,  besides,  to  keep  the  agreement  about  paying  proper 
wages  to  the  soldiers ;  again  Paul  was  indignant. 

In  the  meantime  Napoleon  returned  from  Egypt  to  carry  out 
his  first  coup  d'etat:  on  Brumaire  18  he  overthrew  the  Directory, 
and  became  First  Consul,  actually  the  lord  of  France.  See- 
ing that  things  were  leading  to  the  restoration  of  the  monarchy, 
even  if  by  the  "  usurper,"  Paul  changed  his  attitude  towards 
France,  expecting  Napoleon  to  do  away  with  the  last  vestiges 
of  the  revolution.  Napoleon,  in  his  turn,  skilfully  flattered  him 
by  releasing  and  sending  back  with  gifts  the  Russian  prisoners, 
without  any  demand  of  exchange.  This  impressed  the  knight- 
spirit  in  Paul,  and  in  the  hope  of  gaining  Napoleon's  co-operation 
in  other  questions,  he  entered  with  him  into  a  discussion  of  terms 
of  peace  and  of  an  alliance  against  England,  whom  he  held  re- 
sponsible for  the  defeat  of  his  army  in  Holland.  It  was  not 
difficult  for  Napoleon  to  array  Paul  against  the  English,  for 
about  that  time  the  latter  had  taken  Malta  from  the  French, 
and  did  not  give  it  back  to  the  Order. 

Immediately,  ignoring  all  international  treaties,  Paul  placed 
an  embargo  on  all  the  English  merchant-vessels,  put  through 
radical  changes  in  the  customs-tariff,  and  finally  forbade  alto- 
gether the  export  and  import  of  goods  to  and  from  England 
and  Prussia,  which  was  then  on  the  side  of  the  British.  By 
these  measures  directed  against  the  English  Paul  shook  the 
entire  Russian  trade.  Not  satisfied  with  the  custom  repressions 
Paul  ordered  arrested  all  English  goods  in  the  stores.  Evidently 
encouraged  by  Napoleon,  Paul  decided  to  strike  England  on  its 
sore  spot:  he  determined  to  conquer  India,  a  task  that  seemed 


62  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

quite  easy  to  him.  Forty  regiments  of  Don-Cossacks  went  to 
take  India,  equipped  with  double  sets  of  horses,  but  without 
provender,  with  no  good  maps  and  with  impassable  steppes  to 
pass  through.  The  army  was  naturally  doomed  to  perish.  The 
folly  of  that  act  appeared  so  obvious  to  his  contemporaries  that 
the  Princess  Lieven,  wife  of  the  Tzar's  closest  adjutant-general, 
stated  in  her  memoirs  that  Paul  undertook  the  plan  in  order  to 
abolish  deliberately  the  Cossack  army,  which  he  suspected  of 
excessive  love  for  freedom.  The  suggestion  was  not  true,  of 
course,  but  it  shows  the  sort  of  intentions  ascribed  to  Paul  by 
his  entourage.  Happily  that  march  began  two  months  before 
Paul's  death  and  Alexander  hastened  on  the  very  night  of  the 
overthrow  to  send  a  courier  for  the  return  of  the  unlucky  Cos- 
sacks; it  was  found  that  they  had  not  yet  reached  the  frontier, 
but  had  already  lost  half  of  their  horses.  .  .  . 

This  fact  illustrates  Paul's  madness  and  the  horrible  conse- 
quences which  his  measures  could  have  had.  The  finances  were 
naturally  painfully  affected  by  his  campaigns  and  expeditions. 
We  have  seen  him  burning  six  millions'  worth  of  assignations 
early  in  his  reign,  but  his  wars  required  extra  expenses,  and  he 
was  forced  to  issue  assignations  again,  since  there  was  no  other 
source  for  money.  By  the  end  of  his  reign  their  sum  rose  from 
151  to  212  millions,  which  definitely  devalued  the  paper-ruble. 
Such  were  the  results  of  Paul's  international  policy. 

In  summarising  Paul's  reign  we  see  that  the  territorial  boun- 
daries remained  intact.  The  tzar  of  Gruzia,  pressed  by  Persia, 
declared  in  January,  1801,  his  desire  to  become  a  Russian  sub- 
ject; but  the  formal  annexation  of  Gruzia  took  place  under 
Alexander. 

As  to  the  condition  of  the  people,  Paul's  measures,  however 
pernicious  they  had  been,  could  not  cause  any  profound  effects  in 
four  years.  The  most  disastrous  change  in  the  peasant-life  was 
the  transference  from  the  state-class  into  private  bondage  of 
530,000  persons  distributed  by  Paul  among  private  citizens. 


COMMERCE  AND  INDUSTRY  63 

In  the  realm  of  commerce  and  industry,  despite  the  numerous 
favourable  conditions  at  the  beginning  of  the  reign,  towards  the 
end  the  foreign  trade  was  annihilated,  and  the  internal  trade  in 
the  most  chaotic  state.  A  still  greater  chaos  reigned  in  the  na- 
tional and  provincial  administration. 

Such  was  the  situation  of  Russia  when  Paul  ceased  to  exist.3 

8  The  personality  of  the  half -demented  Tzar  and  the  circum- 
stances of  his  assassination  are  vividly  and  truthfully  pictured  by 
Merezhkovsky  in  his  play,  "Paul  I."—  TR. 


CHAPTER  IV 

WITH  March  12,  1801,  begins  the  history  of  Russia 
in  the  nineteenth  century.  I  deem  it  not  useless 
to  cast  a  preliminary  view  at  its  contents,  and  to  say 
a  few  words  about  its  possible  division  into  periods.  At  this  I 
recall  the  words  which  I  heard  twenty-five  years  ago  in  a  lec- 
ture by  Professor  V.  I.  Sergeyevich :  "  If  history  has  to  do  with 
the  developmental  laws  of  human  societies,  then  its  division  into 
periods  reflecting  the  consequentiality  of  that  development  has 
an  essential  significance:  in  the  division  of  history  into  periods 
is  its  whole  sense,  the  entire  philosophy  of  its  course  and 
changes." 

It  is  clear  from  my  preceding  exposition  that  I  share  this  view 
on  the  role  of  the  periodical  division  of  history.  I  have  char- 
acterised the  first  long  period  of  Russian  history,  and  have 
pointed  out  the  advent  of  a  new  period  under  Catherine  and 
those  changes  which  accompanied  the  process  that  formed  the 
contents  of  the  history  of  Russia  in  the  nineteenth  century.  This 
new  period,  of  the  nineteenth  century,  may  in  its  turn  be  divided 
into  two  large  parts.  The  process  of  the  "  unbinding  "  of  all 
classes  and  the  mitigation  of  the  autocratic  despotism  has  been 
carried  on  by  the  way  of  inter-class  struggle  and  by  the  way  of 
a  struggle  between  the  Government  and  the  most  conscious  and 
progressive  representatives  of  the  public.  The  course  and  out- 
come of  that  struggle  were  influenced  by  internal  as  well  as 
by  foreign  events  taking  place  during  that  time;  all  these  phe- 
nomena and  facts  compose  the  subject  of  this  book.  If  we 
shall  bear  in  mind  only  the  most  general  course  of  the  historical 
process  in  the  development  of  which  those  phenomena  took  place, 

64 


THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  65 

we  may  point  out  from  the  outset  the  two  epochs  into  which 
the  process  is  naturally  divided  by  the  chief  event  of  internal 
Russian  history  in  the  nineteenth  century  —  the  abolition  of 
serfdom. 

From  this  point  of  view  to  the  first  period  of  the  nineteenth 
century  belong  the  reigns  of  Alexander  I  and  Nicholas  I,  char- 
acterised by  preparations  for  the  fall  of  bondage  —  the  event 
that  has  served  as  a  starting  point  for  the  liberation  of  the 
whole  population.  To  the  next  period  we  must  assign  the  fol- 
lowing four  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century,  when  the  results 
of  the  abolition  of  serfdom  had  developed  the  further  process  of 
the  substitution  by  a  constitutional  of  the  autocratic  state. 

These  are  the  two  main  stages  in  the  history  of  the  last  cen- 
tury, but  in  the  detailed  study  of  the  events  and  facts  that  have 
taken  place  in  the  course  of  the  process  we  shall  have  to  observe 
considerably  more  stages  and  periodical  subdivisions. 

In  Russia  only  the  first  years  of  the  nineteenth  century  passed 
peacefully;  the  external  peace  and  the  progressive  tendencies  of 
the  Government  helped  the  regular  course  of  the  internal  life 
and  the  calm  evolution  of  the  historical  process  for  which  pre- 
ceding history  had  prepared.  Then  the  general  course  of  events 
in  Western  Europe,  which  had  grown  very  stormy  and  threat- 
ened to  engulf  the  whole  universe  into  its  whirlpool,  had  in- 
fluenced resolutely  the  tempo  and  direction  of  Russian  affairs. 
It  had  influenced  the  tendency  of  the  Russian  Government  and 
the  change  in  the  nature  of  its  task ;  the  participation  in  the  uni- 
versal struggle  had  checked  the  peaceful  trend  of  evolution,  but 
it  had  also  accelerated  the  tempo  of  events,  quickening  the  beat 
of  the  pulse  in  the  national  organism  and  drawing  Russia  reso- 
lutely into  the  sphere  of  European  social  life.  The  reign  of 
Alexander  was  full  of  great  events,  and  the  progress  of  Russian 
life  went  on  rapidly  and  turbulently  under  external  shocks,  but 
with  marked  vacillations,  making,  so  to  say,  considerable  zigzags. 
These  zigzags  are  the  fractional  periods  or  stages  into  which  the 


66  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

reign  of  Alexander  must  be  divided.  I  count  six  such  stages 
in  the  first  quarter  of  the  last  century. 

The  first  stage  of  Alexander's  reign —  1801-1805  —  is  char- 
acterised by  the  Emperor's  ardent  and  sincere  reformatory  activ- 
ity, taken  up  on  his  own  initiative  —  the  period  of  most  rosy 
though  indefinite  expectations  on  the  part  of  the  people.  The 
next  two  years  (1805-1807)  stand  sharply  apart:  they  are  the 
years  of  the  first  wars  with  Napoleon,  wars  that  were  carried 
on  without  any  visible  relation  to  Russian  interests,  heavily  im- 
pressed the  position  of  the  people,  and  temporarily  interrupted 
the  reforms  of  the  Government. 

The  third  period  (1808-1811)  is  marked  by  Alexander's  al- 
liance with  Napoleon,  and  in  connection  with  this,  by  the  Con- 
tinental System  which  had  an  enormous  significance,  disastrous 
for  Russian  trade,  and  provoked  the  first  friction  between  the 
Government  and  the  people.  At  the  same  time  those  four  years 
saw  the  second  attempt  to  introduce  reforms,  less  ardent  and 
important,  but  undertaken  in  connection  with  the  public  dissatis- 
faction, and  therefore  symptomatic.  Society  began  to  regard 
Alexander's  policy  consciously  and  critically. 

Then  followed  the  fourth  period  (1812-1815),  when  not 
only  the  Government  but  the  whole  country  took  part  in  the 
greatest  universal  events  of  that  time. 

The  fifth  period  (1816-1820)  passed  for  Alexander  largely 
in  international  congresses,  and  for  the  public  in  expectation  of 
reforms  and  reorganisations  which  they  regarded  more  con- 
sciously, putting  forth  definite  demands,  but  still  not  breaking 
completely  with  the  Government  and  not  losing  hope  for  its 
reformatory  activity. 

The  sixth  period  (1821—1825)  was  quite  definitely  reactionary 
in  the  ruling  spheres,  showed  despair  on  the  part  of  the  people, 
and  the  formation  of  a  revolutionary  movement,  subterranean 
but  very  keen  and  of  definite  political  ideals. 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  ALEXANDER         67 

Before  discussing  the  events  of  his  reign  I  shall  define  the 
personality  of  Alexander,  a  personality  that  greatly  influenced 
the  internal  and  external  development  of  Russia  and  of  con- 
temporary Europe. 

Alexander  was  the  eldest  grandson  and  personal  pupil  of 
Catherine,  who  with  much  energy,  and  revealing  a  remarkable 
pedagogical  talent,  endeavoured  to  make  out  of  him  if  not  an 
ideal  man,  at  least  an  ideal  ruler.  The  Imperial  grandmother 
took  him  away  immediately  after  his  birth,  and  had  closely  ob- 
served to  the  slightest  details  his  nourishment  and  education, 
personally  inspecting  his  nursery,  composing  an  alphabet  and 
fairy-tales  for  her  little  grandson,  and  later  not  sparing  her  time 
in  digging  out  old  chronicles  and  first  sources  in  order  to  write 
for  him  a  history  text-book.  In  her  letters  to  Baron  Grimm  she 
expressed  her  views  on  physical  and  mental  education  and  on  the 
application  of  her  views  to  the  bringing  up  of  Alexander;  in 
them  she  showed  not  only  a  profound  intellect  but  such  energy, 
tenderness,  and  love  for  her  grandson,  as  one  could  hardly  have 
suspected  in  that  woman  accustomed  to  spend  her  time  upon 
either  state  affairs  or  personal  pleasures  —  sensual  and  intel- 
lectual. 

Later  Catherine  carefully  thought  out  a  plan  for  the  further 
education  and  development  of  her  grandson,  and  she  drew  up 
her  instructions  for  the  staff  of  teachers  and  governors,  whose 
chief  was  Count  Saltykov.  One  of  the  teachers,  Masson,  sar- 
castically remarks  in  his  memoirs  that  the  main  and  exclusive 
function  of  Saltykov  consisted  in  guarding  Alexander  and  his 
brother  from  draught  and  indigestion.  But  the  choice  of  that 
ordinary  individual  as  chief  educator  of  the  Grand  Duke  was 
explained  by  the  fact  that  Catherine  intended  to  use  Saltykov  as 
a  screen  for  her  personal  interest  in  the  high  pupil.  Besides, 
Saltykov  in  his  rank  of  court-steward  in  Paul's  household  had 
shown  his  skill  as  mediator  between  the  Empress  and  her  son 


68  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

and  smoothed  over  many  frictions  and  difficulties.  Catherine 
had  evidently  hoped  to  be  able  to  use  his  services  in  the  future 
relations  between  Paul  and  Alexander. 

The  real  teachers  were  indeed  remarkable  persons.  First 
among  them  was  the  Swiss,  La  Harpe,  whose  discovery  and 
selection  Catherine  owed  to  her  connection  with  the  best  intel- 
lectual forces  of  contemporary  Europe.  Grimm  recommended 
him  for  a  travelling  companion  to  Lanskoy,  the  younger  brother 
of  Catherine's  favourite.  In  1782,  when  Alexander  was  barely 
five  years  old,  La  Harpe  was  invited  to  remain  with  him  as 
Chevalier  and  to  teach  him  French.  Two  years  later  La  Harpe 
presented  a  memorandum  about  the  education  of  the  future  em- 
peror, expressing  lofty  views  on  the  duties  of  the  monarch  to 
his  subjects.  Catherine  approved  of  his  views  and  plans  and 
gave  him  full  liberty  to  imbue  Alexander  with  his  own  ideas, 
which  corresponded  to  the  ideas  of  the  foremost  people  of  his 
age. 

La  Harpe  was  brought  up  on  republican  and  democratic  ideas ; 
he  had  a  high  education,  and  professed  lofty  views  not  only  in 
theory,  but  was  in  real  life  scrupulously  honest,  straightforward, 
sincere,  and  incorruptible.  These  moral  qualities  had  as  much 
influence  on  Alexander  as  the  knowledge  which  La  Harpe  trans- 
mitted to  him. 

La  Harpe  remained  Alexander's  tutor  and  educator  eleven 
years,  from  1784  to  1795,  and  Alexander  had  frequently  declared 
afterwards  in  public  that  whatever  was  good  in  him  he  owed 
to  La  Harpe. 

The  selection  of  a  religious  instructor  for  Alexander  and 
Constantine  (his  brother)  was  quite  characteristic.  The  Arch- 
presbyter  Somborsky  was  married  to  an  Englishwoman,  lived  in 
England  a  long  time,  and  had  become  so  accustomed  to  condi- 
tions of  Western  Europe  that  Catherine  was  forced  to  permit 
htm  to  wear  secular  garments  and  shave  his  beard  and  mous- 
tache, to  the  confusion  of  the  entourage.  (Orthodox  clergy  do 


ALEXANDER'S  EDUCATION  69 

not  cut  or  trim  their  hair  and  whiskers.  Tr.)  Somborsky  re- 
mained with  Alexander  not  less  than  nine  years,  and  had  a 
favourable  influence  on  his  pupils,  inspiring  them  with  the  belief 
that  they  must  "  find  in  every  human  being  their  neighbour  in 
order  to  fulfil  the  law  of  God."  He  also  taught  Alexander 
English  (which  Alexander  knew  from  his  infancy,  his  nurse 
being  an  Englishwoman). 

His  instructor  in  Russian  language  and  history  was  Mikhail 
Muraviov,  one  of  the  best  Russian  writers  at  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  who  later  collaborated  with  Karamzin  in  his 
researches  into  Russian  history.  He  was  the  father  of  the 
famous  Decembrist,  Nikita  Muraviov.  Alexander  preserved  for 
him  respect  and  gratitude  all  his  life.  One  should  mention  also 
Masson,  his  instructor  in  mathematics,  Pallas,  the  well  known 
traveller  who  taught  him  geography,  and  the  professor  of 
physics,  Kraft.  His  tutor,  General  Protasov,  who  had  left  a 
curious  diary,  had  a  considerable  influence  over  him.  He  was  a 
man  of  old  regulations,  but  undoubtedly  conscientious  and  hon- 
est ;  being  a  patriot  and  a  conservative  he  did  not  approve  of  La 
Harpe's  political  views,  but  admitted  his  merits,  valuing  his 
honesty  and  incorruptibility.  Protasov's  role  consisted  mainly 
in  watching  Alexander's  behaviour,  in  reprimanding  him  for  the 
slightest  fault,  to  which  Alexander  reacted  patiently  and  kindly. 

Such  was  Alexander's  education  until  the  age  of  sixteen. 
Unfortunately  the  broad  educational  plans  of  Catherine  and 
La  Harpe  were  not  brought  to  a  conclusion,  but  were  twisted  in 
the  end,  when  in  her  last  year  new  state-plans  had  taken  hold 
of  the  Empress.  Definitely  convinced  of  Paul's  incapacity  for 
the  throne,  she  decided  to  set  him  aside  and  proclaim  Alexander 
her  heir.  At  the  same  time,  having  in  mind  her  old  age,  she 
determined  to  hasten  the  education  of  her  grandson.  To  make 
him  appear  grown-up  in  the  eyes  of  the  court  she  found  nothing 
better  than  marrying  him  before  he  was  yet  sixteen.  La  Harpe 
had  fallen  into  disgrace :  the  Empress  had  expected  that  he  would 


70  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

sympathise  with  the  idea  of  substituting  Alexander  for  Paul  and 
assist  her  in  preparing  his  pupil  for  the  plan.  But  the  straight 
and  strict  La  Harpe  suspected  a  court-intrigue,  and  although 
Paul's  attitude  towards  him  was  hostile  he  categorically  refused 
to  take  part  in  Catherine's  plan.  The  irritated  Empress  dis- 
missed him  immediately  after  Alexander's  wedding  under  the 
pretext  that  the  married  Grand  Duke  was  no  longer  in  need 
of  a  tutor.  Thus  Alexander  was  deprived  of  his  chief  guide  and 
instructor  and  at  the  same  time  entered  into  a  position  which 
did  not  in  the  least  correspond  with  his  age. 

The  plans  for  his  education  were  in  this  way  confounded. 
True,  he  continued  reading  books  according  to  the  programme  of 
La  Harpe,  who  had  left,  upon  Alexander's  request,  a  detailed 
instruction  about  his  behaviour  on  all  occasions.  To  be  sure 
the  ten  years'  teaching  of  La  Harpe  could  not  have  remained 
without  influence;  but  the  premature  interruption  of  his  regu- 
lated and  systematic  education  had  a  very  bad  effect  on  Alex- 
ander. La  Harpe  instilled  into  Alexander  a  number  of  high 
ideas  and  noble  strivings,  but  he  had  not  had  time  to  give  him 
a  sufficient  amount  of  positive  knowledge,  the  acquisition  of 
which  was  to  begin  just  at  the  moment  when  his  education  was 
stopped.  In  regard  to  his  liberal  ideas  and  humanitarian  views, 
Catherine  herself,  though  quite  reactionary  at  the  end  of  her 
reign,  continued  in  her  conversations  with  Alexander  to  side 
with  the  liberal  ideas  of  the  Enlightenment  epoch.  Curiously 
enough,  she  read  and  explained  to  him  the  famous  Declaration 
of  Rights,  thus  strengthening  in  him  his  liberal  ideas  and  even 
republican  dreams. 

But  all  this  did  not  make  up  for  the  lack  of  positive  knowl- 
edge, which,  according  to  the  memoirs  of  Prince  Adam 
Czartoryski,  was  responsible  for  the  excessive  dreaminess  of 
Alexander's  intentions. 

The  development  of  Alexander's  character  was  unfavourably 
influenced  by  the  abnormal  family  conditions  and  by  the  un- 


ALEXANDER  UNDER  CATHERINE  71 

healthy  court  atmosphere  in  which  he  grew  up,  and  which  could 
not  be  paralysed  by  any  educational  plans. 

Towards  Catherine  Alexander  had  always  expressed  a  tender 
feeling,  not  at  all  times,  however,  sincere.  With  the  growth  of 
consciousness  in  the  sensitive  youth  he  could  not  overlook  the 
mass  of  contradictions  between  the  ideas  preached  to  him  and 
the  facts  round  about  him.  Neither  could  he  help  observing  the 
abnormal  relations  that  existed  between  him  and  his  parents, 
and  between  the  latter  and  Catherine.  The  more  he  grew  and 
developed  the  more  his  eyes  opened  to  the  negative  sides  of 
Catherine's  court  and  to  the  unpleasant  features  of  Catherine 
herself.  He  could  hardly  as  yet  appreciate  her  state-merits  and 
brilliant  gifts,  but  he  could  certainly  observe  or  at  least  feel 
quite  early  the  atmosphere  of  falsehood  and  intrigues  that  had 
surrounded  her.  La  Harpe  and  Protasov  did  their  duty  in 
implanting  in  their  pupil  good  feelings  for  his  father,  while  Paul 
himself  could  not  or  would  not  conceal  his  negative  attitude 
towards  the  "  big  court."  At  any  rate  Alexander  felt,  if  he 
did  not  know  definitely,  that  his  grandmother  was  responsible 
for  the  tense  relations  between  her  and  his  father,  and  that  the 
latter  was  the  suffering  and  persecuted  victim.  Under  such 
conditions  it  appears  very  probable  that  in  spite  of  the  savage 
and  unattractive  manners  in  Gatchina  there  grew  up  in  the 
heart  of  the  youthful  Alexander  some  sympathy  for  the  position 
of  his  father  and  a  concealed  condemnation  of  Catherine.  Little 
by  little  he  began  to  express  in  secret  to  his  friends  his  negative 
attitude  towards  his  grandmother  and  her  entourage.  Openly 
he  could  not  speak  it,  trained  as  he  was  from  his  childhood  to 
tell  his  grandmother  only  respectful  and  flattering  phrases.  No 
wonder  that  under  such  circumstances  there  developed  in  him 
early  dissimulation  and  hypocrisy.  It  is  quite  probable  that  he 
had  received  instructions  in  that  spirit  at  the  "  little  court,"  if 
not  from  his  father  then  from  his  mother.  All  the  flagrant,  and 
in  his  eyes  revolting,  contradictions  between  the  ideas  preached 


72  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

to  him  from  his  childhood  and  the  surrounding  reality,  aroused 
in  Alexander  a  natural  disgust  for  the  court  life  and  the  atmos- 
phere of  falsehood,  intrigues,  lewdness,  and  cupidity  that  reigned 
there.  By  nature  reserved,  mild,  disinclined  to  sharp  forms  of 
protesting,  and  at  the  same  time  greatly  inclined  towards  dream- 
ing and  idealisation,  owing  to  the  peculiarities  of  his  education, 
he  began  to  form  plans  of  a  peaceful  existence  as  a  private  person 
somewhere  on  the  Rhine,  and  gradually  came  to  the  conviction 
of  the  possibility  and  necessity  of  abdicating  from  his  future  high 
but  unpleasant  position.  Alexander's  young  wife,  Elizabeth, 
the  Princess  of  Baden,  who  was  barely  fourteen  at  her  marriage, 
shared  these  plans  and  maybe  took  part  in  their  formulation 
and  development.  According  to  the  unanimous  testimony  of 
her  contemporaries,  the  Grand  Duchess  Elizabeth  was  an  ex- 
tremely attractive  and  fascinating  person,  of  an  honest  mind  and 
developed  intellect  open  for  all  the  lofty  ideas  and  conceptions 
that  had  then  inspired  her  husband.  During  the  years  preceding 
Alexander's  accession  the  young  couple  lived  in  perfect  harmony ; 
one  may  even  suppose  that  Elizabeth,  more  passionate  and  out- 
spoken than  her  husband,  had  exercised  a  certain  influence  on  the 
further  development  of  the  principles  they  worked  out  together. 
In  the  last  year  of  Catherine's  reign  Alexander's  plans,  directly 
opposed  to  her  plans,  had  evidently  ripened  definitely,  and  he 
described  them  in  his  letters  to  La  Harpe  and  to  his  young  friend 
Kochubey,  then  ambassador  at  Constantinople,  and  later  in  a 
conversation  with  the  young  Polish  aristocrat  and  patriot,  Prince 
Adam  Czartoryski,  with  whom  he  became  acquainted  not  long 
before.  It  is  not  known  what  La  Harpe  and  Kochubey  replied 
(if  they  did  reply),  but  Czartoryski  testifies  in  his  memoirs  that 
however  impressed  he  was  with  the  mood  of  the  youthful  Alex- 
ander, however  he  admired  the  sincerity,  enthusiasm,  and  sim- 
plicity with  which  Alexander  confided  to  him  his  thoughts,  he 
even  then  was  able  to  discern  in  them  dreamy  and  egoistic  ele- 
ments, which  opinion  he  did  not  conceal  from  his  exalted  friend. 


ALEXANDER  UNDER  PAUL  73 

The  convictions  of  Czartoryski  and  of  his  other  young  friends  — 
Stroganov  and  Novosiltzev  —  impressed  Alexander,  and  he  ad- 
mitted that  he  had  no  right  to  decline  the  burden  which  was 
descending  upon  his  shoulders  at  a  moment  of  difficulty  for 
the  country,  and  he  soon  changed  his  original  decision.  Several 
months  after  his  conversation  with  Czartoryski  he  declared  that 
he  saw  himself  obliged  to  ascend  the  throne,  when  the  time  came, 
and  that  he  must  first  grant  the  land  a  firm,  free,  political 
structure  before  he  might  abdicate  and  retreat  into  private  life. 

Later  events  proved  the  last  decision  of  Alexander  also  a 
dream  that  was  not  realised.  But  before  he  could  bear  the 
test  he  had  to  live  through  the  four  years  of  his  father's  reign  — 
the  most  trying  period  in  Alexander's  life. 

Those  four  years  were  morbidly  reflected  in  the  final  formation 
of  his  character  and  on  his  subsequent  fate.  His  own  position 
and  the  position  of  all  Russia  at  that  time  were  passionately 
described  by  him  in  a  letter  to  La  Harpe  secretly  sent  with 
Novosiltzev,  who  fled  abroad  from  the  horrors  of  Paul's  reign 
in  September,  1797.  "To  state  briefly,"  he  wrote  in  that 
letter,  "  the  welfare  of  the  state  plays  no  role  in  the  management 
of  affairs.  There  exists  only  an  unlimited  power  which  does 
everything  topsy-turvy.  It  is  impossible  to  relate  all  the  mad- 
nesses that  have  taken  place  here.  Add  to  it  severity  which  lacks 
the  slightest  justice,  not  a  small  amount  of  partiality,  and  abso- 
lute inexperience  in  matters  (of  state).  The  choice  of  execu- 
tives is  based  on  favouritism,  merits  are  of  no  account.  In  a 
word,  my  unhappy  country  is  in  an  indescribable  state.  The 
farmer  is  abused,  trade  is  oppressed,  freedom  and  personal  se- 
curity are  abolished.  Such  is  the  picture  of  Russia  —  you  may 
judge  how  my  heart  suffers.  Obliged  to  comply  with  all  the 
details  of  military  service,  I  waste  all  my  time  in  fulfilling  the 
functions  of  a  sub-officer,  and  have  no  possible  chance  to  devote 
myself  to  my  studies,  which  used  to  be  my  favourite  pastime  .  .  . 
I  have  become  the  most  unfortunate  man  .  .  ." 


74  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

This  extract  shows  how  Alexander  felt  as  early  as  the  first 
year  of  his  father's  reign.  In  the  same  letter  he  informed  La 
Harpe  about  the  formation  of  that  friendly  circle  which  even- 
tually played  such  an  important  role  in  the  first  years  of  his 
reign,  and  consisted  of  Czartoryski,  Stroganov,  Novosiltzev,  and 
Kochubey.  Then  the  young  liberals  found  all  roads  closed 
for  them,  and  it  was  left  for  them  only  to  translate  foreign 
books,  which  could  not  be  published.  Soon  they  were  forced  to 
give  up  even  that  innocent  occupation  and  to  disperse  in  different 
directions  to  await  a  better  future. 

The  position  of  Alexander  grew  worse  as  Paul  showed  in- 
creasing ferociousness  in  his  treatment  of  his  subjects.  During 
those  four  years  he  went  through  a  school  that  was  to  leave  its 
fatal  traces  on  his  whole  life.  Paul  compelled  him  to  be  not 
only  a  witness,  but  not  infrequently  a  participant  in  all  his 
follies  and  cruel  undertakings.  At  the  very  beginning  of  the 
reign  Alexander  was  appointed  Chief  Military  Governor  of 
Petrograd,  which  made  him  the  main  police  official  in  the  capital. 
Through  him  had  passed  thus  the  mass  of  punitive  measures 
which  Paul  had  showered  upon  his  subjects.  In  this  position 
Alexander  had  to  serve  with  such  persons  as  Arkharov,  one  of 
the  most  revolting  Gatchina-men.  After  Arkharov  his  fellow- 
official  was  Count  Palen,  the  one  who  eventually  became  the 
soul  of  the  conspiracy  that  brought  about  the  murder  of  Paul. 
He  was  a  man  of  strong  will,  lustful  for  power,  and  of  a  big 
mind,  but  also  a  cynicist  who  was  unscrupulous  about  his  means. 

At  times  Alexander  had  to  live  through  tragic  moments  which 
left  deep  morbid  traces  in  his  sentimental  soul;  this  took  place 
when  Paul  wished  to  emphasise  their  unanimity.  Paul  actually 
made  him  sign  decrees  about  shooting  innocent  people  in  order 
that  all  might  see,  as  he  had  said,  that  "  you  and  I  breathe 
with  the  same  spirit."  One  can  easily  imagine  how  these  facts 
impressed  the  twenty  year  old  pupil  of  La  Harpe,  after  all  the 
idyllic  plans  he  had  formed  during  the  last  years  of  Catherine. 


ALEXANDER,  PALEN  AND  PANIN  75 

Finally  Alexander  was  forced  against  his  will  to  take  part 
in  the  conspiracy  against  his  own  father.  The  conspirators  did 
not  spare  Alexander;  they  reckoned  that  by  drawing  him  into 
the  affair  they  would  secure  their  own  safety.  Palen  and  Panin 
argued  with  Alexander  for  months,  and  at  last  persuaded  him 
to  consent  to  the  removal  of  Paul  and  the  establishment  of  a 
regency.1  There  was  no  doubt  of  the  need  for  the  welfare  and 
security  of  Russia  of  removing  the  mad  Paul.  Alexander  made 
Palen  swear  to  him  that  Paul's  life  would  be  spared  and  then 
gave  his  consent  for  the  overthrow. 

But  when  the  oath  was  broken,  and  the  tragic  death  of  Paul 
took  place,  Palen  explained  to  Alexander  that  there  had  been 
no  other  way  out.  The  naive  Alexander  had  not  expected  such 
a  tragic  result,  although  one  could  not  have  imagined  the 
removal  of  Paul  without  the  taking  of  his  life.  The  violent 
death  of  his  father  made  a  despondent,  depressing  impression  on 
him,  the  traces  of  which  remained  through  all  his  life.  Some 
of  his  biographers  claim,  perhaps  not  without  reason,  that  the 
heavy,  mystic  mood  of  Alexander  in  his  last  years  had  its  roots 
on  one  hand  in  the  horrors  of  Paul's  reign,  and,  on  the  other, 
in  his  indirect  participation  in  his  father's  assassination. 

Under  such  heavy  influences  and  exceptional  conditions  had 
been  formed  the  character  of  Alexander,  which  has  baffled  both 
his  contemporaries  and  his  later  biographers.  His  early  child- 
hood passed  in  the  apparently  rational  and  brilliant  care  of  his 
grandmother,  but  even  then  he  could  not  have  escaped  the  harm- 
ful influence  of  the  unhealthy  atmosphere  of  Catherine's  court 
and  of  the  strange  relations  between  his  parents  and  the  Em- 
press. His  further  education  under  La  Harpe  was  suddenly 
interrupted  by  his  premature  marriage  and  the  dismissal  of  his 
tutor.  Then  came  a  period  very  unfavourable  for  a  normal 
course  of  study;  his  continued  reading  after  La  Harpe's  plan 

1  Panin  evidently  sincerely  believed  that  such  was  the  purpose. 


76  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

was  not  accompanied  by  an  acquisition  of  positive  knowledge. 
Hence  —  lofty  and  noble  aspirations,  but  deprived  of  soil  and 
stability.  This  inclination  to  flirt  with  high  plans  without  con- 
sidering the  methods  of  their  realisation  and  their  consequences, 
remained  with  Alexander  for  ever,  and  caused  those  contradic- 
tions which  we  shall  observe  all  through  his  reign.  Finally 
the  horrible  four  years'  schooling  under  Paul,  with  its  climatic 
tragedy,  had  put  the  finishing  touch  to  the  formation  of  his 
character. 


CHAPTER  V 

ASCENDING   the   throne   in   his   twenty-third   year, 
Alexander  was  no  longer  the  naive  dreamer  of  the 
letters  to  La  Harpe  in  the  years  1796-97.     True,  he 
had  not  given  up  his  quest  for  the  good,  but  he  had  consider- 
ably lost  his  confidence  in  people  and  his  former  enthusiasm. 

In  spite  of  his  participation  in  administrative  affairs  under 
Paul  he  still  remained  inexperienced  and  ignorant  about  Russian 
conditions.  Yet  we  must  not  take  his  despondency  and  the 
apparent  helplessness  he  manifested  in  the  first  days  of  his  reign 
as  showing  lack  or  weakness  of  will-power.  He  proved  later 
that  he  had  a  perseverant  will  and  was  able  to  achieve  what  he 
wished  to,  but  he  wanted,  especially  at  first,  positive  knowledge, 
a  definite  programme  and  experience.  He  was  well  aware  of 
these  shortcomings,  and  for  this  reason  he  hesitated,  not  know- 
ing what  to  undertake  immediately. 

At  the  same  time  outside  of  a  few  old  statesmen  who  did 
not  understand  his  aims  he  had  no  one  at  his  side  on  whom  he 
could  depend  and  in  whom  he  could  confide  absolutely.  There 
were  clever  men  of  the  sort  of  Palen  and  Panin,  but  he  could 
not  trust  them  entirely  in  view  of  their  role  in  the  conspiracy 
against  Paul;  it  is  probable  even  that  they  were  repulsive  to 
him  though  he  had  to  conceal  the  feeling  of  disgust.  The  Cath- 
erinian  lords  were  dispersed  by  Paul,  the  most  distinguished 
among  them  had  died  (e.g.,  Bezborodko),  and  those  who  re- 
mained inspired  no  confidence.  Alexander  was  very  glad,  how- 
ever, when  on  the  very  night  of  the  overthrow  there  came  to 
his  call  one  of  the  "  old  servers,"  D.  P.  Troshchinsky,  whom  he 
had  known  as  a  man  honest  and  experienced  in  affairs.  He 

77 


78  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

then  appointed  another  "  old  server,"  Bekleshev,  as  Procurator- 
General  in  place  of  the  dismissed  Obolianinov.  Both  of  these 
were  naturally  clever  and  honest,  but  not  well  educated,  of  no 
definite  ideas  or  principles,  and  they  managed  state-matters  ac- 
cording to  the  usual  routine  and  "  common  sense." 

Of  course  there  were  immediately  recalled  from  abroad  Alex- 
ander's personal  friends:  Czartoryski,  Novosiltzev,  Kochubey, 
but  they  could  not  come  at  once  on  account  of  the  slow  means  of 
communication. 

Some  are  inclined  to  explain  by  the  weakness  of  the  young 
tzar  the  fact  that  he  did  not  arrest  the  conspirators,  that  he 
retained  Count  Palen  at  his  post  and  recalled  Count  Panin,  who 
had  been  dismissed  by  Paul.  But  knowing  at  present  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  plot  we  may  say  that  he  could  have  hardly 
done  otherwise,  since  the  two  counts  did  not  take  direct  part 
in  the  murder  of  Paul,  and  as  to  actual  participation  in  the 
conspiracy,  Alexander  would  have  had  to  arrest  himself  as  well. 
For  reasons  of  state,  and  because  of  lack  of  men  around  him, 
Alexander  had  to  appreciate  every  capable  statesman.  In  the 
hands  of  Palen  were  concentrated  all  the  threads  of  administra- 
tion, and  he  was  the  only  person  who  knew  all  the  ins  and 
outs  of  the  Government,  which  was  then  in  a  state  of  chaos. 
The  situation  was  very  difficult  and  even  dangerous,  at  least 
externally,  so  far  as  foreign  relations  were  concerned.  At  the 
end  of  his  reign  Paul  had  seriously  enraged  England,  who  was 
forced  to  undertake  a  naval  expedition  against  Russia  and  its 
ally,  Denmark.  A  week  after  Paul's  death  Nelson  bombarded 
Copenhagen,  and  having  destroyed  the  Danish  fleet,  prepared  to 
bombard  Cronstadt  and  Petrograd.  Quick  action  was  neces- 
sary to  stop  the  English  without  hurting  the  national  prestige. 
Palen  was  the  only  available  member  of  the  Collegium  of  Foreign 
Affairs  at  Petrograd.  He  performed  the  task  quickly  and  suc- 
cessfully, perhaps  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  British  Government 
had  been  initiated  into  the  significance  of  the  coup  d'etat  by  the 


ALEXANDER'S  ACCESSION  79 

ex-ambassador,  Witworth,  who  knew  closely  the  conspirators. 
At  any  rate  the  English  were  entirely  appeased,  and  Nelson  de- 
parted from  Reval  with  apologies. 

As  to  Count  Nikita  Panin,  he  was  one  of  the  few  experienced 
and  gifted  diplomats,  and  his  return  to  affairs  was  quite  natural. 
Alexander  invited  him  from  his  Moscow  estate  to  Petrograd, 
and  immediately  entrusted  him  with  the  management  of  all 
foreign  affairs.1 

Despite  his  depressed  mood  Alexander  demonstrated  from 
his  first  days  great  energy  in  matters  that  appeared  clear  to  him. 

On  the  very  night  of  the  overthrow  he  did  not  forget  to 

JThe  relations  of  Alexander  to  Palen  and  Panin  are  differently 
described  in  the  memoirs  of  the  Decembrist  Von  Visin  (nephew  of  the 
famous  author).  According  to  him  Palen  and  Panin  demanded  from 
Alexander  a  solemn  promise  to  grant  a  constitution  immediately  after 
his  accession,  but  the  commander  of  the  Petrograd  garrison,  General 
Talyzin,  persuaded  Alexander  not  to  consent  to  the  demand,  and 
promised  him  the  support  of  all  the  Guards  in  the  capital  in  case  of 
need.  Alexander  heeded  Talyzin  and  rejected  the  offer  of  Palen  and 
Panin,  whereupon  the  infuriated  Palen  ordered  Talyzin  poisoned  (as 
a  matter  of  fact  Talyzin  did  suddenly  die  just  at  that  time).  The 
legend  claims  that  those  circumstances  were  responsible  for  the  dis- 
missal of  Palen  and  Panin.  Nobody  to-day  doubts  the  incorrectness  of 
that  story. 

Panin  was  not  even  in  Petrograd  then;  he  came  only  sev- 
eral weeks  after.  Besides,  if  the  story  were  true,  Alexander  would 
have  dismissed  Palen  at  once  and  would  not  have  appointed  Panin, 
whereas  both  of  them  resigned  months  after,  when  they  were  no 
longer  needed.  The  facts  of  Palen's  dismissal  are  known.  He  was 
dismissed  on  the  demand  of  the  Dowager  Empress  Marie,  who  had 
a  sharp  collision  with  him  in  June,  1801,  on  account  of  the  ikons  pre- 
sented to  her  by  the  Old  Believers  and  exhibited  by  her  command 
in  the  court  chapel ;  one  of  the  ikons  had  an  inscription  in  which  Palen 
saw  a  hint  at  the  desirability  of  inflicting  a  severe  punishment  upon  the 
murderers  of  Paul.  Palen  allowed  himself  to  remove  the  ikon  and 
even  complained  to  Alexander  about  the  matter.  The  Empress  in  her 
turn  demanded  his  discharge.  Alexander  not  only  took  his  mother's 
side  and  discharged  him,  but  even  banished  him  from  Petrograd. 

Panin  managed  foreign  affairs  from  April  to  September,  1801.  It 
is  well  known  to-day  that  Panin  did  not  agree  with  Alexander's  views, 
and  tried  his  own  against  the  will  of  Alexander,  which  proved  to  be 


8o  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

issue  an  order  for  the  recall  of  the  Cossacks  who  were  sent 
to  conquer  India. 

On  the  same  night  Troshchinsky  formed  a  hasty,  but  happy, 
project  for  the  Manifesto  of  Accession,  in  which  Alexander 
solemnly  promised  to  govern  the  people  "  after  the  laws  and 
heart  of  his  grandmother,  Catherine  the  Great."  The  reference 
to  Catherine  was  very  clever,  as  it  signified  in  the  eyes  of  the 
contemporaries  the  promise  to  annul  all  that  had  been  decreed  by 
Paul  and  a  return  to  the  age  of  Catherine,  which  appeared  then 
to  all  in  rosy  colours. 

On  the  first  day  Alexander  ordered  the  release  of  the  numer- 
ous victims  of  the  Secret  Expedition  from  prison  and  exile. 

Then  he  began  a  careful  change  in  personnel ;  the  first  to  be 
discharged  were:  Procurator-General  Obolianinov,  who  per- 
formed the  role  of  supreme  inquisitor  under  Paul ;  the  equerry 
Kutaysov,  one  of  Paul's  most  despicable  sycophants,  who  started 
as  the  heir  apparent's  barber  and  had  attained  during  Paul's 
reign  the  highest  rank  and  distinctions,  orders  and  decorations, 
and  enormous  wealth,  but  was  generally  hated;  the  Supreme 
Chief  of  Police  at  Moscow,  Ertel,  who  had  terrified  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  first  Capital. 

Then  followed  a  series  of  ukases  annulling  the  hateful  obscu- 
rantist and  prohibitive  measures  of  Paul:  from  twelve  to  fifteen 
thousand  adminstratively  discharged  clerks  and  officers  were 
recalled;  an  amnesty  was  declared  for  all  fugitives  (except 
homicides) ;  the  Secret  Expedition  was  abolished,  and  it  was 
declared  that  every  offender  must  be  accused,  tried,  and  punished 
according  to  the  general  system  of  law;  officials  were  strictly 
warned  not  to  mistreat  the  citizens;  the  prohibition  of  foreign 

stronger  than  Panin  had  expected.  He  had  to  resign.  It  is  no  wonder 
that  there  were  a  multitude  of  various  legends  concerning  the  un- 
usual accession  of  Alexander,  which  had  been  veiled  in  mystery  for 
many  years;  many  important  materials  illuminating  that  event  were 
published  only  very  recently. 


ALEXANDER'S  EARLY  MEASURES  81 

books  was  removed,  private  printing-houses  were  reopened,  the 
embargo  was  set  aside,  and  Russians  were  permitted  to  go 
abroad;  then  the  granted  charters  to  the  nobility  and  the  cities 
were  restored,  and  the  more  liberal  tariff  of  1797  was  reintro- 
duced.  The  soldiers  were  exempted  from  wearing  the  hated 
locks,  but  the  somewhat  shortened  braids  remained  till  1806. 
Finally  the  peasant-question  was  touched  upon :  the  Academy  of 
Sciences  which  issued  public  announcements  was  enjoined  from 
accepting  announcements  about  sales  of  serfs  without  soil. 
These  were  the  most  important  measures  taken  during  the  first 
week  of  Alexander's  reign. 

All  these  measures  introduced  no  new  radical  changes,  but 
merely  did  away  with  Paul's  tyrannical  follies.  As  to  organic 
changes,  Alexander  felt  that  he  could  not  promulgate  them  with- 
out having  a  definite  plan  and  without  preliminary  work.  Still 
he  made  a  few  early  steps  in  the  direction  of  fundamental  reor- 
ganisations. Troshchinsky  worked  out  the  reformation  of  the 
Court  Council,  which  was  established  by  Catherine  and  had  de- 
generated under  Paul  into  a  committee  for  censoring  foreign  and 
Russian  books.  This  Council  was  dismissed  on  March  26,  and 
four  days  later  was  established  the  Permanent  Council  (con- 
sisting of  twelve  high  officials  least  mistrusted  by  Alexander), 
which  was  to  act  as  an  advisory  board  to  assist  the  Tzar  in  his 
management  of  state-affairs.  Troshchinsky  was  one  of  the 
members  and  the  Chief  of  the  Council's  chancery. 

The  next  important  step  was  the  ukase  of  June  5,  1801,  to 
the  Senate,  ordering  that  institution  to  present  a  report  about 
its  rights  and  duties  for  incorporation  into  the  laws  of  the  state. 
At  that  moment  Alexander  was  evidently  inclined  to  restore  to 
the  Senate  its  power  as  the  highest  organ  of  government,  and 
to  assure  it  by  law  an  independence  of  judgments  and  orders. 

Another  ukase  of  the  same  date  instituted  "  under  the  Em- 
peror's personal  supervision  "  and  under  the  direct  management 
of  Count  Zavadovsky,  a  "  Commission  for  the  Constitution  of 


82  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

Laws."  The  Commission  was  not  to  work  out  any  new  laws 
but  to  clarify  and  adjust  the  existing  old  laws.  In  his  rescript 
to  Zavadovsky  Alexander  said :  "  Basing  the  people's  welfare  on 
the  uniformity  of  our  laws,  and  believing  that  various  measures 
may  bring  the  land  happy  times  but  that  only  the  law  may  affirm 
them  forever,  I  have  endeavoured  from  the  very  first  days  of 
my  reign  to  investigate  the  conditions  of  this  department  of  the 
state.  I  have  known  that  since  the  edition  of  the  Ulozheniye 
(the  Code  of  Laws  under  Tzar  Alexis,  in  1649)  to  our  days, 
i.e.,  during  one  century  and  a  half,  the  laws  issuing  from  dif- 
ferent and  often  contradictory  sources  and  published  more  for 
occasions  than  from  general  state-considerations,  could  have 
neither  connection,  .nor  unity  of  purpose,  nor  permanence  of 
function.  Hence  the  general  confusion  of  rights  and  duties, 
darkness  enwrapping  both  the  judge  and  the  defendant,  the 
impotence  of  the  laws  in  their  performance,  and  the  convenience 
of  changing  them  by  the  first  move  of  whim  or  despotism.  .  .  ." 

These  ukases  had  an  enormous  demonstrative  importance  in 
their  day.  After  the  despotism  of  Paul  the  intention  of  Alex- 
ander to  augment  law  above  everything  had  gained  for  him 
popularity  and  sympathy  among  wide  strata  of  the  population. 

Such  were  Alexander's  steps  in  the  first  three  months  of  his 
reign. 

As  early  as  April  24,  1801,  Alexander  expressed  in  a  conversa- 
tion with  Stroganov  his  intention  of  reorganising  the  State  along 
radical  lines.  He  agreed  with  Stroganov,  however,  that  before 
limiting  the  autocracy  the  administration  should  be  reformed.2 

2  Let  us  say  a  few  words  about  Stroganov  and  Alexander's  other 
young  friends  recalled  from  abroad.  Stroganov  was  the  only  son  of 
the  richest  Catherinian  lord,  Count  A.  S.  Stroganov.  His  instructor 
was  a  French  mathematician,  Romm,  who  subsequently  was  a  mem- 
ber and  even  a  temporary  president  of  the  Convention  of  1793;  he  died 
on  the  scaffold.  Romm,  a  stauncher  republican  than  La  Harpe, 
travelled  in  1790  with  young  Stroganov  through  Europe,  and  arriving 
in  Paris  during  the  revolution,  both  entered  the  Jacobine  club,  of 


THE  UNOFFICIAL  COMMITTEE  83 

In  May,  1801,  on  the  basis  of  the  aforementioned  April  con- 
versation, Stroganov  presented  to  Alexander  a  memorandum  in 
which  he  proposed  the  institution  of  an  unofficial  committee  for 
the  discussion  of  the  plan  for  reorganisations.  Alexander  ap- 
proved of  the  idea,  and  appointed  as  members  of  the  Committee 
Stroganov,  Novosiltzev,  Czartoryski,  and  Kochubey.  In  view 

which  the  Russian  became  a  librarian,  and  grew  intimate  with  the 
famous  revolutionary,  Mile.  Theroigne  de  Mericourt.  Catherine  re- 
called Stroganov  and  sent  him  to  his  village  under  his  mother's  super- 
vision; Romm  was  forbidden  to  enter  Russia.  Soon,  however, 
Stroganov  was  permitted  to  return  to  court  where  he  became  a  friend 
of  Alexander  (through  Czartoryski),  and  gradually  familiarised  him- 
self with  Russian  conditions.  Of  his  former  radicalism  and  Jacobin- 
ism remained  a  rectilinearity  of  character  and  a  tendency  to  realise 
even  liberal  reforms  in  a  Jacobine  way;  but  his  views  were  not  more 
than  liberal,  with  a  marked  democratic  tint.  From  his  instructor 
Romm  he  adopted  a  remarkable  exactness  of  thought  and  a  habit  of 
formulating  his  ideas  with  absolute  definiteness. 

Among  Alexander's  young  advisors  Stroganov  was  if  not  the  most 
gifted,  the  most  steadfast,  with  a  definite  plan  of  action  in  his  mind. 
Stroganov  was  five  years  Alexander's  senior,  and  considered  the  Em- 
peror a  man  of  noble  intentions  but  lazy  and  weak.  He  endeavoured 
to  hold  Alexander  under  the  influence  of  his  circle,  lest  he  fall  under 
other  influences. 

Another  member  of  that  circle,  N.  N.  Novosiltzev,  was  a  cousin  of 
Stroganov,  appeared  considerably  more  clever  than  Stroganov,  and 
possessed  a  brilliant  literary  style  for  the  exposition  of  his  ideas.  He 
was  five  years  older  than  Stroganov,  consequently  much  older  than 
Alexander,  less  passionate,  more  cautious,  though  he  lacked  Stroga- 
nov's  exactness  of  thought  and  consciousness  of  plan. 

A  third  member  of  the  circle  was  Prince  Adam  Czartoryski,  a  man 
of  remarkable  gifts,  an  ardent  native  Polish  patriot,  a  subtle  diplo- 
mat, a  sober  observer,  who  understood  best  of  all  Alexander's  char- 
acter. In  his  time  he  had  been  also  attracted  by  the  revolutionary 
ideas  of  1789,  but  all  his  cravings  and  efforts  were  directed  toward  the 
restoration  of  a  strong,  independent  Poland.  Describing  the  members 
of  the  circle  in  his  memoirs,  Czartoryski  calls  himself  the  most  disin- 
terested, since  he  took  part  in  a  matter  foreign  to  him.  He  never  con- 
cealed from  Alexander  his  real  intentions  and  aims,  and  in  1802, 
before  accepting  the  post  of  Deputy-Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  he 
warned  Alexander  that  as  a  Polish  patriot  he  would  side  with  Polish 
interests  in  case  of  their  collision  with  Russian  interests. 

The  fourth  person,  originally  not  a  member  of  the  triumvirate,  but 


84  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

of  the  absence  of  the  last  three,  the  work  was  postponed  till  June 
24,  1801. 

At  the  first  session  of  the  Committee  plans  and  purposes  were 
definitely  formulated.  They  found  it  necessary  first  of  all  to 
learn  the  actual  state  of  affairs,  then  to  reform  the  governmental 
mechanism,  and  finally  to  secure  the  existence  and  independence 
of  the  renewed  institutions  by  a  constitution  granted  by  the 
autocratic  power  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  the  Russian, 
people.  The  formulation  voiced  the  sentiment  of  Stroganov, 
but  did  not  entirely  satisfy  Alexander,  who  was  preoccupied 
with  the  idea  of  issuing  some  demonstrative  declaration,  a  sort 
of  "  Declaration  of  Rights." 

Novosiltzev  was  appointed  to  gather  information  about  the 
internal  state  of  affairs  and  to  submit  reports  and  opinions  on 
various  branches  of  the  administration.  Unfortunately  this 
matter  was  not  considered  profoundly,  but  was  reduced  to  the 
study  of  the  governmental  apparatus  and  the  observation  of  its 
faults,  and  it  was  not  a  study  of  the  conditions  of  the  people. 
Novosiltzev's  programme  embraced  the  following  points:  (i) 
questions  of  national  defence  on  land  and  sea;  (2)  questions  of 
foreign  relations;  (3)  questions  of  internal  affairs  of  the  coun- 
try in  the  statistic  and  administrative  respects.  By  the  "  sta- 
tistic respect "  one  could  perhaps  understand  the  study  of  the 
conditions  of  the  people,  but  according  to  the  plan  this  term 
meant  only:  trade,  means  of  communication,  agriculture,  and 
industry;  the  administrative  point  —  which  was  to  be  the  clef 

added  to  it  by  Alexander,  was  Count  V.  P.  Kochubey,  a  distinguished 
diplomat,  a  nephew  of  Bezborodko,  who  began  his  career  under  Cath- 
erine, and  at  the  age  of  24  occupied  with  success  the  post  of  am- 
bassador at  Constantinople.  A  sincere  liberal,  he  was  more  moderate 
than  Stroganov  and  even  than  Alexander.  He  was  brought  up  in 
England,  and  knew  it  better  than  Russia.  He  took  part  in  the  internal 
reforms  of  Russia,  for  which  he  willingly  gave  up  his  brilliant  diplo- 
matic career  (he  had  the  rank  of  Vice-Chancellor  under  Paul). 


THE  WORK  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  85 

de  la  voute  of  the  plan, —  comprised :  justice,  finances,  and  legis- 
lation. 

Statistics  in  our  modern  sense  did  not  exist  at  that  time; 
besides,  the  sessions  of  the  Committee  were  secret,  and  a  con- 
sensus gentium  could  not  take  place.  The  only  statistic  data  in 
the  possession  of  the  Committee  were  those  received  through 
the  Permanent  Council,  or  through  the  Emperor,  or  some 
private  sources  in  the  governmental  spheres.  The  members 
could  have  made  use  of  their  own  information,  but  only  Stro- 
ganov  had  some  acquaintance  with  internal  affairs,  owing  to 
his  life  in  a  village,  while  Kochubey  and  Czartoryski  had  some 
knowledge  of  international  matters. 

The  discussion  of  the  first  point  of  the  programme,  the  de- 
fence of  the  country,  did  not  occupy  much  time,  and  the  ques- 
tion was  handed  over  to  a  special  commission  of  military  and 
naval  experts.  The  discussion  of  the  second  point,  of  foreign 
relations,  revealed  Alexander's  complete  unpreparedness  and 
ignorance  in  matters  of  foreign  policy.  Kochubey  and  Czar- 
toryski, on  the  other  hand,  had  quite  definite  knowledge  and 
views  in  the  matter.  Alexander,  who  had  just  signed  a  friendly 
treaty  with  England,  suddenly  expressed  his  opinion  before  the 
Committee  about  the  need  of  forming  a  coalition  against  Eng- 
land. The  members  felt  confused  and  uneasy,  all  the  more 
since  they  knew  the  Emperor's  inclination  to  converse  person- 
ally with  foreign  representatives  and  thus  entangle  matters. 
The  Committee  insistently  counselled  Alexander  to  ask  the 
opinion  of  old  experienced  diplomats  on  the  question,  and  they 
pointed  out  Count  A.  R.  Vorontzov. 

This  first  flaw  strongly  impressed  Alexander,  and  he  came 
to  the  next  session  better  prepared.  He  asked  Kochubey  to 
expound  his  view  on  the  foreign  policy.  Kochubey  in  his  turn 
expressed  his  desire  first  to  get  acquainted  with  the  views  of 
the  Emperor.  An  exchange  of  opinions  took  place.  All 


86  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

agreed  with  the  views  of  Czartoryski  and  Kochubey  that  Eng- 
land was  Russia's  natural  ally,  receiving  almost  all  her  export. 

At  the  same  time  they  pointed  out  the  need  for  checking  the 
over-ambitious  aspiration  of  the  French  Government.  These 
views  were  in  direct  opposition  to  Alexander's  original  views; 
but  soon  he  demonstrated  his  remarkable  talents  in  the  field  of 
diplomacy,  and  succeeded  not  only  in  orienting  himself  in  for- 
eign affairs,  but  in  working  out  an  independent  outlook  on  those 
questions. 

At  the  next  sessions  of  the  Committee  internal  affairs  were 
discussed  with  numerous  digressions.  Alexander  was  interested 
most  of  all  in  two  problems  that  appeared  interdependent  in  his 
mind ;  the  first  was  the  granting  of  some  "  charta  "  or  declar- 
ation of  rights,  and  in  connection  with  this  the  second  —  the 
reorganisation  of  the  Senate,  in  which  he  saw  at  that  time  the 
guarantor  of  civil  rights.  In  the  latter  question  Alexander  was 
supported  even  by  the  old  senators,  by  liberals  as  well  as  by 
conservatives.  Prince  P.  A.  Zubov  (the  last  favourite  of  Cath- 
erine) presented  a  project  for  making  the  Senate  an  independent 
legislative  body,  consisting  of  highest  officials  and  highest  nobles. 
Derzhavin  proposed  that  the  Senate  be  composed  of  persons 
elected  by  the  officials  of  the  first  four  ranks  from  their  midst. 
The  Committee  had  no  difficulty  in  proving  that  those  pro- 
jects had  little  in  common  with  a  popular  representation. 

The  third  project  handed  over  to  the  Committee  by  Alex- 
ander was  planned  by  A.  R.  Vorontzov,  and  it  had  to  do  not 
with  the  reorganisation  of  the  Senate  but  with  the  Emperor's 
idea  about  a  charta.  Vorontzov's  project  for  granting  the  peo- 
ple a  charter  resembled  in  form  Catherine's  charters  granted 
to  the  nobility  and  the  cities,  and  in  substance  it  expanded  over 
the  whole  people,  giving  them  serious  guaranties  of  civil  rights 
not  unlike  the  English  Habeas  Corpus  Act.  At  the  discussion 
of  the  project  by  the  Committee  Novosiltzev  expressed  his 
doubt  whether  such  promises  could  be  given  under  the  con- 


THE  PEASANT  QUESTION  87 

ditions  of  that  time,  and  his  fear  that  if  given  they  would  have 
to  be  withdrawn  in  a  few  years.  Alexander  hastened  to  agree 
with  Novosiltzev's  opinion,  and  the  Committee  decided  that  the 
publication  of  the  charter  at  the  time  of  the  coronation  would 
be  inopportune. 

This  incident  is  very  characteristic,  showing  how  careful 
were  those  members  of  the  Committee  whom  their  enemies 
labelled  Jacobines.  The  "  old  server "  Vorontzov  demon- 
strated on  many  occasions  that  he  could  be  more  liberal  than 
the  "  Jacobines  "  assembled  in  the  Winter  Palace. 

The  same  moderate  and  conservative  views  were  expressed 
in  regard  to  the  peasant-question.  The  Committee  touched  the 
question  for  the  first  time  in  connection  with  Vorontzov's 
charter,  which  had  a  clause  about  giving  the  peasants  the  right 
to  own  real  estate.  Alexander  found  it  at  that  time  too  dan- 
gerous a  right.  Later,  after  the  coronation,  in  November, 
1801,  Alexander  informed  the  Committee  that  a  number  of 
persons,  among  them  La  Harpe,  invited  by  the  Emperor  to 
return  to  Russia,  and  Admiral  Mordvinov,  a  convinced  con- 
stitutionalist of  the  type  of  an  English  Tory,  had  declared  the 
need  of  doing  something  for  the  peasants.  Mordvinov  pro- 
posed a  practical  measure,  apparently  having  little  to  do  with 
the  peasant-question  proper,  which  consisted  in  extending  the 
right  of  real  estate  ownership  to  merchants,  burghers,  and  state- 
peasants.  Mordvinov  had  his  own  logic,  however. 

He  considered  that  the  limitation  of  the  autocratic  power 
could  be  best  secured  by  the  presence  of  an  independent  nobility, 
hence  his  desire  to  create  such  an  independent  aristocracy  in 
Russia,  He  advocated  the  transference  of  a  considerable  part 
of  fiscal  lands  (by  sale  or  gift)  to  the  nobles,  so  as  to  increase 
their  material  security  and  independence.  As  to  the  peasant- 
question  and  the  abolition  of  serfdom,  he  thought  that  the 
supreme  authority  had  no  right  to  meddle  with  those  matters, 
but  that  the  liberation  of  the  serfs  from  bondage  should  be  de- 


88  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

cided  by  the  nobles  alone.  Having  this  point  of  view,  Mord- 
vinov  intended  to  create  an  economic  state  in  which  the  nobles 
would  find  bondage-labour  unprofitable  and  would  willingly 
resign  their  rights.  He  hoped  that  on  the  lands  owned  by  com- 
moners there  would  develop  farms  on  the  basis  of  hired  labour, 
which  would  compete  with  the  bondage-system  and  compel  the 
landowners  to  abolish  that  system.  Thus  Mordvinov  had  in 
mind  a  roundabout  way  for  preparing  the  abolition  of  serfdom, 
instead  of  any  legislative  restrictions  in  that  field.  Such  was 
the  status  of  the  peasant-question  even  among  liberal  and  en- 
lightened men  like  Mordvinov. 

Zubov,  who  had  no  principles  but  simply  tried  to  meet  Alex- 
ander's liberal  ideas,  also  presented  a  project  about  the  peasant- 
question,  even  more  liberal  than  that  of  Mordvinov:  he  pro- 
posed to  forbid  the  sale  of  serfs  without  soil.  We  have  seen 
that  Alexander  had  already  enjoined  the  Academy  of  Sciences 
from  publishing  announcements  about  such  sales;  but  Zubov 
went  further :  desiring  to  lend  the  institution  of  serfdom  a  char- 
acter of  ownership  of  estates  to  which  permanent  labourers  were 
assigned  (glebae  adscripti),  he  proposed  to  forbid  ownership 
of  house-serfs,  transferring  them  into  tzekhs  and  guilds  and 
recompensing  the  landowners  with  money  for  the  loss  they  sus- 
tained. 

In  the  Committee  the  first  to  oppose  categorically  Zubov's 
project  was  Novosiltzev.  He  pointed  out  that,  first,  the  State 
had  no  money  for  the  redemption  of  the  house-serfs,  and,  next, 
that  it  was  uncertain  what  could  be  done  with  such  a  mass  of 
men  incapable  of  helping  themselves.  There  was  further  ex- 
pressed an  opinion  that  it  was  inadvisable  to  take  at  once  several 
measures  against  serfdom  for  fear  of  irritating  the  nobles.  No- 
body shared  Novosiltzev's  ideas;  but  Alexander  was  evidently 
shaken  by  them.  Czartoryski  spoke  passionately  against  serf- 
dom, arguing  that  it  was  such  a  revolting  institution  that  in 
the  struggle  against  it  there  should  be  no  fears  or  hesitations. 


THE  PEASANT  QUESTION  89 

Kochubey  maintained  that  in  case  of  the  acceptance  of  Mord- 
vinov's  project  the  bonded  peasants  would  consider  themselves 
overlooked,  since  the  other  classes  would  get  important  rights 
while  their  lot  would  not  be  alleviated.  Stroganov  delivered  a 
long,  brilliant  speech  which  was  directed  mainly  against  the 
idea  that  it  was  dangerous  to  irritate  the  nobles ;  he  showed  that 
politically  the  Russian  nobles  were  zero,  that  they  were  in- 
capable of  protesting,  that  they  could  be  only  slaves  of  the 
Monarch;  in  proof  he  pointed  to  the  reign  of  Paul  when  the 
nobles  had  shown  that  they  were  unable  to  protect  their  own 
honour  when  it  was  trampled  by  the  Government  with  the  aid 
of  other  nobles.  At  the  same  time  he  asserted  that  the 
peasants  still  considered  the  Tzar  as  their  only  defender,  that  the 
loyalty  of  the  people  to  the  Tzar  depended  upon  their  hopes  in 
him,  and  that  to  shake  those  hopes  was  indeed  dangerous. 
Therefore  he  believed  that  if  apprehensions  should  be  enter- 
tained at  all,  the  last  ones  should  be  considered  most  of  all. 

His  speech  was  listened  to  with  great  attention,  and  it  had 
an  effect,  but  it  did  not  shake  either  Alexander  or  Novosiltzev. 
Zubov's  project  was  rejected.  In  the  end  they  accepted 
Mordvinov's  plan;  thus  persons  of  not-noble  classes  were  per- 
mitted to  buy  unpopulated  lands.  Novosiltzev  asked  permis- 
sion to  consult  La  Harpe  and  Mordvinov  concerning  Zubov's 
project;  the  two  shared  Novosiltzev's  apprehensions.  It  is  re- 
markable that  La  Harpe  who  was  considered  a  Jacobine  and  a 
democrat  remained  in  the  peasant-question  as  undecisive  and 
timid  as  the  rest.  He  saw  Russia's  chief  need  in  education  and 
stubbornly  emphasised  that  without  education  nothing  could  be 
accomplished,  yet  though  he  admitted  the  difficulty  of  spreading 
education  under  conditions  of  bondage,  he  feared  the  danger  of 
seriously  affecting  the  institution  of  serfdom  under  such  condi- 
tions of  education.  A  peculiar  enchanted  circle. 

The  members  of  the  Committee  proposed  that  in  the  course 
of  time  they  might,  by  a  slow  and  gradual  process,  come  to  the 


90  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

abolition  of  serfdom,  but  even  the  course  of  that  process  re- 
mained obscure. 

Trade,  industry,  and  agriculture  were  not  investigated,  al- 
though the  state  of  those  branches  of  national  economy  was 
such  that  it  required  the  serious  attention  of  the  Government. 

The  most  important  work  of  the  Committee  consisted  in  the 
reorganisation  of  the  central  administrative  organs.  The  need 
of  this  had  been  evident  since  Catherine  had  reformed  the  local 
organs,  but  had  not  had  time  to  reorganise  the  central  institu- 
tions, except  to  abolish  the  larger  part  of  the  Collegia.  The 
members  of  the  Committee  saw  the  pressing  need  for  the  reor- 
ganisation of  the  central  organs,  where  the  confusion  was  so 
great  that  in  cases  of  great  disturbances  or  calamities,  as  for 
instance  when  in  Siberia  people  died  from  famine,  there  was 
no  way  of  obtaining  information  about  the  state  of  affairs. 
Under  the  influence  of  such  an  occasion  Alexander  expressed  his 
desire  that  the  question  of  the  differentiation  of  the  jurisdiction 
among  the  central  organs  should  be  advanced  in  the  work  of  the 
Committee.  In  the  absence  of  Novosiltzev  the  Emperor  in- 
structed Czartoryski  to  present  a  report  on  the  question.  On 
February  10,  1802,  Czartoryski  read  his  clear  and  orderly  report, 
in  which  he  pointed  out  the  necessity  of  dividing  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  supreme  administrative  organs,  the  supervisory,  judiciary, 
and  legislative,  and  of  clearly  defining  the  role  of  each.  In  his 
opinion  the  Senate  should  be  independent  from  its  chancery;  as 
it  was,  the  real  ruler  of  the  Senate  appeared  to  be  the  Procurator- 
General  who  as  head  of  the  chancery  had  the  privilege  of  per- 
sonally reporting  to  the  tzar.  Then  Czartoryski  advocated  the 
exact  definition  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Permanent  Council, 
and  the  differentiation  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Senate  and  the 
Permanent  Council.  He  suggested  that  the  Senate  should  deal 
only  with  contestable  matters  both  administrative  and  judicial, 
while  the  Permanent  Council  should  be  an  advisory  institution 
discussing  matters  and  projects  of  a  legislative  nature.  The 


POLITICAL  REFORMS  91 

supreme  administration  should  be  divided  among  separate  de- 
partments, each  with  a  strictly  defined  sphere  of  work;  at  the 
head  of  each  department  should  be,  not  a  Collegium,  but  one  re- 
sponsible minister.  He  aptly  explained  how  in  the  Collegia  any 
personal  responsibility  necessarily  disappeared. 

We  see  thus  that  the  merit  of  introducing  the  question  of 
ministries  belongs  to  Czartoryski.  At  one  time  this  was 
ascribed  to  La  Harpe,  but  since  the  publication  of  the  Com- 
mittee's minutes  which  were  accurately  written  down  by  Stro- 
ganov,  there  have  been  no  more  doubts  in  this  respect.  In  the 
report  another  measure  was  advocated,  touching  the  part  of  the 
judiciary.  Czartoryski  wished  to  copy  the  system  introduced  in 
France  after  the  Revolution,  which  divided  the  courts  into  three 
classes:  criminal,  civil,  and  police.  The  highest  appeal  for  all 
judiciary  matters  should  be  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cassations, 
This  part  of  Czartoryski's  plan  was  not  thoroughly  examined 
by  the  Committee  but  his  idea  about  the  institution  of  ministries 
was  accepted  unanimously.  The  work  of  the  Committee  be- 
came concentrated  on  the  development  of  that  idea;  on  the 
basis  of  that  work  there  were  established  September  8,  1802,  the 
Ministries  of  Foreign  Affairs,  of  War,  and  of  the  Navy,  which 
corresponded  to  the  three  then  still  existing  Collegia,  and  en- 
tirely new  Ministries  of  the  Interior,  Finances,  Popular  Edu- 
cation, and  Justice.  Upon  Alexander's  initiative  there  was 
formed  also  the  Ministry  of  Commerce,  on  the  institution  of 
which  he  insisted  for  absolutely  casual  reasons,  as  he  wished  to 
give  the  rank  of  Minister  to  Count  N.  P.  Rumiantzev,  who 
had  been  in  charge  of  the  waterways. 

The  establishment  of  ministries  was,  properly  speaking,  the 
only  original  and  accomplished  work  of  the  Committee.  The 
reorganisation  of  the  Senate  took  place  in  accordance  with  Czar- 
toryski's ideas  and  with  the  report  of  the  Senate  about  its  rights. 
The  Senate  was  to  be  an  organ  of  state  supervision  over  the 
administration  and  at  the  same  time  the  highest  judiciary  body. 


92  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

The  following  points  were  accepted  in  regard  to  the  reformed 
Senate :  ( I )  The  Senate  was  to  be  the  supreme  administrative 
and  judiciary  institution  in  the  Empire;  (2)  the  power  of  the 
Senate  was  to  be  limited  only  by  the  power  of  the  Emperor; 
(3)  the  Emperor  was  to  preside  in  the  Senate;  (4)  the  ukases 
of  the  Senate  were  to  be  fulfilled  by  all,  as  the  ukases  of  the 
Tzar  himself,  who  alone  could  stop  their  fulfilment;  (5)  the 
Senate  was  to  be  permitted  to  present  an  opinion  concerning 
such  Imperial  ukases  as  it  might  appear  impossible  to  carry  out, 
or  which  seemed  to  be  opposed  to  other  laws,  or  not  clear;  but 
if  after  the  Senate's  presentation  no  changes  were  made  in  the 
protested  ukase,  it  was  to  remain  valid;  (6)  the  ministers  were 
to  submit  to  the  Senate  their  yearly  accounts  for  examination; 
the  Senate  could  require  from  them  information  and  explana- 
tions and  should  report  to  the  Tzar  about  any  faults  and  abuses 
it  found;  (7)  in  case  of  disagreement  between  certain  decisions 
of  the  general  assembly  of  the  Senate  and  the  opinion  of  the 
Procurator-General  or  the  Super-Procurator,  the  matter  should 
be  submitted  to  the  Tzar;  (8)  in  criminal  cases  involving  depri- 
vation of  nobility  and  rank  the  confirmation  of  the  Tzar  should 
be  sought;  (9)  for  unjust  complaints  against  the  Senate  before 
the  Tzar  offenders  should  be  tried  by  court;  (10)  senators  im- 
peached in  a  crime  should  be  judged  by  the  general  assembly  of 
the  Senate. 

On  the  whole  these  fundamental  points  of  the  senatorial  juris- 
diction did  not  contradict  the  fundamental  statutes  of  Peter's 
Reglament. 

The  sixth  point  of  the  Reglament  aroused  at  the  session  of  the 
Committee  sharp  opposition  on  the  part  of  Alexander  who  was 
afraid  that  the  Senate  would  hamper  his  reformatory  activities 
by  displaying  control  over  the  ministers.  The  obstinacy  with 
which  he  protested  against  that  point  showed  the  superficiality  of 
his  liberal  views;  at  the  first  practical  attempt  to  submit  to 
control  not  even  his  own  acts,  but  those  of  his  assistants,  he  at 


POLITICAL  REFORMS  93 

once  demonstrated  a  stubborn  opposition  to  the  plan  in  which 
he  now  saw  but  aggravating  negative  sides.  Not  without  foun- 
dation did  he  fear  that  the  Senate,  composed  of  "  old  servers," 
would  try  to  check  his  reformatory  activity,  but  it  is  curious 
that  in  view  of  that  apprehension  Alexander  was  unable  to  hold 
to  his  principle. 

The  superficiality  of  his  political  views  was  still  more  clearly 
demonstrated  on  another  occasion,  in  connection  with  the  fifth 
point  of  the  Reglament,  which  gave  the  Senate  the  right  to 
protest  against  Imperial  ukases  if  they  did  not  correspond  with 
the  laws,  or  were  not  clear,  or  for  some  reason  or  other  incon- 
venient. This  right  corresponded  with  the  droit  de  remon- 
trance,  the  privilege  of  the  old  French  parlements. 

Soon  after  the  publication  of  the  new  Reglament  there  came 
an  occasion  for  the  application  of  that  privilege.  Upon  the 
report  of  the  Minister  of  War  the  Emperor  declared  that  all 
the  nobles  of  the  sub-officer  rank  had  to  serve  twelve  years  in 
the  army.  One  of  the  senators,  Count  Severin  Potocky,  justly 
found  in  it  an  infringement  of  the  granted  Charter,  and  he  sug- 
gested that  the  Senate  make  use  of  its  right  to  protest.  The 
Procurator-General,  G.  R.  Derzhavin,  was  so  astounded  by  the 
idea  of  protesting  that  without  placing  the  protest  before  the 
Senate  he  reported  to  Alexander.  The  Emperor  was  discon- 
certed at  the  news,  but  he  ordered  action  to  proceed  according 
to  the  law.  On  the  next  day  Derzhavin  appeared  before  Alex- 
ander and  reported:  "  Sire,  the  entire  Senate  is  against  you  on 
the  question  raised  by  Potocky."  The  Emperor,  according  to 
Derzhavin  (in  his  memoirs),  changed  in  countenance,  but  only 
said  that  the  Senate  should  send  him  a  deputation  with  a  report 
on  the  motives  of  their  protest.  Alexander  received  the  deputa- 
tion very  dryly,  accepted  the  written  report,  and  promised  to 
consider  it.  After  a  long  time,  in  March  of  1803,  he  issued 
an  ukase  which  declared  that  the  Senate  had  misinterpreted  its 
rights,  that  the  right  of  protest  was  extended  only  in  regard  to 


94  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

old  ukases,  but  not  to  new  ukases;  these  the  Senate  was  to 
accept  promptly. 

It  is  difficult  to  comprehend  how  Alexander  with  the  idea  of 
limiting  the  autocratic  power  could  justify  such  contradictions 
in  practice.  Alexander's  behaviour  in  the  above  case  was  the 
stranger  since  the  disputed  right  of  the  Senate  did  not  limit  his 
power  in  fact,  for  according  to  the  Reglament  the  Senate  was  to 
accept  the  protested  ukase  if  the  Emperor  refused  to  consider 
the  protest.  But  such  were  the  superficial  political  views  of 
Alexander  at  that  time. 

Thus  the  chief  results  of  the  work  of  the  Committee  were 
the  establishment  of  the  Ministries  and  the  issue  of  the  new 
Reglament  for  the  Senate.  In  May  of  1802  the  sessions  of  the 
Committee  in  the  Winter  Palace  were  practically  discontinued ; 
Alexander  left  for  a  meeting  with  the  King  of  Prussia,  and 
upon  his  return  did  not  summon  the  Committee.  At  the  end 
of  1803  the  Committee  was  assembled  several  times  again,  but 
for  the  discussion  of  private  questions  unrelated  to  the  work  of 
reorganisation.  Actually,  then,  the  Committee  was  in  existence 
for  one  year. 

Let  us  summarise  its  activity.  The  conservatives  of  the 
time,  "  old  servers  "  and  inveterate  serf-owners  of  Derzhavin's 
type,  called  the  members  of  the  Committee  "  a  band  of  Jaco- 
bines."  But  we  have  seen  that  if  they  could  be  accused  of  any- 
thing, it  was  of  timidity  and  of  the  inconsequentiality  with 
which  they  pursued  the  course  of  liberal  reforms.  The  two 
chief  problems  of  the  day  —  the  bondage  and  the  autocracy  — 
were  reduced  to  nought.  The  only  important  result  of  its  work 
was  an  administrative  reform,  quite  daring  in  the  technical 
sense;  the  "old  servers"  attacked  the  institution  of  the  Minis- 
tries as  an  arrogant  blow  at  Peter's  collegiate  principle.  The 
critics  also  pointed  out  the  unfinished  form  of  the  law,  its  lack 
of  harmony  in  defining  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Senate  and  the 
Permanent  Council,  and  their  relation  to  the  Ministries;  the 


RESULTS  OF  THE  COMMITTEE'S  WORKS     95 

chief  point  of  attack  was  the  want  of  a  regulation  for  the  inner 
composition  of  the  Ministries,  of  a  separate  instruction  for  each 
Ministry,  and  of  a  clear  statement  about  the  relation  of  the 
Ministries  to  the  provincial  institutions. 

The  reproach  for  mistreating  Peter's  legislation  had  no  foun- 
dation, for  we  have  seen  that  the  Collegia  had  been  abolished 
by  Catherine,  and  Alexander's  task  consisted  not  in  supplanting 
the  existing  Collegia  with  ministries,  but  in  erecting  a  new 
building  on  a  vacant  place.  As  to  the  flaws  in  the  law,  they 
were  numerous  indeed.  The  law  embraced  in  one  statute  all 
the  Ministries,  there  were  no  separate  instructions,  the  inner 
order  was  not  worked  out,  the  relation  of  the  Ministries  to  the 
provincial  institutions  was  not  clear.  But  admitting  all  this, 
we  must  say  that  the  establishment  of  the  Ministries  was  the 
means  of  doing  away  with  a  considerable  portion  of  those  faults ; 
they  were  new  institutions,  and  had  to  be  given  a  chance  for  a 
gradual,  empirical  development  of  their  inner  order  and  for  the 
regulation  of  mutual  relations  among  various  departments.3 

Such  were  the  tangible  results  of  the  Committee's  work. 

But  for  Alexander  himself  work  on  the  Committee  with  its 
educated  and  talented  members  was  a  very  useful  school  which 
had  made  up  to  some  extent  for  his  lack  of  positive  knowledge. 
Having  made  use  of  the  lessons  he  had  received  in  the  Com- 
mittee, and  having  accepted  as  a  gift  from  it  an  excellent  instru- 
ment for  the  further  development  of  his  internal  policy,  in  the 
form  of  the  Ministries  and  the  Committee  of  Ministers,  Alex- 
ander undoubtedly  felt  firmer  and  more  conscious  in  his  inten- 
tions and  was  better  equipped  for  the  promulgation  of  his  politi- 
cal plans  than  he  had  been  a  year  before.  This  may  certainly 
be  said  also  with  respect  to  his  foreign  policy  in  which  he  soon 
manifested  great  originality. 

8  All  the  mentioned  faults  of  the  first  ministerial  law  were  soon 
observed  by  V.  P.  Kochubey,  as  it  can  be  seen  from  his  report  to  Alex- 
ander on  March  28,  1806. 


CHAPTER  VI 

FROM  the  study  of  the  state  measures  we  shall  now  turn 
to  an  examination  of  the  position  of  society  at  the  time  of 
Alexander's  accession  and  during  the  first  years  of  his 
reign,  and  of  the  changes  in  the  conditions  of  the  country  and 
its  economic  and  social  life  that  took  place  during  that  time. 
All  historians  agree  as  to  the  general  mood  that  reigned  in  the 
country  after  the  death  of  Paul. 

"  All  is  calm  and  peaceful,"  wrote  the  Empress  Elizabeth 
to  her  mother,  "  unless  we  speak  of  the  mad  joy  that  has  taken 
possession  of  everybody,  from  the  last  muzhik  to  the  highest 
ranks  of  society  ...  I  breathe  peacefully  together  with  all 
Russia." 

Wiegel,  eye-witness  of  the  Moscow  reception  of  the  accession- 
manifesto,  wrote  in  his  memoirs:  "This  is  one  of  those  remi- 
niscences which  time  can  never  erase:  a  silent  general  joy  illu- 
mined by  a  bright  spring  sun.  .  .  .  Common  embraces,  as  on 
the  day  of  Easter-Sunday;  not  a  word  about  the  deceased,  so 
as  not  to  darken  even  for  a  moment  the  hearty  gladness  that 
burned  in  all  eyes;  not  a  word  about  the  past,  but  only  about 
the  present  and  the  future  .  .  ." 

The  public  rejoiced  over  their  deliverance  from  the  terrors 
and  tribulations  of  Paul's  regime;  at  once  there  reappeared  the 
forbidden  hair-dresses,  hats,  carriages,  for  even  such  miserable 
privileges  had  been  taken  away  by  the  despot.  More  earnest 
patriots  rejoiced  not  so  much  over  the  passing  of  the  terror  as 
over  the  advent  of  a  new  epoch  with  which  they  connected  the 
most  rosy  hopes.  They  saw  a  confirmation  of  their  hopes  in  the 
energetic  activity  of  the  young  Monarch  who  tried  from  the 

96 


SOCIETY'S  MOOD  97 

outstart  to  erase  and  smoothe  over  all  the  morbid  traces  of  his 
father's  reign,  and  to  revoke  all  his  oppressive  and  hateful 
measures. 

The  progressive  elements  had  good  reasons  for  expecting 
radical  reforms  from  the  new  Tzar  whose  political  views  had 
been  known  even  before  he  had  declared  them  in  his  early 
ukases.  It  is  curious,  however,  to  note  that  all  these  liberals 
associated  their  constitutional  expectations  with  the  manifesto 
of  March  12,  in  which  Alexander  promised  to  reign  according 
to  the  heart  and  will  of  his  grandmother.  But  Catherine  was 
a  convinced  autocrat,  with  no  thoughts  about  granting  a  con- 
stitution! The  public  had  evidently  suffered  so  much  under 
Paul  that  it  looked  back  to  the  time  of  Catherine  as  to  the 
golden  age.  Generally  speaking  there  were  many  young  men 
who  had  dreamt  about  limiting  the  absolutism,  but  most  of  them 
were  poorly  informed  as  to  the  real  foundations  of  a  constitu- 
tional order. 

For  the  time  being  they  felt  satisfied  with  the  chance  to 
breathe  freely  and  to  get  a  respite  from  the  mad  governmental 
terror;  even  such  enlightened  and  scholarly  men  as  Academic 
Storch,  the  investigator  of  Adam  Smith,  in  his  chronicle  of 
Alexander's  early  reign  considered  all  the  young  Monarch's 
measures  for  the  first  five  years  as  direct  steps  toward  a  con- 
stitutional state.  Even  the  incident  with  Potocky  and  the 
wilful  interpretation  of  the  rights  of  the  Senate  that  followed, 
aroused  no  criticism  of  Alexander  among  his  contemporaries. 
The  nobles  organised  ovations  in  honour  of  Potocky  and  hos- 
tile demonstrations  against  Derzhavin  and  Viazmitinov  (the 
minister  of  war  and  author  of  the  circular  that  had  caused  the 
whole  imbroglio),  but  nobody  thought  of  accusing  Alexander,  or 
of  questioning  the  sincerity  of  his  constitutional  intentions. 

The  liberal-rosy  mood  of  the  public  was  reflected  also  in 
the  periodical  press  which  reappeared  immediately  after  the 
unsealing  of  the  private  printing-houses.  The  first  magazine 


98  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

to  have  gained  great  importance  after  1802  was  the  European 
Messenger,  issued  by  Karamzin,  the  most  popular  and  favourite 
publication  of  the  time,  as  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that 
Karamzin  earned  six  thousand  rubles  a  year  from  subscriptions 
only.  Karamzin  himself  no  longer  belonged  to  the  young 
generation ;  he  had  lived  through  his  "  Sturm  und  Drang 
Periode  "  back  in  the  nineties  of  the  eighteenth  century,  when 
he  wrote  his  Letters  of  a  Russian  Traveller.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  nineteenth  century  he  was  already  a  well-balanced 
writer  of  ultra-sentimental  tendencies,  author  of  such  works  as 
Poor  Lize  over  which  our  grandmothers  raved  so  much. 

Karamzin  asserted  in  1802  that  all  the  nations  had  grown 
convinced  of  the  necessity  of  a  firm  government  after  a  decade 
of  revolutionary  wars,  and  that  all  governments  had  become 
convinced  of  the  importance  of  public  opinion,  of  the  need  of 
popular  loyalty  and  of  the  necessity  of  eradicating  abuses.  He 
saw  then  the  pledge  for  the  aggrandisement  of  Russia's  pres- 
tige and  glory  in  the  development  of  civil  consciousness  and 
the  spread  of  education  in  the  country;  for  this  reason  he  sym- 
pathised at  that  time  with  Alexander's  mild  rule  and  with  his 
liberal  and  enlightening  measures.  He  had  not  yet  become 
that  extreme  conservative  who  later  condemned  Alexander's 
liberalism  and  fiercely  opposed  Speransky.  In  the  European 
Messenger  Karamzin  lauded  the  human  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment. "  Russia  sees  on  her  throne  a  beloved  Monarch  who 
zealously  desires  her  happiness,  guided  by  the  rule  that  virtue 
and  enlightenment  should  be  the  basis  of  national  welfare  .  .  ." 

"  Through  our  zeal  for  education  we  shall  prove  that  we  do 
not  fear  its  consequences,  and  wish  to  enjoy  only  such  rights 
as  agree  with  the  general  well-being  of  the  state  and  with  love 
for  mankind." 

The  magazine  had  an  abundance  of  sentimental  novels  partly 
original  and  partly  translated ;  in  its  publicistic  department  was 
preached  a  sentimental  and  haughty  patriotism,  and  very  opti- 


PERIODICAL  PUBLICATIONS  99 

mistic  views  were  expressed  on  Russian  reality,  including  serf- 
dom, which  was  described  idyllically,  the  landowners  figuring 
in  most  cases  as  benefactors  of  their  peasants.  Praising  Alex- 
ander's first  reforms  and  greeting  the  establishment  of  minis- 
tries, Karamzin  found  it  opportune  to  emphasise  the  formation 
of  an  intelligent  public  opinion  that  had  taken  place  in  Russia. 
"  The  time  has  passed,"  he  wrote,  "  when  the  Monarch's  grace 
and  a  peaceful  conscience  could  be  the  reward  of  a  virtuous 
minister.  .  .  .  Now  it  is  glorious  to  deserve  together  with  the 
Monarch's  grace  also  the  love  of  the  enlightened  Russians." 

By  the  success  of  the  European  Messenger  we  may  judge 
that  it  corresponded  to  the  tastes  and  requirements  of  the  pub- 
lic. There  was  a  number  of  other  sentimental-idyllic  maga- 
zines; one  should  mention  the  Moscow  Mercury,  which  was 
the  first  to  introduce  a  critical  department  where  at  times  nega- 
tive views  about  other  publications  were  expressed.  This  maga- 
zine was  also  the  first  to  raise  the  woman-problem  in  the  most 
energetic  manner;  in  the  very  first  number  it  advocated  the 
need  of  woman-education  and  her  participation  in  the  social  life 
of  the  country;  it  pointed  out  the  role  of  the  French  salons  in 
enlightening  the  public.  The  reign  of  sentimentalism  in  the 
tastes  of  that  time  was  responsible  for  the  appearance  of  such 
revolting  magazines  as  the  Magazine  for  Lovers,  or  the  Moscow 
Observer  and  similar  frivolous  publications  that  offered  empty 
anecdotes  and  dubious  stories.  Those  magazines  had  also 
a  reactionary  character:  they  attacked  the  free-thinkers  who 
doubted  the  usefulness  of  orders  and  ranks,  and  so  forth.  In 
the  Friend  of  Enlightenment  appeared  attacks  against  the  new 
reforms,  written  by  Derzhavin  and  Shishkov. 

The  progressive  elements  united  in  1804  around  the  Maga- 
zine of  Russian  Letters,  published  by  Brusilov  with  the  active 
co-operation  of  the  talented  publicist,  I.  P.  Pnin.  Pnin  had 
there  an  imaginary  dialog  between  a  censor  and  an  author  in 
China,  in  which  he  expressed  a  definite  liberal  view  on  the 


ioo  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

necessity  of  freedom  of  the  press  and  the  futility  of  any  cen- 
sorship; in  his  verses,  which  were  very  popular,  Pnin  also 
discussed  personal  freedom  and  the  abnormality  of  serfdom. 
Still  more  radical  was  Pnin's  pamphlet  "  An  Essay  on  Educa- 
tion," which  was  published  in  1804,  but  the  second  edition  of 
which  was  forbidden  by  the  censor.  It  is  curious  that  although 
Pnin  was  a  liberal,  his  educational  ideas  were  based  on  a 
class-point  of  view.  In  his  opinion  there  should  be  special 
schools  for  each  class  —  for  peasants,  commoners,  merchants, 
and  nobles;  the  children  of  the  lower  classes  should  study  a 
cycle  of  subjects  corresponding  to  their  needs,  and  only  the 
nobles  were  to  acquire  the  higher  sciences  and  abstract  knowl- 
edge. 

Not  less  remarkable  was  another  liberal  organ,  the  Northern 
Messenger,  published  by  I.  I.  Martynov,  director  of  the  chan- 
cery of  the  Ministry  of  Education.  The  magazine  was  finan- 
cially supported  by  the  Government,  and  carried  on  a  polemic 
with  all  reactionaries.  In  its  educational  programme  it  agreed 
with  the  views  of  Pnin.  Politically  it  tried  to  prepare  the 
minds  for  constitutional  ideas.  It  considered  England  as  the 
ideal  country  in  the  political  sense.  In  one  article  it  advo- 
cated an  aristocratic  constitution  of  the  type  that  corresponded 
with  the  views  of  Mordvinov,  mentioned  above,  and  one  may 
assume  that  the  article  was  inspired  by  Mordvinov. 

Another  liberal  magazine  was  published  from  1804  to  1806, 
Periodical  Publication  of  the  Society  of  Lovers  of  Letters,  the 
editor  and  chief  publicist  of  which,  Popugaiev,  lent  it  an  out- 
spoken democratic  tendency,  in  contrast  to  the  Northern  Mes- 
senger. 

In  1804  a  censorship-statute  was  issued,  copied  from  that 
of  Denmark,  which  established  preliminary  censorship  of  all 
publications.  Though  the  statute  was  not  liberal  in  substance, 
it  recommended  the  censors  to  be  lenient  with  authors.  In 
view  of  the  liberal  views  of  the  Government  the  press  enjoyed 


PUBLICATION  OF  BOOKS  101 

in  fact  considerable  freedom ;  it  could  print  what  it  wanted  to, 
but  one  must  say  that  it  did  not  want  overmuch. 

The  existence  of  all  these  magazines  shows  how  strongly  the 
public  interest  in  political  thought  had  been  cultivated  at  that 
time,  with  the  direct  co-operation  of  the  Government. 

Besides  magazines  there  appeared  during  that  period  a  mass 
of  new  books,  economic,  political,  juridical,  and  philosophical 
treatises,  of  which  the  majority  presented  expositions  and 
translations  of  European  works  of  the  later  eighteenth  century. 
For  this  purpose  Alexander  generously  offered  subsidies,  which 
amounted  to  more  than  sixty  thousand  rubles  in  five  years. 
The  translator  of  Adam  Smith  received  five  thousand  rubles, 
and  about  the  same  sum  was  given  to  the  publishers  of  Bentham 
and  Tacitus.  Among  the  published  works  were  the  political 
tractates  of  Beccaria,  Montesquieu,  Mably,  and  others.  A 
detailed  account  of  the  books  published  then  occupies  a  con- 
siderable part  of  the  ninth  volume  of  Storch's  Russland  unter 
Alexander  dem  Ersten. 

Such  was  the  mood  of  the  Government,  of  the  public,  and 
particularly  of  the  metropolitan  intelligentzia  and  press  during 
the  first  five  years  of  Alexander's  reign. 

As  to  the  masses,  no  essential  changes  in  their  condition  had 
taken  place  since  the  time  of  Catherine,  and  my  sketch  of  the 
position  of  the  peasants  under  Catherine  holds  true  also  con- 
cerning the  first  years  of  the  nineteenth  century.  One  should 
note,  however,  that  the  peasants,  who  usually  manifested  rest- 
lessness at  each  new  accession,  remained  calm  at  Alexander's 
accession. 

The  most  prominent  act  of  Alexander's  early  reign  in  regard 
to  the  peasant  question  was  the  ukase  of  February  20,  1803, 
concerning  the  Free  Agriculturists.  The  law  was  issued  on  the 
basis  of  Count  Rumiantzev's  memorandum,  and  it  allowed  serf- 
owners  to  liberate  their  bondmen  individually  or  by  whole  vil- 
lages not  otherwise  than  with  land-allotments  under  conditions 


102  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

arrived  at  by  mutual  agreement  between  the  owners  and  their 
serfs;  the  agreement  was  to  be  presented  to  the  Emperor  for 
sanction,  after  which  it  became  a  legal  enactment.  The  peasants 
thus  liberated  were  called  Free  Agriculturists,  and  the  Govern- 
ment could  not  dispose  of  their  land  as  it  did  of  that  of  the 
Fiscal  peasants. 

The  serfdom-advocates  considered  the  ukase  extremely  harm- 
ful, not  without  reason,  seeing  in  it  the  first  symptom  of  hos- 
tility toward  the  bondage  system.  Derzhavin  made  many 
efforts  to  prevent  the  enactment  of  that  law,  but  he  achieved 
only  an  Imperial  reprimand.  In  the  years  immediately  fol- 
lowing the  publication  of  the  ukase  there  were  concluded  on 
its  basis  a  very  few  agreements,  by  which  the  peasants  had  to 
pay  as  much  as  five  hundred  rubles  in  assignations  per  person. 
One  may  judge  how  high  that  price  was  by  the  fact  that  in 
the  fifties  the  value  of  the  landowners'  estates  (with  the  land 
and  buildings)  divided  by  the  number  of  bondmen  did  not 
exceed  two  hundred  to  three  hundred  rubles  per  soul. 

Altogether  there  were  made  during  the  reign  of  Alexander 
one  hundred  and  sixty  agreements  about  Free  Agriculturists,  the 
total  number  of  liberated  peasants  amounting  to  47,153  male 
souls;  in  seventeen  cases  the  liberation  was  transacted  without 
redemption  (the  number  of  freely  liberated  peasants  was  7,415, 
of  which  7,000  were  liberated  without  land  by  the  bequest  of 
one  landowner).  In  other  cases  the  peasants  bought  their 
freedom;  the  average  redemption  sum  for  the  whole  reign 
equalled  three  hundred  and  ninety-six  rubles  in  assignations  per 
soul,  or  about  one  hundred  rubles  in  silver  (according  to  the 
course  established  after  the  year  1809).  In  single  cases  the 
Government  helped  the  peasants  to  pay  out  their  redemp- 
tion-fees. 

The  next  peasant-measure  was  the  regulation  of  February 
20,  1804,  concerning  the  peasants  of  the  Lifland  province.  The 
initiative  in  this  case  belonged  to  the  landowners  of  the  prov- 


CONDITION  OF  THE  PEASANTS  103 

ince  themselves,  as  a  result  of  the  liberation  movement  that 
had  started  under  Catherine.  The  regulations  were  worked 
out  by  a  special  committee  that  consisted  of  Kochubey,  Stro- 
ganov,  Kozodavlev,  and  two  representatives  of  the  Lifland  no- 
bility, and  according  to  them,  (i)  it  was  forbidden  to  sell 
or  pledge  peasants  without  land;  (2)  the  peasants  received 
personal  rights,  self-government  and  volost-courts ;  x  ( 3 )  the 
peasants  became  hereditary  owners  of  their  land  portions,  which 
they  could  lose  only  by  the  verdict  of  the  court,  or  for  profligacy ; 
(4)  the  barshchina  was  limited  to  two  days;  (5)  in  the  obrok- 
estates  the  money  dues  established  by  a  special  revision-com- 
mission could  not  be  raised  by  the  landowners,  while  the  cur- 
tailment of  the  peasants'  portions  could  take  place  only  for  a 
special  compensation;  (6)  the  houseworkers  and  journeymen 
remained  under  the  disciplinary  authority  of  the  landowners, 
but  the  peasants  could  be  punished  only  by  verdict  of  the 
volost-court. 

In  1805  similar  regulations  were  worked  out  for  the  prov- 
ince of  Estland,  though  on  conditions  somewhat  less  favourable 
for  the  peasants.  These  regulations  later  played  a  certain  part 
in  the  course  of  the  peasant-question,  as  we  shall  see. 

Alexander's  personal  attitude  toward  the  peasant-question  at 
that  time  was  characterised  by  his  attention  to  peasant-com- 
plaints against  their  landowners  and  by  his  inflicting  severe 
punishments  upon  guilty  owners,  usually  depriving  them  of 
the  management  of  their  estates. 

Economically  the  land  underwent  no  radical  changes  during 
that  period.  The  population  increased  normally  in  the  absence 
of  wars  or  other  extraordinary  calamities.  The  general  in- 
crease of  the  population  for  the  years  1801-1805  equalled 
2,655,000. 

The  first  five  years  of  Alexander's  reign  saw  a  rapid  devel- 
opment of  the  colonisation  of  southern  Russia.  At  the  same 

1 A  volost  is  a  district  consisting  of  several  villages. —  TR. 


104  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

time  the  immigration  of  foreign  colonists  continued  to  grow 
owing  to  the  rumours  about  the  improved  conditions  of  admin- 
istration, and  also  to  the  privileges  offered  the  colonists  by  the 
manifesto  of  1763.  From  1803  to  1805  five  thousand  male 
colonists  settled  in  New  Russia  (Germans,  Czechs,  and  various 
southern  Slavs). 

In  the  meantime  there  began  to  appear  a  dearth  of  land  in 
densely  populated  regions,  such  as  the  provinces  of  Tula  and 
Kursk,  where  the  extensive  system  of  agriculture  predominated 
and  industry  was  slightly  developed.  The  Government  began 
to  transport  Fiscal  peasants  from  those  places  to  New  Russia, 
and  encouraged  privately  organised  immigration  of  peasants, 
allotting  them  land  on  favourable  conditions.  The  Govern- 
ment was  forced  to  change  its  attitude  toward  foreign  immigra- 
tion in  view  of  the  need  of  land  in  Russia  proper,  and  also 
because  of  the  numerous  disorders  in  the  foreign  colonies  that 
had  taken  place  during  Catherine  and  Paul.  In  1804  Kochubey 
presented  a  report  on  the  question  to  the  Committee  of  Min- 
isters, after  which  it  was  decided,  (i)  to  make  use  of  the 
southern  steppes  primarily  for  the  colonisation  of  Russians, 
and  (2)  to  handle  more  cautiously  foreign  immigration  by 
discontinuing  the  practice  of  inviting  masses  from  abroad  and 
by  allowing  only  such  immigrants  as  had  means  for  defraying 
their  travel-expenses  and  for  establishing  themselves  on  the 
new  place,  and  who  would  at  the  same  time  be  capable  of 
introducing  better  methods  in  agriculture,  or  be  skilled  in  some 
craft. 

In  spite  of  numerous  errors,  failures,  and  abuses  of  various 
authorities,  the  colonisation  of  New  Russia  developed  intensely. 
Empty  expanses  became  peopled  with  Russians  as  well  as  with 
foreigners:  Germans,  German  Mennonites,  southern  and  west- 
ern Slavs  (especially  since  disturbances  had  begun  in  Turkey), 
and  Jews  from  White  Russia.  The  cultivation  of  the  fertile 
southern  fields  was  markedly  reflected  on  the  productivity  of 


THE  JEWISH  QUESTION  105 

Russian  grain,  the  export  of  which  had  grown  thirty  times 
since  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  five  to  six 
times  since  the  eighties.  The,  lion  share  of  the  export  con- 
sisted of  corn  that  was  raised  in  the  newly  cultivated  southern 
steppes. 

Caring  for  the  rapid  economic  development  of  the  South, 
the  Government  granted  various  privileges  to  the  colonists  in 
regard  to  the  payment  of  dues  and  taxes,  and  also  trade  privi- 
leges, by  establishing  free  ports  at  first  in  Crimea  (under  Paul) 
and  later  in  Odessa.  Odessa,  established  by  Catherine,  was 
administered  at  that  time  by  the  French  emigre,  Duke  Richelieu 
(ultimately  minister  of  Louis  XVIII),  and  rapidly  grew  into 
a  large  commercial  city  and  port. 

In  connection  with  the  colonisation-policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment we  should  mention  here  two  big  problems  of  internal  life 
that  had  come  to  the  front  about  that  time:  that  of  the  Jews 
and  of  the  Sectarians. 

The  first  was  directly  connected  with  the  annexation  at  the 
end  of  the  eighteenth  century  of  the  vast  Polish-Lithuanian 
provinces  that  contained  one  million  Jews.  Up  to  that  time 
the  question  had  only  a  limited  importance,  touching  mainly  the 
permission  for  Jewish  merchants  to  appear  at  Little  Russian 
fairs.  This  permission  was  regulated  by  a  ukase  of  Catherine 
I  (in  1727),  and  was  later  greatly  curbed  by  Elizabeth.  Under 
Catherine  II,  after  the  annexation  of  Crimea,  New  Russia,  and 
the  partitions  of  Poland,  there  was  introduced  for  the  first  time 
the  idea  of  a  Jewish  Pale  of  Settlement,  which  consisted  of  the 
provinces  of  Little  Russia,  New  Russia,  Crimea,  and  the  terri- 
tories included  in  the  three  partitions  of  Poland.  The  Jews 
were  forbidden  to  enter  other  parts  of  the  Empire,  but  within 
the  Pale  they  were  given  all  civil  rights  of  the  "  middle  sort." 
Only  at  the  end  of  Catherine's  reign,  by  the  law  of  1794, 
were  the  Jews  required  to  pay  double  taxes  in  comparison  with 
the  taxes  of  Christian  commoners  and  merchants.  Under  Paul 


106  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

the  law  remained  intact;  in  his  last  years  Derzhavin,  who  had 
performed  a  senatorial  revision  of  White  Russia  in  view  of 
its  failure  of  crops  and  famine,  presented  a  special  report  on 
the  Jewish  question,  which  was  disregarded  by  Paul  and  re- 
mained in  the  Senate  until  1802,  when  the  question  came  under 
discussion.  A  special  committee  was  organised  to  examine 
"  the  complaints  of  the  inhabitants  of  those  provinces  where 
Jews  lived,  about  various  abuses  and  disorders  detrimental  to 
agriculture  and  industry."  As  a  result  of  the  committee's  work 
came  the  "  Statute  concerning  the  Jews  "  of  1804.  The  Jews 
were  as  before  forbidden  to  settle  outside  of  the  Pale,  but  the 
Pale  itself  was  somewhat  expanded;  to  the  provinces  of  Lith- 
uania, White  Russia,  Little  Russia,  Kiev,  Minsk,  Volhyn, 
Podolsk,  Kherson,  Ekaterinoslav,  and  Tavrida  (Crimea),  were 
added  the  provinces  of  Astrakhan  and  the  Caucasus;  in  view 
of  complaints  against  Jew-smugglers,  they  were  not  allowed  to 
settle  within  fifty  versts  of  the  frontier.  Within  the  Pale  the 
Jews  were  to  enjoy  "  the  protection  of  the  law  on  equal  basis 
with  the  other  Russian  subjects."  The  Statute,  however, 
specified  the  civil  rights  of  the  Jews,  setting  forth  a  double 
purpose:  to  encourage  their  assimilation  with  the  rest  of  the 
population  and  to  direct  them  to  useful  work  that  they  might 
abandon  such  occupations  as  exploited  the  local  population,  es- 
pecially the  lower  class,  whose  frequent  complaints  to  the  Gov- 
ernment had  brought  about  the  discussion  of  the  Jewish  ques- 
tion. The  Jews  were  divided  by  the  Statute  of  1804  into 
four  classes:  (i)  agriculturists,  (2)  factory-owners  and  artisans, 
(3)  merchants,  and  (4)  commoners.  They  were  encouraged 
to  take  up  farming  and  were  forbidden  to  keep  taverns  in  vil- 
lages. The  Statute  endeavoured  to  secure  for  the  Jews  all 
means  of  education,  in  which  respect  it  differed  favourably  from 
the  later  policy  of  the  Government  in  the  same  question.  Their 
children  could  attend  all  primary  schools,  gymnasia,  and  uni- 
versities, and  were  granted  the  same  degrees  as  other  subjects 


ATTITUDE  TOWARD  THE  SECTS  107 

of  the  Empire.  For  the  Jews  who  in  view  of  their  religious  ex- 
clusiveness  were  unwilling  to  send  their  children  to  common 
schools,  the  Government  ordered  special  schools  established,  for 
the  maintenance  of  which  an  extra  tax  was  levied  on  the  Jews. 
According  to  Prof.  A.  D.  Gradovsky  the  Statute  of  1804  has 
been  the  starting  point  for  all  the  subsequent  legislation  con- 
cerning the  Jews,  and  one  should  note  that  the  further  meas- 
ures have  developed  by  no  means  favourably  for  the  Jews,  so 
that  the  Statute  of  1804  is  in  many  respects  much  better  dis- 
posed toward  them  than  the  later  policy  of  the  Government. 

More  favourable  and  human  was  the  attitude  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, and  particularly  of  the  Emperor  himself,  towards  the 
various  Russian  and  foreign  sects.  Such  sects  as  the  Dukho- 
bory  and  Molokane  were  granted  toleration,  while  under  Cath- 
erine the  Dukhobory  were  sentenced  to  be  burned,  and  only 
through  the  intercession  of  the  Empress  were  they  exiled  instead 
to  Siberia.  Alexander  protected  all  rationalistic  sects  and  con- 
sidered useless  not  only  repressive  measures  against  Sectants 
and  Schismatists,  but  even  the  missionary  activity  of  the  Ortho- 
dox church. 

The  rapid  growth  of  the  fertile  South  was  reflected  on  the 
industrial  life  of  the  northern,  not  black-soil,  provinces.  Un- 
able to  compete  with  the  South  in  the  production  of  cereals, 
particularly  of  corn,  they  concentrated  their  activity  on  the 
production  of  flax  and  hemp  and  their  fabrics,  which  was 
greatly  aided  by  the  removal  of  the  commercial  restraints  in  the 
relations  with  England,  the  chief  consumer  at  that  time  of 
flax  and  hemp  for  its  fleet.  The  restoration  of  the  liberal 
tariff  of  1797  and  the  abolition  of  Paul's  restrictions  in  regard 
to  foreign  lands,  had  benefited  the  Russian  foreign  trade,  and 
the  temporary  trade-balance  had  in  its  turn  favourably  im- 
pressed the  course  of  the  paper-money,  notwithstanding  the  new 
issues  of  assignations  for  the  extinction  of  the  yearly  deficits. 
This  favourable  financial  situation  after  the  depressed  state  of 


io8  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

affairs  under  Paul  had  aroused  in  governmental  circles  an  exces- 
sive optimism  and  carelessness  in  financial  management,  the 
results  of  which  were  quite  painful;  but  at  the  same  time  it 
allowed  the  progressive  government  to  spend  generously  on 
various  productive  purposes,  and  first  of  all  on  education.  Of 
a  similar  productive  importance  were  the  enormous  subsidies 
given  for  the  building  of  waterways,  mainly  begun  under 
Catherine  and  Paul  and  finished  during  the  first  years  of 
Alexander,2  and  the  expenses  for  the  colonisation  of  the  South. 
Yet  the  lion-portion  of  the  budget  was  even  at  that  time  ab- 
sorbed by  the  army  and  navy  (30-40  per  cent.).  About  10  per 
cent,  went  for  the  court  expenses;  Alexander  had  tried  to  cut 
down  the  extravagant  court  expenditures,  so  that  the  courtiers, 
used  to  the  prodigality  of  Catherine  and  Paul,  loudly  accused 
him  of  parsimony.  In  view  of  the  broadened  progressive 
activity  of  the  Government,  the  income  from  the  earlier  estab- 
lished taxes  could  not  cover  the  new  expenses,  and  the  budgets 
brought  yearly  deficits  of  about  20-25  per  cent.  Instead  of 
revising  the  tax-system  by  a  simple  proportional  increase  of  the 
direct  taxes,  the  Government  covered  the  deficit  year  after  year 
by  issues  of  assignations,  the  course  of  which  had  not  fallen, 
but  had,  on  the  contrary,  risen,  owing  to  the  rapid  develop- 
ment of  foreign  commerce  and  to  a  favourable  balance  of  trade. 
By  the  end  of  Catherine's  reign  the  course  of  the  assignations 

2  In  1805  was  the  Beresina  canal  opened  for  navigation.  It  joined 
the  Dnieper  with  Western  Dvina;  in  1804  the  Oginsky  canal  for  the 
connection  of  the  rivers  Shara  and  Yatzolda  was  opened;  in  the  same 
year  Sivers  finished  the  canal  around  lake  Ilmen,  connecting  the  rivers 
Msta  and  Volkhov;  the  work  for  the  Maryinsky  canal  was  intensified 
by  the  great  sums  offered  by  Empress  Marie  Feodorovna  (the 
Dowager),  for  which  reason  the  canal  finished  in  1810  has  borne  her 
name.  At  the  same  time  were  finished  the  Svirsky  and  Siassky 
canals  around  lake  Ladoga.  Among  the  works  of  secondary  im- 
portance one  may  consider  the  Mytishchinsky  aqueduct  in  Moscow, 
which  was  brought  up  to  the  Kuznietzky  Bridge  (the  centre  of 
Moscow)  in  1805  at  the  cost  of  1,164,000  rubles. 


FINANCES  AND  STATE  REFORMS  109 

(their  total  was  157  million)  fell  to  70  copecks  per  ruble;  by 
the  end  of  Paul's  reign,  when  the  number  of  assignations  had 
reached  212  million,  the  course  fell  below  50  copecks  and  threat- 
ened to  fall  further,  owing  to  the  mad  measures  of  Paul  in 
regard  to  foreign  trade;  but  after  the  revocation  of  all  Paul's 
restrictions  the  course  began  to  rise,  despite  the  new  yearly 
issues  of  assignations,  so  that  in  1803-1804,  when  their  number 
in  circulation  exceeded  300  million  rubles,  their  course  still 
stood  above  80  copecks  per  ruble.  The  war  that  began  in 
1805  completely  destroyed  these  favourable  financial  conditions. 

The  work  of  fundamental  state  reorganisation,  that  had  been 
planned  by  Alexander,  progressed  with  a  slow  tempo  after  the 
cessation  of  the  Committee  sessions.  The  discussion  of  im- 
portant state  affairs  and  questions  was  now  concentrated  in  the 
Committee  of  Ministers  which  consisted  of  all  the  members  of 
the  Committee  who  had  become  ministers  and  deputy-ministers. 
The  working  out  of  further  administrative  reforms  was  cen- 
tred mainly  in  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  at  the  head  of 
which  stood  Kochubey  and  his  deputy  Stroganov  and  the  talented 
young  assistant  of  Troshchinsky,  M.  M.  Speransky,  destined 
to  play  a  prominent  role  in  the  reorganisation  of  Russian 
state-institutions.  The  views  of  Speransky  on  the  necessary 
caution  in  promulgating  fundamental  reforms  were  clearly  ex- 
pressed in  a  memorandum  presented  by  him  in  1803. 

"  In  the  present  state  of  affairs,"  he  wrote  there,  "  we  do 
not  find  the  first  elements  necessary  for  the  establishment  of  a 
monarchical  order  (by  monarchical  Speransky  understood  con- 
stitutional). Indeed,  how  is  it  possible  to  introduce  a  monarchi- 
cal (i.e.,  constitutional)  order  after  the  plan  expounded  above, 
in  a  land  where  half  of  the  population  is  in  complete  slavery, 
where  that  slavery  is  bound  with  almost  all  parts  of  the  political 
organisation  and  with  the  military  system,  and  where  that 
system  is  indispensable  in  view  of  the  expansion  of  the  fron- 
tiers and  the  political  situation  ?  How  is  it  possible  to  organise 


no  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

a  monarchical  state  without  a  code  of  laws  ?  How  is  it  possible 
to  establish  a  code  of  laws  without  separating  the  legislative 
power  from  the  executive?  How  is  it  possible  to  separate  the 
legislative  power  without  an  independent  institution  for  its  main- 
tenance and  support?  How  introduce  such  an  independent  in- 
stitution without  overthrowing  the  whole  existing  order  of 
things,  with  the  existence  of  slavery  and  in  the  absence  of  educa- 
tion? How  develop  a  public  opinion,  create  a  national  spirit 
without  freedom  of  the  press?  How  introduce  or  allow  free- 
dom of  the  press  in  the  absence  of  education  ?  How  establish  a 
real  ministerial  responsibility  where  the  planning  and  execution 
of  measures  are  combined  in  one  person?  How  can  the  ob- 
servance of  the  laws  be  secured  in  the  absence  of  responsibility  ? 
How  can  the  laws  be  observed  without  education  and  an  abund- 
ance of  executors?  .  .  ." 

All  these  questions,  in  Speransky's  opinion,  had  to  be  solved 
before  granting  a  constitution.  For  this  reason  he  insisted  that 
the  fundamental  reorganisation  of  the  state  should  be  postponed, 
and  the  immediate  future  should  be  devoted  to  regulating  the 
existing  order.  He  suggested  the  following:  (i)  the  autocracy 
to  be  preserved  for  the  time  being,  (2)  to  strengthen  public 
opinion  which  should  wield  an  influence  on  the  authorities, 
(3)  to  aim  at  an  approach  toward  a  constitutional  order,  for 
which  purpose  the  existing  order  should  contain  institutions 
capable  of  "  adapting  the  national  spirit "  to  the  new  ideas. 

Speransky's  considerations  resembled  in  substance  those  of 
Stroganov,  but  they  were  formulated  more  practically  and 
categorically.  It  is  characteristic  that  for  Speransky  in  1803, 
as  for  the  members  of  the  Committee,  a  constitutional  order 
was  the  fundamental  ideal,  but  an  ideal  unrealisable  in  the  near 
future.  The  chief  obstacle  to  its  realisation  appeared  in  the 
eyes  of  the  most  earnest  progressives  of  that  period  to  be  the 
institution  of  serfdom,  but  to  abolish  serfdom  was  considered 
dangerous  —  in  the  absence  of  education ;  and  to  spread  edu- 


EDUCATIONAL  ACTIVITY  111 

cation  under  conditions  of  serfdom  was  difficult;  hence  the 
enchanted  circle,  from  which  they  hoped  to  get  out  by  the  way 
of  slow  and  persistent  efforts. 

The  immediate  task  was  the  care  for  education,  to  which 
the  whole  attention  of  the  Government  was  directed  during 
the  first  five  years  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The  Ministry  of 
Education  produced  very  effective  results.  Though  at  its  head 
stood  the  lazy  Catherinian  aristocrat,  Count  Zavadovsky,  he  had 
the  co-operation  of  an  entire  committee  (the  Chief  Manage- 
ment of  Schools)  which  consisted  of  enlightened  and  devoted 
workers.  Some  of  them  were  appointed  Curators  over  five 
educational  districts:  the  Curator  of  the  Moscow  district  was 
Michail  Muraviov,  the  former  teacher  of  Alexander  (at  the 
same  time  he  remained  Deputy-Minister),  of  the  Petrograd 
district  —  N.  N.  Novosiltzev  (at  the  same  time  Deputy-Minis- 
ter of  Justice),  of  the  Vilna  district  (to  which  belonged  all 
Lithuania,  White  Russia,  and  the  South-Western  Region)  — 
Prince  Czartoryski  (Deputy-Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs),  of 
the  Kharkov  district  —  Count  Severin  Potocky  (the  Senator 
who  protested  in  1802),  of  the  Kazan  district  —  Academic  Ru- 
movsky,  one  of  Lomonosov's  favourite  pupils,  quite  senile  at  the 
time  of  his  appointment,  and  finally,  of  the  Dorpat  district 
(Livonia)  — the  enlightened  General  Klinger.  All  the  Cura- 
tors lived  in  Petrograd,  visited  their  districts  from  time  to  time, 
and  took  part  in  collegiate  discussions  of  all  problems  related 
to  the  spread  of  education  in  Russia.  One  of  the  members  of 
the  Chief  Management  of  Schools  was  Yankovich  de  Mirievo, 
the  Austrian  pedagogue,  who  had  laid  a  foundation  for  a  net 
of  schools  in  Russia  under  Catherine.  The  secretary  of  the 
Management  was  Vassily  Karazin,  the  young  enthusiast  whose 
address  of  welcome  to  Alexander  immediately  after  his  acces- 
sion had  become  the  leit-motive  of  the  progressives.  South 
Russia  owed  to  the  energy  of  Karazin  the  establishment  of  the 
university  of  Kharkov:  he  induced  the  Kharkov  nobility  to  col- 


112  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

lect  400,000  rubles  for  that  purpose,  and  the  university  was 
founded  in  1804.  At  the  same  time  were  founded  the  univer- 
sity of  Kazan  and  the  Petrograd  Institute  of  Pedagogy,  later 
reorganised  into  a  university.  Thus  Russia,  up  to  that  time  in 
possession  of  one  university  at  Moscow,  had  now  six  high  edu- 
cational institutions  (that  of  Vilna  was  Polish,  and  that  of 
Dorpat  —  German) .  The  Government  actively  set  out  to  plant 
education  from  above ;  for  most  of  all  there  was  need  of  forming 
a  cadre  of  teachers,  for  which  reason  in  Petrograd  was  founded 
not  a  university,  but  an  Institute  of  Pedagogy,  divided  into  de- 
partments. 

One  may  judge  of  the  dimensions  of  the  governmental  edu- 
cational activity  by  comparing  the  following  figures:  whereas 
the  highest  assignment  for  education  under  Catherine  reached 
780,000  rubles  a  year,  in  1804  there  was  assigned  for  the 
purpose  2,800,000  rubles  —  an  enormous  sum,  considering  the 
low  cost  of  living  at  that  time  and  the  remuneration  of  the 
personnel,  which,  compared  with  modern  salaries,  was  negligible. 
During  1803-1806  the  Government  assigned  sums  for  the 
support  of  educational  institutions;  each  university  received 
130,000  rubles,  each  of  the  42  gymnasia  (not  counting  those 
of  the  districts  of  Vilna  and  Dorpat)  5,500-6,500  rubles,  and 
each  of  the  District-Schools  (there  were  405) — 1250-1600 
rubles.  Besides  the  state  institutions  there  were  formed  during 
that  period  by  private  means  the  Demidov  Lyceum  in  Yaroslavl 
and  the  Gymnasium  of  Higher  Sciences  of  the  Name  of  Bez- 
borodko  in  Niezhin. 

The  first  University  Statute  was  issued  in  1804.  It  was 
based  on  the  principle  of  respect  for  knowledge  and  for  free- 
dom of  instructions,  and  gave  autonomy  to  university  Councils, 
which  was  greatly  limited  and  almost  destroyed  by  the  end  of 
Alexander's  reign,  and  entirely  abolished  by  Nicolas  I.  By 
the  Statute  of  1804  the  university  Councils  were  placed  at  the 
head  of  all  educational  institutions  of  the  districts;  they  en- 


EDUCATIONAL  ACTIVITY  113 

joyed  full  power  for  spreading  and  directing  education  in  their 
districts,  while  the  Curators  were  not  administrators  in  the 
proper  sense  of  the  word,  but  dignitaries  who  lived  in  Petro- 
grad  and  represented  the  needs  of  each  district. 

I  have  already  mentioned  the  generous  subsidies  of  the  Gov- 
ernment for  the  publication  of  books  and  magazines.  To  this 
one  should  add  the  pensions  that  the  Government  appointed  for 
persons  who  devoted  themselves  to  the  pursuit  of  knowledge 
outside  of  state-service ;  Karamzin,  for  instance,  received  a  pen- 
sion of  2,000  rubles  a  year,  a  sum  that  allowed  one  at  that  time 
to  live  comfortably  and  devote  oneself  entirely  to  study.  On 
the  whole  we  may  consider  those  years  as  the  best  and  most 
productive  in  the  history  of  Russian  education.  Unfortunately 
the  government  of  Alexander  I  could  not  long  continue  in  the 
same  way,  for  first  of  all  there  were  not  sufficient  financial 
resources  for  the  purpose.  As  soon  as  in  1805  the  war  with 
France  broke  out,  the  sums  assigned  for  education,  which  had 
been  continually  increasing  up  to  that  time,  not  only  ceased  to 
increase,  but  were  diminished  by  force  of  need. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  next  period  of  Alexander's  reign  was  signified  by 
two  wars  with  Napoleon.     The  relations,  however, 
which  brought  the  war  of  1805  had  begun  to  take 
form  long  before  that  year. 

Let  us  recall  that  at  the  moment  of  Paul's  death  war  with 
England  seemed  imminent,  and  the  English  fleet  was  about  to 
bombard  Cronstadt.  Immediately  after  Alexander's  acces- 
sion peace  was  concluded,  and  the  disputable  questions  of 
sea-rights  which  had  long  impeded  the  good  relations  between 
Russia  (and  other  powers)  and  England  were  solved.  Al- 
though all  the  sympathies  of  the  youthful  Alexander  lay  on  the 
side  of  France,  he  yielded,  nevertheless,  as  we  have  seen,  to 
the  pressure  of  his  close  advisors  and  formed  an  alliance  with 
England.  At  the  very  first  sessions  of  the  Committee  it  was 
decided  in  principle  not  to  meddle  with  any  internal  affairs 
of  foreign  countries,  and  although  they  looked  with  suspicion 
upon  France  in  view  of  the  ambitious  designs  of  Bonaparte, 
there  prevailed  the  pacifist  principle  in  foreign  relations.  Thus 
Russia  was  free  from  foreign  entanglements,  which  was  quite 
in  line  with  Alexander's  desire  to  turn  all  his  attention  to 
internal  affairs.  This  pacifism  was  not  limited  to  Western 
Europe  alone,  but  expanded  to  the  Eastern  frontier  as  well, 
so  that  when  Gruzia,  pressed  by  Persia,  appealed  to  Russia 
for  annexation,  the  question  was  decided  negatively  by  the  Com- 
mittee; in  view  of  the  insistence  of  the  Permanent  Council, 
however,  Alexander  had  to  revise  his  decision,  but  he  pre- 
scribed that  all  the  income  from  the  population  of  Gruzia 
should  be  spent  for  local  needs,  and  that  Gruzia  should  be 

114 


RELATIONS  WITH  NAPOLEON  115 

governed  according  to  native  customs.  Unfortunately  the  good 
intentions  of  the  young  Tzar  did  not  prevent  the  Russian 
representatives  in  Gruzia  —  Knorring  and  Kovalensky  —  from 
arousing  against  Russia  the  entire  public  opinion  of  Gruzia  by 
their  revolting  abuses  and  the  violence  of  the  first  few  months 
of  the  Russian  administration. 

The  relations  with  Napoleon,  that  had  been  quite  favourable 
at  the  beginning  and  were  confirmed  by  a  treaty  in  the  fall  of 
1 80 1,  became  tense  by  the  end  of  the  same  year,  partly  because 
of  the  hostile  attitude  toward  Napoleon  taken  by  the  Russian 
ambassador  at  Paris,  the  supercilious  Count  Morkov,  and  partly 
because  of  Napoleon's  resolution  to  wipe  out  the  king  of  Sar- 
dinia, in  defiance  of  his  previous  agreement  with  Alexander 
on  the  matter.  Besides,  Alexander  became  more  and  more 
inclined  to  think  it  necessary  to  curb  the  ambitions  of  Bona- 
parte. At  the  same  time,  having  grown  better  acquainted  with 
international  relations,  and  coming  in  personal  contact  with 
foreign  representatives  at  Petrograd  (in  spite  of  his  friends' 
efforts  to  prevent  him  from  doing  so),  Alexander  had  evidently 
discovered  in  himself  —  not  without  foundation  —  a  diplomatic 
talent  and  a  great  predilection  for  diplomatic  negotiations;  he 
was  probably  attracted  by  the  very  technique  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions. One  may  assume  that  even  then  he  was  guided  by  a 
vague  idea  of  liberating  in  the  future  Europe  from  the  grow- 
ing despotism  and  limitless  lust  for  power  of  Napoleon. 

In  spite  of  the  warnings  of  his  friends  Alexander  decided  to 
take  an  active  part  in  European  affairs,  and  for  a  beginning  he 
arranged  a  meeting  with  the  king  of  Prussia  in  Memel,  in  1802. 
In  the  same  year  he  was  completely  convinced  of  Napoleon's 
vulgar  aspirations,  when  after  another  coup  d'etat  he  proclaimed 
himself  Consul  for  life.  "  The  veil  has  fallen,"  wrote  Alex- 
ander to  La  Harpe;  "Napoleon  has  deprived  himself  of  the 
best  glory  which  a  mortal  may  achieve,  the  glory  of  proving 
that  he  worked  disinterestedly  for  the  good  of  his  country,  and 


ii6  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

remaining  loyal  to  the  constitution  to  which  he  swore  alle- 
giance, after  ten  years  resign  his  power.  Instead  he  has  pre- 
ferred to  emulate  monarchical  courts,  breaking  thereby  the 
constitution  of  his  land.  Henceforth  he  is  the  most  prominent 
of  the  tyrants  that  we  find  in  history." 

At  the  same  time  the  rights  of  the  king  of  Sardinia  were  ab- 
solutely trampled  down,  and  his  possessions  annexed  to  France. 
In  1803,  on  the  renewal  of  his  war  with  England,  Napoleon 
seized  Hanover  and  ostensibly  threatened  to  become  the  dictator 
of  the  destinies  of  Central  Europe.  The  personal  relations  of 
Napoleon  and  Count  Morkov  had  become  so  unpleasant  that 
Napoleon  demanded  his  recall.  Alexander  did  not  meet  the 
demand  at  once,  and  finally  when  recalling  Morkov  he  rewarded 
him  demonstratively  with  the  highest  Russian  order,  of  Andrey 
the  First  Called,  in  which  decoration  Morkov  appeared  to 
take  his  leave  from  Napoleon.  Russia  did  not  appoint  another 
ambassador  to  France,  and  the  temporary  management  of  the 
embassy's  affairs  was  entrusted  to  a  minor  official,  Oubri. 
The  proclamation  of  Napoleon  as  emperor  and  the  preceding 
execution  of  the  Duke  d'Enghien  served  as  the  last  causes  for 
a  rupture. 

From  the  aforesaid  we  see  that  the  interests  of  Russia  had 
in  fact  nothing  to  do  with  the  story;  in  the  whole  affair 
Alexander  acted  not  as  a  representative  of  Russian  interests 
proper,  but  as  a  head  of  one  of  the  European  Powers.  Having 
broken  with  Napoleon,  Alexander  became  active  in  forming  a 
coalition  against  him. 

The  management  of  foreign  affairs  was  at  that  time  in  the 
hands  of  Prince  Adam  Czartoryski,  since  the  Chancellor,  Count 
A.  R.  Vorontzov,  whom  Alexander  did  not  like,  had  resigned. 
Czartoryski  sympathised  with  the  idea  of  a  coalition  against 
Napoleon,  in  his  hope  that  as  one  of  the  war's  results  might  be 
the  restoration  of  Poland.  He  tried  to  persuade  Alexander 


CZARTORYSKI  AND  THE  POLES  117 

that  an  armed  resistance  to  Napoleon  was  not  sufficient,  that 
in  view  of  his  extraordinary  genius  and  prestige  of  invincibility, 
it  was  necessary  to  arouse  in  the  European  nations  a  strong 
enthusiasm  for  a  struggle  against  him.  As  an  idea  that  might 
arouse  such  an  enthusiasm  Czartoryski  put  forth  the  principle 
of  restoring  the  independence  of  nationalities.  Alexander  evi- 
dently agreed  with  such  a  formulation  of  the  question,  although 
in  the  mouth  of  Czartoryski  the  restoration  of  the  Polish  na- 
tionality meant  the  wresting  from  Russia  of  such  ancient  Rus- 
sian lands  as  Volhynia  and  Podolia,  for5  Czartoryski  dreamt 
of  Poland  before  the  partition  of  1772.  At  such  a  formula- 
tion of  the  question  the  war  of  1805  against  Napoleon  was 
not  only  not  aroused  by  Russian  interests,  but  threatened  to 
involve  Russia  in  the  future  into  a  new  territorial  struggle,  a 
struggle  which  had  conditioned  in  the  past  centuries  her  back- 
wardness and  darkness.  Pretending  to  share  all  the  views  of 
Czartoryski,  Alexander,  however,  made  peculiar  use  of  the 
hopes  of  the  Polish  patriots.  He  encouraged  them,  though  not 
binding  himself  with  any  definite  promises,  mainly  with  the  view 
of  compelling  the  vacillating  king  of  Prussia  to  join  the 
coalition  against  Napoleon  under  the  threat  of  a  Polish  in- 
surrection in  Prussian  Poland;  as  soon  as  he  coerced  Friedrich 
Wilhelm  of  Prussia  into  signing  a  treaty  with  him  (it  was 
not  carried  out  after  all),  he  declined  to  encourage  the  in- 
flamed hopes  of  the  Poles  and  indefinitely  postponed  the  solu- 
tion of  the  Polish  question.  By  this  reckless  and  incorrect 
behaviour  Alexander  aroused  a  bitter  disappointment  in  the 
Poles  and  pushed  them  into  the  arms  of  Napoleon,  who  made 
good  use  of  them. 

In  the  war  of  1805  Russia  had  to  mobilise  a  considerable 
army,  for  on  the  Continent  only  Austrian  and  Russian  troops 
actually  fought  against  Napoleon.  Three  consecutive  recruit- 
ments were  required  to  get  150,000  men  (ten  recruits  from 


ii8  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

every  thousand  males,  but  since  the  recruits  were  taken  from 
among  those  of  the  age  of  twenty  to  thirty-five,  the  relation 
of  the  number  of  recruits  to  the  number  of  that  group  of  the 
population  equalled  10:225).  Besides,  a  new  and  considerable 
deficit  had  to  be  allowed  in  the  budget,  which  had  to  be  cov- 
ered with  a  new  issue  of  assignations. 

Alexander  acted  in  this  case  as  a  true  autocrat  who  knew 
no  obstacles  to  his  will  and  was  not  responsible  before  any  one. 
But  we  should  note  that  Russian  public  opinion  was  all  against 
Napoleon,  and  a  war  with  him  did  not  appear  unreasonable, 
except  to  a  few  of  his  worshippers;  Czartoryski's  scheme  was 
not  generally  known,  and  as  to  the  people  —  they  had  been 
accustomed  to  bear  even  heavier  burdens. 

As  it  is  well  known,  the  war  of  1805  ended  very  badly  for 
Russia  and  Austria,  chiefly  because  of  the  stupidity  of  the 
Austrian  generals,  and  partly  because  of  the  inexperience  and 
self-confidence  of  Alexander,  who  forced  the  chief  commander 
Kutuzov  to  act  against  his  convictions,  but  in  accordance  with 
the  plan  of  the  Austrian  theoretic  strategist,  the  doctrinaire 
Weiroter.  After  the  capitulation  of  the  Austrian  army  at 
Ulm  and  the  subsequent  defeat  of  the  Russians  in  the  Battle 
of  Austerlitz  —  which  was  fought  against  the  will  and  advice 
of  Kutuzov,  the  Russian  army  had  to  retreat  quickly  towards 
the  frontier,  and  the  war  was  at  an  end.  Austria  concluded 
in  Presburg  a  humiliating  peace,  while  Prussia  signed  an  of- 
fensive and  defensive  alliance  with  Napoleon. 

Nevertheless  Alexander  began  to  make  preparations  for  the 
continuation  of  the  war;  the  defeat  of  the  army  created  a 
patriotic  mood  in  society,  which  Alexander  tried  to  fan  by 
direct  appeals  to  the  people.  Desiring  to  reach  the  masses  he 
employed  a  strong  means,  in  the  form  of  appeals  of  the  Holy 
Synod,  which  were  read  in  all  churches.  In  those  appeals 
Napoleon  was  declared  an  enemy  of  mankind,  who  intended  to 
proclaim  himself  a  Messiah,  and  arouse  the  Jews  to  annihilate 


PREPARATIONS  FOR  WAR  WITH  FRANCE      119 

the  Christian  Church.1  Foreseeing  the  transference  of  the 
war  into  Russian  territory,  Alexander  in  addition  to  the  mo- 
bilisation of  recruits  gave  orders  for  calling  a  militia,  which 
according  to  the  original  plan  was  to  consist  of  612,000  men. 
One  can  imagine  the  cost  of  such  preparations.  They  were 

1 "  The  furious  enemy  of  peace  and  blessed  calm,"  thus  began  the 
proclamation  of  the  Synod,  "  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  who  wilfully 
usurped  the  royal  crown  of  France  and  by  force  of  arms,  but  mainly 
by  treachery,  has  spread  his  power  over  numerous  neighbourly  states 
and  has  devastated  their  towns  and  villages  with  fire  and  sword, 
dares  in  the  madness  of  his  fury  to  threaten  God  protected  Russia 
with  an  invasion  of  her  territory,  with  destruction  of  her  well-being 
which  she  alone  in  the  whole  world  enjoys  at  present  under  the  mild 
sceptre  of  by  God  blessed  and  by  all  beloved  most  pious  Tzar 
Alexander  the  First,  and  with  shocking  the  Orthodox  Greco-Russian 
Church  in  all  purity  and  sanctity  blossoming  in  this  Empire.  .  .  ." 

After  an  appeal  to  all  shepherds  of  the  church  the  Synod  continued: 

"  The  whole  world  knows  his  Godless  intentions  and  deeds  by 
which  he  has  trampled  law  and  truth. 

"  Yet  in  the  times  of  national  disturbances  that  reigned  in  France 
during  the  Godless  revolution,  disastrous  for  mankind,  which  brought 
down  the  heavenly  curse  upon  its  instigators,  he  rejected  the  Christian 
faith,  celebrated  in  popular  assemblies  pagan  festivities  instituted  by 
evil-minded  heretics,  and  in  company  with  evil-doers  he  paid  homage, 
due  only  to  the  Almighty,  to  statues,  human  creatures,  and  whores 
that  served  them  as  idols. 

"  In  Egypt  he  associated  with  the  persecutors  of  the  Christian 
Church,  preached  the  Alkoran  of  Mahomet,  proclaimed  himself  de- 
fender of  the  creed  of  the  followers  of  that  false  prophet,  and  solemnly 
demonstrated  his  contempt  for  the  shepherds  of  the  Holy  Church  of 
Christ. 

"  Finally  to  the  greater  shame  of  France  he  assembled  there  Jewish 
synagogues,  ordered  to  pay  honour  to  the  Rabbins,  and  established  a 
new  great  Jewish  Synedrion,  that  same  Godless  congregation  which 
once  dared  condemn  to  crucifixion  our  Lord  and  Saviour  Jesus  Christ, 
and  now  he  attempts  to  unite  the  Jews  scattered  by  Divine  wrath  over 
the  whole  earth,  and  to  direct  them  for  the  overthrow  of  Christ's 
Church  and  for  (O  horrible  impudence  overstepping  all  his  wicked- 
ness!) the  proclamation  of  a  false  Messiah  in  the  person  of 
Napoleon.  .  .  ." 

After  various  vigorous  curses  and  threats  borrowed  from  the  book 
of  Deuteronomy,  the  proclamation  reiterated  in  the  end: 


120  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

accompanied,  especially  in  the  western  provinces,  with  the  tax 
of  carts  by  means  of  which  munitions  and  provisions  were 
brought  to  the  front. 

Although  Prussia  soon  after  the  first  treaty  concluded  a 
second  with  Napoleon,  Alexander  did  not  lose  hope  of  arousing 
her  against  Bonaparte,  who  kept  his  army  on  German  territory, 
refused  to  evacuate,  and  at  the  same  time  did  not  give  his 
consent  to  the  formation  by  the  king  of  Prussia  of  a  North- 
German  union  out  of  the  states  that  were  not  included  in  the 
Rhenish  Confederation.  Prussia's  rupture  with  Napoleon  did 
take  place,  and  sooner  than  Alexander  had  expected  it.  The 
weak  Friedrich  Wilhelm  hesitated  a  long  time,  then  suddenly 
sent  an  ultimatum  to  Napoleon,  demanding  the  immediate 
evacuation  of  the  French  army  and  his  non-interference  in  the 
organisation  of  the  North-German  union.  All  this  happened 
so  unexpectedly  that  Alexander  did  not  have  time  for  bring- 
ing his  army  to  Prussia's  aid.  Napoleon  gave  no  answer  to  the 
ultimatum,  but  began  at  once  military  activities,  and  after 
eight  days  delivered  Prussia  a  terrible  defeat  at  Jena.  The 
main  Prussian  army  was  destroyed  there,  and  after  their  second 
defeat  at  Auerstaedt  almost  all  Prussia  was  occupied  by  the 
French.  The  Prussians  held  only  two  fortresses  in  the  north- 
eastern corner  of  the  kingdom  —  Danzig  and  Koenigsberg  — 
behind  which  Friedrich  Wilhelm  had  to  seek  refuge,  in  the  little 

"  Having  rejected  the  thought  of  God's  judgement,  Napoleon  in  his 
madness  dreams  about  appropriating  (the  thought  of  which  is  hor- 
rible!) the  holy  name  of  Messiah  with  the  aid  of  the  enemies  of 
Christ,  the  Jews;  show  him  that  he  is  a  creature  consumed  by  con- 
science and  deserving  scorn.  .  .  ."  In  the  same  tone  was  the  proclama- 
tion by  the  Catholic  Metropolitan  of  Mohilev,  Sestrentzevich,  sent 
out  to  the  Catholic  priests  of  the  western  provinces.  The  local  ad- 
ministration in  western  Russia  was  ordered  to  watch  the  Jews  from 
communicating  with  the  Paris  Synedrion,  and  the  Jews  were  persuaded 
that  the  Synedrion  attempted  to  change  their  religion.  It  is  curious 
that  in  1812  the  Jews  of  the  western  provinces  remained  absolutely 
loyal  to  Russia,  in  spite  of  all  apprehensions. 


BATTLE  OF  EYLAU  121 

town  of  Memel  on  the  Niemen,  on  the  very  frontier  of  Russia. 
Poland  had  become  the  zone  of  the  war,  and  Napoleon,  wish- 
ing to  counterpoise  his  own  intentions  to  the  hopes  of  the  Poles 
in  Alexander,  made  clever  use  of  their  disappointment  caused  by 
the  treachery  of  1805,  and  began  to  spread  rumours  that  he 
would  restore  Poland  as  a  bulwark  against  Russia. 

The  commander  of  the  Russian  army  was  the  old  Field- 
marshal  Kamensky,  who  lost  his  reason  immediately  after  his 
arrival  at  headquarters,  and  almost  destroyed  the  army  by  his 
senseless  orders;  happily  he  withdrew  voluntarily  after  one 
week,  leaving  an  order  to  retreat  with  the  utmost  rapidity. 
The  generals,  however,  decided  to  disobey  him,  and  Benigsen 
concentrated  the  army  at  one  point  and  successfully  repulsed  the 
French  advance-guard  under  Pultusk,  fifty  versts  from  War- 
saw, east  of  the  Vistula.  Benigsen  was  appointed  commander- 
in-chief.  In  the  battle  of  Eylau  that  followed  soon,  despite 
the  loss  of  50,000  men  on  both  sides,  both  the  French  and  the 
Russian  armies  retained  their  positions;  the  fact  that  a  battle 
with  such  an  opponent  as  Napoleon  was  not  lost  greatly  uplifted 
the  spirit  of  Benigsen's  army.  But  five  months  after  Napo- 
leon decidedly  defeated  the  Russian  army  at  Friedland,  with  a 
loss  of  15,000  men,  after  which  the  Russians  could  not  con- 
tinue the  war.  There  was  no  hope  of  reinforcements,  except 
for  one  division  of  infantry  under  Prince  Lobanov-Rostovsky, 
which  consisted  entirely  of  fresh  recruits;  in  the  meantime  war 
was  declared  against  Turkey,  and  a  part  of  the  army  had  to 
withdraw  to  assist  Michelson's  army  which  had  occupied  Mol- 
davia and  Wallachia.  As  to  the  militia,  in  spite  of  its  great 
numbers  it  proved  quite  useless;  it  might  give  great  resistance 
in  case  of  the  enemy's  invasion  of  Russia,  in  a  guerrilla-war, 
but  for  the  regular  army  the  untrained  and  poorly  armed  mili- 
tiamen were  of  no  use.2  It  was  particularly  difficult  to  fill 

2.Bogdanovich  states  that  only  one-fifth  of  the  militiamen  could  be 
equipped  with  rifles;  the  rest  were  to  be  armed  with  pikes.  After 


122  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

the  enormous  loss  of  officers  and  generals;  of  the  latter  there 
remained  a  very  few  good  ones,  and  as  to  officers  there  had 
always  been  a  dearth  of  them,  so  that  their  ranks  had  to  be 
filled  with  unprepared  students  or  with  mere  "  fledglings  "  from 
among  the  nobility  who  consented  to  go  through  some  in- 
struction in  the  Cadet-Corpuses.  Thus  Russia  was  unable  to 
continue  the  war  alone;  England  took  part  in  it  only  by  sub- 
sidies, and  even  those  were  not  too  large  —  2,200,000  pounds 
a  year  for  all  her  continental  allies.  Alexander  was  forced  to 
start  peace  negotiations  in  which  he  was  met  half  way  by 
Napoleon,  who  was  also  in  great  difficulties  after  the  bloody 
battles  of  Eylau  and  Friedland. 

The  two  emperors  met  at  Tilsit,  on  the  Niemen.  There 
Alexander  demonstrated  for  the  first  time  his  remarkable  dip- 
lomatic talent,  since  Napoleon  suggested  carrying  on  the  nego- 
tiations without  the  participation  of  their  ministers,  to  which 
Alexander  willingly  consented.  He  had  to  employ  strenuous 
efforts  to  dissuade  Napoleon  from  completely  annihilating  Prus- 
sia. Still  Prussia  suffered  unprecedented  humiliation;  she  lost 
half  of  her  territory,  and  from  a  Great  Power  was  reduced 
temporarily  to  a  dependency  of  Napoleon,  with  the  right  to 
maintain  an  army  of  not  more  than  42,000  soldiers,  while  the 
fortresses  she  retained  were  occupied  by  the  French  (until  the 
payment  of  the  war-contribution). 

During  the  Tilsit  negotiations  Napoleon  took  into  account 
no  one  except  Alexander,  with  whom  he  intended  to  share  for 

the  Pultusk  battle  Alexander  ordered  the  militia  decreased  to  252 
thousand.  Roustam  in  his  memoirs  published  in  Revue  Retrospective 
brings  out  the  following  fact:  After  the  disorderly  retreat  of  the 
Russians  from  the  battle-field  of  Friedland,  the  French  having  reached 
the  Niemen  at  Tilsit  saw  a  quaint  sight:  "A  horde  of  barbarians 
with  Asiatic  faces,  Kalmucks  and  Siberians  (?),  without  rifles,  ran 
about  the  plain,  shooting  arrows  and  trying  in  vain  to  frighten  us. 
This  was  the  reserve-army  under  Prince  Lobanov,  of  which  Russia  had 
boastfully  announced  to  the  world." 


THE  TREATY  OF  TILSIT  123 

the  time  being  the  domination  of  the  world.  Alexander,  see- 
ing the  impossibility  of  an  immediate  continuation  of  the  strug- 
gle, decided  to  meet  temporarily  the  desires  of  his  rival,  who 
offered  quite  honourable  conditions  of  peace.  But  as  the  con- 
ditio  sine  qua  non  of  the  peace  Napoleon  demanded  that  in  case 
of  England's  refusal  to  accept  his  conditions  —  and  that  she 
would  not  accept  them  was  beyond  doubt  —  Alexander  had  to 
declare  war  against  her,  and  at  the  same  time  to  accept  the 
famous  Continental  System,  which  forbade  Napoleon's  allied 
and  dependent  countries  of  Europe  to  have  any  trade  relations 
with  England,  or  to  admit  to  their  ports  English  vessels.  Be- 
sides this,  Alexander  obligated  himself  to  compel  Sweden  and 
Denmark  to  break  with  England  and  enter  the  Continental 
System;  one  could  have  foreseen  that  Sweden,  being  absolutely 
defenceless  from  the  attack  of  England,  would  not  consent, 
and,  moreover,  King  Gustave  IV  had  manifested  a  fanatical 
hatred  for  Napoleon.  Thus  one  could  have  foretold  even  then 
the  inevitability  of  a  joined  attack  of  England  and  Sweden 
against  Russia  both  from  sea  and  land  in  the  vicinity  of 
Petrograd.  The  northern  shore  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland  be- 
longed at  that  time  to  Sweden,  and  Napoleon  pointed  out  to 
Alexander  the  strategic  necessity  for  its  conquest.  In  Tilsit, 
then,  was  planned  the  annexation  of  Finland  to  Russia,  for 
which  the  latter  had  to  carry  on  for  two  years  a  difficult  war 
with  Sweden. 

In  regard  to  Turkey  Napoleon  offered  his  mediation  for 
a  conclusion  of  peace  on  conditions  favourable  for  Russia,  and 
in  a  verbal  agreement  he  promised  to  uphold  Alexander  even 
unto  the  partition  of  European  Turkey,  should  the  latter  refuse 
to  surrender  the  principalities  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia ;  but 
as  a  preliminary  condition  for  an  armistice  and  for  beginning 
peace  negotiations  Napoleon  required  the  evacuation  of  the 
principalities  by  the  Russian  army,  with  the  understanding  that 
they  were  not  to  be  occupied  by  the  Turks  either.  In  fact 


124  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

the  war  with  Turkey  did  not  cease,  and  although  Napoleon 
continued  to  tempt  Alexander  with  brilliant  prospects  of  driving 
out  the  Turk  from  Europe  and  of  undertaking  a  joint  invasion 
of  India,  Russia  had  to  carry  on  a  fruitless  war  with  Turkey 
until  1812. 

Napoleon's  intrigues  and  undertakings  in  regard  to  the 
Poles  did  Russia  considerable  harm;  he  refused  to  return  to 
Prussia  the  conquered  Polish  districts,  and  formed  out  of  them 
the  Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw  under  the  rule  of  the  king  of 
Saxony  and  under  the  protectorate  of  the  French  emperor. 
Thus  Napoleon  established  a  military  post  on  the  Russian 
frontier.3  At  the  same  time  he  placed  Alexander  in  a  difficult 
situation  concerning  the  Poles,  as  he  was  forced  to  act  in  contra- 
diction to  his  former  declarations,  and  oppose  the  restoration  of 
an  independent  Poland.  This  circumstance  brought  the  final 
disappointment  of  the  Poles  in  Alexander,  and  transferred  all 
their  hopes  to  Napoleon. 

In  Tilsit  and  after  Tilsit  Alexander  manifested  his  admira- 
tion for  the  genius  of  Napoleon  and  his  friendship  with  him. 
His  contemporaries  reproached  him  in  having  been  hoodwinked 
by  the  sly  Corsican  who  failed  to  fulfil  many  of  his  promises. 
But  in  fact  Alexander  was  not  infatuated  with  Napoleon;  he 
skilfully  played  his  part  both  in  Tilsit  and  later  in  Erfurt,  so 
that  Napoleon  called  him  later  "  the  Talma  of  the  North  " 
(Talma  was  a  well-known  dramatic  actor  at  that  time)  and  "  a 
Byzantine  Greek." 

It  is  difficult  to  say  who  was  more  deceived  in  that  diplo- 
matic tournament,  for  Napoleon's  advisors  told  him  later  more 
than  once  that  he  was  deceived  by  Alexander.  From  the  point 

3  Napoleon's  adorer,  Albert  Vandal,  in  his  work  "  Napoleon  and 
Alexander  I"  speaks  on  this  matter:  "Not  intending  to  augment  the 
victim  of  the  triple  partition  into  a  strong  power,  he  wishes  to  create 
in  Europe  —  I  do  not  say  a  Polish  nation  —  but  a  Polish  army,  since 
he  considers  the  projected  state  only  as  a  big  military  force  on  the 
guard  of  France"  (!  —  on  the  shores  of  the  Vistula). 


EFFECT  OF  THE  WAR  ON  RUSSIA          125 

of  view  of  the  international  relations  of  that  time,  and  consid- 
ering the  actual  conditions  of  the  moment,  we  must  admit  that 
Alexander's  policy  in  Tilsit  and  a  year  later  in  Erfurt  was 
very  clever.  In  those  negotiations  Alexander  appeared  for  the 
first  time  in  the  role  of  a  keen  and  far-seeing  diplomat,  and 
we  may  now  presume  that  diplomacy  was  his  real  sphere,  where 
he  was  able  to  cope  with  the  most  prominent  statesmen  of  Eu- 
rope. 

The  influence  of  those  wars  on  the  conditions  of  the  popula- 
tion was  grave.  We  have  spoken  about  the  burdens  of  recruit- 
ments, calling  of  militia,  transportation  of  provision,  etc.  Of 
great  importance  was  also  the  cessation  of  the  Government's 
legislative  activity  on  account  of  the  war.  Finally  the  disas- 
trous state  of  the  finances  under  the  influence  of  the  war-ex- 
penditures had  greatly  affected  the  Government's  plans  in  the 
field  of  popular  education  which  had  so  well  advanced  until 
then.  As  a  consequence  of  the  wars  of  1805-7  and  of  the  com- 
plete failure  of  crops  in  1806,  the  financial  conditions  grew 
worse  from  year  to  year.  In  1806  the  income  and  the  expen- 
ditures were  100  million  and  122  million,  in  1807 —  121  and 
171  million,  in  1808 — 111.5  million  and  240  million,  of 
which  140  million  were  spent  on  the  army.  The  enormous 
deficits  were  again  covered  by  new  paper-issues,  the  total  of 
which  amounted  in  1806  to  319  million  rubles,  in  1807  to 
382  million,  in  1808  to  477  million  rubles.  In  the  meantime 
foreign  trade,  under  the  influence  of  the  war,  and  later  of  the 
Continental  System  and  of  the  prohibition  of  exporting  grain 
from  the  western  provinces  on  account  of  the  crop-failure  of 
1806,  had  diminished  considerably;  the  export  of  raw  material 
had  suffered  especially,  and  this  caused  an  unfavourable  turn 
in  the  balance  of  trade,  hence  an  outflow  of  metal-money,  to 
the  further  fall  of  the  course  of  the  paper-money.  The  paper- 
ruble,  quite  firm  from  1802  to  1805,  now  began  to  depreciate 
rapidly:  in  1806  its  value  fell  to  seventy-eight  copecks,  in 


126  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

1807  —  to  sixty-six,  in  1808  —  to  forty-eight  copecks.  In  the 
meantime  taxes  were  paid  in  assignations,  while  a  considerable 
portion  of  the  state-expenses  (for  the  maintenance  of  the  army 
and  for  subsidies  to  the  ruined  king  of  Prussia)  had  to  be 
paid  in  metal-money.  The  situation  was  difficult,  and  after  the 
Peace  of  Tilsit  and  the  acceptance  of  the  Continental  System 
it  became  unbearable.  The  Treaty  of  Tilsit  had  a  depressing 
effect  on  all  parts  of  Russian  society  and  the  masses;  many 
considered  it  more  ignominious  than  all  the  lost  battles.  Alex- 
ander's popularity  was  greatly  dimmed  after  his  peace  with 
Napoleon.  The  people  who  not  long  before  had  heard  in  the 
churches  anathemas  hurled  at  Napoleon,  could  not  understand 
how  the  Russian  tzar  so  demonstratively  showed  his  friendship 
for  the  "  enemy  of  mankind  "  who  had  schemed  to  annihilate 
Christianity. 

The  dissatisfaction  became  general  when  the  Continental 
System  had  completely  destroyed  the  export  trade,  brought  many 
firms  to  bankruptcy,  ruined  many  estates  that  used  to  send  raw 
material  abroad  (particularly  flax  and  hemp  in  various  forms), 
and  raised  the  cost  of  living.4  According  to  his  contemporaries 
Alexander's  unpleasant  and  difficult  role  in  his  relations  with 
Napoleon  began  to  affect  his  temper;  his  customary  politeness 
and  evenness  was  supplanted  by  an  irritable  and  often  gloomy 
mood,  while  his  natural  obstinacy  was  manifested  in  a  quite 
disagreeable  form.  It  is  noteworthy  that  already  in  1805,  leav- 
ing for  the  war,  Alexander  confidentially  ordered  the  secret- 
police  system  restored,  by  establishing  a  special  temporary  com- 
mittee of  three  persons  for  the  surveillance  of  public  opinion. 
After  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  he  made  the  committee  official  and 
permanent,  and  by  a  secret  instruction  gave  it  the  right  of  mail- 

4  Especially  the  prices  of  colonial  wares  that  had  been  imported  up 
to  that  time  from  England  rose  tremendously.  In  1808  a  pud  (a 
little  over  thirty-six  pounds)  of  sugar  was  priced  in  Petrograd  at  one 
hundred  rubles. 


DISSATISFACTION  WITH  THE  TZAR        127 

perlustration    and   other   means   of   police   supervision   which 
during  the  first  years  of  his  reign  he  had  abhorred. 

At  the  head  of  those  who  opposed  Alexander's  "  friendship  " 
with  Napoleon  was  the  Dowager  Empress  Marie;  Alexander 
had  to  play  his  part  without  being  able  to  reveal  his  real  in- 
tentions to  any  one.  His  closest  friends  —  Kochubey,  Czar- 
toryski,  Novosiltzev  —  resigned,  and  the  last  two  went  abroad, 
while  Stroganov  entered  the  army  in  order  not  to  meddle  with 
politics.  Even  his  court-marshal,  Count  N.  A.  Tolstoy,  ex- 
pressed his  disapproval  of  Alexander's  friendship  with  Napo- 
leon by  refusing  to  wear  alongside  with  the  ribbon  of  the 
Legion  of  Honour  given  to  him  by  the  French  emperor  the 
ribbon  of  the  highest  Russian  order  —  of  Andrey  the  First 
Called  —  which  Alexander  wished  to  bestow  upon  him.  The 
opposition  of  the  higher  circles  of  Petrograd  society  was  most 
strongly  manifested  when  there  arrived  Napoleon's  military 
agent,  General  Savary,  who  had  been  personally  connected  with 
the  execution  of  the  Duke  d'Enghien.  The  Petrograd  salons 
shut  their  doors  to  him;  he  was  received  nowhere  outside  of 
the  Winter  Palace,  and  nobody  called  on  him,  until  Alexander 
personally  interceded  and  demanded  from  the  courtiers  a  po- 
liter treatment  of  his  ally's  representative.  Savary,  eventually 
Napoleon's  Minister  of  Police,  decided  to  employ  his  police- 
talent  right  then  and  there.  He  carefully  collected  and  fab- 
ricated all  sorts  of  gossip  and  careless  phrases  dropped  by  persons 
dissatisfied  with  Alexander's  policy,  and  even  invented  a  story 
about  a  gigantic  plot  and  attempted  coup  d'etat,  all  of  which 
he  tried  to  communicate  to  the  Tzar  in  his  endeavour  to  bring 
friction  between  him  and  the  public,  and  to  fan  the  mutual 
mistrust  that  began  to  appear  at  that  period  between  the  young 
ruler  and  his  subjects.6 

5  It  is  curious  that  other  foreign  diplomats  in  Petrograd  (e.g., 
Baron  Steding)  and  Canning  in  London  (in  his  conversation  with 
the  Russian  ambassador,  Alopeus)  repeated  alarming  rumours  about 


128  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

In  wider  circles  dissatisfaction  appeared  in  stronger  forms, 
was  expressed  in  literature  and  in  theatres  where  the  audience 
applauded  vehemently  patriotic  passages  and  places  that  de- 
rided or  attacked  the  French.  Still  stronger  was  the  oppo- 
sition in  Moscow  where  the  ardent  patriot,  S.  N.  Glinka,  began 
to  publish  an  anti-Napoleonic  magazine,  the  Russian  Messenger. 
Between  the  meetings  at  Tilsit  and  Erfurt,  the  very  period  when 
Alexander  displayed  before  the  world  his  friendship  for  Napo- 
leon, Glinka  wrote  that  the  Peace  of  Tilsit  was  only  a  tem- 
porary armistice,  that  during  the  inevitable  next  war  the  Rus- 
sians would  strain  all  their  efforts  to  repulse  the  power-fiend, 
Napoleon.  The  French  ambassador  called  the  attention  of  the 
Tzar  to  those  writings,  and  as  a  result  the  patriot  and  conserva- 
tive Glinka  was  the  first  to  suffer  from  censorship-persecutions 
during  Alexander's  reign.  About  the  same  time  Count  Rastop- 
chin,  one  of  Paul's  dignitaries,  issued  in  Moscow  a  pamphlet 
under  a  pseudonym,  in  which  the  same  ideas  were  put  in  a 
popular  form,  to  attract  the  masses.  In  Petrograd  Admiral 
Shishkov,  an  Old  Believer,  founded  a  patriotic  literary  society 
"  Discourse,"  to  which  belonged  Old  Believers,  conservatives 
like  Derzhavin  and  Karamzin,  and  even  liberals  like  Mordvinov. 

It  is  worth  noting  that  this  opposition  which  had  united 
quite  broad  circles  and  was  so  patriotic  bore  by  no  means  a  chau- 
vinistic character.  It  was  directed  solely  against  Napoleon  and 
the  Tilsit  Treaty  with  its  disastrous  effects  on  Russian  trade, 
industry,  and  public  life.  Russia  carried  on  four  wars  at  that 
time,  and  in  every  case  society  remained  quite  indifferent,  even 
hostile  to  the  success  of  the  Government's  plans.  Two  of 
those  wars  (with  weak  Persia  and  with  Austria;  against  the 
latter  Alexander  fought  a  contre  cceur  as  an  ally  of  Napoleon)  8 

attempted   plots  and   revolutions   in   Petrograd.     It   is   quite   possible 
that  those  were  results  of  Savary's  intrigues  and  inventions. 

6  In  1809  after  the  Erfurt  meeting,  when  Alexander  saw  the  futility 
of  his  efforts  to  keep  Austria  from  war  with  France  in  which  he  had 


THE  CONQUEST  OF  FINLAND  129 

were  comparatively  easy,  although  they  had  also  required  consid- 
erable expenditures.  But  the  other  two  wars  were  difficult 
and  demanded  enormous  quantities  of  money  and  men.  The 
war  with  Turkey  continued  with  interruptions  but  with  no 
peace  conclusion  from  1806  till  the  spring  of  1812;  the  war 
with  Sweden  came  after  the  Tilsit  Treaty  as  a  direct  result  of 
it,  and  after  heroic  heavy  righting  it  ended  in  1809  with  the 
conquest  of  Finland  as  far  as  the  river  Torneo. 

Alexander  determined  to  attract  the  hearts  of  his  new  sub- 
jects by  magnanimity,  and  even  before  the  conclusion  of  peace 
he  summoned  the  Diet  in  Borgo  and  affirmed  in  a  special 
charter  the  ancient  rights  and  privileges  of  the  Finnish  popula- 
tion. Thus  the  legal  conditions  of  Finland  did  not  grow  worse 
after  the  annexation,  while  the  economic  conditions  of  the 
province  even  improved  at  first,  owing  to  the  abolition  of  the 
tax  which  Finland  had  to  pay  for  the  extinction  of  the  Swedish 
debt,  and  the  abrogation  of  internal  custom-houses. 

But  the  Russian  public  disapproved  of  the  peace  of  Fried- 
richsham,  and  there  were  even  expressed  condolences  for  Swe- 
den. The  war  with  Turkey  also  aroused  opposition.  In  1810 
Mordvinov  presented  a  memorandum  in  which  he  proved  the 
uselessness  of  territorial  acquisitions  for  Russia,  whose  frontiers 
were  already  too  extended,  and  insisted  on  the  necessity  of 
an  immediate  cessation  of  the  war  with  Turkey. 

Such  was  the  mood  of  the  public  after  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit. 

formally  agreed  to  aid  Napoleon,  said  to  the  Austrian  ambassador, 
Prince  Schwarzenberg:  ".  .  .  My  position  is  so  strange  that  although 
we  stand  on  opposite  sides  I  cannot  help  wishing  you  success!  .  .  ." 
The  Russian  public  in  1809  openly  rejoiced  at  every  victory  of  their 
"enemies,"  the  Austrians,  and  at  every  defeat  of  their  "ally," 
Napoleon.  (In  the  "Memoirs"  of  Wiegel,  a  contemporary  of  very 
moderate  views.) 


CHAPTER  VIII 

ALEXANDER  was  troubled  by  the  general  dissatisfac- 
tion of  the  people  after  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit.  He 
understood  that  the  public  mood  could  not  be  altered 
by  police  measures,  and  decided  to  regain  the  common  good- 
will by  a  nobler  and  more  reasonable  means  —  by  returning  to 
the  work  of  internal  reforms  which  had  begun  so  promisingly 
at  his  accession.  This  time  his  chief  co-operator  came  to  be  a 
new  statesman,  Mikhail  Speransky,  by  intellect  and  talent  un- 
doubtedly the  greatest  man  of  Alexander's  epoch,  and  perhaps 
the  most  remarkable  statesman  in  all  modern  Russian  history. 

A  son  of  a  village-priest  and  a  student  of  a  theological  Sem- 
inary, Speransky  succeeded  without  any  protection  in  rising  to 
a  prominent  position,  and  acquiring  a  thorough  knowledge  of 
the  best  French  political,  economic,  and  juridical  works.  In 
four  years  he  rose  from  a  private  secretaryship  to  Prince  Kura- 
kin  to  the  rank  of  Imperial  State-Secretary.  The  ministers 
Troshchinsky  and  Kochubey  fought  for  Speransky,  each  desir- 
ing to  have  him  in  his  department. 

I  have  already  mentioned  Speransky's  memorandum  worked 
out  by  the  request  of  Kochubey  in  1803.  Practically  the  same 
principles  were  laid  as  a  basis  for  his  famous  plan  for  the  re- 
organisation of  the  state,  although,  as  we  shall  see,  under  the 
influence  of  his  journey  abroad  (in  1808  to  Erfurt)  and  in 
connection  with  Alexander's  mood,  Speransky's  views  had  be- 
come more  optimistic  in  regard  to  the  readiness  of  the  country 
for  a  constitutional  order. 

Although  Alexander  gave  up  his  plan  for  an  immediate  con- 
stitutional reorganisation  in  1802,  he  continued  to  keep  others 

130 


NEW  INTERNAL  REFORMS  131 

occupied  with  the  idea.  In  1804  he  commissioned  for  this  pur- 
pose Baron  Rosenkampf  who,  by  the  way,  knew  no  Russian  at 
that  time.  His  plan,  called  "  Constitutional  Cadre,"  was  then 
handed  over  to  Novosiltzev  and  Czartoryski,  but  in  view  of  the 
war  that  broke  out  in  1805  the  plan  lay  motionless  until  1808, 
when  among  other  materials  it  was  brought  before  Speransky 
who  received  after  his  return  from  Erfurt  an  order  from  Alex- 
ander to  work  out  a  general  plan  for  the  reorganisation  of  the 
state.  Korf  relates,  and  Schilder  repeats  an  anecdote  about  a 
conversation  that  supposedly  took  place  between  Alexander  and 
Speransky  in  Erfurt,  where  Speransky  became  acquainted  with 
Talleyrand  and  other  notables  of  Napoleon's  entourage.  Alex- 
ander asked  Speransky  about  his  impression  of  Europe,  and 
Speransky  is  alleged  to  have  answered:  "  We  have  better  men, 
but  they  have  better  institutions."  Alexander  agreed  with  him 
and  added :  "  On  our  return  we  shall  discuss  the  matter."  In 
direct  connection  with  this  conversation  they  place  the  new 
reform-activity  of  1809. 

I  hardly  believe  that  the  conversation  took  place.  In  Prus- 
sia there  was  no  constitution  at  that  time;  her  entire  structure 
lay  in  ruins,  and  the  Prussians  had  a  task  of  building  it  up 
anew;  in  France  there  was  only  a  ghost  of  a  constitution,  and 
all  her  "  constitutional "  institutions  bore  a  charlatanic  charac- 
ter. Alexander  and  Speransky  knew  it  quite  well,  and  we  can 
hardly  ascribe  to  Speransky  the  expression  "  We  have  better 
men,  but  they  have  better  institutions  " ;  besides  he  had  no  rea- 
son to  give  such  a  flattering  opinion  about  the  Russian  men  of 
affairs.  It  is  much  more  probable  to  assume  that  Alexander 
intended  to  win  back  the  lost  sympathy  of  the  people  by  way  of 
renewing  his  former  activity  for  the  improvement  of  internal 
conditions.  It  is  important  to  note  the  change  in  Speransky 's 
own  views  since  1803:  then  he  considered  the  radical  reorgan- 
isation of  the  state  unrealisable,  while  now  he  regarded  it  as 
quite  feasible.  This  change  could  perhaps  have  occurred  under 


132  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

the  influence  of  his  conversations  with  Talleyrand  and  others, 
and  particularly  under  the  influence  of  Alexander's  new  mood. 
Later,  in  his  defence-letter  from  Perm,  Speransky  emphasised 
the  fact  that  the  fundamental  idea  about  the  reorganisation  of 
the  state  had  been  given  to  him  by  Alexander  himself. 

In  his  "  Plan,"  in  the  chapter  on  "  The  wisdom  of  state 
laws  "  Speransky  discussed  in  detail  the  question  of  the  timeli- 
ness of  a  radical  reconstruction  of  the  state.  He  observed  that 
while  in  the  West  constitutions  were  wrested  in  "  chunks " 
after  cruel  revolutions,  the  Russian  constitution  would  owe  its 
existence  to  the  beneficial  grace  of  the  supreme  authority,  which 
consequently  had  the  right  to  choose  the  proper  time  and  forms 
for  the  reform.  He  examined  the  "  timeliness "  of  the  mo- 
ment, and  let  himself  dwell  at  length  on  historical-political  in- 
vestigations; he  reduced  all  the  existing  political  systems  to 
three  main  forms:  republic,  feudal  monarchy,  and  despoty. 
The  Western  European  states  since  the  crusades  had  gone 
through  a  process  of  struggle  in  the  result  of  which  the  feudal 
form  yielded  more  and  more  to  the  republican.  As  to  Russia 
Speransky  considered  that  she  had  already  emerged  from  the 
purely  feudal  forms,  since  all  her  portions  had  been  united 
under  a  single  power.  Regarding  the  constitutional  attempts 
at  the  accession  of  Anna  Joannovna  and  under  Catherine  II  as 
"  untimely,"  Speransky  thought  the  present  moment  opportune 
for  such  a  reform,  in  contradiction  to  his  view  in  1803.  The 
presence  of  serfdom  did  no  longer  trouble  him,  for  he  con- 
sidered a  constitutional  structure  co-existable  with  unequal 
rights.  For  this  reason  his  plan  was  based  on  a  system  of  dif- 
ferent class-rights,  the  distinct  right  of  the  nobility  being  the 
possession  of  bondage-estates.  Thus  the  bondage-right  ap- 
peared as  one  of  the  essential  elements  of  the  reorganised  order. 
Political  rights  he  allowed  only  for  those  citizens  who  had  prop- 
erty. 

Speransky  considered  as  important  preparatory  steps  for  intro- 


SPERANSKY'S  RECOMMENDATIONS         133 

ducing  the  preparatory  constitution,  the  permission  for  all  classes 
to  buy  land,  the  establishment  of  the  class  of  Free  Agriculturists, 
the  law  concerning  the  Lifland  peasants,  and  the  founding  of  re- 
sponsible ministries  (though  he  knew  well  the  value  of  that 
responsibility,  as  we  have  seen).  Of  more  importance  is  Sper- 
ansky's  admission  of  the  significance  of  public  opinion.  As 
symptoms  of  the  ripeness  of  the  moment  he  recognised  the  dis- 
appearance of  respect  for  ranks,  orders,  and  other  external  signs 
of  authority,  the  fall  of  the  moral  prestige  of  the  authorities, 
the  growing  spirit  of  criticism  in  regard  to  the  Government's 
activity.  He  observed  that  under  such  conditions  it  would  be 
impossible  to  promulgate  partial  improvements  of  the  existing 
system,  and  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  moment  had  arrived 
for  a  change  of  the  old  order  of  things.  These  considerations  of 
Speransky,  approved  by  Alexander  himself,  are  of  great  value 
for  us ;  they  testify  to  the  consciousness  of  the  Government  that 
there  had  developed  elements  intent  to  participate  in  the  man- 
agement of  the  state. 

Speransky  recommended  two  ways  out  of  the  situation:  one 
insincere,  fictitious,  and  another,  sincere, —  a  radical  way.  The 
first  consisted  in  lending  the  autocracy  an  external  form  of  legal- 
ity, leaving  its  essential  power  intact;  the  other  way  recom- 
mended "  not  only  to  conceal  the  autocracy  behind  external 
forms,  but  to  limit  it  by  an  intrinsic  and  substantial  force  of 
statutes,  and  to  base  the  ruling  power  on  law  not  only  in  words 
but  in  very  deed."  Speransky  insisted  that  at  the  very  ap- 
proach to  carrying  out  the  reforms  they  had  to  choose  definitely 
one  way  or  the  other.  For  the  fictitious  reform  use  could  be 
made  of  institutions  which,  possessing  an  apparent  freedom  of 
legislative  power,  would  in  fact  remain  under  the  influence  and 
complete  dependence  of  the  autocracy.  At  the  same  time  the  ex- 
ecutive power  could  be  so  instituted  that  "  by  the  wording  of  the 
law  it  would  bear  responsibility,  but  by  its  sense  it  would  be  ab- 
solutely independent."  The  judicial  power  would  be  given  all 


134  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

advantage  of  visible  freedom,  but  in  essence  it  would  be  always 
subject  to  the  autocracy.  As  an  example  of  such  a  fictitious- 
constitutional  state  Speransky  pointed  out  Napoleon's  France. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  the  second  alternative  was  to  be  chosen, 
the  appearance  of  the  state-structure  would  be  entirely  differ- 
ent. In  the  first  place  the  legislative  institutions  would  in  that 
case  have  to  be  so  built  that  although  they  could  not  carry 
through  their  enactments  without  the  confirmation  of  the  Mon- 
arch, yet  their  judgments  would  be  free  and  really  express  the 
popular  opinion;  in  the  second  place  the  judicial  department 
would  have  to  be  so  formed  that  its  existence  would  be  based 
on  free  election,  and  the  Government  would  only  supervise  the 
fulfilment  of  its  decisions;  in  the  third  place  the  executive 
power  would  have  to  be  responsible  before  the  legislative  power. 

"  Comparing  these  two  systems,"  explained  Speransky,  "  we 
can  see  beyond  doubt  that  the  first  has  only  an  appearance  of 
law,  while  the  second  is  its  very  essence ;  the  first  —  under  the 
pretence  of  a  single  authority  —  introduces  complete  absolutism, 
while  the  second  seeks  indeed  to  limit  and  moderate  it.  .  .  ." 

Thus  the  question  was  put  so  clearly  and  straight  that  Alex- 
ander was  unable  to  proceed  with  his  customary  dreamy  in- 
definiteness,  and  he  had  to  make  a  serious  choice.  He  chose 
the  second  system.  Speransky  worked  out  a  corresponding  plan 
of  reorganisation,  and  after  two  months  of  almost  daily  dis- 
cussion between  the  two  Alexander  ordered  in  the  fall  of  1809 
the  beginning  of  its  realisation. 

According  to  the  Plan  the  fundamental  territorial  units  were 
based  on  the  administrative  division  of  the  country,  i.e.,  prov- 
inces were  subdivided  into  districts,  and  districts  into  volosts. 
Each  volost  was  to  have  a  Volost  Duma  composed  of  delegates 
from  Fiscal  peasants  (one  from  five  hundred)  and  of  private 
landowners.  The  Duma  would  be  renewed  once  in  three  years. 
The  chief  objects  of  the  Volost  Duma  would  be  (i)  the  elec- 
tion of  officers  for  the  volost  administration,  (2)  the  control 


DETAILS  OF  SPERANSKY'S  PLAN  135 

of  the  volost  income  and  expenditures,  (3)  the  election  of  dele- 
gates for  the  District-/) uma,  (4)  the  presentation  of  volost- 
needs  before  the  District-Duma.  The  District-Duma  was  to 
consist  of  delegates  elected  by  the  Volost-Dumas;  its  jurisdic- 
tion corresponded  with  that  of  the  Volost-Duma,  but  it  con- 
cerned the  affairs  of  the  district;  it  elected  delegates  to  the 
Provincial  Duma,  the  District-Court,  and  the  District-Council. 
The  Provincial  Duma  was  proposed  to  have  an  analogous  juris- 
diction, and  to  send  delegates  to  the  State-Duma  which  was  to 
assemble  every  year  in  Petrograd.  According  to  Speransky's 
plan  the  sessions  of  the  State-Duma  could  be  postponed  by  the 
Monarch  for  one  year ;  but  its  prorogation  could  take  place  only 
upon  the  election  of  delegates  for  the  next  Duma.  The  chair- 
man of  the  State-Duma  was  to  be  the  State-Chancellor,  i.e.,  an 
appointed  person;  the  work  was  to  be  performed  by  commis- 
sions. The  right  of  legislative  initiative  was  to  belong  exclu- 
sively to  the  Monarch,  with  the  exception  of  presentations  about 
national  needs,  about  the  responsibility  of  officials,  and  about 
decrees  that  might  infringe  upon  the  fundamental  state-laws. 
The  Senate  was  to  become  the  supreme  court  and  consist  of 
life-members  to  be  elected  by  the  Provincial  Dumas  and  con- 
firmed by  the  Monarch.1 

Above  the  State-Duma  the  Plan  proposed  to  institute  the 
State  Council  out  of  the  highest  dignitaries  selected  by  the 
Monarch,  which  was  to  be  not  a  second  legislative  chamber,  as 
it  is  at  present,  but  an  advisory  institution  under  the  Monarch 
for  the  discussion  of  new  projects  presented  by  the  ministers  and 
of  proposed  financial  measures  before  bringing  them  to  the 
State-Duma. 

Such  were  the  general  features  of  Speransky's  plan  approved 
in  principle  by  Alexander.  We  shall  not  discuss  its  weak  sides, 
for  it  was  not  put  into  practice.  Alexander  admitted  its  de- 

1  Compare  Speransky's  Plan  with  the  Duma-statutes  of  Nicolas  II, 
in  the  supplementary  chapters  to  volume  two. —  TR. 


136  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

sirability  and  usefulness,  but  he  decided  to  introduce  it  only 
in  parts.  At  first  was  published  the  new  statute  about  the  min- 
istries and  the  State  Council  as  an  advisory  institution.  The 
State  Council  did  not  receive  its  preparatory  character  as  orig- 
inally designed  by  Speransky,  which  could  take  place  only  after 
the  realisation  of  the  whole  Plan;  it  was  divided  into  four  de- 
partments—  the  department  of  civil  and  church  affairs,  the 
departments  of  laws,  of  war,  and  of  national  economy.  Each 
department  had  at  its  head  a  state-secretary.  Speransky  was 
appointed  Imperial  Secretary;  in  his  hands  were  concentrated 
besides  the  matters  of  the  State  Council  all  the  threads  of  the 
reform-measures  and  of  the  whole  legislative  activity. 

The  project  of  the  State  Council  was  shown  before  its  pub- 
lication to  several  influential  dignitaries,  such  as  Zavodovsky, 
Lopukhin,  Kochubey,  and  others,  and  all  of  them  approved  it, 
not  knowing  the  ultimate  purpose  of  Speransky  with  regard  to 
the  role  of  the  State  Council.  But  despite  Speransky's  efforts 
to  remain  outside  of  any  parties,  there  was  formed  against  him 
a  strong  opposition  among  the  officials,  nobles,  and  courtiers. 
The  hostility  was  aggravated  after  the  issue  of  two  ukases, 
April  3,  and  August  6,  1809  —  which  were  credited  to  Speran- 
sky's influence.  The  first  ukase  prescribed  that  all  persons  with 
court-titles  chose  some  state-service;  thenceforward  court- 
titles  were  considered  only  as  honourable  distinctions  and  gave 
no  service-rights.  The  other  ukase,  with  a  view  of  improving 
the  personnel,  required  that  the  titles  of  Collegiate  Asses- 
sor and  Councillor  of  State  were  given  only  to  those  who  had 
passed  a  certain  examination  and  had  presented  a  university 
diploma. 

The  bureaucratic  and  court-circles  were  indignant  about 
those  ukases,  and  they  began  a  campaign  of  intrigue  against 
Speransky,  finally  succeeding  in  overthrowing  that  remarkable 
statesman.  The  nobles  blamed  him  for  the  deplorable  state 
of  the  finances,  which  was  due,  of  course,  not  to  Speransky's 


FINANCES  IN  WRETCHED  CONDITION      137 

policy,  but  to  the  growing  budgets  and  increasing  paper-issues 
connected  with  the  results  of  the  Continental  System. 

I  have  said  that  after  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  in  1808  the  in- 
come of  the  state  equalled  one  hundred  and  eleven  million  ru- 
bles in  assignations  or  about  fifty  millions  in  silver,  while  the 
expenses  reached  two  hundred  and  forty-eight  million  rubles 
in  assignations.  The  deficit  was  covered  by  a  new  issue  of  as- 
signations the  course  of  which  in  that  year  was  below  fifty  co- 
pecks per  ruble,  and  during  the  summer  months  it  fell  below 
forty  copecks.  In  the  next  year,  1 809,  the  course  in  the  average 
did  not  exceed  forty  copecks,  and  by  the  end  of  the  year  it 
descended  to  thirty-five  copecks;  the  income  of  that  year 
equalled  one  hundred  and  ninety-five  million  rubles  in  assigna- 
tions (less  than  eighty  million  in  silver),  and  the  expenses  — 
two  hundred  and  seventy-eight  million  rubles  in  assignations 
(about  one  hundred  and  fourteen  million  in  silver).  The  defi- 
cit was  again  covered  by  a  new  issue  of  assignations,  but  they 
had  no  circulation ;  the  market  refused  to  accept  such  a  quantity 
of  paper-money.  Toward  the  end  of  1810  their  course  fell 
below  twenty  copecks.  The  country  faced  bankruptcy.  In 
this  difficult  situation  Alexander  turned  to  Speransky  in  1809. 

We  have  seen  the  influence  of  the  limitation  of  the  market 
and  of  the  diminished  trade-turnover  on  the  fall  of  the  course 
of  the  paper-money.  The  limitation  of  the  market  was  condi- 
tioned by  the  Continental  System  which  stopped  the  export  of 
flax  and  hemp  to  England,  which  formed  then  about  half  of  the 
Russian  export  trade.  At  the  same  time  the  custom  tariff  was 
very  unfavourable  for  the  development  of  the  big  industries, 
since  in  view  of  the  insignificant  duties  on  foreign  commodities 
the  Russian  manufacturers  could  not  compete  with  the  foreign- 
ers. Besides,  owing  to  the  prevalence  of  import  over  export, 
the  balance  of  trade  was  very  unfavourable:  Russia  had  to  pay 
for  the  imported  commodities  with  metal-money,  while  the 
small  export  brought  an  insignificant  sum  of  metal-money. 


138  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

Hence  there  was  an  enormous  outflow  of  money  abroad,  and  at 
home  remained  only  assignations  which  continually  depreciated. 
Then,  the  Russian  court  gave  big  subsidies  to  the  king  of  Prussia. 
Finally  Russia  carried  on  four  wars  during  those  years:  a  long 
war  with  Persia  (from  1804  to  1813)  ;  with  Turkey  the  war 
spasmodically  fell  and  rose  for  six  years  (from  1806  to  1812); 
the  war  with  Sweden,  which  ended  with  the  annexation  of  Fin- 
land (1808—1809)  ;  finally  by  virtue  of  her  alliance  with  Napo- 
leon Russia  had  to  take  part  in  the  war  against  Austria  (1809). 
True  the  last  war  was  a  bloodless  farce  (by  orders  from  above 
the  Russian  troops  evaded  the  Austrians),  yet  it  cost  consider- 
able money. 

These  causes  —  the  unfavourable  balance  of  trade  and  the 
necessity  of  maintaining  an  army  abroad  on  metal-money  — 
were  responsible  for  the  difficult  conditions  of  the  treasury. 

Nominally  the  budget  increased  from  year  to  year,  but  in 
fact  it  constantly  fell.  For  instance,  the  maintenance  of  the 
court  in  1803  cost  eight  million  six  hundred  thousand  rubles, 
or  in  silver  —  seven  million  eight  hundred  thousand  rubles;  in 
1810  the  expenses  of  the  court  equalled  fourteen  million  five 
hundred  thousand  rubles  in  assignations,  but  in  silver  it 
amounted  only  to  four  million  two  hundred  thousand  rubles; 
thus  the  actual  budget  of  the  court  decreased  in  those  years  by 
forty- five  per  cent.  Below  are  the  figures  of  the  budget  of  the 
Ministry  of  Popular  Education  (in  millions  of  rubles) : 

fears  In  assignations:  In  silver: 

1804     2.8  2.3 

1809     3.6  1-144 

1810     2.5  0.727 

Thus  the  budget  of  the  Ministry  of  Education  had  dimin- 
ished almost  four  times  in  six  years.  Under  such  circumstances 
there  could  be  no  question  about  opening  new  schools :  even  the 
old  ones  could  scarcely  exist,  and  that  only  by  way  of  paying 


SPERANSKY'S  FINANCIAL  PLAN  139 

the  teachers  in  assignations,  as  all  officials  were  paid  then; 
imagine  their  position  when  the  cost  of  all  commodities  in- 
creased four  times,  and  some  (colonial  wares)  even  consider- 
ably more! 

The  national  treasury  faced  a  collapse,  and  the  country  grew 
alarmed  and  dissatisfied.  It  was  then  that  Speransky,  who  had 
just  finished  his  plan  for  the  general  reorganisation  of  the  state, 
received  the  order  of  the  Tzar  to  take  up  immediately  the  finan- 
cial question.  Speransky  had  long  ago  become  interested  in 
financial  affairs,  and  now  he  made  a  thorough  study  of  them 
with  the  aid  of  the  young  scholars,  Professors  Balugiansky  and 
Jacob,  who  had  been  recently  invited  from  abroad.  Soon  he 
presented  an  exhaustive  memorandum  on  the  state  of  finances 
and  on  the  necessary  improvements,  which  he  submitted  for  a 
preliminary  discussion  to  an  unofficial  assembly  of  all  those 
statesmen  who  had  some  financial  knowledge.  Among  them 
were  Count  Severin  Potocky,  Admiral  Mordvinov,  Kochubey, 
State-Comptroller  Kampfenhausen,  and  Speransky's  close  as- 
sistant, Balugiansky. 

Towards  the  first  of  January,  1810  —  the  opening  of  the 
State-Council  —  Speransky  presented  to  Alexander  a  complete 
plan  for  a  financial  reorganisation,  the  essence  of  which  con- 
sisted in  the  finding  of  measures  for  making  the  state  income 
correspond  with  the  state  expenditures.  Since  the  fiscal  income 
had  actually  decreased  owing  to  the  fall  of  the  course  of  paper- 
money,  Speransky  proposed  first  of  all  to  discontinue  the  fur- 
ther issue  of  assignations,  to  recognise  those  already  issued  as 
a  state-debt,  and  to  take  steps  for  the  gradual  extinction  of 
that  debt  by  way  of  redemption.  He  offered  the  following 
measures  for  getting  the  necessary  means:  (i)  to  decrease  the 
deficit  by  cutting  the  current  expenses,  even  for  such  useful 
needs  as  popular  education,  improving  ways  of  communication, 
and  so  forth;  (2)  to  introduce  a  new  tax  for  the  exclusive 
purpose  of  extinguishing  the  national  debt;  (3)  to  make  an  in- 


140  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

ternal  loan  under  the  pledge  of  state-property;  a  part  of  the 
state-property  he  even  proposed  to  sell.  He  asserted  that  such 
a  loan,  made  for  a  certain  length  of  time  and  secured  by  defi- 
nite property,  would  not  play  the  role  of  an  assignation  loan. 
But  as  all  those  measures  were  not  sufficient,  the  more  so  since 
the  wars  with  Turkey  and  Persia  still  continued,  Speransky 
proposed  a  special  tax  of  fifty  copecks  from  every  soul  on  the 
landowners'  and  state-estates,  for  one  year  only.  In  general 
he  claimed  that  deficits  should  be  covered  as  much  as  possible 
by  percentage  additions  to  the  existing  taxes,  so  that  the  people 
could  immediately  cover  the  current  deficits  without  leaving 
their  burdens  for  the  coming  generations.  For  the  improve- 
ment of  credit-conditions  and  the  regularisation  of  political 
economy  Speransky  proposed  to  introduce  regulated  reports  and 
publicity  in  the  management  of  national  economy.  The  last 
reform  was  carried  through  only  as  late  as  in  the  sixties.  See- 
ing one  of  the  main  reasons  for  the  fall  of  the  paper-course  in 
the  unfavourable  balance  of  trade,  Speransky,  with  the  ener- 
getic support  of  Mordvinov,  president  of  the  department  of 
national  economy,  insisted  on  the  revision  of  the  custom  tariff. 
He  argued  that  the  conditions  accepted  in  Tilsit  concerning  the 
Continental  System  should  be  interpreted  in  a  limited  sense, 
since  Napoleon  had  intended  to  ruin  England,  not  Russia, 
whereas  the  contrary  was  the  result.  In  accordance  with  the 
suggestion  of  Speransky  and  Mordvinov  it  was  decreed  in  1810 
that  all  Russian  ports  were  free  for  vessels  under  neutral  flags, 
regardless  of  whose  goods  they  carried.  On  the  other  hand, 
by  the  new  tariff  of  1810  the  import  of  luxuries  was  forbidden, 
and  high  duties  were  placed  on  other  foreign  manufactures; 
that  tariff  was  to  decrease  the  import,  while  the  opening  of  the 
ports  at  once  renewed  the  export  of  raw  materials  and  certain 
manufacturers  (flax  and  hemp  cloth)  to  England,  whose  ships 
were  not  long  in  arriving  under  the  Teneriffe  flag.  Both  these 
circumstances  brought  about  a  very  favourable  balance  of  trade 


DISSATISFACTION  WITH  SPERANSKY       141 

for  Russia,  and  if  Speransky's  plan  had  been  followed  in  toto, 
the  course  of  the  paper  ruble  would  undoubtedly  have  risen. 
Unfortunately  in  1810  were  issued  new  assignations  for  the 
sum  of  forty-three  million  rubles.  Although  that  issue  was 
made  on  the  basis  of  a  previous  decree  it  nevertheless  funda- 
mentally destroyed  all  Speransky's  measures  and  the  confidence 
of  the  public,  so  that  the  course  continued  to  fall:  during  1811 
it  never  rose  above  twenty-three  copecks,  while  at  certain 
months  it  fell  below  twenty  copecks.  But  the  tariff  played  an 
enormous  role  in  the  economic  life  of  the  country ;  one  may  say 
that  it  had  saved  Russia  from  complete  ruination.  Yet  the 
measures  that  were  taken  by  the  State  Council  not  only  did  not 
bring  Speransky  the  gratitude  of  his  contemporaries,  but  even 
enhanced  the  hatred  of  wide  circles  of  nobles  and  officials  for 
him. 

The  conclusions  which  the  public  had  drawn  from  Sper- 
ansky's financial  plans  were  quite  discouraging.  It  had  be- 
come clear  (i)  that  the  condition  of  the  finances  was  deplor- 
able, (2)  that  the  treasury  had  been  involved  in  considerable 
internal  loans  (it  was  news  for  many,  since  few  had  under- 
stood before  that  the  issues  of  assignations  were  equivalent  to 
loans),  and  (3)  that  there  were  no  means  for  the  ordinary 
expenditures  in  1810,  in  view  of  which  new  taxes  and  loans 
had  to  be  applied.  The  last  conclusion  was  the  most  disagree- 
able, as  the  position  of  the  tax-payers,  especially  of  the  land- 
owners, was  unenviable  even  if  no  new  burdens  had  been  lain 
upon  them.  This  dissatisfaction  was  stupidly  directed  not 
against  those  who  had  caused  the  financial  ruin,  but  against  the 
one  who  had  opened  the  eyes  of  the  public  to  the  real  state 
of  affairs.  The  irritation  of  the  nobles  at  the  new  taxes  on 
their  estates  grew  more  bitter  when  it  appeared  that  in  spite 
of  all  burdens  the  course  of  the  assignations  continued 
falling.  The  tax  that  had  been  intended  for  the  extinction  of 
the  debt  was  used  for  current  expenses  which  increased  greatly 


H2  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

in  view  of  the  expected  war  with  Napoleon,  so  that  the  public 
had  a  plausible  reason  for  accusing  the  State  Council  and  the 
author  of  its  plan  in  having  simply  deceived  them. 

As  I  said,  Speransky  was  blamed  for  the  failure  of  his  plan, 
the  carrying  out  of  which  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  inefficient 
Minister  of  Finances,  Guriev;  there  were  even  rumours  that 
Speransky  had  invented  his  plan  with  the  purpose  of  irritating 
the  opposition,  and  that  he  was  in  criminal  relations  with 
Napoleon.  Alexander  was  unable  to  hold  out  against  the  at- 
tack of  Speransky's  enemies.  He  deemed  it  necessary  at  that 
time  to  raise  the  patriotic  sentiment  of  the  people,  regardless  of 
the  form  in  which  it  was  expressed,  for  he  hoped  to  repulse 
Napoleon  only  in  case  the  war  had  a  popular  character;  he 
saw  no  way  of  entering  into  explanations  and  decided  to 
sacrifice  his  best  co-operator  to  the  wrath  of  the  privileged 
mob.  In  March  of  1812  Speransky  was  discharged  and  ex- 
iled to  Nizhni-Novgorod,  and  later  on  the  basis  of  a  new  in- 
sinuation, to  Perm,  although  Alexander  could  not  have  doubted 
that  Speransky  had  committed  no  serious  crime.  His  only 
guilt  consisted  in  having  received  through  a  certain  official 
copies  of  all  important  secret  papers  of  the  Ministry  of  Foregin 
Affairs,  which  in  his  position  he  could  have  easily  received  by 
getting  the  Tzar's  permission. 

The  hatred  of  the  public  for  Speransky  had  found  a  strong 
expression  in  the  famous  memorandum  of  Karamzin  "  On  an- 
cient and  modern  Russia,"  which  was  presented  to  Alexander 
through  the  Grand  Duchess  Catherine  Paulovna.  In  it  Kar- 
amzin gave  a  brief  picturesque  sketch  of  Russian  history,  praised 
Catherine  II  to  heaven,  spared  no  dark  colours  for  the  reign 
of  Paul,  as  we  have  seen  already,  and  vigorously  condemned 
the  reforms  of  Alexander.  "  Russia  is  seething  with  dissatis- 
faction," he  wrote,  "  they  grumble  in  palaces  and  in  huts ; 
there  is  no  confidence,  no  loyalty  to  the  Government;  its  aims 
and  measures  are  severely  condemned.  An  astonishing  phe- 


KARAMZIN'S  ADDRESS  143 

nomenon!  It  is  customary  for  a  successor  of  a  cruel  monarch 
to  gain  general  approval  upon  mitigating  his  predecessor's 
regime;  how  explain  the  deplorable  state  of  minds  among  the 
people  pacified  by  Alexander's  mildness,  enjoying  all  civil  rights, 
fearing  neither  the  Secret  Chancery  nor  Siberia  ?  —  By  the  un- 
fortunate circumstances  in  Europe,  and  by  the  important,  in 
my  opinion,  mistakes  of  the  Government;  for  even  with  good 
intentions  one  may  err  in  the  means  for  bringing  happi- 
ness. .  .  ." 

The  main  fallacy  of  Alexander's  inexperienced  law-givers, 
according  to  Karamzin,  consisted  in  their  undertaking  organic 
reforms  instead  of  perfecting  Catherine's  institutions.  Karam- 
zin had  no  mercy  for  the  State  Council  or  for  the  new  minis- 
tries, or  even  for  the  educational  measures  of  the  government, 
which  he  had  praised  some  time  before  in  his  European  Messen- 
ger. In  place  of  all  reforms  he  recommended  the  appointment 
of  fifty  good  governors  and  the  securing  for  the  people  of  ade- 
quate spiritual  shepherds.  In  regard  to  the  ministerial  re- 
sponsibility he  wrote:  "Who  selects  the  ministers? —  The 
Tzar.  Then  let  him  reward  the  deserving  ones  with  his  grace 
and  remove  the  bad  ones  without  noise.  A  bad  minister  is  a 
monarchical  error:  such  errors  should  be  corrected,  but  se- 
cretly, in  order  that  the  people  have  confidence  in  the  Tzar's 
personal  selection.  .  .  ." 

In  the  same  way  Karamzin  argued  against  the  uncalled  for 
confessions  of  the  Government  regarding  the  bad  financial  con- 
ditions. Concerning  the  superabundant  issue  of  assignations  in 
former  years  he  remarked :  "  When  an  inevitable  evil  has  been 
done,  one  should  deliberate  and  take  measures  quietly,  not 
whimper,  not  beat  the  tocsin,  which  increase  the  evil.  Let 
the  ministers  be  sincere  before  the  Tzar  alone,  but  not  before 
the  people;  God  beware  if  they  will  follow  a  different  rule: 
to  deceive  the  Tzar  and  reveal  the  truth  to  the  peo- 
ple. ..."(!)  Karamzin  agreed  to  the  redemption  of  assigna- 


144  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

tions,  but  the  declaration  of  the  assignations  as  a  state-debt  he 
considered  the  height  of  thoughtlessness.  The  naivete  of  Kar- 
amzin's  argument  is  remarkable:  as  if  he  did  not  understand 
that  if  secrecy  in  the  management  of  affairs  existed  it  would  be 
easiest  for  the  ministers  to  deceive  the  Monarch. 

A  curious  feature  of  Karamzin's  memorandum  is  its  noble's 
point  of  view.  Not  of  course  the  point  of  view  of  the  consti- 
tutionalist-nobles, not  that  of  the  liberals  of  his  time,  from  the 
noble  Mordvinov  to  the  commoner  Speransky,  but  the  point 
of  view  followed  and  promulgated  by  Catherine,  namely  that 
the  nobility  was  the  first  class  in  the  state  and  its  relations  to 
other  classes,  among  them  to  bonded  peasants,  were  inviolable, 
while  in  regard  to  the  autocracy  of  the  sovereign  the  nobles  had 
to  be  submissive  and  loyal  servants. 

The  presence  of  general  dissatisfaction  in  the  country  Sper- 
ansky ascribed  to  the  ripeness  of  the  public  for  a  radical  reor- 
ganisation of  the  form  of  government;  whereas  Karamzin  ex- 
plained it  by  the  failure  of  the  new  reforms.  Both  of  them 
were  wrong :  the  dissatisfaction  had  more  real  reasons  —  it 
was  rooted  in  the  fallacious  foreign  policy  that  brought  about 
the  unnecessary,  at  least  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  con- 
temporaries, war  of  1805-1807,  the  Continental  System  and  its 
resultant  ruination  of  the  country,  and  finally  the  Tilsit  hu- 
miliation which  offended  the  national  honour  and  aroused  a  keen 
patriotic  opposition  to  the  friendship  of  Alexander  with  Na- 
poleon. Karamzin  did  mention  those  circumstances  in  passing, 
but  he  did  not  allow  them  the  primary  significance  which  they 
undoubtedly  had. 

It  is  curious  that  Speransky's  enemies  tried,  and  one  must 
say  not  without  considerable  success,  to  spread  the  information 
that  he  intended  to  introduce  in  Russia  the  Code  of  Napoleon, 
that  he  was  an  admirer  of  Napoleon,  if  not  his  agent.  The 
success  of  those  insinuations  can  be  explained  by  the  strength 


POPULAR  EDUCATION  145 

of  the  patriotic  protestantism  that  dominated  society  at  that 
time. 

Before  passing  to  the  next  period  I  must  say  a  few  words 
about  the  condition  of  popular  education  at  that  time.  The 
activity  of  the  Ministry  of  Education,  which  had  well  developed 
in  the  preceding  period,  especially  in  the  years  1803-4,  came  to 
a  standstill  for  lack  of  means.  Yet  private  societies  and  litera- 
ture continued  to  grow.  A  number  of  literary  and  philan- 
thropic societies  were  founded.  Besides  Shiskov's  "  Russian 
Discourse "  we  should  mention  the  "  Society  of  Lovers  of 
Russian  Letters "  founded  by  Yazykov  at  the  university  of 
Moscow ;  the  "  Society  of  Lovers  of  Mathematics,"  founded 
by  Mikhail  Muraviov  at  the  age  of  fifteen,  which  later 
developed  into  a  free  school  and  served  as  the  cradle 
of  the  Russian  General  Staff;  many  of  the  members  of  the 
secret  societies  in  the  twenties  were  educated  in  that 
school.  At  the  university  of  Moscow  was  opened  by  Profes- 
sor Chebotarev  a  "  Society  of  Russian  History  and  Antiqui- 
ties"; at  the  same  university  was  founded  in  1804  by  Count 
A.  K.  Razumovsky  the  "  Society  of  Nature  Experimentators," 
which  still  enjoys  a  deserved  fame.  Such  societies  were  opened 
even  in  the  provinces;  for  instance,  in  Kazan  was  founded  in 
1806  a  "  Society  of  Lovers  of  Russian  Letters,"  which  had 
in  1811  a  membership  of  thirty-two. 


CHAPTER  IX 

WE  have  observed  the  conditions  in  Russia  after  the 
Treaty  of  Tilsit  —  the  third  period  of  Alexan- 
der's reign.  The  alliance  with  Napoleon  was  intol- 
erable for  Russia  not  only  because  it  conflicted  with  national 
consciousness  and  pride,  but  also  because  it  destroyed  the  eco- 
nomic forces  and  the  welfare  of  the  Russian  state  and  people. 
Napoleon,  while  forcing  Russia  to  waste  her  forces  fruitlessly  in 
wars  with  England,  Sweden,  Turkey,  and  Austria,  sharpened 
at  the  same  time  the  Polish  question  in  a  way  quite  dangerous  for 
Russia.  The  relations  of  the  Poles  to  Alexander  became  in- 
creasingly unhappy,  while  as  devoted  allies  of  Napoleon  in  his 
war  against  Austria  in  1 809  they  received  by  the  treaty  after  the 
battle  of  Wagram  a  considerable  territorial  addition  to  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Warsaw  at  the  expense  of  Galicia,  with  a  pop- 
ulation of  over  one  and  a  half  million ;  at  the  same  time  Russia 
received  but  a  small  portion  of  Galicia,  the  district  of  Tarnopol, 
with  a  population  of  only  four  hundred  thousand.  True,  Al- 
exander was  in  no  need  of  territorial  acquisitions ;  but  the  Rus- 
sian Government  could  not  remain  indifferent  to  the  growth  of 
the  hostile  Duchy,  the  more  so  since  it  learned  the  secret  views 
and  plans  of  Napoleon  from  the  confidential  report  of  Duroc, 
obtained  from  the  French  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  by  Am- 
bassador Prince  Kurakin.  Duroc  had  definitely  declared  in 
his  report  that  Napoleon's  domination  of  Europe  would  not  be 
firmly  based  as  long  as  even  in  one  country  there  reigned  a 
Bourbon,  as  long  as  Austria  was  not  excluded  from  the  Ger- 
man Empire,  and  as  long  as  Russia  was  not  weakened  and  re- 
pulsed beyond  the  Dnieper  and  Western  Dvina.  With  equal 

146 


CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812  147 

definiteness  Duroc  condemned  the  acquiescence  of  the  former 
French  government  in  the  partition  of  Poland,  and  recom- 
mended the  restoration  of  the  frontiers  of  1772,  as  a  necessary 
bulwark  against  Russia.  The  report  naturally  alarmed  the 
Russian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs;  but  since  it  could  not 
refer  to  a  stolen  document,  the  Russian  Government  based  its 
apprehensions  and  complaints  concerning  the  Polish  question 
on  the  territorial  aggrandisements  of  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw 
in  formal  violation  of  one  of  the  statutes  of  the  Tilsit  Treaty. 
To  appease  Alexander  on  this  point  Napoleon  agreed  to  a  spe- 
cial treaty  with  Russia,  by  which  both  emperors  mutually  guar- 
anteed to  oppose  the  restoration  of  an  independent  Polish  state. 
But  when  such  a  treaty  was  concluded  by  the  French  repre- 
sentative, Caulaincourt,  and  the  Russian  Minister,  Rumiant- 
zev,  Napoleon  declined  to  ratify  the  document,  alleging  that 
Caulaincourt  had  overstepped  his  powers.  His  refusal  came 
immediately  after  the  failure  of  his  negotiations  for  marrying 
one  of  Alexander's  sisters,  Anna  Paulovna;  some  historians  see 
an  inner  connection  between  those  two  events.  But  the  reason 
evidently  lay  not  in  the  unsuccessful  wooing  which  had  not 
even  begun  formally,  but  in  the  fact  that  Napoleon  was  de- 
cidedly unwilling  to  alter  his  policy  in  regard  to  the  Polish 
question,  and  simply  tried  to  gain  time,  since  in  view  of  his 
failures  in  Spain  he  was  not  ready  for  a  war  with  Russia.  At 
the  same  time  he  drove  out  the  Duke  of  Oldenburg  from  his 
own  territory,  on  account  of  the  Duke's  failing  to  observe 
strictly  the  Continental  System.  The  house  of  Oldenburg  had 
received  that  territory  from  their  older  line,  the  house  of  Hol- 
stein-Hotorp,  after  the  latter  had  become  connected  with  the 
Russian  reigning  dynasty,  beginning  with  Peter  III.  Alex- 
ander, as  a  representative  of  that  house,  considered  himself 
personally  insulted,  and  after  failing  in  his  negotiations  for 
the  compensation  of  the  Duke  with  some  other  territory,  he 
sent  a  protesting  circular  to  all  European  courts.  Napoleon 


148  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

took  the  protest  as  a  casus  belli,  and  if  he  did  not  immediately 
declare  war,  it  was  because  he  was  still  not  ready  for  it. 
Finally  Russia's  violation  of  the  Continental  System  by  the 
acceptance  of  Speransky's  plan,  and  particularly  the  tariff  of 
1810,  which  directly  affected  the  pockets  of  the  French  mer- 
chants and  manufacturers,  appeared  to  be  the  most  important 
circumstances  in  which  Napoleon  could  not  acquiesce. 

By  the  beginning  of  the  year  1812  the  war  between  France 
and  Russia  was  inevitable.  It  was  clear  that  in  that  "  last 
struggle  "  between  Alexander  and  Napoleon,  Austria,  and  es- 
pecially Prussia,  not  to  mention  the  other  states  that  were 
subjected  by  France,  could  not  remain  neutral.  Prussia  might 
side  with  Russia  in  case  Russia  led  an  offensive  campaign  and 
threw  her  armies  across  the  Niemen  before  Napoleon  had  time 
to  draw  there  sufficient  forces.  But  Russia  was  not  in  posi- 
tion to  do  it,  as  the  Poles  would  have  given  an  energetic 
opposition  from  the  very  first,  while  the  Prussian  fortresses  had 
remained  in  the  hands  of  the  French  since  1806,  so  that  Na- 
poleon could  have  definitely  destroyed  Prussia  before  Alexan- 
der had  time  to  come  to  her  help.  Besides,  the  war  with 
Turkey  had  not  come  to  an  end  until  the  spring  of  1812,  and 
on  the  whole,  the  forces  which  Russia  could  move  against  Na- 
poleon were  considerably  inferior  to  those  that  he  was  able 
to  draw  to  the  Vistula,  even  not  counting  the  Austrian  and 
Prussian  armies.  Thus  a  Russian  offensive  was  unthinkable. 

Before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  however,  Napoleon  suffered 
two  important  diplomatic  fiascoes.  He  failed  to  draw  into  the 
coalition  against  Russia  either  Sweden  or  Turkey. 

He  failed  to  win  over  Sweden  —  in  spite  of  his  promise  to 
restore  Finland  and  even  the  Baltic  (Ostsee)  provinces  —  first 
of  all  because  Sweden  was  unable  to  fight  against  England, 
who  of  course  renewed  her  alliance  with  Russia  immediately 
after  Russia  had  broken  away  from  France;  besides,  the  pro- 
voking actions  of  Napoleon's  agents  in  Swedish  Pomerania 


SWEDEN  AND  TURKEY  149 

strongly  aroused  the  Swedes  against  France;  finally  Berna- 
dotte,  Sweden's  heir-elect,  being  of  old  Napoleon's  rival,  re- 
fused to  enter  into  an  alliance  with  him.  On  the  contrary, 
after  a  meeting  with  Alexander  in  the  summer  of  1812  Berna- 
dotte  concluded  with  him  a  friendly  agreement  by  which  the 
Russian  emperor  promised  to  assist  in  the  annexation  of  Nor- 
way to  Sweden  as  a  compensation  for  Finland.  Owing  to  this 
treaty  Alexander  was  not  only  relieved  from  apprehensions 
about  an  attack  from  that  side  (which  would  have  threatened 
Petrograd),  but  he  was  enabled  to  withdraw  his  troops  from 
Finland  and  employ  them  against  Napoleon. 

As  to  Turkey,  the  new  Russian  commander,  Kutuzov,  suc- 
ceeded early  in  1812  in  decisively  defeating  the  Turks,  after 
which  and  in  view  of  the  continued  internal  disturbances  in 
Turkey  they  were  unable  to  continue  the  war.  In  May, 
1812,  Kutuzov  signed  in  Bucharest  a  peace  with  Turkey,  at  a 
most  opportune  moment  —  two  weeks  before  the  entrance  of 
Napoleon's  army  into  Russia.  Although  now  there  could  no 
longer  be  any  chance  of  the  annexation  of  Moldavia  and  Wal- 
lachia  —  to  which  Napoleon  gave  his  conditional  consent  at 
Tilsit  and  Erfurt  —  still  by  that  peace  Russian  territory  was 
enlarged  by  the  addition  of  Bessarabia,  with  the  river  Prut. 
True,  in  making  the  treaty  Kutuzov  neglected  some  of  Alex- 
ander's instructions:  Alexander  had  insisted  on  demanding 
from  Turkey  as  an  indispensable  condition  of  peace  its  conclu- 
sion of  a  defensive  and  offensive  alliance  with  Russia,  or  at 
least  a  secure  passage  for  the  Russian  army  through  Turkish 
territory  to  Napoleon's  Illyria.  Kutuzov's  relinquishment  of 
those  demands  was  of  great  service,  since  less  than  one  month 
after  the  peace  with  Turkey  Napoleon's  army  was  on  Russian 
territory. 

To  such  an  experienced  general  as  Kutuzov  it  was  clear 
even  then  that  the  coming  war  was  to  be  defensive,  not  of- 
fensive: one  had  to  think  not  of  sending  troops  to  Illyria,  ac- 


150  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

cording  to  the  dreams  of  Alexander  and  the  ambitious  Ad- 
miral Chichagov  who  was  sent  to  the  Southern  army  in  place 
of  Kutuzov,  but  of  concentrating  all  defensive  forces  against 
the  enormous  enemy  whom,  even  then,  many  considered  it  pos- 
sible to  defeat  only  by  drawing  him  far  into  the  depths  of 
Russia.  The  "  Scythian "  plan,  which  consisted  in  evading 
serious  battles,  but  in  fighting  off  attacks,  and  constant  re- 
treating, leaving  behind  devastated  and  ruined  places, —  had 
been  in  many  minds  before  the  war  of  1812.  There  was 
nothing  new  about  the  method  which  was  known  in  ancient 
times  (since  Darius  of  Persia) ;  but  for  the  realisation  of  such 
a  plan  it  was  necessary  that  the  war  became  national,  for  only 
the  people  could  burn  their  own  houses,  not  the  army,  which 
in  doing  so  against  the  wish  of  the  population  would  acquire 
a  new  enemy  in  them. 

Alexander  understood  this  well.  Aware  of  the  danger  and 
responsibility  of  a  war  with  Napoleon,  and  at  the  same  time 
of  its  inevitability,  he  hoped  that  the  war  on  Russian  territory 
would  become  not  less  popular  than  that  in  Spain.  The  im- 
portance of  a  popular  war  Alexander  appreciated  even  before 
the  Spanish  failure  of  Napoleon:  he  tried  even  in  1806,  as  you 
remember, —  and  not  without  success  —  to  arouse  the  popu- 
lation against  Napoleon,  not  scrupling  about  means.  Yet  a 
"  Scythian  "  war  was  well  adapted  for  Scythians ;  while  in  a 
land  that  stood  even  on  such  a  stage  of  culture  as  Russia  of 
those  days,  such  a  war  was  combined  with  terrible  sacrifices. 
Moreover,  the  devastation  had  to  begin  from  the  western  re- 
gion, the  most  cultured  and  populated,  and  but  recently  an- 
nexed to  Russia.  Finally  the  necessity  and  inevitability  of  a 
"  Scythian  "  war,  in  spite  of  its  popularity,  was  not  understood 
by  all. 

Towards  the  beginning  of  the  year  1812  Napoleon  was  in  a 
position  to  concentrate  on  the  Russian  frontier  with  the  aid 
of  all  his  allies  and  vassals  about  four  hundred  thousand  men, 


THE  PLAN  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  151 

and  could  add  soon  after  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
more.  Russia  was  able  to  draw  to  the  border  not  more  than 
two  hundred  thousand  men.  This  alone  made  an  offensive 
war  impossible,  even  disregarding  Napoleon's  genius  and  the 
talents  and  experience  of  his  generals.  Yet  Alexander  did 
not  lose  hope  of  prevailing  in  the  long  run  over  his  enemy. 
On  the  very  eve  of  the  war  he  frankly  said  to  one  of  Na- 
poleon's messengers,  General  Narbonne,  that  he  appreciated 
all  the  advantages  of  the  French,  but  that  he  reckoned  on  his 
side  space  and  time;  his  words  ultimately  came  true,  and  "  space 
and  time,"  combined  with  his  own  firmness  and  perseverance 
and  those  of  all  Russia,  did  give  him  a  complete  triumph. 

The  original  plan  of  the  campaign  consisted  in  slowly  re- 
treating before  Napoleon,  retaining  him  at  positions  conven- 
ient for  giving  resistance,  and  at  the  same  time  attempting  to 
attack  his  flanks  and  rear.  For  this  reason  the  Russian  forces 
were  divided  into  two  armies,  of  which  one  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  Minister  of  War,  Barclay  de  Tolly,  one  of  the 
heroes  of  the  Finland  campaign,  was  to  retreat,  to  resist  at 
fortified  positions,  and  to  draw  Napoleon  gradually  into  the 
heart  of  the  country;  the  other  army,  commanded  by  Bagra- 
tion,  one  of  Suvorov's  generals,  was  to  harass  the  enemy's 
flanks  and  rear.  The  army  of  Barclay  was  concentrated  more 
to  the  north  (in  the  province  of  Vilna),  and  that  of  Bagration, 
more  to  the  south  (south  of  Grodno).  But  about  half  of  Ba- 
gration's  army  —  nearly  forty  thousand  men  —  had  to  be  sent  at 
once  against  the  Austrians  and  other  allies  of  the  French,  who 
invaded  Volhynia  through  Galicia.  At  the  same  time  Barclay 
had  to  set  aside  a  considerable  corps  under  the  command  of 
Witgenstein  for  the  defence  of  the  Ostsee  (Baltic)  provinces 
and  the  road  to  Petrograd.  For  this  reason,  and  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  the  Drissa  fortifications  on  the  Western  Dvina  were 
found  to  be  in  wretched  condition,  Barclay's  forces  were  quite 
insufficient  for  checking  Napoleon's  advance. 


152  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

After  the  separation  of  Witgenstein's  corps  from  Barclay, 
and  of  several  divisions  of  Bagration  for  the  aid  of  Tormasov, 
Barclay's  army  consisted  of  eighty  thousand,  Bagration's  of 
less  than  forty  thousand,  and  Napoleon  by  cutting  the  com- 
munications between  the  two  armies  could  defeat  them  singly, 
one  after  the  other.  Towards  this  were  directed  his  efforts 
after  his  moving  out  of  Vilna  early  in  July.  In  view  of  this 
danger  the  Russian  armies  had  to  unite  as  soon  as  possible,  and 
to  give  up  their  original  plan.  To  prevent  this  Napoleon  at- 
tempted to  outflank  Barclay  under  Vitebsk.  Barclay  under- 
stood Napoleon's  intention,  and  endeavoured  to  unite  with 
Bagration  at  Vitebsk.  Napoleon's  plan  failed  owing  to  the 
quick  march  of  Barclay  from  Drissa  to  Vitebsk  and  to  the  brave 
resistance  of  a  small  corps  under  the  command  of  Count  Os- 
terman-Tolstoy  that  was  ordered  to  keep  off  the  main  forces 
of  the  French;  but  Barclay  did  not  succeed  in  uniting  with 
Bagration  at  Vitebsk,  since  under  the  furious  attack  of  Davout, 
Bagration  had  to  withdraw  to  Smolensk,  where  the  Russian 
armies  finally  came  together.  A  considerable  battle  took  place 
there;  the  Russians  evacuated  Smolensk  only  after  the  enemy's 
cannonade  had  reduced  it  to  a  heap  of  burning  ruins.  Im- 
mediately after  Smolensk  Napoleon  attempted  to  repulse  the 
Russian  army  from  the  Moscow  road  to  the  north,  and  thus 
cut  it  off  from  the  fertile  southern  provinces,  but  in  this  at- 
tempt he  also  failed  and  was  forced  to  abandon  his  idea  after 
a  bloody  battle  at  the  Valutin  Hill  on  the  Moscow  road. 

In  spite  of  the  swift,  aggressive  attack  of  Napoleon's  army 
and  the  almost  uninterrupted  retreat  of  the  Russians  who  left 
behind  them  burned  and  devastated  lands,  the  position  of 
Napoleon  grew  with  every  step  more  difficult  and  perilous. 
After  the  battle  at  the  Valutin  Hill  Napoleon  even  considered 
stopping  for  the  winter  at  Smolensk ;  but  the  waste  land  around 
the  ruined  city  did  not  appeal  to  him,  and  he  determined  to 
move  on  to  the  heart  of  Russia,  Moscow,  where  he  hoped  to 


THE  MOOD  OF  THE  ARMY  153 

dictate  terms  of  peace  to  the  defeated  enemy.  In  the  mean- 
time his  army  melted.  Already  at  Vilna  he  had  about  fifty 
thousand  sick  soldiers.  His  main  army,  which  had  consisted  — 
with  the  subtraction  of  the  corps  of  Macdonald  and  Oudinot, 
later  enforced  by  the  division  of  St.  Syr,  that  were  to  march 
against  Petrograd  and  the  Ostsee  provinces  —  of  three  hun- 
dred thousand  men,  had  lost  by  the  time  of  entering  Vitebsk 
nearly  one  hundred  thousand  in  battles  and  from  sickness,  i.e., 
the  army  was  diminished  by  one-third;  after  Smolensk  and 
the  Valutin  Hill  not  more  than  one-half  of  the  original  num- 
ber remained  in  the  ranks. 

The  Russians  retreated  in  good  order,  fighting  furiously. 
Their  resistance  was  costly  both  for  them  and  for  Napoleon. 
When  under  the  attack  of  Napoleon's  enormous  army  Oster- 
man-Tolstoy  was  asked  by  his  adjutants,  what  there  remained 
to  do,  he  answered :  "  To  stand  and  die !  "  Such  was  the 
mood  of  the  army.  The  heroic  resistance  of  Nievierovsky's 
division  of  recruits,  which  held  back  the  entire  cavalry  of  Murat 
during  the  retreat  of  Bagration,  and  Raievsky's  short  but 
glorious  defence  of  Smolensk  against  Napoleon's  main  forces 
are  well  known.  One  must  bear  in  mind  that  while  Napoleon's 
losses  were  irretrievable,  the  losses  of  the  Russians  who  re- 
treated into  the  country  could  be  considerably  replenished  by 
reserves. 

If  Alexander  understood  clearly  the  responsibility  of  the 
war,  Napoleon  had  also  foreseen  all  the  difficulties  in  store, 
particularly  in  regard  to  forage  and  provision,  and  for  this 
reason  he  had  stored  up  early  in  1812  an  enormous  amount 
of  provisions  at  Danzig,  which  should  have  kept  his  army  for 
a  whole  year.  But  these  provisions  required  a  train  of  ten 
thousand  carts,  a  big  burden  for  the  marching  army;  the  train 
had  to  be  constantly  guarded  from  Cossack-raids.  Having 
prepared  provisions  for  the  soldiers  Napoleon  nevertheless  could 
not  start  the  campaign  till  the  middle  of  May,  and  remained 


154  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

motionless  on  the  Russian  border  for  lack  of  provender  for  his 
horses  that  amounted  to  more  than  one  hundred  and  twenty 
thousand;  he  had  to  wait  till  the  middle  of  May,  when  the 
fields  could  offer  some  forage.  This  forced  delay  eventually 
proved  very  costly. 

Thus  the  difficulties  did  not  surprise  Napoleon;  he  knew 
them  and  yet  determined  to  achieve  his  purpose.  One  must 
say  he  did  reach  his  purpose:  he  took  Moscow.  But  there 
disappointment  awaited  him.  He  had  underrated  the  force 
of  popular  resistance;  he  understood  it  when  in  Moscow,  but 
it  was  too  late  for  making  repairs. 

Looking  back  with  the  eye  of  a  historian  upon  the  war  of 
1812  and  its  outcome,  one  can  easily  see  that  Napoleon's 
chances  began  to  fall  at  the  very  start,  and  fell  constantly ;  but 
contemporaries  did  not  understand  this  at  once ;  they  only  knew 
that  Napoleon  was  advancing,  and  the  Russians  retreating. 
Such  a  course  of  affairs  aroused  despondency  in  the  popula- 
tion and  grumbling  in  the  army,  which  craved  a  general  battle. 
The  grumbling  grew  also  from  the  fact  that  at  the  head  of 
the  army  stood  a  German;  the  generals  intrigued  against  Bar- 
clay de  Tolly,  and  even  gossiped  about  his  being  a  traitor. 
The  matter  was  complicated  by  unfriendliness  between  Bar- 
clay and  Bagration;  although  formally  Bagration  submitted 
to  Barclay,  he  commanded  his  army  independently.  Finally 
under  the  pressure  of  public  opinion  Alexander  determined  to 
appoint  a  new  commander  for  both  armies.  The  general  voice 
was  for  Kutuzov.  Personally  he  was  disagreeable  to  Alex- 
ander ever  since  Austerlitz  and  his  disobedience  at  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Bucharest  Treaty,  yet  he  yielded  to  the  popular 
demand.  Convinced  of  the  need  of  a  national  war  with  Na- 
poleon, Alexander  had  been  very  attentive  to  the  public  voice  at 
that  time,  as  we  have  observed.  For  this  reason  he  sacrificed 
Speransky,  appointed  to  the  post  of  Imperial  Secretary  Ad- 


ALEXANDER  AND  THE  ARMY  155 

miral  Shishkov,  a  "  true-Russian "  patriot  of  the  ancient 
calibre,  but  in  no  way  a  statesman ;  for  the  same  reason  he  ap- 
pointed as  Governor-General  of  Moscow  the  madcap  Rastop- 
chin  who  had  been  famous  by  his  patriotic  pamphlets  and 
placards.  For  the  same  considerations  he  appointed  Prince 
Kutuzov  chief  commander  of  all  his  armies. 

At  first  Alexander  intended  to  remain  with  the  army,  and 
he  arrived  at  the  headquarters  in  Vilna,  but  Shishkov,  who 
accompanied  him,  had  observed  at  the  right  moment  that  the 
Emperor's  presence  was  a  great  inconvenience,  embarrassing  the 
actions  of  the  Chief  Commander.  He  persuaded  Adjutant- 
General  Balashov  and  Count  Arakcheiev  to  sign  with  him  a 
letter  to  Alexander,  in  which  they  entreated  the  Tzar  to  leave 
the  army  and  go  to  Moscow  for  the  support  and  upheaval  of 
the  patriotic  spirit. 

Reluctantly  Alexander  followed  Shishkov's  advice.  In  Mos- 
cow he  was  met  with  an  outburst  of  general  enthusiasm  which 
exceeded  all  his  expectations.  The  nobility  of  the  province 
of  Moscow  offered  at  once  three  million  rubles,  an  enormous 
sum  for  that  time,  and  volunteered  to  bring  ten  recruits  from 
every  hundred  souls,  which  meant  almost  half  of  the  working 
population  capable  of  bearing  arms.  The  Moscow  merchants 
offered  ten  million  rubles.  Similar  unusual  offers  were  made 
by  the  nobles  of  the  provinces  of  Smolensk,  Estland,  Pskov, 
Tver,  and  others.  Towards  autumn  the  total  amount  of  the 
contributions  exceeded  one  hundred  millions.  The  war  was 
becoming  truly  national.  Never  before  or  after  had  such 
colossal  sums  been  contributed. 

Kutuzov  assumed  the  commandership  of  the  army  at  the 
village  Tzarevo-Zaymishche,  the  place  where  Barclay  had  in- 
tended to  give  Napoleon  a  general  battle,  yielding  to  the  per- 
suasions of  his  staff  and  the  desire  of  the  whole  army.  After 
the  observation  of  the  positions  by  Benigsen,  who  had  arrived 


156  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

with  Kutuzov,  it  was  decided  to  retreat  still  farther,  and  the 
general  battle  took  place  at  Borodino,  one  hundred  and  thirty 
versts  from  Moscow,  ten  versts  from  Mozhaysk.1 

The  general  course  of  that  battle  is  well  known,  and  I  shall 
not  describe  it.  It  was  the  bloodiest  of  all  Napoleonic  bat- 
tles; both  armies  lost  half  of  their  men,  the  number  of  killed 
and  wounded  officers  alone  exceeded  two  thousand.  The 
Russians  lost  over  twenty  generals,  among  them  Bagration  and 
Tuchkov;  Napoleon  lost  forty-nine  generals. 

Military  historians  are  of  the  opinion  that  Napoleon  could 
have  won  the  battle  if  he  had  employed  his  Guards;  but  he 
refused  to  risk  his  Guards  at  a  distance  of  three  thousand  versts 
from  France,  and  he  said  so  himself  during  the  battle  in  answer 
to  the  advice  of  his  staff. 

Kutuzov,  despite  the  fact  that  he  had  maintained  all  his 
positions,  upon  the  review  of  his  army  after  the  two  days' 
fighting  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  necessary  to  re- 
treat to  Moscow,  and  not  finding  a  good  position  for  a  new 
battle  around  Moscow  he  moved  on  beyond  Moscow,  at  first 
on  the  road  of  Riazan,  and  then  on  the  Kaluga  road.  Mos- 
cow was  surrendered  without  fighting.2  Napoleon's  army, 

1 A  verst  is  equivalent  to  0.6629  of  a  mile,  or  1.067  of  a  kilometer. 

2  The  impression  of  the  surrender  of  Moscow  upon  the  public  was 
reflected  in  numerous  memoirs  of  that  time,  some  of  which  have  been 
used  in  later-day  fiction,  with  particular  artistic  truthfulness  in  Tol- 
stoy's "  War  and  Peace."  Recently  was  published  the  curious  cor- 
respondence of  Alexander  with  his  favourite  sister,  Catherine  Paulovna 
(issued  by  Grand  Duke  Nicolay  Mikhailovich,  Petrograd,  1910),  which 
well  illustrates  the  general  indignation  of  the  public  at  the  first  news 
about  the  evacuation  of  Moscow.  On  September  6  Catherine  Paul- 
ovna, who  mingled  with  patriots  of  the  type  of  Karamzin  and 
Rastopchin,  wrote  to  her  brother  from  Yaroslavl :  "  The  occupation 
of  Moscow  by  the  French  has  overfilled  the  cup  of  despair  in  all 
minds,  dissatisfaction  has  spread  to  an  extreme  degree,  and  even  you 
(i.e.,  the  Tzar)  are  not  spared  in  the  condemnations.  .  .  .  You  are 
loudly  blamed  for  the  misfortunes  of  your  empire,  for  the  general 
ruination,  in  a  word  for  the  loss  of  the  country's  and  of  your  own 


MOSCOW!  157 

"  smashed  at  the  Russians,"  in  the  expression  of  Yermolov,  en- 
tered Moscow  and  encamped  there  for  a  long  rest.  That 
standstill  reduced  the  French  army  to  a  definite  decay  and 
demoralisation.  In  the  depopulated  Moscow  there  began  con- 
tinuous conflagrations  which  could  not  be  extinguished  — 
Rastopchin  had  wisely  withdrawn  all  pipes.  There  was  noth- 
ing to  eat ;  the  remainder  of  the  provisions  was  soon  plundered. 
Astounded  by  the  sight  of  the  empty,  burning  Moscow,  in 
which  he  had  expected  to  find  comfortable  and  well  provided 
quarters,  Napoleon  remained  five  weeks  without  action  in  the 
"  conquered "  city  among  heaps  of  burning  ruins.  All  his 
peace  preludes  were  rejected.  After  five  weeks  Napoleon  left 
Moscow  with  the  single  desire  of  returning  home  with  his  army. 
But  Kutuzov  blocked  his  way  to  the  south,  and  he  had  to  re- 
turn by  the  old,  devastated  road  of  Smolensk.  A  cruel  guerrilla 
war  began,  severe  frost  came  earlier  than  usually,  and  the 
Grande  Armee  was  fast  reduced  to  a  big  frozen,  starving  mob, 
beaten  and  captured  not  only  by  peasants,  but  even  by  women. 
The  escape  of  Napoleon  in  a  native  carriage,  wrapped  up  in 
shawls  and  furs,  but  without  his  army,  was  due  only  to  the 
negligence  of  Admiral  Chichagov,  who  overlooked  him.  At 
Warsaw  Napoleon  said :  "  From  the  sublime  to  the  ridiculous 
is  only  one  step.  .  .  ." 

Alexander  was  in  a  position  to  raise  his  head  high;  he  had 
not  only  fulfilled  his  promise  "  not  to  make  peace  as  long  as 
there  remained  one  armed  enemy  in  Russia,"  but  there  was  no 
one  to  negotiate  with. 

Napoleon,  however,  though  he  had  lost  his  army,  did  not 

dignity."  She  reminded  him  of  his  determination  not  to  conclude 
peace  even  if  he  had  to  retreat  to  Kazan. 

Alexander,  touched  to  the  quick  by  that  sharp  letter,  replied  a  few 
days  later  at  his  first  moment  of  leisure  in  a  long  epistle,  in  which 
he  expressed  a  firm  and  sober  view  of  his  own  position  and  that 
of  Russia,  and  his  opinion  about  the  persons  in  whose  hands  was  at 
that  time  held  to  a  considerable  extent  the  fate  of  the  army  and  Russia. 


158  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

lose  his  spirit  and  self-confidence,  and  hastened  to  France  to 
gather  new  troops;  he  foresaw  that  with  the  collapse  of  his 
army  all  his  subjected  nations  would  attempt  to  throw  off  his 
yoke. 

Before  Alexander  appeared  the  question:  Should  he  be  sat- 
isfied with  the  repelling  of  the  enemy  from  Russia,  or  should 
he  make  use  of  Napoleon's  desperate  plight  and  undertake  the 
liberation  of  Europe  from  his  power? 

Alexander  chose  the  latter.  For  three  whole  years  he  had 
been  the  "  Agamemnon  "  of  Europe,  the  king  of  kings,  as  they 
said  then.  One  cannot  deny  that  the  task  was  of  great  im- 
portance for  Russia  also,  as  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  if 
Napoleon  was  given  time  to  recuperate  he  would  not  fail  to 
attempt  eventually  a  revanche. 

Alexander's  activity  in  Europe  during  1813-15  was  un- 
doubtedly the  most  brilliant  phase  in  his  life,  but  it  forms  the 
contents  of  universal,  not  Russian  history.  In  regard  to  the 
socio-political  process  which  we  are  studying,  that  activity  has 
but  an  indirect  and,  moreover,  a  negative  significance.  For 
this  reason  we  shall  discuss  only  those  circumstances  of  that 
period  which  have  some  bearing  on  the  process  under  our 
observation. 

The  struggle  with  Napoleon  was  far  from  easy  even  after 
1812.  Still  more  difficult  was  the  struggle  that  Alexander 
had  to  carry  on  against  the  mistrust  and  vacillations  of  his 
allies,  Austria  and  Prussia.  Finally  after  the  defeat  of  Na- 
poleon in  the  "  battle  of  the  nations "  at  Leipzig,  Germany 
was  freed  from  the  French,  and  the  allies,  urged  and  led  by 
Alexander  (though  formally  the  commander  of  the  allied 
armies  was  not  he,  but  an  Austrian  general  —  the  weak  waver- 
ing Prince  Schwarzenberg) ,  had  passed  by  the  beginning  of 
the  year  1814  the  French  border,  and  in  April  of  the  same  year 
they  entered  Paris;  Napoleon  signed  his  abdication  and  with- 
drew to  the  island  Elbe.  The  Bourbons  were  restored,  and 


THE  CONGRESS  OF  VIENNA  159 

Louis  XVIII,  to  a  great  measure  under  the  influence  of  Alex- 
ander, granted  a  constitutional  charter. 

At  the  Vienna  Congress  the  map  of  Europe  had  to  be  re- 
arranged once  more;  it  was  proposed  to  give  some  autonomy 
and  representative  governments  to  the  nationalities  that  had 
taken  part  in  the  wars  against  Napoleon.  The  Congress  re- 
stored the  old  frontiers  of  France  (as  before  1792),  added  a 
considerable  slice  to  Austria,  and  remapped  Germany  without 
special  difficulties.  One  of  the  most  difficult  questions  was  that 
of  Poland.  On  the  one  hand  Austria,  England,  and  France 
feared  a  too  strong  Russia,  and  did  not  want  to  give  her  Poland ; 
on  the  other  hand  complications  arose  in  connection  with  the 
necessary  compensation  of  Prussia  for  her  losses  by  the  Tilsit 
Treaty.  Alexander  did  not  want  to  offend  the  king  of  Prussia, 
who  was  now  his  faithful  ally;  but  at  Tilsit  the  Grand  Duchy 
of  Warsaw  had  been  formed  out  of  Prussian  possessions.  Al- 
exander had  intended  to  make  use  of  Saxony  for  the  com- 
pensation of  Prussia,  without  destroying  the  new  Polish  state. 
The  king  of  Saxony  was  Napoleon's  most  devoted  ally,  and 
was  therefore  treated  almost  as  a  traitor  to  the  German  nation ; 
the  Saxon  people  cared  nothing  about  depriving  their  king  of 
his  dominion,  since  they  were  indignant  over  his  anti-German 
policy;  Frederick  William  of  Prussia  was  pleased  to  receive  so 
many  German  subjects  in  place  of  hostile  Poles.  But  the  king 
of  Saxony  found  an  unexpected  and  energetic  champion  in 
Talleyrand,  who  represented  the  interests  of  Louis  XVIII  at 
the  Congress.  Of  course  Talleyrand  was  not  interested  in 
Saxon  affairs,  but  he  endeavoured  to  uphold  the  interests  of 
the  small  German  states  in  order  to  preserve  the  weakness 
and  disunion  of  Germany;  besides,  he  hoped  to  arouse  hostile 
feelings  among  the  allies  in  connection  with  that  question,  and 
particularly  to  provoke  mistrust  in  regard  to  Alexander.  In- 
deed, he  succeeded  in  drawing  on  his  side  England  and  Austria, 
and  the  three  Powers  refused  to  give  Saxony  to  Prussia  and 


160  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

the  Duchy  of  Warsaw  to  Russia.  As  a  matter  of  fact  Alex- 
ander wanted  to  receive  the  Duchy  not  for  the  sake  of  enlarg- 
ing Russia's  territory,  but  in  order  to  fulfil  his  old  promise 
to  the  Poles;  he  had  intended  to  transform  the  Duchy  of  War- 
saw into  a  Kingdom  of  Poland,  which  would  have  a  liberal 
constitution  under  the  sceptre  of  the  Russian  Tzar. 

Affairs  in  Poland  were  at  that  moment  very  difficult.  As 
soon  as  the  Russians  had  crossed  the  frontier  in  1813  and 
entered  the  Duchy,  they  established  there  a  temporary  govern- 
ment in  the  form  of  a  commission  of  five,  with  V.  S.  Lanskoy 
at  the  head ;  the  members  of  the  commission  were  N.  N.  Nov- 
osiltzev,  Prince  A.  A.  Czartoryski,  and  two  former  ministers 
of  the  Duchy.  The  Poles  had  tightly  knit  their  fate  with  that 
of  Napoleon;  they  had  fought  bravely  and  vigorously  in  his 
ranks  both  in  Spain  and  in  Russia.  In  the  meantime  the  Polish 
lands  were  reduced  to  complete  ruin,  since  they  had  become  the 
zone  of  war;  this  circumstance  had  completed  the  financial 
and  economic  destruction  of  the  country  which  had  been  groan- 
ing under  the  burden  of  maintaining  an  army  of  sixty-five 
thousand  men. 

When  Napoleon's  army  entered  Russia  in  1812,  it  was 
joined  by  many  Poles  who  had  been  Russian  subjects,  espe- 
cially from  the  Lithuanian  provinces;  they  had  thus  broken 
their  oath  of  allegiance  to  Alexander.  Yet  Alexander  granted 
them  all  an  amnesty  after  the  war  of  1812,  and  besides  pub- 
lished a  very  friendly  proclamation  to  the  population  of  the 
Duchy  of  Warsaw.  This  prompted  Czartoryski  to  present  to 
the  Tzar  a  new  proposition  about  the  restoration  of  Poland  ac- 
cording to  the  frontiers  of  1772  under  the  sceptre  of  Alex- 
ander's youngest  brother,  Grand  Duke  Mikhail.  Alexander 
categorically  refused,  declaring  that  to  restore  Poland  with  its 
frontiers  of  1772  and  not  have  it  under  the  sceptre  of  the 
emperor  of  Russia  would  be  contrary  to  the  national  feelings 
of  his  subjects  who  could  not  sympathise  with  the  relinquish- 


POLISH  AFFAIRS  161 

ment  of  ancient  Russian  lands  for  which  there  had  been  cen- 
turies of  struggle  between  Russia  and  Poland. 

In  this  case  Alexander  understood  correctly  the  sentiments 
of  his  people  and  army  whose  hostility  towards  the  Poles  was 
obvious;  even  some  of  the  members  of  the  Commission  that 
governed  Poland  were  not  free  from  that  feeling.  Novosiltzev, 
for  instance,  called  Alexander's  attention  to  the  Poles'  opposi- 
tion to  everything  Russian;  Lanskoy  vigorously  protested 
against  giving  Poland  an  autonomy,  particularly  against  pre- 
serving a  separate  Polish  army  which  would,  in  his  words, 
"  become  a  snake  spouting  its  venom  at  us."  The  diplomats 
and  statesmen  who  surrounded  Alexander  at  that  time,  Rus- 
sians as  well  as  foreigners,  were  all  against  the  restoration  of 
Poland,  not  to  mention  Metternich,  who  considered  all  the 
liberal  plans  of  Alexander  as  dangerous  dreams.  The  Russian 
ambassador  to  France,  Count  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  expressed  him- 
self sharply  against  restoring  Polish  independence,  and  in  a 
detailed  memorandum  he  tried  to  prove  on  the  basis  of  nu- 
merous historical  analogies  that  Poland  should  not  be  restored, 
that  she  was  not  capable  of  a  separate  political  existence,  and 
that  her  restoration  would  be  detrimental  to  Russia.  Also 
Baron  Stein,  the  famous  Prussian  reformer,  one  of  the  most 
honest  statesmen  of  that  epoch,  considered  that  the  maximum 
of  what  Poland  should  receive  was  a  well  organised  local  self- 
government.  Even  Capo  d'Istria,  subsequently  the  first  presi- 
dent of  liberated  Greece,  thought  that  Poland  should  not  be 
given  a  constitution,  since  she  had  no  developed  middle  class, 
but  only  a  szlachta  (nobility)  and  an  enslaved  peasantry. 

In  spite  of  all  these  opinions  Alexander  remained  firm  in  his 
intentions.  Though  he  refused  in  1814  to  restore  to  Poland 
her  frontiers  of  1772,  he  resolved  not  to  return  to  Prussia  the 
original  Polish  lands  that  formed  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw,  but 
to  found  out  of  them  an  independent  Polish  state  under  his 
sceptre.  In  view  of  the  sharp  opposition  of  France,  England, 


162  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

and  Austria,  Alexander  was  forced  to  compromise:  the  king 
of  Saxony  retained  his  throne,  and  only  a  part  of  Saxony  was 
given  to  Prussia;  the  king  of  Prussia  received  besides,  the  rich 
Rhenish  provinces  and  the  Duchy  of  Posen  with  the  city  of 
Thorn,  which  had  formed  a  part  of  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw 
before  1815. 

Then  Alexander  had  to  give  back  to  Austria  all  of  Galicia, 
the  part  that  was  annexed  by  Napoleon  to  the  Duchy  of  War- 
saw and  the  part  that  was  given  by  Napoleon  to  Russia.  Thus 
the  Tzar  succeeded  in  forming  a  Polish  kingdom  only  out  of 
the  lands  that  form  at  present  3  the  ten  provinces  of  the  "  Vis- 
tula Region."  The  agreement  of  the  Powers  on  all  dis- 
putable questions  was  accelerated  by  the  news  of  Napoleon's 
flight  from  Elbe  and  his  arrival  at  France.  After  his  final 
defeat  at  Waterloo  by  the  British  and  Prussians  Napoleon  ab- 
dicated for  the  second  time  and  was  exiled  to  the  island  of 
St.  Helena. 

Alexander  left  Vienna  in  1815,  not  waiting  for  the  end  of 
the  work  of  the  Congress.  To  that  time  belongs  his  ac- 
quaintance with  an  elderly  lady  raving  with  mystical  nonsense, 
Baroness  Juliane  Kriidener.  Many  historians  and  biographers 
of  Alexander  have  ascribed  a  great  importance  to  that  ac- 
quaintanceship in  regard  to  the  growth  of  Alexander's  religious 
mysticism;  Alexander  himself  considered  his  meeting  with  her 
of  great  significance.  But  we  must  say  that  his  inclination  for 
mysticism  had  developed  even  before  his  meeting  with  the 
Baroness,  which  circumstance,  in  my  opinion,  had  given  Mme. 
Kriidener  an  access  to  him.  A  definite  impulse  to  Alexander's 
mysticism  was  given  evidently  by  the  great  and  formidable 
events  of  1812,  but  even  before  1812  he  had  eagerly  conversed 
with  monks  and  "  holy  men."  We  read  in  Shishkov's  memoirs 
that  in  1813,  among  his  reports  on  important  state-questions 
Shishkov  —  the  Imperial  Secretary  —  read  to  Alexander  se- 

3  I.e.,  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  in  1914. —  TR. 


ALEXANDER'S  MYSTIC  MOOD  163 

lections  from  the  Hebrew  prophets,  the  text  of  which,  it  ap- 
peared to  them,  well  fitted  the  contemporary  events;  at  this 
both  shed  "  tears  of  overcharged  emotion."  Since  1812  the 
New  Testament  had  always  been  with  Alexander,  and  he  often 
used  it  as  an  oracle,  opening  pages  at  random  and  pondering 
over  passages  that  had  some  relation  to  the  facts  of  surround- 
ing life.  However,  such  mysticism  was  common  in  Europe  at 
that  time;  the  application  of  some  expressions  from  the  Apoca- 
lypse to  Napoleon  was  particularly  in  vogue.  The  consider- 
able spread  of  Freemasonry  and  the  Masonic  orders  also  caused 
the  growth  of  mysticism.  The  colossal  revolutions  of  that 
epoch  contributed  evidently  to  such  an  alarmed  state  of  the 
contemporary  mind.  In  any  case  the  mystic  mood  of  Alex- 
ander was  not  in  any  marked  way  reflected  in  1815  upon  his 
socio-political  views  and  measures.  But  the  far  seeing  La 
Harpe  even  then  felt  despondent  about  Alexander's  new  pred- 
ilection. 

In  his  foreign  policy  this  inclination  found  expression,  not 
without  the  influence  of  Baroness  Kriidener,  as  it  is  asserted,  in 
his  at  first  quite  innocent  proposal  to  his  allies  about  forming 
a  Holy  Alliance  of  the  European  monarchs  for  the  promulga- 
tion of  the  ideas  of  peace  and  brotherhood  in  international 
relations.  According  to  the  idea  of  that  Alliance  the  Euro- 
pean monarchs  were  to  treat  one  another  as  brothers,  and  their 
subjects,  as  children;  all  international  misunderstandings  and 
disputes  were  to  be  solved  in  a  peaceful  way.  The  king  of 
Prussia  expressed  some  sympathy  with  the  idea;  the  emperor 
of  Austria,  Francis,  a  pietist  who  had  been  all  his  life  in  the 
hands  of  Jesuits,  signed  the  agreement  only  after  he  had  con- 
sulted Metternich,  who  said  that  although  it  was  an  empty 
chimera,  it  was  yet  an  absolutely  harmless  one.  The  king  of 
England  could  not  sign  the  agreement  without  the  approval  of 
Parliament,  but  he  expressed  his  sympathy  in  a  personal  letter 
to  Alexander.  Later  into  the  Alliance  had  gradually  entered 


164  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

all  European  monarchs  except  the  Sultan  and  the  Pope.  In 
the  hands  of  Metternich  this  institution  had  ultimately  de- 
generated into  an  alliance  of  rulers  against  revolting  nation- 
alities, but  in  1815  the  Alliance  did  not  have  such  a  character, 
and  Alexander  was  still  a  sincere  advocate  of  liberal  institu- 
tions. Yet  his  struggle  with  Napoleon  and  with  the  remains 
of  the  Revolution  acquired  after  1812  a  growing  mystical  and 
sacramental  aspect,  which  caused  his  old  tutor,  La  Harpe,  to 
express  his  apprehension. 


CHAPTER  X 

IN  the  autumn  of  1815,  after  considerable  travelling 
through  Europe  Alexander  departed  at  last  for  Russia, 
and  on  his  way  stopped  at  Warsaw,  where  a  special  com- 
mission consisting  exclusively  of  Poles  was  at  that  time  busy 
working  out  the  constitution  of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland,  ac- 
cording to  Alexander's  instructions.  The  constitution  had 
some  features  that  resembled  Speransky's  Plan  and  many  fea- 
tures in  common  with  the  Charter  of  Louis  XVIII;  the  mem- 
bers of  the  commission  had  in  mind  also  the  constitution  given 
by  Napoleon  to  the  Duchy  of  Warsaw  in  1807.  At  any  rate, 
contemporaries,  even  such  radicals  as  Carnot  who  then  lived  at 
Warsaw,  considered  that  constitution  very  liberal,  not  only  for 
an  autocrat,  but  even  much  better  than  the  Charter  of  Louis 
XVIII,  which  was  given  to  France  largely  under  the  pressure 
of  Alexander.  The  constitution  of  1815  guaranteed  freedom 
of  the  press,  the  limits  of  which  were  to  be  determined  by  the 
Diet,  and  personal  inviolability;  abolished  confiscation  of  prop- 
erty and  administrative  banishment,  instituted  the  use  of  the 
Polish  language  in  the  governmental  institutions  of  the  King- 
dom, and  the  obligatory  occupation  of  all  administrative,  ju- 
dicial, and  military  positions  by  subjects  of  the  Kingdom  of 
Poland.  It  even  instituted  the  oath  to  the  constitution  on  the 
part  of  the  Tzar  of  Poland,  i.e.,  the  Russian  Emperor,  a  point 
that  is  not  found  in  the  present  Russian  constitution.  The 
Diet  was  to  be  the  legislative  apparatus;  it  consisted  of  the 
king  and  two  chambers.  The  lower  chamber  had  seventy- 
one  members  elected  by  the  landowning  nobility,  and  fifty-one 
members  from  the  cities.  The  right  of  suffrage  was  given  to 
persons  not  below  the  age  of  thirty,  who  paid  in  direct  taxes 

165 


166  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

not  less  than  one  hundred  zloty  (fifteen  rubles  in  silver).  The 
upper  chamber  consisted  of  "  Princes  of  the  blood,"  i.e.,  mem- 
bers of  the  Imperial  Russian  house  during  their  abode  in  War- 
saw, several  Catholic  bishops,  one  Uniate  1  bishop,  and  several 
Voivodes 2  and  Castellans.3  The  membership  of  the  upper 
chamber  was  half  that  of  the  lower  chamber;  the  members 
were  appointed  by  the  Emperor,  one  from  every  two  candidates 
recommended  by  the  Senate  out  of  persons  who  paid  direct  taxes 
of  not  less  than  two  thousand  zloty  (three  hundred  rubles). 

The  Diet  assembled  once  in  two  years  for  thirty  days,  dur- 
ing which  time  it  had  to  discuss  all  the  legislative  projects 
brought  in  by  the  ministry  responsible  before  it.  The  Diet 
had  no  legislative  initiative,  though  it  could  present  petitions 
to  the  Tzar  and  raise  questions  about  ministerial  responsibility. 
All  the  projects  presented  to  the  Diet  by  the  ministry  were 
first  discussed  in  the  State-Council  whose  role  in  this  instance 
corresponded  with  that  given  it  by  Speransky's  original  Plan. 
The  entire  power  in  the  land  was  given  by  that  constitution  to 
the  szlachta,  while  certain  administrative  and  judicial  positions 
were  to  be  occupied  only  by  landowners. 

Alexander  at  once  ratified  the  constitution  at  Petrograd  on 
December  12,  1815.  In  his  speech  on  that  occasion  Prince 
Adam  Czartoryski  remarked  that  "  Emperor  Alexander  could 
dominate  by  sheer  force,  but,  led  by  the  inspiration  of  virtue, 
he  rejected  such  a  domination.  He  has  based  his  power  not 
on  external  right  alone,  but  on  the  feeling  of  gratitude,  on  the 
feeling  of  loyalty,  and  on  that  moral  might  which  originates  in 
place  of  terror  —  a  feeling  of  obligation,  in  place  of  compulsion 
—  devotion  and  voluntary  sacrifices." 

However,  Czartoryski  himself  was  for  the  second  time  of- 

1  The  Uniates  are  a  small  sect  professing  a  creed  which  is  a  com- 
promise  between    Roman    Catholicism   and    Greek    Catholicism. —  TR. 

2  Polish    administrative    officials.    The    Poles    employed    also    the 
equivalent  title   of   palatinus. — >TR. 

3  Originally,  castle-managers.    Later  —  councillors. —  TR. 


ALEXANDER  AT  WARSAW  167 

fended  and  disappointed  in  his  expectations  by  Alexander.  For 
the  post  of  Namiestnik  (viceroy)  was  appointed  not  he,  but  an 
old  Polish  general,  Zayoncheck,  a  former  Republican,  who  had 
commanded  a  division  under  Napoleon.  The  Council  included 
besides  five  ministers  who  divided  among  them  the  spheres  of 
administration,  and  besides  the  president  (the  viceroy)  — an  Im- 
perial Commissary,  and  that  position  was  given  to  Novosiltzev, 
whose  attitude  towards  the  restoration  of  Poland  was  quite 
sceptical.  As  commander  of  the  Polish  army  —  forty  thou- 
sand men  —  was  appointed  Grand  Duke  Constantine,  an  ex- 
cited, violent  man  who  was  considered  responsible  for  the 
subsequent  downfall  of  the  Polish  constitution. 

During  his  stay  at  Warsaw  Alexander  received  a  deputation 
of  Lithuanian  nobles  with  Prince  Oginsky  at  their  head,  but 
on  the  condition  that  they  should  not  even  mention  the  annexa- 
tion of  the  Lithuanian  provinces  to  Poland,  and  that  the  depu- 
tation did  not  include  representatives  of  Volhynia  and  Podolia.4 

In  Russia  Alexander  was  awaited  by  a  mass  of  cares  for  the 
internal  reconstruction  of  the  country  and  the  restoration  of  its 
welfare,  which  had  been  destroyed  by  the  wars.  The  year  of 
1812  was  accompanied  with  unparalleled  misery,  and  the  splen- 
did defeat  of  the  powerful  enemy  was  accomplished  at  a  big 

4  In  his  memoirs  Prince  Oginsky  describes  his  conversation  with 
Alexander  at  Warsaw  in  1815,  and  the  reception  of  the  deputation  from 
three  Lithuanian  provinces:  Vilna,  Grodno,  and  Minsk.  In  his  con- 
versation with  Oginsky  Alexander  clearly  hinted  at  his  intention  to 
join  those  provinces  to  Poland,  figuring  that  through  such  a  measure 
they  would  become  closer  united  with  the  Russian  Empire,  since  their 
population  would  have  no  more  reason  for  dissatisfaction.  But  at 
the  same  time  he  forbade  the  delegates  to  ask  him  about  it,  fearing 
that  this  would  sharpen  the  hostility  of  Russian  public  opinion  toward 
the  question.  That  hostility  was  keenly  expressed  in  Karam/in's  mem- 
orandum "  An  opinion  of  a  Russian  citizen  "  presented  to  Alexander 
in  1819,  and  in  his  notes  "For  posterity";  it  is  also  illustrated  in  the 
memoirs  of  the  Decembrist  Yakushkin  who  observed  the  attitude  of 
the  progressive  military  circles  towards  the  Polish  question  in  the 
years  1817-18. 


168  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

cost  not  only  for  the  enemy,  but  also  for  Russia.  Eyewitnesses 
relate  unbelievable  pictures  of  horror  and  death,  that  presented 
themselves  to  travellers  on  the  big  Smolensk  road  at  the  be- 
ginning of  1813.  The  mass  of  unburied  corpses  infected  the 
air  along  the  entire  line  from  Vilna  to  Smolensk,  and  even 
far  aside  from  that  tract.  Shishkov  says  that  in  February, 
1813,  the  Minister  of  Police,  Balashov,  who  accompanied  him, 
had  received  a  report  from  two  provinces  —  Smolensk  and 
Minsk  —  that  there  had  been  gathered  and  burned  ninety-six 
thousand  corpses,  and  that  numerous  more  still  remained  on 
the  ground.  No  wonder  that  various  epidemics  had  spread 
in  those  provinces.  In  1813  the  population  of  the  Smolensk 
province  decreased  by  fifty-seven  thousand,  and  that  of  Tver, 
which  touched  the  war-zone  only  on  its  southern  end,  had  lost 
twelve  thousand.  Similar  losses  were  sustained  by  other  prov- 
inces in  the  vicinity  of  the  war-zone.  Outside  of  the  epidemics, 
the  loss  in  human  life  was  caused  by  direct  consumption  of  the 
war-operations.  During  those  years  about  one  million  men 
and  nearly  three  thousand  militia-men  were  recruited,  which 
constituted  almost  one-third  of  the  able-bodied  population  of 
the  country.  On  the  whole,  in  1813  the  population,  instead 
of  the  normal  increase  of  six  hundred  to  six  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand,  suffered  a  loss  of  two  thousand  seven  hundred  men 
(according  to  the  incomplete  birth-registration  of  that  year), 
and  the  general  number  of  human  lives  lost  during  the  last 
Napoleonic  wars  should  be  put  at  not  less  than  one  million  and 
a  half. 

The  provinces  of  Kovno,  Vitebsk,  Grodno,  Mohilev,  Vol- 
hynia,  Vilna,  Smolensk,  and  Moscow  suffered  most  of  all,  and 
then  the  provinces  of  Kurland,  Pskov,  Tver,  Kaluga.  The 
material  losses  of  the  province  of  Moscow  alone  were  figured 
out  by  the  English  who  subsidised  the  campaign  against  Napo- 
leon and  therefore  carefully  gathered  information  about  condi- 
tions in  Russia,  as  two  hundred  and  seventy  million  rubles.  The 


THE  COST  OF  THE  WAR  169 

provinces  adjacent  to  the  war-zone  had  also  suffered  greatly, 
owing  to  epidemics  and  the  cart-tax.  In  the  province  of  Tver 
that  tax  required  at  times  one  cart  from  every  two  and  a  half 
persons,  i.e.,  an  amount  of  carts  that  did  not  exist  there  at  all. 
The  provinces  of  Novgorod,  Tver,  Vladimir,  and  Yaroslavl 
were  once  ordered  to  contribute  one  hundred  and  forty-seven 
thousand  carts  at  the  fiscal  price  of  four  million  six  hundred 
and  sixty-eight  thousand  rubles,  whereas  the  peasants  had  to 
pay  in  addition  about  nine  million  rubles  more.  This  order 
had  to  be  recalled,  but  only  after  it  had  begun  to  be  carried  out, 
and  the  population  was  already  ruined.  Such  examples  were 
numerous. 

As  early  as  in  April,  1812,  the  Minister  of  Finance,  Guriev, 
proposed  to  raise  provender  and  provisions  for  the  army  through 
requisitions  from  the  population,  who  were  to  receive  notes 
with  a  definite  date  of  payment.  These  so  called  "  obliga- 
tions "  did  not  lower  the  course  of  the  assignations,  being  of  a 
fixed  date.  But  the  Government's  settlements  of  those  notes 
were  so  extended,  in  spite  of  Alexander's  sharp  reprimands  to 
the  Committee  of  Ministers,  that  they  had  not  been  executed 
even  towards  the  end  of  his  reign,  and  the  landowners  who 
were  the  chief  creditors  of  the  Government  on  those  notes 
lost  all  hope  of  recovering  their  money  and  relinquished  their 
claims,  involuntarily  turning  them  thus  into  new  contribu- 
tions. 

The  general  cost  of  the  war  of  1812-15  is  very  difficult  to 
gauge  at  present.  According  to  the  report  of  Barclay  de  Tolly, 
composed  by  Kankrin,  the  fiscal  expenses  were  expressed  in  an 
astonishingly  small  sum  —  one  hundred  fifty-seven  and  a  half 
million  rubles  for  the  four  years.  But  the  enormous  expenses 
of  the  population  itself  are  hardly  estimable.  In  his  secret 
memorandum  Minister  Guriev  moderately  estimated  the  ex- 
penses of  the  people  as  early  as  1812  above  two  hundred  mil- 
lion rubles.  The  upheaval  of  patriotism  caused  by  the  in- 


170  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

vasion  of  the  enemy  was  expressed  in  voluntary  direct  con- 
tributions which  in  1812  exceeded  one  hundred  million  rubles 
and  enabled  the  Government  to  bring  the  campaign  of  1812  to 
an  end  without  special  difficulties.  The  general  sum  of  Rus- 
sia's material  loss  during  those  years  probably  exceeded  one 
billion  rubles. 

The  population  had  borne  those  expenses  without  complaints 
and  even  with  sincere  enthusiasm,  in  spite  of  the  gross  abuses 
by  the  ministerial  and  commissariat-officials.  But  the  paying 
capacity  of  the  population  was  entirely  drained,  and  in  many 
places  the  payment  of  all  taxes  had  ceased  already  in  1815. 
The  treasury  was  then  almost  constantly  empty.  When  in 
1813  Alexander  decided  to  transfer  the  war  abroad  Barclay 
de  Tolly  reported  that  for  the  maintenance  of  the  army  of 
two  hundred  thousand  men  for  the  next  two  months  there 
were  needed  fourteen  and  a  half  million  rubles  in  coin,  whereas 
the  total  amount  of  coin  in  possession  of  the  treasury  at  that 
moment  was  not  more  than  five  and  one-fourth  million  rubles, 
so  that  it  wras  short  of  nine  million.  An  issue  of  assignations 
would  be  of  no  help,  as  there  was  required  only  metal-money; 
a  loan  was  unattainable:  Arakcheiev  wrote  then  to  Count  Nes- 
selrode  about  the  Government's  apprehensions  that  the  course 
of  the  paper  ruble  would  fall  to  ten  copecks. 

Under  such  conditions  the  continuation  of  the  war  with 
Napoleon  was  made  possible  only  through  the  big  subsidies 
of  England. 

To  a  great  extent  Russia  was  saved  from  total  bankruptcy 
owing  to  her  favourable  balance  of  trade,  which  had  been 
established  after  the  tariff  of  1810.  The  exports  considerably 
exceeded  the  imports,  in  spite  of  the  war.  In  1812  the  im- 
portations were  less  than  ninety  million  rubles,  while  the  ex- 
port rose  to  one  hundred  and  fifty  million.  This  was  due  to 
the  alliance  with  England  and  the  unmolested  trade  with  her 
through  Petrograd  and  Arkhangelsk. 


ECONOMIC  CONDITION  OF  RUSSIA          171 

It  is  remarkable  that  in  1812  the  course  of  the  ruble  on  the 
London  Exchange  was  at  its  highest  at  the  moment  of  Na- 
poleon's entry  into  Moscow.  At  the  same  time  the  trade  with 
China  and  Central  Asia  continued  to  develop;  considerable 
quantities  of  cotton  were  imported  from  the  Central  Asiatic 
Khanates.  Minister  Guriev  began  to  work  out  a  plan  for  the 
return  to  a  more  liberal  tariff,  seeing  that  Russian  manufac- 
tures had  been  sufficiently  supported;  his  intention  aroused 
wailing  among  the  Moscow  manufacturers  who  had  just  started 
to  stand  firmly  on  their  feet,  and  their  views  were  upheld  by 
the  Minister  of  Interior,  Kozodavlev,  and  even  by  the  Chan- 
cellor, Count  N.  P.  Rumiantzev,  who  despite  his  fame  as  an 
admirer  of  the  French  and  Napoleon,  considered  the  claims 
of  the  Moscow  manufacturers  just.  Count  Guriev  suffered 
a  fiasco  in  1813:  the  revision  of  the  tariff  was  found  untimely. 

The  rise  of  national  feeling  in  the  years  1812-1815  was 
shown  also  in  the  energetic  activity  of  private  persons  for  sup- 
port of  the  families  that  had  suffered  from  the  war;  in  general 
the  public  had  for  the  first  time  demonstrated  initiative  and 
voluntary  action. 

Of  equal  interest  is  the  rapidity  with  which  Moscow  and 
other  burned  cities  were  rebuilt;  the  Government  gave  for  this 
purpose  some  subsidies,  altogether  about  fifteen  million  rubles. 
The  cities  began  to  revive  at  the  beginning  of  the  twenties, 
but  the  landowners'  estates  could  not  recuperate  so  soon  from 
their  ruination,  and  their  indebtedness  had  assumed  enormous 
dimensions  and  continued  growing  to  the  very  time  of  the 
abolition  of  serfdom. 

The  vigorous  work  that  was  manifested  throughout  Russia 
after  the  war  showed  that  the  nation  had  come  out  of  the 
terrible  calamity  renewed  and  ready  for  further  growth  and 
cultural  development.  High  spirits  were  sustained  also  by  the 
military  successes  that  had  brought  Russia  to  the  peak  of  fame. 
These  together  with  the  reforms  of  the  first  years  of  Alexan- 


172  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

der's  reign  gave  assurance  that  after  the  happy  end  of  the  war 
and  with  the  advent  of  peaceful  times  the  socio-political  forms 
of  the  country  which  required  radical  changes,  especially  in  the 
eyes  of  those  Russians  who  had  been  abroad  and  observed  the 
different  life  there,  would  be  rapidly  improved. 

It  is  obvious  how  important  had  been  the  influence  of  those 
men  on  the  public,  not  only  in  the  capitals  and  large  cities,  but 
even  in  remote  provincial  corners.  The  army-officers  who  had 
returned  from  France  affected  the  nobility,  the  merchants,  and 
the  commoners,  and  this  influence  combined  well  with  the  early 
liberal  tendencies  of  the  Government. 

True,  the  educational  activity  of  the  Government  had  come 
to  a  standstill  after  1805  owing  to  lack  of  funds.  But  the 
progressive  work  of  the  Government  was  later  renewed  in  the 
reforms  of  Speransky,  and  it  appeared  clear  to  the  public  that 
at  the  end  of  the  war  Alexander  would  take  up  again  his  early 
reforms,  enriched  with  experience  and  knowledge. 

It  seemed  that  Alexander's  activity  in  Paris,  and  later  in 
Poland,  gave  good  reasons  for  the  confirmation  of  those  hopes. 
True,  the  sporadic  rumours  about  Alexander's  infatuation  with 
mysticism,  and  the  manifesto  which  he  issued  on  January  I, 
1816,  soon  after  his  return  to  Russia,  would  have  served  as 
warnings  for  those  who  had  been  over-optimistic;  but  mystic 
moods  could  not  alarm  the  progressive  elements  of  that  time, 
when  mysticism  was  common  and  a  considerable  portion  of 
society  belonged  to  various  Masonic  orders  or  had  close  friends 
among  the  Masons.  As  to  the  manifesto  of  January  i,  1816, 
which  was  written  by  Shishkov  back  in  1814  on  the  occasion 
of  the  entry  of  the  allied  armies  into  Paris,  and  contained  many 
loud  phrases  against  the  "  Godless  "  French  and  the  "  abomina- 
ble "  revolutionists,  without  however  attacking  constitutional 
ideas, —  it  had  made  a  very  bad  impression  abroad,  but  passed 
without  special  notice  in  Russia,  and  was  soon  forgotten. 

In  any  case  Alexander  in  1816  was  still  a  sincere  and  con- 


HOPES  FOR  A  CONSTITUTION  173 

vinced  constitutionalist,  and  we  must  observe  that  he  had  real- 
ised his  ideas  in  actual  life  —  by  granting  constitutions  to  Fin- 
land and  Poland,  and  by  helping  France  and  some  secondary 
European  states  to  secure  constitutions. 

Even  his  closest  assistants  were  convinced  then  of  his  inten- 
tion to  give  Russia  a  constitution.5  Among  the  papers  of  Gen- 
eral Kiselev  were  preserved  notes  about  a  detailed  report  that 
he  made  before  Alexander  in  1816  about  the  state  of  affairs  in 
south  Russia.  Kiselev  had  been  requested  to  find  men  fitted 
for  the  new  administrative  work,  but  having  journeyed  through 
the  South  he  discovered  not  so  many  capable  men  as  a  mass  of 
abuses,  which  he  reported  to  Alexander.  After  hearing  the  re- 
port, Alexander  remarked:  "  One  cannot  do  everything  at  once: 
circumstances  have  not  allowed  us  to  take  proper  care  of  internal 
affairs,  but  at  present  we  are  engaged  in  reorganising.  .  .  ." 
Discussing  the  administrative  abuses  in  the  South  the  Emperor 
said :  "  I  know  that  the  majority  of  the  administrative  officials 
should  be  dismissed,  and  you  are  right  in  holding  that  the  evil 
comes  both  from  the  higher  officials  and  from  the  poor  selection 
of  lower  officials.  But  where  can  you  get  them?  I  am  un- 
able to  choose  fifty-two  governors,  and  there  are  needed  thou- 

5  However,  one  of  the  early  co-operators  of  Alexander's  reforms, 
Count  V.  P.  Kochubey,  who  had  held  quite  moderate  views  while  on 
the  famous  Committee,  now  expressed  his  desiderata  with  still  greater 
caution.  After  Alexander's  death  among  his  papers  was  found  a 
memorandum  presented  by  Kochubey  at  the  very  end  of  1814.  Among 
other  things  he  wrote:  "The  Russian  Empire  is  an  autocratic  state, 
and  whether  we  consider  its  dimensions  or  its  geographic  position,  the 
degree  of  its  education  and  many  other  circumstances,  we  must  admit 
that  this  form  of  government  is  the  only  one  that  will  be  proper  for 
Russia  for  many  years;  but  this  form  cannot  prevent  the  Tzar  from 
choosing  all  possible  ways  for  the  best  government,  and  as  it  is  proven 
that  a  monarch,  however  far  seeing  he  may  be,  cannot  alone  embrace 
all  branches  of  the  government,  he  is  obliged  to  seek  firm  state  in- 
stitutions which,  bringing  the  empire  nearer  to  other  best  ordered 
states,  would  present  to  the  subjects  the  advantages  of  a  just,  mild, 
and  enlightened  government.  .  .  ." 


174  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

sands.  .  .  ."  "  The  army,  the  civil  administration,  everything, 
is  not  as  I  would  have  it  —  but  what  can  you  do  ?  You  cannot 
do  everything  at  once ;  there  are  no  assistants.  .  .  ." 

From  that  conversation,  copied  by  Kiselev  with  a  photographic 
exactness,  we  learn  that  Alexander  was  particularly  interested 
in  questions  of  military  reorganisation,  while  he  considered  ques- 
tions of  civil  administration  of  secondary  importance.  For  in- 
stance, when  Kiselev  depicted  the  bacchanalia  of  abuses  in 
Bessarabia,  and  suggested  that  its  whole  administration  must  go, 
and  recommended  that  General  Inzov  be  sent  there,  Alexander 
quickly  remarked  that  he  could  not  sacrifice  such  a  good  general 
for  civil  service. 

In  view  of  his  European  policy  at  that  time,  Alexander's  posi- 
tion was  not  an  easy  one.  In  1816-17  he  set  aside  the  earlier 
proposed  recruitment,  but  at  the  same  time  he  did  not  want  to 
diminish  the  numbers  of  his  standing  army.  When  it  was  re- 
ported to  him  that  the  population  was  grumbling,  since  though 
the  war  was  over  the  military  expenditures  did  not  decrease, 
Alexander  replied  with  irritation  that  he  could  not  maintain 
an  army  smaller  than  those  of  Prussia  and  Austria  combined. 
In  answer  to  the  remark  that  those  states  had  already  dismissed 
part  of  their  armies,  Alexander  said  that  he  also  "  intended  "  to 
do  so.  To  his  generals  who  advised  him  to  decrease  the  army 
Alexander  pointed  out  that  Russia  needed  a  preponderance 
Politlque,  and  that  there  could  be  no  thought  of  diminishing  the 
military  forces.  He  was  greatly  interested,  on  the  other  hand, 
in  the  question  of  contracting  military  expenses  and  improving 
the  status  of  the  soldiers;  he  watched  closely  the  military  re- 
form in  Prussia  after  she  was  obliged  by  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  to 
maintain  not  more  than  forty-two  thousand  men  under  arms. 
As  is  well  known,  General  Scharnhorst  found  a  clever  way  out 
of  the  difficulty;  according  to  his  system  every  Prussian  served 
three  years  in  the  army,  after  which  he  was  registered  in  the 
reserve,  to  be  called  from  time  to  time  for  military  exercises; 


MILITARY  COLONIES  175 

in  this  way  the  population  was  trained  in  a  short  time,  and 
could  easily  be  mobilised  in  case  of  need.  Thus  he  increased 
the  actual  army  several  times.  Alexander  was  greatly  inter- 
ested in  that  idea,  but  he  soon  figured  out  that  it  was  not 
applicable  to  Russia,  in  view  of  her  enormous  territory,  sparse 
population,  and  the  total  absence  of  good  roads,  which  would 
make  a  rapid  mobilisation  impossible.  In  his  constant  preoccu- 
pation with  that  problem  he  came  in  1810  upon  a  French  work 
of  a  certain  Servane,  which  advocated  the  idea  of  military 
colonies  on  the  frontier,  engaged  in  agriculture  and  at  the  same 
time  bearing  service.  The  idea  appealed  to  him  so  much  that 
he  at  once  ordered  P.  M.  Volkonsky  to  translate  the  brochure 
into  Russian,  in  order  that  Arakcheiev,  to  whom  he  decided  to 
entrust  the  matter,  might  become  acquainted  with  it.  Thus 
originated  the  system  of  military  colonies  which  ultimately 
brought  so  much  distress.  The  system  consisted  in  transferring 
certain  territories  from  the  civil  to  the  military  department, 
exempting  them  from  all  taxes  and  dues,  and  obliging  them  in 
lieu  of  taxes  to  complete  and  maintain  definite  military  units. 
The  first  application  of  the  system  was  made  in  i8io-n  in  the 
province  of  Mohilev,  one  of  whose  volosts  was  settled  by  the 
Yeletz  infantry  regiment,  while  the  native  population  was  trans- 
ferred to  New  Russia.  In  order  to  lend  the  colony  at  once  an 
agricultural  character,  a  special  battalion  was  formed  of  the 
married  soldiers  of  the  regiment,  and  their  wives  and  children 
were  arbitrarily  brought  to  them.  These  married  soldiers  were  to 
form  the  basic  population  of  the  volost;  among  their  houses  were 
distributed  the  unmarried  soldiers  who  were  turned  into  farm- 
workers and  received  their  pay  from  the  married  soldiers  in  the 
form  of  complete  maintenance,  like  members  of  their  families. 
Such  was  the  idea  that  attracted  Alexander  in  1810.  The 
first  Mohilev  colony  did  not  succeed,  because  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  of  1812  the  Yeletz  regiment  went  to  the  front,  and  the 
whole  idea  was  smothered  during  the  Napoleonic  wars. 


176  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

But  in  1816  Alexander  decided  to  renew  his  attempts  to 
realise  that  idea.  This  time  the  experiment  was  made  in  the 
province  of  Novgorod  in  which  Arakcheiev  had  an  estate  and 
could  therefore  better  observe  the  course  of  affairs  in  the  colonies. 
An  order  was  given  not  to  transplant  the  native  population,  but 
to  transform  it  directly  into  military  colonists.  A  whole  volost 
was  given  over  to  the  colony,  all  its  peasants  were  declared 
military  colonists,  and  a  regiment  was  distributed  among  their 
homes.  An  incident  helped  the  construction  of  the  colony  after 
a  military  model :  the  central  village  of  the  volost  Vysokoie  had 
burned  down.  Arakcheiev  ordered  the  reconstruction  accord- 
ing to  a  definite  plan.  The  former  inhabitants  were  installed 
in  the  mathematically  symmetrical  farmhouses;  their  beards 
were  shaved  off,  they  were  donned  in  uniforms,  and  were  or- 
dered to  maintain  a  regiment.  Care  was  taken  of  their  material 
well-being;  they  received  cattle,  horses,  and  were  allowed  sub- 
sidies and  privileges.  Among  these  soldier-farmers  were  set- 
tled prescribed  battalions  who  had  become  farm-labourers. 
When  bachelor-soldiers  married  they  received  separate  house- 
holds, but  marriages  required  the  permission  of  the  military  au- 
thorities. All  widows  and  marriageable  girls  were  kept  on 
record,  and  marriages  were  prescribed  by  the  authorities. 

Large  sums  were  spent  to  establish  those  colonies  firmly  and 
in  an  orderly  manner.  The  life  of  the  colonists  was  chained 
by  a  deadening,  pedantic,  military  system ;  every  household  was 
under  the  incessant  supervision  of  the  authorities;  a  careless 
colonist  might  lose  his  household  and  even  be  banished  from  the 
volost.  Not  only  the  men  were  subject  to  military  discipline, 
but  even  women ;  at  a  certain  age  the  children  were  taken  away 
and  schooled  as  cantonists  (soldiers'  children).  In  spite  of 
material  advantages  the  population  hated  the  system,  for  it  was 
bondage,  worse  than  serfdom-bondage. 

One  must  say  that  Arakcheiev  himself  was  honest  in  his 
transactions,  and  the  enormous  sums  that  had  passed  through 


ARAKCHEIEV  177 

his  hands  were  properly  employed ;  he  strictly  watched  his  sub- 
ordinates. I  must  warn  the  reader  that  there  does  not  exist 
an  impartial  biography  of  Arakcheiev;  his  role  and  significance 
are  depicted  only  externally,  and  the  gloomy  legends  that  have 
gathered  around  his  ominous  name  are  hardly  just.  Too  much 
hatred,  too  many  bloody  memories  are  connected  with  that 
name.  Besides,  it  has  been  convenient  to  blame  Arakcheiev  for 
everything  that  was  done  by  the  will  of  Alexander.  This  was 
partly  due  to  the  censorship  conditions  under  which,  until  re- 
cently, historical  works  have  been  written  in  Russia.  Many  as- 
cribe to  Arakcheiev  a  pernicious  influence  on  Alexander,  and 
endeavour  to  explain  by  that  influence  the  dark  features  of  the 
last  years  of  his  reign;  they  present  Arakcheiev  not  only  as  a 
friend  of  the  Tzar,  but  as  the  only  friend  towards  whom  Alex- 
ander had  never  changed.  In  fact  Arakcheiev  was  not  so  much 
Alexander's  friend,  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word,  as  a  faithful 
slave,  regardless  of  whether  his  master  was  Paul  or  Alexander. 
He  was  not  stupid,  but  uncultured ;  a  man  of  action,  diligent, 
very  honest  —  he  did  not  steal,  a  rare  virtue  at  that  time,  and 
always  tried  to  save  a  copeck  for  his  master.  With  all  his 
dog-like  devotion  —  even  his  fatherland  appeared  to  him  as  a 
trifle  in  comparison  with  the  interests  of  his  master  —  he  had, 
nevertheless,  a  sense  of  honour  and  ambition.  He  was  merci- 
less, unhuman  in  his  readiness  to  obey  orders ;  but  he  also  could 
foretell  his  master's  desires.  He  was  vainglorious,  but  the  chief 
object  of  his  ambition  was  to  enjoy  the  unlimited  confidence  of 
his  master.  Of  course  such  a  servant  is  a  real  treasure  for  an 
autocrat,  especially  one  like  Alexander  who,  having  grown  tired 
of  the  tribulations  of  his  reign,  was  in  need  of  a  faithful  man 
capable  of  looking  at  things  with  the  eyes  of  his  master.  But 
we  can  hardly  call  Arakcheiev  a  friend  of  Alexander,  and  still 
less  may  we  ascribe  to  him  a  moral  and  political  influence  on 
the  latter.  He  was  but  the  executive  of  the  Tzar's  policy,  and 
in  regard  to  the  military  colonies  he  asserted  more  than  once  that 


178  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

it  was  not  his  idea,  that  he  opposed  them  in  the  beginning,  but 
since  he  had  undertaken  the  work  he  carried  it  out  conscien- 
tiously, to  the  end. 

We  must  say  that  the  military  colonies  grew  and  developed 
with  great  rapidity,  so  that  by  1825  their  Corpus  consisted  of 
ninety  battalions  of  infantry  in  the  province  of  Novgorod  and 
of  thirty-six  battalions  of  infantry  and  two  hundred  and  forty- 
nine  cavalry-squadrons  in  the  Little-Russian  colonies.  The 
historian  Schilder  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  work  of 
the  military  colonies  had  been  carried  on  in  secret,  without  the 
interference  of  the  State  Council,  i.e.,  against  the  legal  order. 
Materially  the  undertaking  was  apparently  a  success;  the  popu- 
lation seemed  to  thrive,  the  colonies  were  self-sustaining  and 
did  not  buy  anything  from  the  outside  for  the  provisioning  and 
clothing  of  their  members.  Owing  to  this  Arakcheiev  succeeded 
in  saving  up  a  reserved  capital  of  nearly  fifty  million  rubles 
(Capital  of  Military  Colonies),  and  he  liked  to  boast  of  his 
orderly  management.  It  is  noteworthy  that  many  authoritative 
and  relatively  independent  men  of  the  time  gave  quite  flatter- 
ing reports  about  the  colonies.  Such  were  the  opinions  of  Count 
Kochubey  after  his  personal  inspection,  of  the  State  Comptroller, 
Baron  Kampfenhausen,  and  even  of  Speransky,  who  after  his 
recall  from  Siberia  visited  the  Novgorod  colonies,  and  finally, 
of  Karamzin.  In  spite  of  strict  supervision,  however,  there  were 
later  discovered  flagrant  abuses  in  some  colonies.  But  what 
chiefly  undermined  their  importance  from  the  economic  point 
of  view,  was  the  account  of  the  fiscal  expenditures  on  that  un- 
dertaking. In  the  very  first  years  nearly  one  million  rubles  were 
spent,  and  one  must  besides  take  into  consideration  the  exemp- 
tion of  the  colonists  from  taxes.  The  very  experiment  of  that 
peculiar  type  of  state-Socialism  deserves  a  serious,  exhaustive 
study;  such  a  study  has  not  been  made  as  yet.  Most  of  the 
information  we  find  in  literature  concerns  the  uprisings  that  took 
place  in  the  colonies  at  various  times.  Among  the  people,  at 


THE  COMMITTEE  OF  MINISTERS  179 

any  rate,  there  has  remained  a  gloomy  memory  of  that  mon- 
strous attempt  to  place  a  considerable  portion  of  the  country 
under  military  bondage. 

Alexander's  chief  care  after  the  Napoleonic  wars  consisted  in 
the  reorganisation  of  the  army  by  the  aid  of  the  colonies-system. 
In  spite  of  his  words  to  Kiselev  in  1816,  which  he  had  probably 
repeated  to  many  persons,  about  his  intention  to  undertake  in- 
ternal reforms,  those  words  were  fulfilled,  if  at  all,  by  fits  and 
starts,  and  on  an  insignificant  scale. 

Since  the  Napoleonic  wars  all  the  higher  administration  and 
even  the  higher  police  were  concentrated  in  the  Committee  of 
Ministers  which,  according  to  Alexander's  repeated  orders,  had 
to  act  independently  in  the  absence  of  the  Tzar,  and  could  carry 
through  the  most  important  measures  without  the  monarch's 
sanction,  and  with  only  the  confirmation  of  the  president  of  the 
Committee.  For  the  post  of  president  N.  I.  Saltykov  was  ap- 
pointed; he  whom  Catherine  had  chosen  as  the  chief  supervisor 
of  Alexander's  education.  Now  he  was  a  quite  infirm  old  man, 
and  the  actual  ruler  was  the  director  of  the  Committee,  Mol- 
chanov. 

After  the  war  cases  of  gross  thievery  were  discovered,  mainly 
in  the  commissariat,  not  so  much  in  the  army  where  at  the  head 
of  this  department  stood  Kankrin,  a  man  of  energy  and  sterling 
honesty,  as  in  the  Ministry  of  War  and  in  the  Committee  of 
Ministers.  Alexander,  who  had  been  long  dissatisfied  with  the 
disorder  and  indolence  of  the  Committee,  became  indignant  at 
the  revelation  of  spoliations,  and  ordered  a  prosecution  of  Mol- 
chanov  and  the  whole  Ministry  of  War  with  Prince  Gorchakov 
at  the  head.  At  the  same  time  he  appointed,  as  an  aid  to  Salty- 
kov, Arakcheiev,  who  was  to  report  to  him  personally  on  the  af- 
fairs of  the  Committee.  He  remained  in  this  position  even 
when  after  the  death  of  Saltykov,  Lopukhin,  a  person  far  from 
senile,  was  appointed  president  of  the  Committee.  Thus  Arak- 
cheiev had  become  something  like  a  prime  minister,  although  he 


i8o  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

had  no  portfolio.  A  strange  order  was  established :  Alexander 
no  longer  received  the  ministers  with  their  reports,  and  never 
attended  the  sessions  of  the  Committee.  Most  of  his  time  he 
spent  in  travels  through  Russia  or  in  attending  international 
congresses  abroad.  All  the  matters  that  required  the  Em- 
peror's sanction  were  brought  by  the  ministers  before  the  Com- 
mittee, and  the  brief  journal  of  the  Committee  with  the  con- 
cluding resolutions  of  Arakcheiev  were  presented  to  Alexander. 
Almost  without  exception  the  Tzar  agreed  with  all  of  Arak- 
cheiev's  resolutions.  This  circumstance  made  Arakcheiev  ap- 
pear a  powerful  favourite  who  was  responsible  for  all  the 
obscurantist  measures  and  repressions  of  the  age.  But  a  close 
study  of  the  mass  of  those  documents  (e.g.,  in  the  Historical 
Review  of  the  Activity  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers,  by  Sere- 
donin)  convinces  us  that  the  greater  part  of  them  were  of  second- 
ary importance,  and  that  Arakcheiev's  resolutions  were  not  always 
cruel  or  repressive ;  we  can  rather  discover  in  them  a  wide-awake 
watchfulness  for  the  conservation  of  the  fiscal  coffers  and  for 
the  strict  fulfilment  of  the  Emperor's  ideas.  Among  Arak- 
cheiev's resolutions  were  even  such  that  recommended  quite  just 
decisions,  often  more  human  than  those  of  the  Committee.  He 
always  tried  to  decide  in  a  way  which  would  correspond  to  Alex- 
ander's mood.  It  is  natural  that  under  such  conditions  Alex- 
ander trusted  the  man  who  relieved  him  from  such  affairs  as 
no  longer  interested  him,  his  mind  being  occupied  with  other 
matters.  On  this  chiefly  was  based  Arakcheiev's  reputation  as 
a  man  who  had  had  an  unusual  influence  on  Alexander. 

Besides  these  positions  Arakcheiev  was  chairman  of  the  special 
committee  for  the  construction  of  roads,  and  there  he  also  dem- 
onstrated great  activity  and  strict  watchfulness,  though  the 
results  were  not  brilliant.  Then  he  was  chairman  of  the  de- 
partment of  military  affairs  at  the  State  Council  from  the 
moment  of  its  establishment  (1810),  resigning  at  that  time  his 
post  of  Minister  of  War. 


CHAPTER  XI 

AFTER  the  removal  of  Speransky  and  the  resignation  of 
the  president  of  the  Department  of  State-Economy, 
Mordvinov,  in  1812,  the  State  Council  remained  almost 
idle  during  the  Napoleonic  wars;  as  we  know,  the  Committee 
of  Ministers  was  the  only  ruling  body.  In  the  absence  of  any 
other  activity  the  State  Council  occupied  itself  with  the  discussion 
of  Speransky 's  plan  concerning  the  new  civil  and  criminal  code, 
his  least  successful  work,  as  he  later  himself  admitted.  The 
code  was  based  on  French  models,  without  sufficient  investigation 
of  the  history  of  Russian  legislation  and  of  Russian  needs.  After 
Speransky's  exile  the  State  Council  felt  freer  in  criticising  his 
project;  they  rejected  point  after  point,  and  finally  gave  the 
matter  over  to  a  special  committee  where  it  remained  till  the 
reign  of  Nicolas  I,  when  it  again  fell  into  the  hands  of  Speransky. 
In  1816  Admiral  Mordvinov  was  once  more  invited  to  the 
post  of  president  of  the  Department  of  State-Economy,1  and  only 
then  the  regular  work  of  the  State  Council,  at  least  in  the  matter 
of  state-budgets,  began.  Mordvinov  immediately  after  his  reap- 
pointment  harshly  criticised  the  work  of  the  Minister  of  Finance, 
Guriev,  especially  his  financial  reports,  which  lacked  clearness  and 
abounded  in  befogging  accounts.  About  the  same  time  he  pre- 
sented to  the  State  Council  his  opinion  concerning  the  economic 
condition  of  the  country,  with  a  detailed  criticism  of  the  financial 
system  and  suggestions  for  the  improvements.  He  severely  at- 
tacked the  immoderate  issues  of  assignations  which  the  Com- 
mittee of  Ministers  put  through  secretly  during  the  war,  an  act 

1At  the  same  time  Speransky  was  recalled  and  appointed  governor 
of  the  province  of  Pezna. 

181 


182  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

absolutely  against  the  law;  he  further  appealed  for  the  need  of 
strict  economy  in  every  phase  of  national  life,  pointing  out  that 
the  whole  country  was  dissatisfied  with  the  deplorable  state  of 
finances,  the  high  cost  of  living,  and  general  impoverishment. 
Mordvinov  recommended  measures  analogous  to  those  of  Sper- 
ansky  in  1810. 

Under  the  pressure  of  those  attacks  Guriev  carried  through  the 
State  Council  a  series  of  projects,  quite  substantial,  externally  at 
least,  about  the  renewal  of  the  work  of  the  commission  for  the 
extinguishing  of  state-debts,  about  the  establishment  of  a  special 
council  for  credit  transactions  with  the  participation  of  represen- 
tatives of  the  merchant-class,  and  about  the  founding  of  a  com- 
mercial bank.  For  the  first  mentioned  committee  were  assigned 
big  sums,  and  in  1817  for  the  first  time  under  Alexander,  they 
burned  assignations  for  the  sum  of  thirty-eight  million  rubles. 
But  the  amount  of  the  remaining  assignations  was  still  eight 
hundred  million  rubles,  and  the  total  state-debt  exceeded  one  bil- 
lion —  an  enormous  sum  for  that  time.  Alongside  with  the  pay- 
ment of  debts  the  Ministry  of  Finance  abolished  in  1817  private 
beverage-contracts,  supplanting  them  with  a  state-monopoly,  but 
this  resulted  only  in  the  development  of  unusual  thievery  among 
the  officials  of  that  department.  At  the  same  time  the  free-port 
system  was  renewed  for  Odessa,  and  Berd  was  granted  the  privi- 
lege of  establishing  the  first  steam-ship  line  in  Russia. 

All  these  measures  impressed  the  public  favourably,  although 
the  cost  of  living  remained  very  high  owing  to  the  low  course 
of  the  paper-ruble.  This  last  circumstance  depended  to  a  large 
degree  upon  the  liberal  changes  in  the  tariff,  that  were  made  in 
1816,  and  especially  in  1819.  I  have  mentioned  that  the  Min- 
ister of  Finance  had  intended  to  change  the  tariff  in  1813,  but 
the  Moscow  merchants  successfully  opposed  it.  At  the  Vienna 
Congress  Alexander  gave  promises  to  representatives  of  various 
Powers  to  mitigate  or  abolish  tariff-restrictions  in  Russia.  The 
first  mitigating  measures  were  carried  through  in  1816.  The 


THE  TARIFF  INDUSTRY  183 

new  tariff  removed  all  prohibitions  from  foreign  trade,  and  low- 
ered many  customs  dues,  not  so  much  on  manufactured  goods  as 
on  raw  material  not  found  in  Russia;  thus  the  tariff  could  not 
shake  the  position  of  Russian  industry,  but  it  undoubtedly  affected 
the  balance  of  trade,  since  imports  increased  while  exports  re- 
mained stationary.  This  circumstance  kept  the  course  of  the 
paper-money  low.  In  1819  new  serious  changes  were  made  in 
the  tariff,  lowering  customs  dues  on  some  manufactured  com- 
modities, which  caused  many  Russian  factories  to  reduce  or  to 
discontinue  their  activity. 

I  have  already  mentioned  that  until  the  nineteenth  century 
the  Russian  manufacturing  industry  had  satisfied  mainly  fiscal 
needs,  and  most  of  the  factories  produced  either  iron  and  arms, 
or  cloth  and  linen  for  the  army  and  navy.  The  Possessional 
cloth-factories  were  not  allowed  to  sell  to  private  persons,  and  all 
their  work  was  limited  to  supplying  the  army.  Alexander's  gov- 
ernment hesitated  a  long  time  about  removing  that  restriction, 
in  view  of  the  growing  needs  of  the  army,  but  in  1816  the  fac- 
tories were  freed  from  that  burden,  and  the  results  proved  very 
favourable  for  the  development  of  industry. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  cotton-mills 
began  to  develop.  Before  the  Continental  System  Russia  had 
imported  thread  from  England,  but  upon  its  installation  cotton- 
thread  was  made  in  Russia  from  Central-Asiatic  cotton.  The 
cotton-mills  appeared  to  be  dangerous  competitors  for  the  linen- 
and  canvas-mills;  back  in  1818  the  learned  statistician,  K.  I. 
Arseniev,  considered  as  the  most  profitable  industry  for  Russia 
the  manufacture  of  flax  and  hemp,  i.e.,  of  linen  and  canvas, 
which  had  been  largely  exported  to  England  for  the  needs  of 
her  fleet. 

The  tariff  of  1819  aroused  the  vehement  opposition  of  the 
manufacturers,  and  they  succeeded  in  bringing  forth  in  1822  a 
new  protectionist  tariff  which  established  for  a  long  time  the 
protectionist  principle  in  the  state  legislation. 


184  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

During  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  iron  indus- 
try remained  undeveloped ;  investigators  explain  it  by  the  forced 
labour  in  the  Possessional  factories  where  the  bonded  workers 
could  not  be  very  productive;  another  circumstance  must  be 
added  —  the  lack  of  good  ways  of  communication:  the  trans- 
portation of  iron  from  the  Ural  Mountains  was  then  costlier  and 
more  difficult  than  from  abroad.  Below  are  interesting  figures 
about  the  state  of  industry  during  the  reign  of  Alexander,  worked 
out  by  Professor  Tugan-Baranovsky. 

In  1 804  the  number  of  factories  was  two  thousand  four  hun- 
dred and  twenty-three;  in  1825  —  five  thousand  two  hundred 
and  sixty-one.  The  number  of  workers  in  1 804  was  ninety-five 
thousand  two  hundred  and  two ;  of  them  forty-five  thousand  six 
hundred  and  twenty-five  (48  per  cent.)  were  free  workingmen, 
not  bonded  and  not  Possessional.  In  1825  there  were  two  hun- 
dred and  ten  thousand  five  hundred  and  sixty-eight  workers, 
among  them  one  hundred  and  fourteen  thousand  five  hundred 
and  fifteen  (54  per  cent.)  free  workingmen.  The  increase  in 
the  number  of  free  workers  shows  that  there  existed  a  tendency 
toward  free  hired  labour  among  the  manufacturers,  a  circum- 
stance that  had  played  a  not  unimportant  role  in  undermining 
the  bondage-institution  by  proving  it  detrimental  to  the  interests 
of  Russian  industry. 

With  the  return  of  society  to  peaceful  occupations  the  at- 
tempts to  solve  the  peasant-question  were  renewed.  In  1816 
the  question  was  definitely  settled  in  the  Ostsee  provinces,  very 
disadvantageously  for  the  peasants.  In  1804-5  the  conditions 
had  been  much  more  favourable  for  them,  as  the  landowners 
were  restricted  in  their  power  over  the  peasants'  property  and  of 
raising  their  dues.  The  Ostsee  nobility  were  greatly  dissatisfied 
with  the  laws  of  1804  and  1805,  tried  to  hinder  the  material- 
isation of  those  laws,  and  in  1811  the  Estland  nobles  presented 
a  new  project  in  which  they  proposed  to  free  the  peasants  from 
bondage  altogether,  but  to  deprive  them  also  of  their  land.  The 


THE  PEASANT  QUESTION  185 

Government  took  the  bait.  After  the  war  Alexander  signed  the 
law  for  the  abolition  of  serfdom  in  the  government  of  Estland 
( 1816) ;  all  the  land  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  nobles.  The 
peasants  became  personally  free,  but  were  forced  to  become  the 
economic  slaves  of  their  landowners.  In  1817  a  similar  law  was 
decreed  for  Kurland,  and  in  1819  for  Lifland. 

The  results  greatly  tempted  the  nobles  of  certain  provinces  to 
free  their  peasants  on  the  same  basis.  Fortunately  the  majority 
of  the  landowners  had  not  been  prepared  for  such  reasoning; 
in  some  places  (as  in  the  province  of  Penza)  the  bondage-system 
was  the  most  convenient  for  the  exploitation  of  the  estates,  and 
the  nobles  dreaded  the  rumours  about  innovations. 

The  Government  continued  to  vacillate  on  the  peasant-ques- 
tion. For  instance,  Alexander  gave  his  own  money  for  the 
French  publication  of  Academic  Storch's  course  of  political 
economy,  which  he  read  to  the  Grand  Dukes,  and  in  which  was 
decisively  condemned  any  forced  labour,  in  particular  the  bond- 
age system  in  Russia.  But  when  Storch  intended  to  issue  his 
work  in  Russian,  the  censor  forbade  it.  At  the  same  time  the 
learned  Professor  of  the  university  of  Kharkov,  Schad,  who  was 
recommended  to  Uvarov  by  Goethe  and  Schiller,  published  in 
Latin  a  book  in  which  he  expressed  views  similar  to  those  of 
Storch;  for  this  he  was  banished  from  Russia.  In  the  same 
year  (1816)  was  issued  a  very  intelligent  though  reservedly 
written  book  by  Gribovsky  on  the  position  of  the  landowners' 
peasants ;  the  book  was  dedicated  to  Arakcheiev,  and  passed  the 
censor  safely. 

The  most  popular  magazine  of  the  time,  The  Spirit  of  Jour- 
nals, had  often  discussed  the  question  of  liberating  the  peasants, 
and  sharply  opposed  their  liberation  without  land.  But  when 
that  magazine  printed  in  1818  the  speech  of  the  Governor- 
General  of  Little  Russia,  Prince  Riepnin,  in  which  he  urged 
the  nobles  of  the  provinces  of  Poltava  and  Chernigov  to  give 
their  peasants  the  same  conditions  that  had  been  proposed  for 


i86  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

the  Ostsee  region  in  1804,  the  speech  aroused  considerable  in- 
dignation, and  the  editor  was  reprimanded. 

Alexander  himself  undoubtedly  continued  to  think  about 
peasant-reform.  When  he  received  through  Miloradovich  Push- 
kin's poem,  The  Village,  he  ordered  Pushkin  thanked  for  dis- 
seminating noble  feelings  and  views,  but  the  censor  again  with- 
out ceremonies  forbade  its  publication.  Alexander  was  inter- 
ested in  the  memorandum  of  N.  I.  Turgeniev  about  rational 
methods  for  peasant-reform;  he  advocated  their  liberation  with 
land.  Another  practical  plan  for  the  gradual  extinction  of 
serfdom  was  offered  by  Kankrin,  who  as  Intendant-General  of 
the  army  had  observed  the  hard  conditions  of  the  peasants  during 
his  trips  through  various  provinces;  Kankrin  was  also  a  learned 
economist,  and  he  prefaced  his  memorandum  with  a  review  of 
the  liberation  of  the  serfs  in  Western  Europe.  It  is  possible 
that  the  last  memorandum  induced  Alexander  in  1818  to  re- 
quest Arakcheiev  for  a  project  concerning  the  gradual  liberation 
of  the  peasants;  Alexander  required  that  the  project  should  not 
include  "  any  measures  oppressive  for  the  landowners,  and  par- 
ticularly that  those  measures  should  not  appear  forced  by  the 
Government."  Arakcheiev  fulfilled  his  order  within  those 
limits.  He  proposed  a  simple  measure:  to  spend  five  million 
rubles  yearly  for  the  redemption  of  estates  from  those  owners 
who  would  be  willing  to  sell  them;  the  peasants  were  to  get 
two  desiatins  2  of  land  per  person.  Of  course  Arakcheiev  un- 
derstood that  this  was  not  enough,  but  it  was  his  intention  to 
allow  the  peasants  an  incomplete  security  in  order  to  secure 
thereby  hired  labour  for  the  landowners. 

There  had  been  many  unofficial  attempts  to  accelerate  the 
solution  of  the  peasant-problem.  It  is  worth  noting  an  attempt 
to  form  an  all-Russian  union  of  landowners  for  the  liquidation 
of  serfdom ;  among  the  initiators  were  Count  M.  S.  Vorontzov, 
Prince  Vassilchikov,  the  brothers  A.  I.  and  N.  I.  Turgeniev. 

2  A  desiatin  equals  2.7  acres. —  TR. 


SYMPTOMS  OF  REACTION  187 

Alexander  received  the  founders  of  the  union  very  dryly,  and 
remarked  that  there  was  no  use  in  establishing  an  all-Russian 
undertaking;  let  the  landowners  act  individually  on  their  own 
estates,  but  the  general  treatment  of  the  question  belonged  to 
the  autocracy.  In  the  official  spheres  there  reigned  a  marked 
reactionary  attitude  towards  the  peasant-question;  it  had  been 
manifested  in  the  sessions  of  the  State  Council,  of  the  Free 
Economic  Society,  and  in  the  utterings  of  such  liberals  as  Ad- 
miral Mordvinov. 

The  symptoms  of  the  growing  reactionary  mood  after  the 
Napoleonic  wars  appeared  first  of  all  in  the  activity  of  the 
Ministry  of  Education. 

The  impulse  given  in  the  years  1803-1804  had  been  strong 
and  fruitful.  In  1804  the  Government  opened  five  new  uni- 
versities in  the  country  where  there  had  been  only  one  university 
and  almost  no  primary  schools.  The  aim  of  the  universities 
was  not  only  to  give  their  students  an  advanced  education,  but 
also  to  care  for  the  general  education  in  the  districts  under  their 
supervision.  The  university  Councils  enjoyed  considerable  au- 
tonomy, and  they  successfully  carried  on  the  work  of  organising 
adequate  school  systems,  and  choosing  the  right  personnel.  The 
pedagogical  personnel  was  then  quite  high,  chiefly  owing  to  the 
invitation  of  foreign  professors  (about  sixty),  although  they 
had  to  lecture  in  Latin,  French,  or  German;  only  half  of  the 
professors  lectured  in  Russian. 

In  view  of  lack  of  funds  the  number  of  schools  did  not  in- 
crease considerably  after  1805,  but  they  continued  to  improve 
qualitatively.  The  development  of  schools  was  enhanced  by 
abundant  private  contributions.  Such  institutions  as  the  Riche- 
lieu Lyceum  in  Odessa,  later  transformed  into  a  university,  or 
the  Lazarev  Institute  for  Oriental  Languages  in  Moscow,  were 
founded  on  private  capital.  The  state  founded  in  those  years 
the  Lyceum  in  Tzarskoie-Selo,  which  has  played  an  important 
role  in  the  history  of  Russian  literature  and  education.  That 


i88  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

Lyceum  was  established  as  a  counter-balance  to  the  prevailing 
system  among  the  nobles  of  that  time  to  give  their  children  a  do- 
mestic education  with  the  aid  of  private  teachers,  mostly  French 
emigrants,  among  whom  there  had  been  Jesuits  carrying  on  an 
active  propaganda  for  Catholicism.  The  Government  tried  to 
prevent  that  influence  by  requiring  the  teachers  to  hold  examina- 
tions and  by  founding  the  Lyceum  as  a  rival  to  private  pensions. 

In  the  provincial  schools  the  body  of  pupils  was  quite  demo- 
cratic. The  nobles,  accustomed  to  use  the  services  of  foreign 
tutors,  did  not  favour  the  state-schools,  and  therefore  were 
able  to  accept  into  their  schools  commoners'  children,  and  even 
some  of  peasant  origin,  which  was  against  the  law.  In  fact  the 
reluctance  of  the  nobles  to  make  use  of  the  state-schools,  which 
greatly  distressed  the  Ministry  of  Education,  played  perhaps  a 
beneficial  role  in  spreading  education  among  the  lower  classes. 

The  further  free  development  of  education  was  impeded  by 
the  infection  of  the  Ministry  of  Education  with  mystic  ten- 
dencies. Among  the  public  the  mystic  inclination  was  mani- 
fested in  infatuation  with  Freemasonry.  But  in  the  govern- 
mental spheres  those  tendencies  were  expressed  in  a  different 
form,  namely  in  the  energetic  activity  after  the  war  of  the 
Biblical  Society,  whose  development  was  largely  due  to  Alex- 
ander's sympathy  with  the  views  of  that  quaint  institution. 

The  Bible  Society  was  founded  in  England  in  1804,  and  its 
chief  aim  was  the  translation  of  the  Bible  into  all  languages,  and 
its  sale  at  a  very  low  price,  which  was  possible  owing  to  the 
lavish  contributions  given  for  the  purpose.  A  branch  of  the 
Society  was  opened  in  Russia  in  1812,  and  its  head  soon  became 
the  Super-Procurator  of  the  Synod,  Prince  A.  N.  Golitzin,  a 
boyhood  friend  of  Alexander,  at  first  a  free  thinker,  but  later 
a  believing  mystic  of  approximately  the  same  nature  as  Alexander 
had  been  in  the  epoch  of  the  Holy  Alliance.  Like  Alexander, 
Golitzin  was  impressed  with  the  Baroness  Kriidener  and  with 
her  exalted  dim  mysticism,  with  the  Quakers,  with  the  Jesuit 


THE  BIBLE  SOCIETY  189 

Joseph  de  Maistre,  and  with  Russian  "  saints  "  and  ascetics  of 
that  time.  When  Golitzin  became  the  head  of  the  Bible  Society 
the  governors  of  the  provinces  hastened  to  establish  such  societies 
throughout  Russia.  Golitzin  attracted  to  the  Society  the  heads 
of  the  Orthodox  church,  and  when  a  translation  of  the  Bible 
into  Russian  was  undertaken  its  editor  became  Bishop  Filaret, 
subsequently  the  famous  Metropolitan  of  Moscow.  The  aims 
of  the  Society,  modest  and  not  reactionary  in  themselves,  had 
acquired  a  different  aspect  in  Russia,  spreading  ideas  of  nebu- 
lous mysticism  and  hypocrisy,  particularly  among  the  officials. 
However,  the  spread  of  branches  over  the  country,  especially 
in  remote  districts,  far  from  the  direct  supervision  of  the  centre, 
had  some  beneficial  results,  since  in  their  endeavour  to  popularise 
the  Scripture  the  branches  were  inevitably  confronted  with  the 
problem  of  preliminary  spread  of  education.  The  idea  of  the 
need  of  popular  education  for  the  understanding  of  the  Bible, 
originated  in  the  provincial  branches,  had  come  to  be  shared  by 
Golitzin,  who  decided  to  establish  a  net  of  primary  schools  and 
almost  succeeded  in  getting  the  Government's  assignment  of 
two  million  rubles  a  year  for  the  purpose,  a  sum  that  nearly 
equalled  the  whole  budget  of  the  Ministry  of  Education.  But 
soon  Golitzin  was  appointed  to  replace  the  Minister  of  Edu- 
cation, Count  A.  K.  Razumovsky,  and  one  year  after  the  Min- 
istry of  Education  was  merged  with  the  Ministry  of  Public 
Worship,  according  to  the  project  of  the  Prince.8  Golitzin  sur- 
rounded himself  with  desirable  members  of  the  Chief  Manage- 
ment of  Schools,  and  added  to  them  a  Scholastic  Committee, 
into  which  entered  such  persons  as  the  famous  Sturdza,  the 
author  of  the  pamphlet  against  the  German  universities  that 

8  In  the  manifesto  of  October  24,  1817,  about  the  establishment  of  the 
new  Ministry,  was  said: 

"  Desiring  to  have  Christian  piety  as  the  permanent  basis  of  true 
enlightenment,  we  have  deemed  it  useful  to  unite  the  work  of  educa- 
tion with  the  work  of  all  creeds  into  one  department  under  the  name 
of  the  Ministry  of  Public  Worship  and  Popular  education." 


190  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

served  as  a  signal  for  their  persecution  in  1819.  Alongside 
with  Sturdza  there  appeared  such  hypocrites  and  bigots  as 
Magnitzky  and  Runich,  who  became  District  Curators  and 
completely  smashed  the  educational  system  that  had  recently 
been  introduced  with  the  aid  of  foreign  professors.  Soon  the 
obscurantist  tendencies  were  enhanced  by  the  reaction  in  Ger- 
many, that  took  place  after  the  assassination  of  Kotzebue  by 
the  student  Sand,  which  with  the  influence  of  Metternich  had 
deeply  impressed  Alexander.  We  must  say,  however,  that 
Magnitzky 's  activity  in  Kazan  had  preceded  the  measures  of  the 
German  reactionaries.* 

Magnitzky  had  been  one  of  Speransky's  assistants  in  the 
Law  Committee,  and  together  with  him  suffered  banishment  as 
a  dangerous  person  in  1812,  but  upon  his  return  from  Siberia 
in  1816  and  appointment  as  governor  of  Simbirsk  he  soon 
showed  himself  as  a  thorough  reactionary,  Mystic,  and  hypo- 
crite. In  1819  as  a  member  of  the  Chief  Management  of 
Schools  he  was  appointed  inspector,  and  then  Curator  of  the 
school-district  of  Kazan.  Upon  his  demand  eleven  out  of  the 
twenty-odd  professors  were  dismissed,  and  he  proceeded  to 
reorganise  the  whole  state  of  the  university  of  Kazan,  interfer- 
ing with  the  programme  of  every  course  and  putting  forth  abso- 
lutely impossible  demands.  For  instance,  the  course  of  political 
economy  had  to  be  constructed  on  the  fundamental  teachings 
of  the  Scripture;  the  students  were  transformed  into  hali-can- 
tonists  (pupils  of  Arakcheiev's  military  schools.  Tr.),  half- 
novices:  they  were  forced  to  march,  to  read  and  sing  prayers  in 

4  In  fact  the  first  attempts  of  the  Russian  reactionaries  to  turn  the 
tendency  of  the  Ministry  of  Education  in  the  direction  of  obscurantism 
had  been  made  even  in  the  time  of  the  Ministry  of  Count  Razumovsky. 
The  famous  Catholic  clerical,  Count  Joseph  de  Maistre  (the  former 
minister  from  Sardinia,  who  lived  then  in  Petrograd  as  a  private 
person),  made  great  efforts  in  i8io-n  to  influence  Razumovsky  and 
Golitzin  (then  the  Super-Procurator  of  the  Synod).  In  the  same 
reactionary  spirit  though  less  cleverly  and  less  audaciously,  acted  the 
Moscow  Curator,  P.  I.  Golenishchev-Kutuzov  (1810-1813). 


THE  UNIVERSITIES  191 

chorus;  those  who  disobeyed  were  put  in  cells  and  wore  plates 
with  the  inscription  "  Sinner,"  after  which  they  had  to  do 
penance.  Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  in  Kazan,  but  through- 
out Russia  there  was  marked  a  sharp  reaction  in  educational 
institutions,  especially  in  the  Scholastic  Committee,  which  was 
instructed  by  Sturdza  to  revise  all  text-books  and  inspect  the 
entire  pedagogical  personnel.  Among  the  exempted  books  was 
"  Common  Moral,  or  a  Book  about  the  Duties  of  Man,"  which 
appeared  in  1783  and  ran  through  eleven  editions;  its  author- 
ship has  been  ascribed  to  Catherine.  Later  even  such  a  retro- 
grade as  Shishkov,  when  he  became  Minister  of  Education,  inter- 
ceded for  the  rehabilitation  of  that  book.  Even  most  innocent 
text-books  were  put  under  suspicion. 

After  the  University  of  Kazan  came  the  turn  of  Kharkov. 
There  the  reoganisation  took  place  after  the  same  manner  by 
the  Curator  Karnieev,  although  on  a  smaller  scale:  one  of  the 
best  Russian  professors,  the  mathematician  Osipovsky,  was  dis- 
charged, and  Professor  Schad,  as  mentioned,  was  banished 
abroad ;  the  latter  was  removed  as  a  follower  of  a  dangerous 
philosophical  doctrine  (he  was  a  Schellingian),  and  for  his 
opposition  to  serfdom. 

This  reaction,  however,  did  not  at  once  affect  all  educational 
districts;  the  district  of  Petrograd,  for  instance,  presented  an 
exception.  Its  Curator,  Count  S.  S.  Uvarov,  for  a  time  quite 
liberal  and  at  any  rate  a  very  learned  man,  had  attempted  to 
oppose  the  reaction,  and  even  carried  through  in  1819  the 
reorganisation  of  the  Pedagogic  Institute  into  a  university. 
The  fact  that  Uvarov,  an  admirer  of  Karamzin,  whose  views 
he  later  advocated  as  Minister  of  Education,  appeared  as  the 
chief  representative  of  the  opposition  in  the  Ministry  of  Public 
Worship  and  Popular  Education,  shows  how  extreme  had  been 
the  reactionary  activity  of  that  Ministry.  Uvarov,  however, 
had  to  resign,  and  his  place  was  taken  by  the  mad  obscurantist 
Runich,  also  a  member  of  the  Scholastic  Committee,  who  began 


192  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

to  do  in  Petrograd  what  Magnitzky  had  done  in  Kazan.  In 
1821  he  started  a  persecution  of  the  Professors  Raupach,  Her- 
mann, Arseniev,  and  Galich.  The  first  two  were  foreigners, 
and  they  were  to  be  banished  abroad,  as  in  the  case  of  Schad; 
Arseniev  was  a  remarkable  statistician,  and  Galich  a  distin- 
guished philosopher.  The  nonsensical  persecution  of  the  Pro- 
fessors was  prolonged,  however,  for  several  years,  and  it  re- 
mained for  Nicolas  in  1827  to  order  their  rehabilitation. 

Among  the  magazines  published  after  the  Napoleonic  wars 
the  most  important  was  The  Spirit  of  Journals  issued  by  Yat- 
zenkov;  another  popular  magazine  was  The  Son  of  the  Father- 
land, edited  by  Grech,  which  supplanted  Glinka's  Russian 
Messenger.  Yatzenkov  had  been  a  censor,  and  he  knew  how 
to  get  by  the  censorship.  Under  the  rubric  of  Thoughts  and 
Judgments  by  Empress  Catherine  he  carried  on  an  indirect  criti- 
cism of  contemporary  events.  The  censor  pursued  him  for 
his  attitude  towards  the  old  order  of  government,  for  his  finan- 
cial and  administrative  views  and  especially  for  his  opposition 
to  serfdom. 

Formally  the  Censorship  Statute  of  1804  was  in  force,  but 
beginning  with  1807  the  special  censorship  of  the  secret  police 
began  to  function,  parallel  with  the  official  censorship  of  the 
Ministry  of  Education.  The  Secret  Committee  established  in 
1807  was  to  examine  all  newspapers  and  magazines,  and  the 
newly  founded  Ministry  of  Police  had  the  right  to  confiscate 
even  publications  that  had  been  passed  by  the  official  censor. 
Beginning  with  1815  the  censor  did  not  allow  any  new  publica- 
tions before  getting  a  preliminary  sanction  of  the  Ministry  of 
Police.  Razumovsky,  who  took  the  place  of  Zavadovsky  as 
Minister  of  Education  in  1810,  expressed  views  analogous  with 
those  of  the  Ministry  of  Police,  and  held  that  no  criticism  of 
persons  in  the  service  of  the  state  was  permissible ;  the  director 
of  the  Ministry  of  Police,  Viazmitinov,  demanded  on  this  basis 
that  even  criticism  of  actors  on  the  Imperial  stage  should  be  for- 


ALEXANDER'S  MOOD  1818-1820  193 

bidden.  Yet  while  under  Razumovsky  the  censorship  had  a 
prohibitive,  negative  character,  under  Golitzin  it  began  to 
manifest  positive  tendencies  toward  promulgating  through  books 
and  periodicals  a  definite  reactionary  and  obscurantist  spirit. 

However  dark  was  the  picture  of  the  condition  of  education 
and  of  the  press  in  the  years  that  immediately  followed  the  end 
of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  still  during  the  years  1816-1820  one 
could  definitely  distinguish  the  tendencies  and  actions  of  ob- 
scurantists who  had  triumphed  in  separate  departments,  from 
the  ideas  of  Alexander  himself,  who  in  spite  of  his  growing  mys- 
ticism remained  moderately  liberal  in  his  attitude  towards 
political  questions. 

In  his  speech  at  the  opening  of  the  first  Polish  Diet  in  1818 
Alexander  requested  the  representatives  of  Poland  to  prove  to 
Europe  that  "  free  institutions  whose  sacred  principles  some  at- 
tempt to  confuse  with  destructive  teachings  are  not  a  dangerous 
dream;  that  on  the  contrary  such  institutions  established  with 
a  pure  heart  for  the  achievement  of  a  useful  and  salutary  aim 
are  in  perfect  accord  with  social  order  and  confirm  the  well- 
being  of  nations."  "  It  is  for  you,"  he  said,  "  to  prove  by  ex- 
perience this  great  truth.  May  concord  be  the  soul  of  your 
assemblies,  and  may  dignity,  coolness,  and  moderation  signify 
your  discussions.  ...  In  so  acting  your  assembly  will  gain  the 
approval  of  your  country  and  those  feelings  of  general  respect 
which  are  inspired  by  such  institutions  when  the  representatives 
of  a  free  people  do  not  distort  the  sacred  calling  bestowed  upon 
them.  .  .  ." 

In  the  beginning  of  that  speech  Alexander  said :  "  The  former 
existence  of  this  order  (constitutional.  Tr.)  in  your  country 
has  enabled  me  to  grant  you  at  once  that  which  has  not  ceased 
to  be  the  object  of  my  cares,  and  the  beneficial  influence  of  this 
free  institution  I  hope,  with  the  aid  of  God,  to  expand  on  all 
countries  entrusted  to  my  care.  Thus  you  have  given  me  a 
means  to  demonstrate  to  my  country  that  which  I  have  been 


194  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

preparing  for  it  since  long,  and  which  it  will  enjoy  as  soon  as 
the  foundations  for  such  an  important  matter  will  reach  the 
necessary  ripeness  .  .  ." 

The  sessions  of  the  Diet  lasted,  according  to  the  Constitution, 
exactly  thirty  days.  In  violation  of  the  Constitution,  Alexander 
postponed  the  presentation  of  the  budget,  relying  on  the  confi- 
dence of  the  people,  giving  as  a  reason  the  impossibility  of  intro- 
ducing a  new  financial  system  before  knowing  definitely  the 
figures  of  the  national  debt,  the  investigation  of  which  had  not 
yet  been  finished.  The  Chamber  did  not  oppose  the  postpone- 
ment. Also  the  Criminal  code  presented  to  the  Diet  by  the 
Government  was  accepted  without  discussion.  But  the  Cham- 
ber rejected  by  a  large  majority  the  bill  concerning  marriage 
and  divorce,  which  disagreed  with  the  established  law  of  the 
land.  In  this  connection  Alexander  said  in  his  speech  at  the 
closing  of  the  Diet:  "Of  the  bills  presented  to  you  only  one 
was  disapproved  by  the  majority  votes  of  both  Chambers.  Inner 
conviction  and  frankness  dictated  this  decision.  It  gratifies  me, 
as  I  see  in  it  the  independence  of  your  opinions.  Those  who  are 
freely  chosen  must  deliberate  freely.  Through  you  I  hope 
to  hear  a  sincere  and  full  expression  of  public  opinion,  and  only 
an  assembly  similar  to  yours  can  serve  for  the  Government  as 
a  pledge  that  the  published  laws  are  in  accordance  with  the 
essential  needs  of  the  people." 

The  Warsaw  speeches,  reprinted  and  commented  upon  by 
the  Russian  periodicals  —  the  censor  was  unable  to  forbid  them 
as  they  were  the  speeches  of  the  Emperor  himself  5 —  made  an 
enormous  impression  on  the  Russian  reading  public.  Karamzin, 
who  regarded  them  negatively,  wrote  to  Dmitriev :  "  The  War- 

6  What  had  been  impossible  for  the  Russian  censor  in  1818  was 
actually  done  in  the  next  century  by  a  more  audacious  censor.  About 
1906  there  appeared  a  brochure  under  the  title:  "Speeches  and 
toasts  by  Emperor  Nicolas  II."  There  was  not  a  single  word  by  way 
of  comment  in  the  pamphlet.  A  few  days  after  its  publication  the 
censor  ordered  its  confiscation. —  TR. 


THE  TZAR'S  WARSAW  SPEECHES  195 

saw  speeches  have  been  strongly  re-echoed  in  the  hearts  of  the 
young.  They  see  the  constitution  while  asleep  and  awake ;  they 
talk,  discuss,  even  write  about  it  —  in  The  Son  of  the  Father- 
land, in  the  speech  of  Uvarov  .  .  ."  Grech's  publication  had 
had  no  stable,  definite  views,  and  belonged  to  the  category  of 
newspapers  which  were  later  characterised  by  Shchedrin  by  the 
slogan :  "  What  is  your  request  ?  "  Uvarov  was  then  the  Cura- 
tor of  the  Petrograd  district,  and  in  the  speech  he  delivered  on 
the  occasion  of  the  reorganisation  of  the  Pedagogic  Institute 
he  called  political  freedom  "  the  latest  fair  gift  of  a  god,"  and 
declared  that  the  dangers  and  storms  which  accompany  that 
freedom  should  not  frighten  the  people:  the  great  gift  of 
freedom  is  "  accompanied  with  enormous  sacrifices  and  losses, 
it  is  gained  slowly  and  is  preserved  only  by  steady  firmness."  As 
we  see,  Uvarov  understood  better  than  Alexander  the  inevi- 
table connection  between  political  disturbances  and  political 
freedom.  On  another  occasion  he  remarked  about  those  who 
hoped  to  grant  enlightenment  and  at  the  same  time  to  tender 
it  "  harmless,"  that  "  they  desired  fire  which  should  not  scald." 
Such  was  the  complicated  internal  policy  of  Alexander  during 
the  fifth  period  of  his  reign,  when  under  the  influence  of  the 
great  events  the  public  had  developed  a  profound  demand  for 
a  radical  reconstruction  of  the  social  and  political  order  of  the 
state;  the  period  that  appeared  so  trying  and  unbearable  for 
those  who  had  been  imbued  with  the  liberal  doctrines  of  the 
age  and  had  seen  with  their  own  eyes  the  beginnings  of  the  re- 
nascence of  Germany  and  the  more  democratic  structure  of  the 
Western  European  countries.  Those  ideas  found  expression  in 
secret  societies  that  had  risen  since  1 8 1 6,  secret  because  along  with 
the  liberal  declarations  of  Alexander  there  existed  the  Ministry 
of  Police  which  did  not  permit  any  criticism  of  internal  affairs. 
But  the  impression  of  Alexander's  Warsaw  speeches  was  such 
that  many  of  the  founders  of  the  secret  societies  hoped  that  before 
long  their  societies  would  be  declared  open,  legal  organisations. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  aspiration  for  social  activity  which  appeared  among 
the  young  army-officers  after  their  return  from  abroad 
in  the  years  1813-14,  was  manifested  in  the  formation 
of  various  organisations,  clubs,  Masonic  orders,  literary  and 
educational  circles,  like  the  "  Arzamas,"  the  "  Green  Lamp," 
and  others,  whose  significance  in  the  history  of  Russian  litera- 
ture is  generally  known.  Soon  there  appeared  also  political  or- 
ganisations. In  Petrograd  two  such  undertakings  were  formed 
at  the  same  time.  On  one  hand,  the  twenty-four-year-old 
colonel,  Alexander  Muraviov,  a  young  man  inclined  towards 
mysticism  (he  occupied  a  high  degree  in  a  French  Masonic  or- 
der), founded  a  society  among  the  officers  of  the  Semionovsky 
regiment ;  on  the  other  hand,  a  young,  brilliant  general  who  had 
performed  important  diplomatic  tasks  during  the  war  of  1814, 
Mikhail  Orlov,  made  an  attempt  to  attract  to  the  formation 
of  a  political  Masonic  society  Count  Mamonov  (a  representa- 
tive of  the  old  Catherinian  Freemasonry  which  had  pursued 
political  aims  during  Novikov  and  Schwarz)  and  Nicolay  Tur- 
geniev,  who  undertook  the  mission  of  talking  the  matter  over 
with  several  persons,  among  them  with  the  generals  of  the 
Guards,  Benkendorf  and  Vassilchikov.  In  the  provincial  towns, 
among  the  infantry  and  artillery  regiments,  an  analogous  move- 
ment had  taken  place.  Thus  Junker  Borisov  founded  a  circle 
of  "  Lovers  of  Nature  "  for  young  officers,  which  later  devel- 
oped into  the  "  Society  of  United  Slavs "  that  subsequently 
joined  the  "  Southern  Society  " —  the  most  significant  secret 
organisation  in  the  twenties. 

196 


THE  SECRET  SOCIETIES  197 

Orlov's  attempt  had  failed,  the  circle  of  "  Lovers  of  Nature  " 
had  no  importance  at  the  beginning,  but  the  undertaking  of 
Muraviov  was  destined  to  play  a  great  historical  role.  Here 
is  an  outline  of  its  history. 

In  1816  several  officers  of  the  Semionovsky  regiment  came 
together  —  Lieutenant  I.  D.  Yakushkin,  the  brothers  Sergey 
and  Matvey  Muraviov-Apostol,  Colonel  Alexander  Muraviov, 
and  Nikita  Muraviov  (the  son  of  Mikhail  Muraviov,  one  of  the 
teachers  of  Alexander  I ) ,  and  decided  to  form  a  political  organi- 
sation. The  organisation  grew,  but  had  no  definite  programme 
or  aim,  until  a  new  member  entered  —  Pavel  Pestel,  a  young, 
clever,  and  energetic  adjutant  of  Prince  Witgenstein,  who  at 
once  gave  the  society  a  definite  platform.  Its  aim  became  the 
achievement  of  a  constitutional  form  of  government ;  Pestel  bor- 
rowed its  organisation  from  the  Italian  secret  societies,  the 
Carbonari.  The  Society,  founded  by  Muraviov  and  organised 
by  Pestel,  was  named  "  The  Union  of  Salvation,  or  of  the 
Faithful  and  True  Sons  of  the  Fatherland."  In  general  two 
main  types  of  secret  societies  were  known  in  Europe  at  that 
time:  one,  the  more  peaceful,  cultural  organisation,  of  the  kind 
of  the  German  Tugendbund,  whose  aim  had  been  the  cultural 
and  political  revival  of  Germany,  and  which  worked  with  the 
approval  of  the  Government  since  it  had  been  directed  chiefly 
against  the  enemy  of  Germany  —  Napoleon ;  on  the  other  hand, 
in  southern  Europe  worked  the  Carbonari,  or  as  they  were  called 
in  Greece,  the  Het<zri<z, —  typical  organisations  of  conspirators. 
Pestel  chose  the  type  of  the  Carbonari,  which  corresponded  bet- 
ter with  his  personal  character  and  principles.  Most  of  the 
founders  of  the  "  Union  of  Salvation  "  were  liberal-minded 
men  who  sought  better  forms  of  political  and  social  life,  but 
to  some  degree  they  were  mystics  and  dreamers;  many  of  them 
were  not  yet  twenty  years  of  age.  Pestel,  although  also  young 
(he  was  not  yet  twenty-four),  was  a  man  with  quite  formed 
views  and  definite  convictions,  and  of  extraordinary  ability  and 


198  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

will-power.  He  was  greatly  respected  not  only  by  his  com- 
rades and  friends,  but  also  by  his  superiors  and  by  all  who  knew 
him.  His  chief  superior,  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  South- 
ern army,  Prince  Witgenstein,  declared  that  Pestel  might  the 
very  next  day  become  a  minister,  or  an  army-commander,  and 
that  he  would  not  fail  in  any  post.  Of  the  same  opinion  was 
General  Kiselev,  then  Chief  of  the  Staff  of  the  Southern 
army.  His  close  comrades  —  Prince  Volkonsky,  Yakushkin, 
and  other  Decembrists,  who  left  memoirs  or  testified  at  the  trial 
of  Pestel,  spoke  about  him,  of  course,  with  still  greater  enthu- 
siasm. In  a  word  Pestel  was  the  most  remarkable  personality 
among  the  members  of  the  secret  societies.  He  possessed  a 
big  mind,  and  at  the  same  time  also  a  corresponding  tempera- 
ment; he  had  an  iron  will  and  a  colossal  ambition  which  had 
evidently  been  one  of  the  moving  springs  in  him  alongside  with 
his  sincere  ideals  for  common  welfare. 

It  was  natural  that  such  a  person  could  sway  the  vague 
dreamers  on  his  side,  and  he  had  no  difficulty  in  getting  the 
members  to  accept  the  Carbonari  constitution.  One  of  the 
quaint  points  of  that  constitution  was  the  ceremony  of  terrible 
oaths  that  had  to  be  taken  at  the  initiation,  not  unlike  most  of 
the  Masonic  orders.  A  more  interesting  point  was  the  division 
of  the  members  into  various  degrees  unequal  in  their  rights. 
At  the  head  of  the  Society  stood  the  Boyars,  who  were  not  even 
to  be  known  (in  principle)  to  the  other  members;  the  con- 
stitution of  the  Society  was  known  only  to  the  Boyars  and  to 
the  next  degree,  the  Men,  but  not  to  the  third  degree,  the 
Brothers,  who  had  to  obey  blindly  the  orders  of  the  Society. 
Finally  there  was  a  fourth  degree,  not  members,  but  sympa- 
thisers, Friends,  who  were  registered  as  desirable  material, 
could  be  recruited  into  active  membership,  but  might  not  know 
either  about  their  registration  or  their  connection  with  the 
Society.  Such  an  organisation  corresponded  with  Pestel's 
Jacobine  views  which  he  had  developed  in  himself  as  an  admirer 


"  UNION  OF  WELFARE  "  199 

of  the  epoch  of  the  Convention  and  of  the  revolutionary  govern- 
ment in  France  of  1793. 

Pestel  had  to  leave  soon  after  the  acceptance  of  the  Constitu- 
tion for  the  place  of  his  service,  at  first  in  the  Ostsee  Region, 
where  Witgenstein  had  been  in  command  of  a  corps,  and  from 
1818,  with  the  appointment  of  Witgenstein  as  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  Southern  army,  at  Tulchin,  a  small  town  on  the 
Moldavian  frontier,  the  headquarters  of  the  army.  Among  the 
remaining  members  of  the  Society  a  fermentation  soon  took 
place,  especially  after  the  acceptance  of  a  new  member,  Mikhail 
Muraviov,  a  man  of  strong  will,  who  disagreed  with  Pestel's 
views  and  sharply  opposed  the  Jacobine  form  of  the  organisation. 
He  categorically  refused  to  bring  the  oaths  at  his  initiation,  and 
upon  reading  the  Constitution  he  declared  that  it  was  fit  for 
forest-brigands,  but  not  for  a  cultural  society  with  political  aims. 
There  rose  discussions  and  negotiations.  About  that  time  a 
considerable  part  of  the  Guards  gathered  at  Moscow  on  the 
occasion  of  erecting  a  cathedral  in  memory  of  the  last  war,  and 
long  debates  took  place  among  the  members  of  the  Society  con- 
cerning the  differences  of  opinion  that  had  risen  on  account  of 
Mikhail  Muraviov. 

Muraviov  and  his  adherents  finally  prevailed  upon  the  mem- 
bers to  let  them  work  out  a  new  constitution,  for  which  they 
took  as  a  model  that  of  the  Tugendbund,  published  in 
Freimiithige  Blatter.  Muraviov  and  his  circle  translated  and 
adapted  it  for  Russian  circumstances,  and  after  many  debates 
it  was  accepted,  and  the  Society  was  named  instead  of  "  Union 
of  Salvation,"  "Union  of  Welfare"  (1818).  The  platform 
was  extremely  moderate ;  the  Society  was  to  co-operate  with  the 
Government  for  the  betterment  of  the  condition  of  the  people, 
materially  and  spiritually;  it  appealed  to  the  Government  for 
confidence,  quoting  for  the  purpose  some  of  Catherine's  early 
liberal  aphorisms.  In  fact  the  Society  acted  almost  openly,  and 
the  Government  did  not  persecute  it. 


200  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

Some  suggest  that  these  aims  were  put  forth  only  for  appear- 
ance, and  that  there  was  a  second  part  of  the  constitution,  of  a 
purely  political  nature.  But  that  second  part,  the  preparation 
of  which  was  turned  over  to  Nikita  Muraviov,  had  not  been 
finished;  it  had  been  discussed  by  some  of  the  leaders,  but  had 
not  been  accepted  by  the  Union,  or  even  by  the  central  organ. 
As  they  did  not  propose  to  pursue  any  conspiratory  aims,  the 
members  acted  openly  along  cultural-educational  lines,  and  all 
knew  their  constitution,  the  so-called  "  Green  Book." 

The  activity  of  the  "  Union  of  Welfare "  was  grouped  in 
four  branches.  The  first  was  philanthropic,  i.e.,  it  comprised 
succour  for  needy  mankind.  In  practice  this  activity  could  be 
then  expressed  particularly  in  the  improvement  of  peasant-con- 
ditions, the  more  so  since  most  of  the  members  (if  not  all)  were 
landowners.  But  although  the  constitution  of  the  Tugendbund 
forbade  the  members  to  have  slaves,  the  constitution  of  the 
"  Union  of  Welfare  "  advocated  only  a  kind  treatment  of  one's 
serfs.  The  chief  worker  for  the  improvement  of  the  serfs  in  the 
Union  had  been  N.  I.  Turgeniev. 

The  second  branch  of  activity  was  educational,  and  in  this 
respect  the  members  worked  chiefly  among  the  army.  The  most 
active  in  that  field  had  been  General  M.  F.  Orlov,  the  one  who 
had  long  ago  dreamt  about  founding  a  secret  political  society. 
As  a  commander  of  a  division  he  aided  the  wide  spread  of 
Lancasterian  schools  both  among  his  regiments  and  among  the 
population  with  which  his  division  had  come  in  contact.  Orlov 
contributed  personally  and  collected  large  sums  for  the  educa- 
tional work.  In  1818  he  wrote,  for  instance,  that  he  had 
collected  sixteen  thousand  rubles.  N.  I.  Turgeniev  asserted 
that  Orlov  had  given  all  his  salary  for  education. 

The  third  branch  consisted  in  the  work  for  the  betterment  of 
justice  in  Russia.  In  this  respect  the  activity  of  the  Society 
could  be  best  expressed  in  the  working  out  of  projects  for  the 
new  courts.  This  work  fell  also  to  Turgeniev  who  served  as  a 


THE  WORK  OF  THIS  SOCIETY  201 

state-secretary  at  the  State  Council.  Many  members  had  the 
idea  that  in  order  to  effect  an  immediate  improvement  of  justice 
they  should  have  resigned  their  military  positions  and  entered 
the  service  in  lower  courts,  e.g.,  in  Aulic  courts.  Some  of  them 
did  so.  Pushkin's  close  Lyceum-friend,  I.  I.  Pushchin,  accepted 
the  post  of  Aulic  judge  at  Moscow.  Ryleiev  did  likewise,  even 
before  his  becoming  a  member  of  the  Society. 

Finally,  the  fourth  branch,  the  economic,  cared  for  the  eco- 
nomic and  financial  improvement  of  national  affairs.  The  work 
consisted  largely  in  publishing  books  on  the  question.  As  a 
monumental  work  of  that  activity  we  have  Turgeniev's  remark- 
able Essay  on  the  Theory  of  Taxation.  Turgeniev  had  in- 
tended together  with  Professor  Kunitzin  to  issue  a  monthly, 
but  he  was  not  allowed  to  do  so,  in  spite  of  his  being  a  state- 
secretary  at  the  State  Council  and  a  director  of  one  of  the  de- 
partments in  the  Ministry  of  Finance. 

In  spite  of  the  increase  in  membership  (in  1819  the  Society 
had  two  hundred  members),  the  activity  of  the  Union  was  rather 
indolent  and  appeared  to  many  as  too  lukewarm,  considering  the 
growing  dissatisfaction  with  the  Government's  policy  of  re- 
pressions, obscurantism,  and  the  hateful  Military  Colonies. 
There  was  felt  a  need  for  a  more  revolutionary  organisation. 
Some  of  the  members  had  long  been  inclined  toward  more  vigor- 
ous action.  Thus  in  1817,  Yakushkin  volunteered  to  assassinate 
Alexander,  when  the  "  Union  of  Salvation  "  had  received  a 
letter  from  Prince  Trubetzkoy  about  the  circulating  rumours  of 
Alexander's  intention  to  move  his  throne  to  Warsaw,  and 
similar  nonsense.  The  question  of  regicidism  was  not  carried 
out  in  practice,  but  the  episode  illustrates  certain  moods  among 
the  members. 

In  1820  Pestel  was  in  Petrograd,  and  took  part  in  a  gathering 
at  the  house  of  F.  N.  Glinka,  the  adjutant  of  the  Governor- 
General  of  Petrograd,  Miloradovich.  The  discussion  turned 
to  the  question,  Which  form  of  government  was  preferable:  a 


202  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

republic  or  a  constitutional  monarchy?  Pestel  categorically  ad- 
vocated a  republic,  and  finally  had  the  question  voted  upon ;  all 
but  one  expressed  themselves  for  a  republic.  True  the  decision 
had  only  a  theoretical  value,  but  Pestel  considered  it  more  ser- 
ious, and  later  tried  to  ascribe  to  it  the  significance  of  a  formal 
resolution. 

In  the  same  year  there  took  place  in  Petrograd  an  event  which, 
although  not  caused  by  the  activity  of  the  "  Union  of  Welfare," 
was  reflected  in  the  fate  of  all  secret  societies  (among  them  the 
Masonic  orders) ;  this  was  the  mutiny  among  the  soldiers  of  the 
Semionovsky  regiment,  which  was  not  influenced  by  the  officers. 
The  regiment  had  been  treated  before  quite  humanly;  most  of 
the  officers  were  liberals,  and  belonged  to  the  "  Union  of  Wel- 
fare " ;  the  commander  was  a  good-hearted  man,  General 
Potiomkin.  In  1820  the  commandership  passed  to  Colonel 
Schwarz,  a  rude  despot,  inclined  to  harsh  reprisals;  in  his  in- 
tention to  bring  the  regiment  under  his  subjection,  he  ordered 
flogged  several  cavaliers  of  the  order  of  St.  George,  who  were 
exempt  by  law  from  such  punishment.  Several  companies  rose 
in  mutiny.  It  had  a  rather  mild  form:  the  soldiers  wished  to 
ask  Schwarz  not  to  employ  such  measures  in  the  future.  The 
officers  —  among  them  S.  I.  Muraviov-Apostol  —  tried  to  dis- 
suade them,  understanding  that  the  soldiers  would  achieve  no 
results;  but  their  arguments  were  of  no  avail,  and  in  the  end 
the  whole  regiment  was  imprisoned  in  the  fortress.  This  cir- 
cumstance made  an  enormous  impression  on  Alexander.  He 
was  at  that  time  at  the  Leibach  Congress.  The  mutiny  took 
place  synchronously  with  another  unpleasant  event  —  the  ses- 
sions of  the  second  Warsaw  Diet  in  1820,  which  rejected  all  the 
bills  introduced  by  the  Government  after  a  series  of  sharp,  op- 
positional  speeches.  To  these  were  added  the  news  about  the 
revolution  in  Naples,  which  formed  the  subject  of  discussions 
at  the  Congress.  All  these  circumstances  worked  on  Alex- 
ander's mood,  so  that  the  "  mutiny  "  of  the  Semionovsky  regi- 


ALEXANDER  AND  THE  SOCIETY  203 

ment  made  a  tremendous  impression  upon  him,  the  more  so 
since  he  had  personally  commanded  it  at  one  time,  and  had  been 
very  fond  of  it.  He  refused  to  believe  that  the  regiment  rose  up 
without  the  agitation  of  secret  leaders.  The  regiment  was  dis- 
persed among  various  military  parts.  The  event  had  two  con- 
sequences. On  one  hand  the  scattered  officers  and  soldiers 
formed  excellent  cadres  of  revolutionary  propagandists  through- 
out the  Empire;  on  the  other  hand,  in  view  of  the  tense  mood 
of  the  Government,  the  "  Union  of  Welfare  "  decided  to  dis- 
band, and  in  January,  1821,  the  chairman  of  the  Moscow  ses- 
sions of  the  Union,  N.  I.  Turgeniev,  sent  out  circulars  to  all  the 
members  about  the  closing  up  of  the  Society. 

An  opinion  exists  that  the  Society  decided  to  disband  only  for 
the  sake  of  appearance,  in  order  to  deceive  the  Government's 
vigilance,  and  to  continue  their  activity  in  a  more  conspirative 
form.  This  could  hardly  have  been  the  idea  of  the  majority  of 
the  members.  At  any  rate,  in  Petrograd  the  Society  actually 
ceased  to  exist. 

Upon  his  return  from  abroad  Alexander  received  a  detailed 
report  about  the  activity  of  that  Society  through  the  treacherous 
Vassilchikov.  True  the  Emperor  remarked  that  he  would  not 
punish  individuals  who  held  the  same  liberal  ideas  which  he  had 
himself  advocated  in  the  first  years  of  his  reign,  but  he  remained 
nevertheless  greatly  distressed  over  the  state  of  mind  among  the 
Guards,  and  ordered  them  sent  to  the  western  frontier  in 
1821,  and  then  purposely  prolonged  their  stay  for  one  year  and 
a  half  in  Lithuania,  evidently  believing  that  the  Petrograd 
atmosphere  acted  detrimentally  upon  the  young  officers.  Thus 
the  main  elements  of  the  Society  were  removed  from  the  capi- 
tal. 

But  when  the  delegates  of  the  Moscow  conference  arrived 
at  Tulchin  with  the  report  about  the  disbandment  of  the  Society, 
the  southern  members,  headed  by  Pestel  and  Yushnevsky  (the 
Intendant-General  of  the  Southern  army),  declared  that  they 


204  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

would  not  disorganise,  and  their  branch  became  an  independent 
Society  which  reintroduced  Pestel's  former  constitution  of  the 
"  Union  of  Salvation,"  and  put  forth  definitely  political  and 
revolutionary  aims.  The  Society  strove  for  the  establishment 
of  a  republic  in  Russia  by  Jacobine  means. 

The  Southern  Society  was  organised  in  the  form  of  three 
boards.  The  central  board  was  at  Tulchin  under  the  manage- 
ment of  Pestel  and  Yushnevsky,  who  were  elected  as  the  chief 
directors  of  the  Society;  the  whole  power  was  actually  in  the 
hands  of  Pestel.  Then  there  were  two  branches,  one  in 
Kamenka  under  the  management  of  a  local  landowner,  a  retired 
colonel,  V.  Davidov,  and  of  the  commander  of  the  infantry 
brigade  that  was  stationed  there,  General  Prince  S.  G.  Volkon- 
sky;  and  another  branch  at  Vassilkov  under  the  management  of 
Sergey  Muraviov-Apostol  who  acted  somewhat  independently 
of  Pestel,  and  made  his  chief  assistant  a  young  officer  (also  of 
the  Semionovsky  regiment),  Mikhail  Bestuzhev-Riumin. 

Pestel  had  constantly  put  before  his  comrades  the  necessity 
not  only  of  regicide  but  of  the  annihilation  of  the  entire  Imperial 
family;  on  this  question  dissensions  always  took  place  between 
him  and  Muraviov-Apostol.  The  conferences  of  the  leaders 
occurred  once  a  year  at  Kiev  during  the  fair,  in  1822,  '23,  '24, 
and  1825;  the  question  about  means  for  the  destruction  of  the 
reigning  House  was  discussed  every  time,  but  the  final  resolu- 
tion had  been  postponed  from  conference  to  conference. 

Although  Pestel  had  put  forth  such  radical  aims,  he  acted 
coolly  and  cautiously,  weighing  and  discussing  every  step  with 
much  deliberation.  Sergey  Muraviov-Apostol  was,  on  the  con- 
trary, impatient  and  inclined  to  be  enthusiastic  and  quick ;  though 
he  could  not  bear  the  thought  of  annihilating  a  whole  family,  he 
yet  demanded  a  prompt  beginning  of  action,  and  always  aspired 
to  raise  a  revolt,  even  for  insignificant  causes,  as  the  dismissal 
of  an  officer.  His  assistant,  Bestuzhev-Riumin,  was  of  a  still 
more  ardent  and  quick  temperament.  He  actively  propagated 


THE  ACTIVITY  OF  PESTEL  205 

his  views,  and  succeeded  in  accomplishing  two  big  things.  He 
discovered  the  existence  of  an  independent  "  Society  of  United 
Slavs,"  whose  aim  was  the  establishment  of  a  federative  republic 
of  all  Slav  nations;  he  persuaded  them  to  join  the  "  Southern 
Society."  He  also  entered  into  negotiations  with  the  Polish 
revolutionary  organisations,  and  discussed  with  them  at  length 
whether  they  would  consent  to  be  guided  by  the  Russian  revo- 
lutionary plans,  and  whether  they  would  arrest  or  kill,  if  so 
demanded,  Grand  Duke  Constantine.  The  Poles  answered 
those  questions  rather  evasively,  evidently  not  trusting  the  firm- 
ness and  discreetness  of  the  Russian  organisations  very  much. 
Bestuzhev  tried  to  throw  dust  into  their  eyes  by  exaggerating  the 
dimensions  of  the  Russian  plot.  Pestel  interfered,  and  took 
part  in  the  discussions  about  the  limits  within  which  Poland 
should  be  restored.  The  Poles  of  course  demanded  the  fron- 
tiers of  1772,  but  Pestel  declared  definitely  for  the  restoration 
of  an  ethnographical  Poland  only  (not  including,  i.e.,  the  Little- 
Russian  and  Lithuanian  elements). 

At  the  same  time  Pestel  employed  energetic  measures  for  the 
revival  of  the  secret  Society  in  Petrograd.  He  kept  sending 
his  emissaries  (Prince  S.  G.  Volkonsky,  Matvey  Muraviov, 
Alexander  Podgio,  and  others)  there,  and  in  1824  he  went  there 
himself.  With  his  efforts  the  Society  did  come  to  life  again, 
but  he  was  unable  to  make  the  members  of  that  "  Northern 
Society"  follow  his  plans  and  obey  his  will:  the  Northerners 
had  by  that  time  developed  independent  views,  which  differed 
greatly  from  Pestel's.  The  "  Northern  Society  "  was  resur- 
rected in  1822,  upon  the  return  of  the  Guards.  A  new  board 
was  elected  consisting  of  Nikita  Muraviov,  Prince  S.  P.  Tru- 
betzkoy,  and  N.  Turgeniev,  but  the  latter  declined  and  was 
supplanted  by  a  young  officer,  Prince  Eugene  Obolensky. 
Nikita  Muraviov  worked  out  a  constitution  which  differed  in 
many  points  from  that  of  Pestel. 

Muraviov's  Constitution,  on  one  hand,  and  Pestel's  Consti- 


206  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

tution,  under  the  name  of  "  Russian  Justice " 1  or  "  State 
Testament,"  on  the  other,  presented  two  rival  currents  among 
the  revolutionary  circles.  Pestel  demanded  a  republican  form 
of  government ;  he  had  been  influenced  by  Destutt  de  Tracy,  the 
famous  French  commentator  of  Montesquieu's  L'esprit  des  lots, 
and  advocated  his  view  about  the  incompatibility  of  a  monarch- 
ical regime  with  the  will  of  the  people.  Admitting  that  Russia 
was  not  ready  for  a  republic,  Pestel  intended  to  overthrow  the 
existing  order  by  a  military  coup  d'etat,  and  to  organise  a  mili- 
tary dictatorship  as  a  temporary  government  which  would  pre- 
pare Russia  for  a  republican  order  in  some  eight  or  ten  years. 
This  would  naturally  lead  to  a  military-despotic  regime,  since 
the  realisation  of  the  plan  would  involve  the  suppression  of  a 
series  of  contre-revolutions. 

Moreover,  the  very  republic  projected  by  Pestel  was  of  a 
clearly  Jacobine  type,  with  a  strong  centralised  administration. 
The  legislative  power  was  to  belong  to  a  vieche  (a  common 
council),  but  the  whole  administration  was  to  be  concentrated, 
after  the  model  of  the  French  Directory,  in  the  hands  of  five 
Directors.  Pestel  did  not  allow  any  local  autonomy,  but  de- 
sired to  unite  all  the  Empire  into  one  politically  uniform  whole ; 
he  intended  to  incorporate  Finland,  and  to  allow  Poland  to 
separate  only  under  the  condition  of  establishing  a  socio-political 
order  similar  to  that  in  Russia.  Pestel  did  not  consider  linguistic 
or  religious  differences :  the  Russian  language  and  Church  were 
to  be  dominating.  He  intended  to  interfere  with  the  internal 
life  of  the  Mahomedans,  and  to  abolish  the  subordination  of 
their  women.  The  Jews  Pestel  considered  harmful  exploiters 
of  the  peasants,  and  planned  to  transplant  them  all  to  Palestine, 
for  which  purpose  he  was  to  give  them  military  aid. 

1  He  borrowed  that  name  from  the  ancient  code  of  laws  established 
in  Russ  early  in  the  eleventh  century  by  Prince  Yaroslav.  The  word 
pravda  signifies  in  Russian  both  justice  and  truth,  or  right  and  verity. 
—  TR. 


THE  "  NORTHERN  SOCIETY  "  207 

Thus  Pestel's  views  were  not  too  liberal ;  but  his  democratic 
principles  were  deeply  promulgated  in  his  plan,  especially  in  the 
economic  region.  His  agrarian  plan  was  original,  democratic, 
and  consequential.  He  planned  to  divide  all  lands  into  two 
categories:  one,  social,  should  be  in  communal  possession  of  the 
people,  the  other,  fiscal,  could  be  exploited  by  the  state  or  be 
distributed  by  the  Government  to  private  persons.  At  any  rate 
Pestel  considered  that  land  could  not  be  an  object  of  private 
property,  but  should  serve  primarily  for  the  provision  of  the 
masses. 

As  to  the  Constitution  of  the  "  Northern  Society,"  worked 
out  by  Nikita  Muraviov,  it  was  monarchical.  Many  of  their 
members,  and  Nikita  himself,  admitted  that  a  republic  was  bet- 
ter than  a  monarchy,  but  they  saw  no  hope  for  accomplishing 
such  a  form  of  government.  This  Constitution  included  the 
principles  of  the  most  radical  constitutions  of  that  time;  as  its 
model  the  Spanish  constitution  of  1812  had  evidently  served. 
The  first  paragraph  of  Muraviov 's  Constitution  definitely  de- 
clared that  the  Russian  Empire  could  not  be  the  property  of  a 
certain  family.  The  will  of  the  people  was  to  be  supreme. 
The  Monarch's  power  was  very  limited.  The  vieche  was  to 
have  not  only  all  legislative  powers,  but  could  even  declare  war, 
peace,  and  amnesty  —  usually  monarchical  privileges.  Another 
distinct  feature  of  Muraviov's  Constitution  was  Federalism, 
with  a  large  provincial  autonomy,  as  against  Pestel's  centralised 
republic.  Muraviov's  monarchy  was  divided  into  thirteen  (fif- 
teen, in  the  second  edition  of  the  Constitution)  autonomous 
provinces,  each  of  which  was  to  have  its  own  Duma,  subject,  of 
course,  to  the  direction  of  the  central  authority. 

Such  were  the  two  main  currents  that  existed  at  that  time 
among  the  revolutionary  societies  in  Russia.  Their  difference 
lay  not  so  much  in  the  question  of  republic  or  monarchy,  as  in 
the  means  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  aim:  whether  by  a 
Jacobine  way,  or  by  way  of  submitting  to  the  will  of  the  people. 


208  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

Ryleiev,  who  became  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  1825  the 
dominant  force  in  the  "  Northern  Society,"  declared  that  in 
principle  one  might  prefer  a  republic,  provided  the  people  con- 
sented to  it.  Thus  the  chief  opposition  of  the  "  Northern 
Society  "  to  Pestel's  plans  was  directed  against  his  intention  to 
establish  a  republic  by  all  means,  even  against  the  will  of  the 
people.  In  this  sense  Ryleiev  and  Nikita  Muraviov  were  true 
Narodovoltzy.2  The  views  of  the  revolutionary  circles  found 
reflection,  naturally,  in  the  views  of  the  broad  layers  of  society. 

2  The  revolutionary  party,  "The  Will  of  the  People,"  which  oper- 
ated during  Alexander  IPs  reign,  and  by  whose  decree  that  Tzar  was 
assassinated  in  1881. —  TR. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

TURNING  to  the  activity  of  the  Government  in  the 
last  years  of  Alexander's  reign,  we  must  first  of  all 
admit  that  it  was  one  of  the  darkest  periods  in 
Russian  history.  The  Government  decidedly  repudiated  any 
idea  of  liberal  reforms. 

Alexander's  own  mood  had  definitely  changed  after  1820. 
We  have  seen  that  up  to  that  time  despite  his  growing  mysticism 
and  increasing  hatred  for  any  form  of  revolution,  he  still  had  a 
warm  sympathy  for  liberal  institutions  and  for  a  constitutional 
order.  Metternich,  in  whose  eyes  there  had  always  existed  a 
close  connection  between  liberalism  and  revolutions,  vigorously 
opposed  Alexander's  views  at  all  international  congresses,  con- 
sidering him  a  Utopianist  and  a  romantic,  and  at  times  ascribed 
Alexander's  liberalism  to  his  masqued  ambitious  plots. 

But  in  1820  the  incident  with  the  Semionovsky  regiment  oc- 
curred, and  Alexander  falsely  interpreted  it  as  a  result  of  revo- 
lutionary propaganda ;  then  came  the  oppositional  attitude  of  the 
Polish  Diet;  and  finally  the  revolutionary  fermentation  in 
Western  Europe  had  broken  out  in  the  Neapolitan  and  Spanish 
revolutions.  All  these  events  combined  had  shaken  Alexander's 
conviction  that  liberal  institutions  and  revolution  were  different 
matters;  he  observed  how  in  the  Twenties  liberals  and  revolu- 
tionists worked  hand  in  hand  against  reactionary  governments 
which  had  broken  their  obligations  and  promises  to  the  people. 

In  view  of  these  changes,  there  was  formed  a  complete 
entente  cordiale  between  Alexander  and  Metternich,  a  perfect 
concord  in  their  hostility  to  all  the  popular  movements  of  that 
time.  It  was  then  that  the  "  Holy  Alliance,"  formed  by  Alex- 

209 


210 

ander  in  1815,  had  become  a  union  of  monarchs  against  freedom- 
craving  nations.  Alexander  tried  to  be  extremely  consequential 
in  that  policy,  and  for  this  reason  he  formally  sided  with  the 
Sultan  against  his  rebellious  subjects,  the  Greeks,  despite  his 
personal  sympathies  and  public  opinion  in  Russia  and  the  views 
of  his  mystical  friends,  such  as  Baroness  Kriidener.  This  was 
demonstrated  so  sharply  that  Alexander's  chief  assistant  in 
foreign  affairs,  Count  Capo  d'Istria,  a  Greek  by  origin,  had  to 
resign  his  post,  while  General  Prince  Alexander  Ypsilanti  who 
took  active  part  in  the  Greek  revolt  was  formally  excluded  from 
Russian  service,  although  inwardly  Alexander  approved  of 
Ypsilanti's  activity,  and  did  not  conceal  his  opinion  from  his 
entourage.  If,  in  spite  of  such  a  policy,  the  relations  between 
Russia  and  Turkey  were  quite  unstable  at  that  time  —  one  mo- 
ment war  was  but  a  hair's  distance  away,  and  the  Russian  am- 
bassador thought  best  to  ask  for  his  papers  and  depart  —  it  was 
due  to  the  fanatical  actions  of  the  Porte  instigated  by  the  British 
ambassador,  Stratford. 

In  his  internal  policy  Alexander  demonstrated  his  new  mood 
only  negatively  —  in  his  rejection  of  all  liberal  undertakings  and 
his  absolute  indifference  to  any  reforms.  He  concentrated  his 
interests  in  military  administration,  particularly  in  the  Military 
Colonies  which  continued  to  grow  rapidly,  against  public  opinion 
and  in  spite  of  the  protests  of  the  peasants  who  were  turned  into 
Colonists.  At  the  same  time  Alexander's  mysticism  reached  its 
climax ;  he  was  gloomy  and  sought  self-forgetf ulness  in  frequent 
and  rapid  travels  over  Russia.  He  fell  under  the  influence  of 
persons  far  inferior  to  Baroness  Kriidener  and  the  English 
Quakers  —  of  such  black  bigots  as  Archimandrite  Fotiy,  who 
had  risen  from  the  position  of  a  bible-instructor  in  a  military 
school  by  the  aid  of  his  devoted  admirer,  Countess  Orlov-Ches- 
mensky,  and  partly  also  by  the  aid  of  Arakcheiev  and  Prince 
Golitzin,  the  famous  Minister.  In  regard  to  Golitzin,  Fotiy, 
perhaps  urged  by  Arakcheiev,  displayed  in  the  end  insolent  hos- 


ALEXANDER'S  INTERNAL  POLICY          211 

tility,  anathematising  him  for  his  alleged  leniency  towards  non- 
Orthodox  creeds  and  mystic  sects.  In  spite  of  Alexander's  per- 
sonal friendship  for  him,  Golitzin  was  forced  to  resign.  The 
Ministry  then  fell  apart;  ecclesiastical  matters  were  again  trans- 
ferred to  the  Super-Procurator  of  the  Synod,  Prince  Meshcher- 
sky;  Admiral  Shishkov,  the  man  who  carried  on  a  controversy 
with  Karamzin  about  the  inviolability  of  the  ancient  Russian 
style,  and  who  later  composed  patriotic  manifestoes  in  the  name 
of  Alexander,  and  read  for  him  passages  from  the  Prophets,  was 
appointed  Minister  of  Education.  Under  Shishkov,  Magnitzky 
and  Runich  remained  in  power  for  some  time.  Magnitzky,  hav- 
ing accomplished  the  ravage  of  the  university  of  Kazan,  under- 
took the  working  out  of  a  new  censorship-statute  for  which  he 
strained  all  his  reactionary  inventiveness.  The  Statute  was 
published  during  the  next  reign  and  did  not  last  long. 

Still,  in  spite  of  the  domination  of  reactionism  at  that  period, 
the  Government  undertook  no  persecution  of  the  revolutionary 
organisations,  which  led  many  to  believe  that  it  had  been  igno- 
rant of  their  existence.  It  is  well  established  at  present  that 
from  1821  Alexander  had  been  informed  about  every  step  of 
the  secret  Societies.  We  have  noted  his  argument  against  per- 
secuting those  who  held  his  own  former  views,  in  his  answer  to 
the  information  of  Vassilchikov.  Evidently  his  conscience  was 
against  taking  strict  measures  to  suppress  the  growing  unrest. 
Espionage  had  rapidly  developed  by  that  time,  but  it  bore  an 
academic  aspect;  the  Government  knew  that  the  "Southern 
Society  "  was  plotting  against  it,  yet  the  conspirators  were  not 
disturbed.  Only  in  his  last  year  Alexander  gave  some  attention 
to  the  information  of  the  sub-officer,  Sherwood,  about  the 
"  Southern  Society  " ;  Sherwood  was  instructed  by  Arakcheiev 
to  obtain  additional  information.  When  already  in  Taganrog 
Alexander  became  somewhat  alarmed  by  Sherwood's  additional 
information,  and  by  the  new  report  of  Captain  Maiboroda,  one 
of  Pestel's  subordinates.  General  Chernyshev  was  sent  to  the 


212  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

Southern  army  with  an  order  to  arrest  the  leaders  of  the  Society 
and  begin  an  investigation.  It  is  hard  to  say  what  would  have 
happened  had  Alexander  not  died  then,  but  we  may  presume 
that  the  persecution  of  the  conspirators  would  not  have  had  the 
cruel  forms  in  which  it  was  expressed  under  Nicolas,  after  the 
insurrection  of  December  14. 

In  regard  to  Poland  Alexander's  reactionary  mood  was  ex- 
pressed in  his  failure  to  convene  the  Diet  for  five  years,  and  in 
another  anti-Constitutional  act  —  his  ordering  the  sessions  of 
the  Diet  of  1825  to  be  closed  to  the  press  and  the  public,  except 
the  opening  and  closing  sessions.  He  said  at  that  time  that  he 
considered  the  Constitution  of  1815  an  experiment,  and  evidently 
felt  at  liberty  to  withdraw  it  at  any  moment.  The  Diet  of 
1825  passed  more  quietly  than  that  of  1820,  externally  at  least; 
but  the  revolutionary  ideas  had  developed  in  Poland  as  strongly 
as  in  Russia,  and  if  they  found  full  expression  only  in  the  in- 
surrection of  1830,  their  fermentation  undoubtedly  had  taken 
place  under  Alexander. 

The  only  branch  of  the  administration  where  order  began  to 
rule  at  that  time,  was  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  after  the  ap- 
pointment, by  the  recommendation  of  Arakcheiev,  of  Kankrin 
in  place  of  Guriev.  The  activity  of  the  honest,  economical,  and 
learned  Kankrin  was  displayed  mainly  during  the  reign  of 
Nicolas;  when  he  was  appointed,  in  1823,  financial  affairs  were 
in  a  deplorable  state.  The  economic  condition  of  the  popula- 
tion was  at  its  worst ;  taxes  were  collected  with  great  difficulty ; 
landowners,  who  were  responsible  for  their  peasants,  were  fre- 
quently placed  under  "wardship"  (receivership)  for  failing  to 
pay  the  taxes,  and  Fiscal  peasants  suffered  forced  sales  of  their 
houses  and  property.  In  the  last  years  of  Alexander's  reign 
the  western  region  suffered  from  crop-failures  and  famines,  with 
which  it  was  difficult  to  cope  in  view  of  the  bad  roads.  The 
building  of  roads  went  on  without  any  plan  or  system,  by  way 
of  "  natural  obligation "  that  lay  hard  on  the  back  of  the 


THE  END  OF  ALEXANDER'S  REIGN         213 

peasantry.  Sometimes  whole  villages  were  driven  out  to  per- 
form the  "  natural  obligation  "  hundreds  of  miles  from  their 
homes,  very  often  in  summer,  during  field-labour  time. 

The  taverns  flourished  under  the  fiscal  monopoly;  the  people 
left  there  their  last  copecks.  Yet  the  beverage-income  of  the 
state  had  decreased,  owing  to  the  extraordinary  thievery  of  the 
officials ;  this  feature  —  official  thievery  and  abuses  —  had 
reached  its  climax  in  those  years,  according  to  the  unanimous 
testimony  of  all  contemporaries. 

Thus  ended  the  reign  that  in  its  beginning  had  aroused  such 
bright  hopes. 

In  casting  a  retrospective  glance  at  the  epoch  we  have  now 
passed,  we  cannot  help  being  astonished  —  at  least  from  the  first, 
superficial  examination,  at  the  comparatively  meagre  results  of 
the  enormous  expenditures  and  sacrifices  of  the  whole  nation: 
Russia  at  the  end  of  Alexander's  reign  seemed  —  externally  — 
not  far  advanced  in  the  conditions  of  her  state  and  social  life 
from  the  times  of  Catherine,  of  Novikov,  and  Schwarz.  There 
still  remained  the  autocracy  above,  serfdom  below,  and  the  reign 
of  anarchy  among  administrators  and  landowners.  Military 
Colonies  had  come  to  be ;  popular  education  that  had  progressed 
so  well  at  the  beginning  of  the  reign,  was  now  suppressed,  dis- 
torted, and  maimed  by  obscurantist  and  reactionary  measures  of 
clericalists  and  fanatical  mystics;  the  press  was  reduced  to  zero, 
and  it  appeared  that  all  legal  and  peaceful  ways  for  the  free 
development  of  society  were  cut  off.  .  .  . 

But  such  a  conclusion  about  the  results  of  Alexander's  reign 
would  be  true  only  from  the  external,  formal,  side;  a  careful 
retrospective  view  at  the  inner  meaning  of  the  events  we  have 
been  studying  and  at  their  inner  connection,  will  prove  the  in- 
correctness of  such  a  conclusion. 

By  the  time  of  Alexander's  accession  the  process  of  the  forma- 
tion of  a  state-territory  had  been  accomplished,  at  least  in  its 


214  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

general  features.  The  struggle  for  territory  no  longer  pre- 
sented an  essential  task  of  the  Russian  state,  consequently  the 
Government  was  able  to  turn  its  attention  to  the  internal  needs 
of  the  population.  Even  under  Catherine  there  began  to  take 
form  a  considerable  centre  of  thinking  society,  in  which  aspira- 
tions for  working  out  independent  views  and  some  political 
ideals  were  manifest.  Towards  the  end  of  her  reign  liberals 
and  democrats  stood  in  opposition  to  the  Government,  and  suf- 
fered persecution.  Under  Paul  those  persecutions  and  the  un- 
bridled despotism  of  the  authorities  had  reached  unbelievable 
dimensions,  and  gave  the  whole  of  Russian  educated  society  an 
impulse  to  think  and  feel  the  importance  of  practical  guarantees 
against  governmental  despotism.  Upon  the  removal  of  Paul 
the  public  fell  into  careless  joy  and  rosy  optimism,  full  of  con- 
fidence in  the  new  Monarch  who  declared  his  intention  of  grant- 
ing his  land  "  legally-free  "  institutions,  and  of  later  withdraw- 
ing to  private  life.  But  he  was  an  inexperienced  youth  who 
knew  neither  the  country  nor  himself ;  by  the  aid  of  his  friends  — 
councillors  whom  the  conservatives  of  the  time  unjustly  named 
"  a  Jacobine  band  " —  Alexander  became  convinced  of  the  great 
difficulty  of  realising  his  dreams  and  political  plans.  At  the 
same  time  he  became  interested  in  the  great  events  of  Western 
Europe,  and  discovered  in  himself  an  inclination  and  vocation  for 
diplomacy.  As  a  result,  the  state-reforms  of  his  first  five  years 
did  not  go  further  than  the  institution  of  the  ministries  and  the 
very  moderate  reform  of  the  Senate.  The  most  important 
obstacles  for  a  progressive  movement  were  found  to  be :  Serfdom, 
the  liquidation  of  which  was  difficult  without  preparation,  and 
the  almost  total  absence  of  education  among  the  people.  For 
the  removal  of  the  last  obstacle  much  had  been  done  in  the  first 
years  of  Alexander's  reign  which  are  justly  considered  the  most 
brilliant  epoch  in  the  history  of  Russian  education  in  the  nine- 
teenth century.  During  the  same  period,  owing  to  external  and 
internal  peace,  Russian  commerce  and  industry  flourished  very 


SUMMARY  OF  ALEXANDER'S  REIGN        215 

markedly.  The  first  measures  for  the  improvement  of  the 
peasant-life  were  also  inaugurated  and,  in  the  Ostsee  region  — 
for  the  limitation  of  the  landowners'  power. 

The  wars  of  1805-07,  the  defeat  of  the  Russian  armies,  and 
the  complete  subjugation  of  their  allies  by  Napoleon,  had  enor- 
mous consequences  for  the  further  course  of  Russian  affairs: 
Russia  could  no  longer  stand  aloof  from  the  events  that  took 
place  in  Western  Europe,  and  was  forced  by  Alexander's  policy 
to  participate  to  the  end  in  those  affairs.  The  Treaty  of  Tilsit 
placed  Alexander  in  a  difficult  position.  He  was  not  so  vain  as 
to  be  flattered  for  a  moment  with  the  role  of  the  only  equal 
ally  and  friend  of  the  great  conqueror  of  Europe.  He  was 
little  attracted  by  Napoleon's  proposal  to  divide  between  them 
the  dominion  of  the  world;  moreover,  he  knew  how  to  value 
Napoleon's  words  and  suggestions,  and  the  necessity  of  con- 
cluding a  close  alliance  with  a  man  whom  a  few  months  before 
he  had  declared  from  church  pulpits  to  be  the  enemy  of  Christen- 
dom and  of  all  mankind,  was  not  very  pleasant  for  him.  At 
Tilsit  he  acted  in  direct  opposition  to  the  thoughts  and  aspira- 
tions of  his  people;  the  Continental  System  had  added  to 
Russia's  moral  humiliation  also  material  ruination.  Those  con- 
ditions weakened  and  almost  destroyed  the  popularity  which 
Alexander  had  theretofore  enjoyed  in  his  country;  they  had 
also  forced  many  minds  to  turn  for  the  first  time  to  political 
questions,  and  to  stand  in  conscious  opposition  to  the  Govern- 
ment. Men  of  such  opposite  views  as  Karamzin  and  Speransky 
testified  alike  about  the  dissatisfaction  of  Russia.  The  un- 
realised reconstruction  of  Speransky  could  not  improve  mat- 
ters, and  his  financial  plan,  also,  in  a  large  measure,  not  carried 
out,  with  all  its  merits,  only  helped  to  open  the  public's  eyes  to 
the  evils  of  the  former  and  subsequent  financial  policy,  and  on  the 
inevitability  of  further  ruin,  from  which  the  country  could  no 
longer  be  saved  either  by  the  abrogation  of  the  Continental  Sys- 
tem or  by  the  beneficial  tariff  of  1810. 


216  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

This  extremely  tense  and  difficult  situation  was  relieved  by  the 
War  of  1812.  Although  the  terrible  sufferings  and  sacrifices 
caused  by  that  war  had  devastated  the  most  developed  part  of  the 
country  and  had  ruined  almost  irretrievably  a  large  portion  of 
the  landowners'  wealth,  the  results  appeared  redeeming  in  the 
eyes  of  the  population.  The  people  stood  the  test  heroically,  and 
the  War  of  1812  proved  the  power  of  Russia's  national  con- 
sciousness and  firmness.  If  the  consequences  of  the  Tilsit  Treaty 
and  of  the  Continental  System  had  been  important  for  the  forma- 
tion of  a  critical  and  oppositional  attitude  in  the  public,  the  con- 
sequences of  Russia's  participation  in  the  Napoleonic  wars  and  in 
the  overthrow  of  Napoleon  were  immeasurably  more  important 
for  all  the  further  development  of  Russian  life.  They  were 
enormous,  appeared  in  various  spheres  and  currents,  and  have  in 
various  ways  helped  the  acceleration  of  the  decay  and  liquidation 
of  the  established  social  and  political  order.  Later  in  the  matter 
of  the  abolition  of  serfdom  we  shall  see  more  clearly  the  impor- 
tance of  the  ruin  and  indebtedness  of  the  landowners.  On  the 
other  hand,  I  have  already  noted  the  significance  of  the  fact  that  a 
mass  of  young,  educated,  and  susceptible  representatives  of  Rus- 
sian society  had  been  present  in  Western  Europe  at  the  very  mo- 
ment of  the  reorganisation  of  that  society,  and  had  had  an  oppor- 
tunity of  getting  acquainted  with  all  sides  of  European  life, 
owing  to  the  length  of  their  stay  there ;  many  had  stayed  on  even 
after  the  conclusion  of  peace,  during  the  three  years'  stay  of 
Vorontzov's  occupational  corps  in  France.  That  circumstance 
had  prepared  the  formation  of  the  secret  societies  of  the  first  and 
second  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century.  We  have  seen  how 
after  the  wars  the  public  once  more  put  their  hopes  in  Alexan- 
der's reformatory  activity,  the  more  so  since  he  had  confirmed  his 
liberal  views  through  the  constitutions  that  were  given  by  him 
or  by  his  intercession  to  Poland,  Finland,  France,  and  Sweden. 
We  have  also  seen  how  Alexander  had  for  the  second  time  disap- 
pointed those  expectations,  expectations  no  longer  of  the  naive 


ALEXANDER'S  MOOD  IN  1825  217 

nature  that  they  possessed  at  the  beginning  of  his  reign ;  we  have 
seen  how,  carried  away  by  his  role  in  the  destinies  of  all  nations, 
he  was  unable  to  devote  sufficient  attention  to  the  needs  and 
interests  of  Russia's  internal  life,  where  the  activity  of  the  Gov- 
ernment expressed  itself  now  in  the  establishment  of  Military 
Colonies,  and  in  the  distortion  of  the  whole  system  of  popular 
education. 

In  the  last  period  of  Alexander's  reign,  when  he  became  disap- 
pointed in  the  possibility  of  a  peaceful  development  of  liberal  in- 
stitutions and  constitutional  principles,  and  when  between  him 
and  Metternich  had  been  established  a  complete  entente  cordiale 
in  foreign  affairs,  while  in  the  internal  affairs  there  had  grown 
a  deep  gulf  between  him  and  the  thinking  public, —  then  the  last 
hope  for  achieving  a  mitigation  of  the  Government's  despotism 
in  a  peaceful  way  had  disappeared,  and  the  secret  societies  which 
had  had  no  definitely  revolutionary  character  at  their  formation, 
grew  rapidly  outspokenly  revolutionary. 

Alexander's  biographer,  Schilder,  asserts  that  had  not  Alex- 
ander died  on  November  19,  1825,  at  Taganrog,  one  could  have 
expected  by  some  imperceptible  signs  a  new  turn  in  his  views  and 
mood,  and  that  he  would  perhaps  have  been  able  to  bring  Russia 
out  of  the  state  of  internal  disruption  into  which  he  had  hurled 
her  in  the  end.  I  do  not  think  so.  In  my  opinion  Alexander 
had  accomplished  all  he  could,  and  in  this  respect  he  died  in  time. 
Had  he  not  died  he  would  have  abdicated  rather  than  launch  out 
on  a  new  course.  In  a  fatal  way  he  had  destroyed  for  himself 
the  possibility  of  a  consequential  and  regulated  leadership  of 
Russia  on  the  way  of  progress  and  fundamental  improvement  of 
her  state,  destroyed  it  by  being  carried  away  with  the  chance 
for  participation  in  the  world-events  of  his  time.  But  it  is  very 
probable  that  had  he  not  done  so,  had  he  not  dragged  Russia  into 
war  with  Napoleon  in  1805,  had  he  been  able  to  continue  the 
peaceful  (in  fact,  hesitating)  way  in  which  he  led  the  country 
at  the  beginning  of  his  reign  —  he  would  have  after  all  not 


218  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

accelerated  but  rather  retarded  the  process  of  internal  develop- 
ment in  Russia.  With  his  unpreparedness,  inexperience,  lack  of 
faithful  co-workers,  and  under  the  conditions  in  which  Russia 
had  been  then,  that  process  would  have  taken  a  very  long  time. 
The  shocks  that  followed  the  wars  of  1805-1807,  and  that 
aroused  the  public  from  its  former  passive-optimistic  state;  the 
economic  and  material  jolts  that  came  as  a  result  of  the  Tilsit 
Treaty  and  the  War  of  1812 ;  the  great  moral  acquisitions  which 
Russian  society  had  made  during  the  Napoleonic  wars  —  served, 
I  think,  as  more  potent  factors  in  the  socio-political  process  of 
Russia's  development  in  the  nineteenth  century.  Great  changes 
took  place  in  the  course  of  that  process  after  the  Napoleonic 
wars  under  the  influence  of  the  events  of  Alexander's  reign; 
the  importance  of  those  changes  will  appear  clearer  to  us  when 
we  shall  get  acquainted  with  the  circumstances  of  Russia's  devel- 
opment in  the  following  thirty  years. 

In  summarising  the  reign  of  Alexander,  it  may  be  not  useless 
to  consider  a  few  facts  and  figures. 

In  regard  to  the  state-territory,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
country  did  not  need  any  territorial  expansion,  of  which  Alex- 
ander himself  was  well  aware,  during  his  reign  the  territorial 
acquisitions  were  enormous.  First  of  all,  Gruzia  came  volun- 
tarily under  Russian  dominion,  trying  to  save  herself  from 
Persia.  This  peaceful  annexation  provoked,  however,  a  war 
with  Persia  and  with  the  warlike  mountaineers  of  the  Cau- 
casus; as  a  result,  by  the  end  of  Alexander's  reign  there  were 
conquered  considerable  lands  west  and  east  of  Gruzia,  which 
pushed  the  frontiers  of  Russian  Trans-Caucasia  to  the  shores  of 
the  Black  and  Caspian  seas.  This  occasioned  a  long  war  for  the 
complete  conquest  of  the  Caucasus,  that  was  ended  only  under 
Alexander  II. 

Next  there  were  annexed  the  Kirghiz  lands,  namely,  Ust-Urt 
(between  the  Caspian  and  Aral  seas)  and  the  enormous  Akhmo- 
linsk  region,  in  space  as  large  as  any  secondary  European  Power. 


TERRITORIAL  GROWTH  OF  RUSSIA        219 

Then  Bessarabia  was  annexed;  strictly  speaking,  its  possession 
was  by  no  means  necessary  for  Russia.  Earlier  still  Finland  had 
been  conquered.  Possibly  this  conquest,  especially  of  the  shores 
of  the  Gulf  of  Finland,  was  indeed  necessary  strategically  for 
the  organisation  of  an  adequate  defence  of  Petrograd  in  case  of 
war  with  Sweden  or  England ;  but  Finland  was  annexed  as  far  as 
the  Arctic  Ocean,  i.e.,  in  absolutely  superfluous  limits. 

Finally  the  Kingdom  of  Poland,  whose  fate  has  been  so 
closely  knit  with  the  course  of  Russian  social  movements,  was 
annexed. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  territorial  acquisitions  were  very  large. 
The  annexation  of  those  frontier-lands  has  brought  out  during 
the  nineteenth  century  the  race-question,  which  had  not  existed  to 
any  marked  degree  before.  Even  in  Alexander's  time  the  na- 
tional question  had  been  widely  discussed  and  differently  solved 
among  intellectual  circles,  particularly  among  radicals:  Pestel 
decided  it  centralistically,  while  Nikita  Muraviov  was  inclined 
toward  Federalism.  Naturally  enough,  Karamzin  considered 
the  question  from  a  nationalistic  point  of  view,  undoubtedly  the 
most  popular  view  at  that  time. 

In  regard  to  ways  of  communication  which  should  unite  the 
enormous  territory,  at  the  beginning  of  Alexander's  reign  much 
had  been  done  for  the  development  and  improvement  of  water- 
ways, by  a  net  of  canals;  this  circumstance  has  had  a  great  im- 
portance for  the  development  of  the  transportation  of  raw 
material  to  ports  for  export  abroad,  but  for  internal  communica- 
tion the  canals  had  but  a  secondary  significance. 

Land-roads  were  built  without  system ;  the  slowness  of  com- 
munications remained  as  before :  for  instance,  the  news  of  Alex- 
ander's death  reached  Petrograd  only  on  the  eighth  day,  with  all 
the  hard  riding  of  couriers. 

As  to  the  population,  its  growth,  as  we  have  seen,  had  vacil- 
lated considerably.  During  the  first  five  years  of  the  century 
there  was  an  increase  of  two  million  six  hundred  thousand  per- 


220  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

sons  of  both  sexes;  in  the  next  five  years,  an  increase  of  two 
million  one  hundred  thousand,  but  in  the  following  five  years,  in 
view  of  the  wars  and  epidemics,  the  increase  amounted  only  to 
one  million  four  hundred  and  ninety-five  thousand;  in  the  five 
years  after  the  war  the  population  increased  by  three  million  one 
hundred  and  forty-nine  thousand,  and  in  the  following  five 
years,  by  three  million  one  hundred  and  seventy-four  thousand. 
In  the  last  five  years  the  growth  of  the  population  was  checked 
by  the  failure  of  crops,  which  caused  epidemics  and  famines. 

Industry  developed,  on  the  whole,  considerably,  though  it 
often  met  with  strong  obstacles.  The  brilliant  period  of  its  de- 
velopment was  in  the  first  years  of  the  reign,  when  it  breathed 
freely  after  the  regime  of  Paul.  Then  came  the  time  of  the  first 
Napoleonic  war  and  the  Continental  System  which  destroyed  the 
normal  course  of  the  industrial  development,  although  it  aided, 
in  part,  the  development  of  cotton-thread  production,  since  in  the 
absence  of  thread  imported  from  England  Russia  began  to  pro- 
duce it  from  cotton  imported  from  Central-Asiatic  Khanates. 

After  the  tariff  of  1810  the  manufacturing  industry  began  to 
develop  quite  rapidly,  but  later  it  was  checked  by  the  liberal 
tariffs  of  1816  and  1819,  and  only  after  the  tariff  of  1822  the 
protectionist  legislation  again  aided  its  development. 

As  to  commerce,  as  a  consequence  of  those  constant  changes  in 
the  custom-tariffs,  that  occurred  in  connection  with  the  Govern- 
ment's cares  for  a  favourable  balance  of  trade,  and  because  of 
the  wars, —  it  underwent  big  shocks,  from  which  foreign  trade 
suffered  most. 


PART  TWO 


CHAPTER  XIV 

BY  the  time  of  the  accession  of  Nicolas,  the  Govern- 
ment was  in  a  quite  complicated  and  even  threatening 
situation.  We  have  seen  that  from  the  beginning  of 
Alexander's  reign  a  mass  of  problems  had  accumulated,  the  solu- 
tion of  which  was  impatiently  awaited  by  that  part  of  Russian 
society  which,  after  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit  and  the  Continental 
System,  had  become  accustomed  to  an  oppositional  attitude,  and 
had  acquired  definite  political  views  after  the  contact  with 
Western  Europe  during  1813-15.  Those  views  were  in  direct 
opposition  to  the  reactionary-obscurantist  tendency  of  the 
Government  at  the  end  of  Alexander's  reign.  We  have  ob- 
served how  bitter  dissatisfaction  had  developed  among  the  pro- 
gressive intelligentzia,  and  how  it  was  expressed  in  the  form 
of  a  conspiracy  which  had  radical  revolutionary  aims. 

Owing  to  casual  circumstances,  that  revolutionary  movement 
ended  in  the  premature  and  unprepared  explosion  of  December 
14,  1825 — an  explosion  which  allowed  the  government  of 
Nicolas  to  liquidate  and  suppress  the  movement  by  cruel  re- 
pressive measures.  As  a  result  the  land  was  deprived  of  the 
best,  most  alive  and  original  representatives  of  its  progressive, 
thinking  society,  the  remaining  members  of  which  were  intimi- 
dated and  terrorised  by  the  repressions,  while  the  Government 
throughout  the  reign  of  Nicolas  found  itself  entirely  divorced 
from  the  intellectual  forces. 

More  important  and  difficult  than  the  political  and  adminis- 
trative tasks  that  loomed  before  Nicolas,  were  the  socio- 
economical  tasks  that  under  the  influence  of  the  general  de- 

223 


224  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

velopment  of  the  social  process  in  Russia,  whose  course  was 
sharpened  and  accelerated  by  the  Napoleonic  wars,  had  ripened 
by  the  time  of  his  accession.  The  development  of  that  process 
continued  to  advance  and  grow  acute  during  the  reign  of 
Nicolas,  and  brought  it  in  the  end  to  a  crisis,  under  the  in- 
fluence of  a  new  external  stimulus  —  the  unhappy  Crimean 
Campaign,  which  moved  to  the  front  with  a  fatal  inevitability 
the  period  of  the  great  reforms  of  the  Fifties  and  Sixties. 

We  are  now  to  study  the  events  and  facts  in  which  the  course 
of  that  process  had  been  manifested. 

The  accession  of  Nicolas  took  place  under  quite  exceptional 
conditions  caused  by  the  unexpected  death  of  Alexander  and  by 
his  strange  orders  in  regard  to  the  succession.  By  the  law  of 
1797,  issued  by  Paul,  if  the  emperor  left  no  son  he  was  to  be 
succeeded  by  his  next  brother.  As  Alexander  left  no  children 
at  his  death,  the  throne  should  have  been  occupied  by  his 
brother,  Constantine.  But  in  the  first  place  Constantine  had 
a  natural  dislike  for  reigning,  as  he  had  declared  on  many  oc- 
casions; then  his  family  circumstances  placed  some  obstacles  in 
the  way  of  his  accession.  In  1803  his  first  wife  left  him  and 
Russia,  and  after  having  obtained  a  divorce,  Constantine  mar- 
ried for  the  second  time,  the  Polish  Countess,  Jeannette  Grud- 
zinsky,  who  received  the  title  of  Illustrious  Princess  Lovich. 
The  marriage  was  morganatic,  and  Constantine  in  contracting 
it  acted  as  if  he  gave  up  his  rights  of  succession.  The  circum- 
stances had  thus  pointed  out  the  possibility  of  the  transference 
of  the  throne-rights  to  Constantine's  younger  brother.  Yet 
Constantine  had  kept  up  to  the  death  of  Alexander  the  title  of 
heir  and  Tzesarevich.  Although  Nicolas  in  later  years  often 
remarked  that  he  had  not  expected  to  reign,  the  probability  of 
his  succession  had  been  quite  evident  to  all.  Alexander  himself 
openly  hinted  to  Nicolas  in  1812  that  he  would  have  to  reign, 
and  in  1819  he  frankly  declared  it  to  him,  warning  him  about 
the  possibility  of  his  own  abdication  before  very  long. 


THE  QUESTION  OF  THE  SUCCESSION      225 

In  1823  Alexander  formally  arranged  the  matter,  not  so 
much  in  the  event  of  death  as  in  case  he  should  abdicate,  which 
he  had  been  seriously  thinking  of  doing  at  that  time.  Even  in 
1822  Alexander  received  from  Constantine  a  written  abdica- 
tion, and  had  a  manifesto  prepared,  in  which  Constantine's 
abdication  was  declared  correct,  and  Nicolas  was  "  appointed  " 
as  his  successor.  This  was  in  full  accord  with  the  circumstance 
that  in  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  Alexander  there  were  the  words, 
"  and  to  the  heir  who  will  be  appointed."  But  for  some  reason 
that  manifesto  was  not  published;  instead  Alexander  ordered 
Prince  Golitzin  to  make  three  copies  of  it,  then  the  original 
was  given  to  Metropolitan  Filaret  to  be  placed  and  kept  in 
strictest  secrecy  on  the  altar  of  the  Cathedral  of  Assumption  at 
Moscow;  the  three  copies  were  distributed  among  the  State 
Council,  the  Senate,  and  the  Synod,  in  sealed  envelopes,  on  one 
of  which,  given  to  the  State  Council,  was  an  inscription  in 
Alexander's  own  hand :  "  To  keep  until  recalled,  and  in  case 
of  my  death  be  opened  before  taking  any  other  measure,  in  extra 
session."  Similar  inscriptions  were  made  on  the  other  two  en- 
velopes. The  manifesto  was  known  only  to  the  Dowager  Em- 
press Marie,  to  Constantine,  who  did  not  see  it  but  knew  about 
its  existence,  to  Golitzin,  and  Filaret.  The  only  plausible  ex- 
planation for  such  conduct  may  be  the  fact  that  Alexander  made 
the  arrangement  mainly  with  his  abdication  in  view,  and  since 
that  act  would  have  been  voluntary  he  hoped  that  the  whole 
matter  would  remain  in  his  hands. 

When  on  November  27,  1825,  the  news  of  Alexander's  death 
reached  Petrograd,  Nicolas  did  not  deem  it  proper  to  make  use 
of  an  unpublished  document,  and  knowing  from  Miloradovich 
that  the  Guards  in  the  capital  were  by  no  means  disposed  to- 
wards him,  he  decided  not  to  ascend  the  throne  until  Constan- 
tine had  formally  and  solemnly  abdicated  in  his  favour.  For 
this  reason  he  took  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  Constantine  as  the 
legal  Sovereign,  and  not  heeding  Golitzin  who  advised  him  to 


226  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

open  the  sealed  envelope  containing  the  copy  of  the  manifesto, 
which  had  been  kept  in  the  State  Council,  ordered  all  the  troops 
of  the  Petrograd  district  swear  allegiance  to  the  Emperor  Con- 
stantine.  Then  he  sent  a  special  courier  to  Constantine  with  a 
report  about  the  administered  oath  and  with  an  expression  of 
his  loyal  feelings. 

Constantine  replied  through  his  brother  Mikhail  who  had 
been  visiting  him  at  Warsaw,  that  he  had  abdicated  long  ago; 
but  he  wrote  this  in  a  personal  letter,  without  giving  the  act  any 
official  character.  Nicolas  considered  such  a  letter  insufficient, 
the  more  so  since  the  Governor-General  of  Petrograd,  Count 
Miloradovich,  advised  him  to  act  with  the  utmost  caution,  in 
view  of  the  indisposition  of  the  Guards  towards  him. 

To  avoid  misunderstandings,  Nicolas  despatched  another 
courier,  requesting  Constantine  to  come  to  Petrograd  and  per- 
sonally confirm  his  abdication.  But  Constantine  again  an- 
swered in  a  private  letter  that  he  had  abdicated  during  Alex- 
ander's lifetime,  that  he  could  not  come  personally,  and  that 
if  his  arrival  were  insisted  upon,  he  would  take  himself  still 
farther  away.  Then  Nicolas  decided  to  bring  these  negotia- 
tions which  had  lasted  two  weeks  to  an  end,  and  to  declare  his 
own  accession.  The  manifesto,  written  by  Speransky  and 
Karamzin,  was  ready  on  December  1 2,  but  it  was  not  published 
until  December  14,  which  day  was  appointed  for  the  general 
oath-taking  to  the  new  Emperor. 

By  the  end  of  that  unusual  interregnum  Nicolas  had  received 
alarming  information  from  various  sources  about  the  state  of 
mind  in  Petrograd  and  throughout  Russia;  but  Miloradovich, 
though  recommending  caution,  denied  the  possibility  of  a  serious 
mutiny. 

In  the  meantime  the  members  of  the  Secret  Society,  who  were 
in  Petrograd,  decided  to  make  use  of  the  unique  confusion  for 
their  own  purposes ;  it  appeared  to  them  that  there  could  not  be  a 


INSURRECTION  OF  DECEMBER  14          227 

more  favourable  moment  for  raising  a  revolt  and  demanding  a 
constitution. 

On  December  14,  when  a  manifesto  was  issued  regarding  the 
abdication  of  Constantine  and  the  accession  of  Nicolas,  the 
members  of  the  Northern  Society,  chiefly  officers  of  the  Guard 
and  of  the  Navy,  who  gathered  daily  at  Ryleiev's,  made  an  at- 
tempt to  persuade  the  soldiers  that  Constantine  had  not  abdi- 
cated, that  Nicolas  acted  against  the  law,  and  that  they  had  to 
keep  to  their  first  oath  to  Constantine,  and  demand  a  constitu- 
tion. The  conspirators  succeeded,  however,  in  persuading  only 
one  regiment  of  the  Guards  —  the  Moscow  regiment;  its  ex- 
ample was  followed  by  several  companies  of  the  Guard-Marines, 
and  by  single  officers  and  soldiers  from  various  parts.  The 
rebels  gathered  on  the  Senate  Square,  declared  that  they  con- 
sidered Constantine  the  lawful  Emperor,  refused  to  swear  al- 
legiance to  Nicolas,  and  demanded  a  constitution. 

Nicolas  regarded  the  matter  as  serious;  still  he  wanted  to 
undertake  measures  for  ending  it  if  possible  without  bloodshed. 
With  this  view  he  at  first  sent  Miloradovich  who  enjoyed  a 
great  prestige  in  the  army  as  a  war-general,  and  was  especially 
loved  by  the  soldiers,  to  talk  to  the  mutineers.  But  when 
Miloradovich  approached  the  rebels  and  began  to  speak  to  them, 
Kakhovsky,  one  of  the  conspirators,  fired  at  him,  and  Milorado- 
vich fell  from  his  horse,  deadly  wounded.  As  the  rebels  were 
joined  in  the  meantime  by  several  artillery-batteries,  Grand 
Duke  Mikhail,  the  Chief  of  Artillery,  offered  to  come  out  to 
them  for  negotiations,  but  he  was  also  fired  at  by  Wilhelm 
Kiichelberg,  and  had  to  withdraw.  Nicolas  ordered  an  attack 
by  the  Cavalry  Guards,  under  the  command  of  Alexey  Orlov, 
brother  of  the  former  member  of  the  Union  of  Welfare.  Orlov 
moved  his  men,  but  their  horses  were  not  shod  properly,  and 
could  not  speed  over  the  rimed  ground.  The  Generals  then 
pointed  out  to  Nicolas  that  it  was  necessary  to  bring  a  prompt 


228  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

end  to  the  matter,  since  the  civil  population  was  beginning  to 
join  the  rebels.  Nicolas  ordered  a  charge;  after  a  few  volleys 
of  grape-shot  the  crowd  was  turned  to  flight;  but  the  firing  at 
the  people  continued  and  they  fled  over  the  Isaac  Bridge  to  the 
Basil  Island.  A  considerable  number  of  dead  and  wounded 
were  left. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  that  was  the  end  of  the  Petrograd  up- 
rising. The  other  troops  took  the  oath  promptly,  and  the  in- 
cident was  closed.  Nicolas  ordered  all  corpses  and  traces  of  the 
event  to  be  removed  by  the  next  day,  and  the  obedient  Chief  of 
Police,  Shulgin,  ordered  the  corpses  thrown  into  the  ice-holes  on 
the  Neva;  rumours  circulated  that  in  the  haste  with  which  the 
work  was  done,  wounded  were  thrown  into  the  river  along  with 
the  dead.  It  was  discovered  later  that  a  number  of  corpses 
had  frozen  to  the  ice,  on  the  Basil  Island  side;  an  order  was 
issued  not  to  use  the  water  on  that  side  during  the  winter,  and 
not  to  cut  ice  there,  since  parts  of  human  bodies  were  found 
in  it.  Such  was  the  dark  event  with  which  the  new  reign 
opened. 

Searches  and  arrests  throughout  Petrograd  followed. 
Among  the  several  hundred  arrested  there  were  many  not  con- 
nected with  the  affair,  but  the  main  leaders  were  apprehended. 

Yet  on  December  10  Nicolas  received  the  first  warning  from 
the  young  lieutenant  Rostovtzev  about  the  threatening  disturb- 
ances among  the  Guards,  and  about  the  same  time  he  received 
from  Dibich  (the  Chief  of  His  Majesty's  Staff  in  Taganrog) 
a  copy  of  the  reports  about  the  conspiracy  of  the  Southern 
Society;  an  attempt  was  also  made  to  bring  about  an  uprising 
in  January,  1826,  by  Sergey  Muraviov,  at  Bielaia-Tzerkov. 
Nicolas  ordered  an  investigation  of  all  secret  societies  at  once, 
and  this  work  occupied  the  first  months  of  his  reign. 

But  before  we  deal  with  the  first  actions  of  Nicolas,  it  is 
necessary  to  give  some  information  about  his  personality.  He 
was  the  third  son  of  Paul,  and  was  in  his  fifth  year  at  his 


PERSONALITY  OF  NICOLAS  I  229 

father's  death.  The  Dowager  Empress  took  over  his  educa- 
tion, and  Alexander  from  false  delicacy  did  not  interfere,  though 
it  would  seem  that  the  education  of  a  possible  heir  to  the  throne 
was  not  a  private  but  a  state-affair.  Most  of  Nicolas'  biogra- 
phers assert  that  he  was  brought  up  not  as  a  future  heir,  but  as 
an  ordinary  Grand  Duke  being  prepared  for  military  service. 
This  view  is  not  correct,  as  the  members  of  the  Imperial  family 
could  not  have  been  ignorant  of  the  probable  accession  of 
Nicolas,  and  moreover,  Empress  Marie  knew  that  Constantine 
did  not  want  to  reign,  and  that  neither  he  nor  Alexander 
had  children.  Nicolas  was  brought  up  as  an  heir  to  the  throne, 
but  his  education  was  quite  different  in  every  respect  from  that 
of  Alexander. 

Although  Empress  Marie  had  endeavoured  to  keep  Nicolas 
from  becoming  attached  to  military  service,  he  revealed  quite 
early  militaristic  inclinations.  Instead  of  La  Harpe  his  mother 
entrusted  his  education  to  an  old  German  routinist,  General 
Lamsdorff,  whom  the  Empress  called  in  intimate  conversations 
and  in  her  letters,  "papa  Lamsdorf"  Nicolas  was  a  rude, 
obstinate,  arrogant  boy;  Lamsdorff  tried  to  eradicate  those  de- 
fects by  corporal  punishments  which  he  employed  in  liberal 
doses.  His  games  with  his  younger  brother  usually  took  on  a 
military  character,  and  ended  in  most  cases  in  a  fight,  owing  to 
Nicolas'  pugnaciousness  and  wilfulness.  The  court  atmosphere 
was  also  such  as  deprived  the  education  of  family-intimacy.  His 
teachers  were  of  a  casual  and  poor  selection.  For  instance,  his 
governor,  a  French  emigre,  Du-Pouge,  taught  him  French  and 
history,  without  being  adequately  prepared  for  either  subject. 
All  his  instruction  was  reduced  to  inspiring  the  boy  with  hatred 
for  revolutionary  and  liberal  views.  Nicolas  was  a  poor  pupil ; 
all  his  teachers  complained  that  he  showed  no  progress,  except  in 
drawing.  Later,  however,  he  manifested  quite  brilliant  abilities 
in  military  science. 

When  he  passed  the  age  of  childhood,  he  was  placed  in  care 


230  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

of  respectable  and  learned  instructors.  Academic  Storch  lec- 
tured to  him  on  political  economy;  Professor  Balugiansky, 
Speransky's  instructor  in  financial  science,  taught  him  history 
and  the  theory  of  finance.  But  Nicolas  himself  confessed  later 
that  during  those  lectures  he  yawned,  and  managed  to  remember 
nothing  of  them.  Military  science  was  taught  him  by  General- 
of-engineering,  Opperman,  and  by  various  officers  recommended 
by  Opperman. 

Empress  Marie  had  intended  to  send  Nicolas  and  Mikhail 
to  the  university  of  Leipzig,  but  Alexander  interfered  unex- 
pectedly with  his  veto,  and  suggested  instead  that  they  be  sent 
to  the  projected  Lyceum  in  Tzarskoie  Selo,  but  when  that 
Lyceum  was  opened  in  1811,  the  Grand  Dukes  were  not  sent 
there,  and  their  education  came  thus  to  an  end. 

In  1812  Nicolas,  then  sixteen  years  old,  begged  Alexander  to 
allow  him  to  take  part  in  active  service,  but  the  Emperor  refused, 
and  hinted  that  in  the  future  he  might  play  a  more  important 
role  which  did  not  permit  him  to  risk  his  life,  and  obliged  him 
to  put  more  effort  in  preparing  himself  for  his  high  and  dif- 
ficult mission. 

In  1814  Alexander  allowed  his  brothers  to  take  part  in  the 
war,  but  they  arrived  late,  when  the  Allied  armies  had  already 
entered  Paris.  Nicolas  was  also  late  in  1815  when  Alexander 
gave  him  permission  to  go  to  the  front  against  Napoleon.  Thus 
Nicolas  did  not  see  a  real  battle  during  the  Napoleonic  wars, 
and  was  present  only  at  the  brilliant  reviews  and  manoeuvres 
that  followed  the  campaigns  of  1814  and  1815. 

In  order  to  complete  the  characterisation  of  Nicolas'  educa- 
tion, we  must  mention  that  in  1816  he  undertook  a  journey 
through  Russia,  with  the  view  of  getting  acquainted  with  his 
country,  and  after  this  he  was  allowed  to  travel  in  Western 
Europe.  But  those  trips  were  performed  with  dizzying  speed, 
so  to  speak,  and  the  young  Grand  Duke  was  able  to  see  Russia 


NICHOLAS'  MARRIAGE  231 

only  superficially  —  its  external  side.  In  the  same  way  he 
travelled  through  Europe.  Only  in  England  he  stayed  some- 
what longer,  visited  the  Parliament,  clubs,  meetings  —  which 
filled  him  with  disgust  —  and  even  called  at  New  Lanark  on 
Robert  Owen,  whose  attempts  to  improve  of  labour-conditions 
made  a  very  favourable  impression  upon  him. 

It  is  curious  that  Empress  Marie  feared  lest  the  young  Grand 
Duke  become  infatuated  with  the  constitutional  forms  of  Eng- 
land, and  she  requested  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Count 
Nesselrode,  to  compose  a  proper  memorandum  for  Nicolas,  with 
the  purpose  of  restraining  him  from  such  infatuations.  But  the 
impressions  which  Nicolas  had  carried  out  from  his  English 
voyage  proved  that  the  memorandum  was  absolutely  super- 
fluous :  his  previous  education  had  evidently  insured  him  against 
any  liberal  temptations. 

His  European  travels  ended  with  his  wooing  the  daughter 
of  the  King  of  Prussia,  Princess  Charlotte,  whom  he  married  in 
1817;  she  accepted  the  Orthodox  creed  and  the  name  of  Alex- 
andra Feodorovna.  In  1818,  at  the  age  of  21,  Nicolas  be- 
came a  father  of  the  future  emperor  Alexander  II.  The  last 
years  of  Alexander  I's  reign  were  spent  by  Nicolas  in  family- 
happiness  and  in  military  service,  though  Alexander  warned 
him  and  his  consort  in  1819  that  he  was  feeling  tired  and  might 
abdicate,  and  that  Constantine  would  not  reign.  Then  in  1820 
Alexander  called  Nicolas  out  to  the  Congress  of  Leibach,  argu- 
ing that  his  brother  ought  to  be  acquainted  with  the  course  of 
foreign  affairs,  and  that  the  representatives  of  the  European 
Powers  should  become  accustomed  to  seeing  in  him  the  succes- 
sor of  Alexander  and  the  follower  of  his  policy. 

In  spite  of  those  conversations  no  changes  took  place  in 
Nicolas'  life.  In  1817  he  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  General, 
and  almost  to  the  end  of  his  reign  he  remained  commander  of  a 
Guard-brigade.  The  work  was  tedious  and  hardly  instructive 


232  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

for  the  future  ruler  of  a  great  empire ;  at  the  same  time  it  was 
combined  with  unpleasant  duties,  since  the  main  task  of  the 
Grand  Duke  consisted  in  restoring  in  the  army  that  external 
discipline  which  had  been  greatly  weakened  during  the  foreign 
campaigns  where  the  officers  were  accustomed  to  obey  military 
regulations  only  at  the  front,  while  outside  of  it  they  considered 
themselves  free  citizens,  and  even  wore  civil  garments.  With 
these  habits  they  returned  to  Russia.  Alexander,  who  par- 
ticularly cared  for  the  preservation  of  the  military  spirit  in  the 
army,  desired  to  "  pull  up  "  the  officers,  especially  those  of  the 
Guards.  In  this  matter  of  "  pulling  up  "  Nicolas  appeared  to 
be  a  most  ardent  and  energetic  missionary.  In  his  reports  he 
complained  about  the  difficulties  in  accomplishing  his  task,  in 
view  of  the  dissatisfaction  and  even  protests  on  the  part  of  the 
officers  who  belonged  to  the  highest  society  and  were  "  infected  " 
with  free  thoughts.  In  his  activity  Nicolas  often  met  with  the 
disapproval  of  his  superiors,  and  soon  with  his  pedantry  and 
strictness  he  aroused  the  general  hatred  of  the  Guards  to  such 
an  extent  that  during  the  interregnum  in  1825  Miloradovich 
felt  obliged,  as  we  have  seen,  to  warn  him  about  the  prevailing 
mood  among  the  Guards,  and  to  recommend  caution. 

Alexander,  strangely  enough,  did  not  try  to  prepare  him  for 
the  management  of  state-affairs,  and  did  not  introduce  him  to 
the  work  of  the  State  Council  and  other  institutions,  so  that 
Nicolas  ascended  the  throne  unprepared  either  in  theory  or  in 
practice,  although  there  exists  an  opinion  that  after  the  numerous 
admonitions  of  Alexander,  Nicolas  began  to  interest  himself 
theoretically  with  state-matters. 

His  home-entourage,  on  the  other  hand,  showed  that  he  was 
not  always  the  unpleasant,  severe  pedant  of  the  brigade.  Among 
the  people  who  stood  close  to  his  family  circle  was  Vassily 
Zhukovsky,  the  famous  poet,  who  was  at  first  invited  to  teach 
Russian  to  the  Grand  Duchess  Alexandra,  and  later  became  the 


INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  SOCIETIES        233 

tutor  of  their  eldest  son.  Nicolas'  chief  friend  in  service  was 
General  Paskevich,  a  strict,  soulless,  vain  militarist,  who  later 
played  an  important  role  in  reorganising  the  Russian  army. 

Having  ascended  the  throne  under  conditions  described  above, 
Nicolas  determined  to  investigate  first  of  all  the  causes  and 
threads  of  the  "  sedition  "  which  in  his  conception  nearly  de- 
stroyed the  State  on  December  14.  He  undoubtedly  exagger- 
ated the  importance  and  number  of  the  secret  societies,  and  was 
always  fond  of  speaking  in  lofty  tones  about  those  events  and  his 
role  in  them,  presenting  them  in  a  heroic  light,  although  the 
Petrograd  mutiny  was  numerically  a  quite  impotent  affair. 
The  numerous  arrests  throughout  Russia  brought  a  total  of  five 
hundred  suspects,  of  whom  only  one  hundred  and  twenty  were 
finally  tried.  To  Nicolas  the  conspiracy  appeared  enormous 
and  monstrous,  and  he  firmly  believed  that  on  December  14  he 
had  saved  Russia  from  inevitable  perdition.  Such  was  also  the 
opinion  of  his  flatterers  and  sincere  admirers.  At  his  coronation 
in  the  Cathedral  of  Assumption,  the  Metropolitan  of  Moscow, 
Filaret,  who  was  known  as  a  liberal  churchman,  called  Nicolas 
the  Tzar  who  had  saved  his  country. 

With  this  idea  of  securing  his  personal  and  the  country's 
safety,  Nicolas  neglected  all  other  affairs  in  the  first  half  year 
of  his  reign  for  the  investigation  of  the  conspiracy.  He  took 
active  part  in  examining  the  prisoners,  and  frequently  displayed 
rudeness,  impatience,  and  bad  temper.  In  a  letter  to  Constan- 
tine  he  naively  wrote  that  by  the  establishment  of  a  supreme 
court  for  the  trial  of  the  Decembrists  he  had  shown  almost  con- 
stitutional tendencies;  from  the  point  of  view  of  modern  juris- 
prudence, his  words  are  sheer  mockery.  The  whole  process  was 
reduced  to  an  inquisitorial  examination  by  a  special  committee 
directed  by  Nicolas,  which  committee  decided  the  verdict  in 
advance.  The  Supreme  Court  was  merely  a  solemn  comedy. 
It  consisted  of  senators,  members  of  the  State  Council,  three 


234  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

members  of  the  Synod,  and  thirteen  personal  appointees  of 
Nicolas,  but  no  trial,  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  word,  took 
place  there:  no  examination,  no  arguments,  not  always  even  a 
brief  questioning  of  the  accused;  they  were  brought  singly  be- 
fore the  Court,  and  some  only  heard  their  sentence  read  to  them, 
as  a  verdict  of  some  secret  Inquisition.  Nicolas  manifested 
great  cruelty  and  callousness  toward  the  defendants,  although 
he  sincerely  believed  that  he  was  displaying  justice  and  civil 
virility.  One  must  admit  that  however  his  personal  views  dif- 
fered regarding  individual  defendants,  he  sentenced  them  all 
with  equal  mercilessness ;  Pestel,  whom  he  considered  "a  hell 
born  fiend,"  and  a  most  pernicious  creature,  received  the  same 
punishment  as  Ryleiev,  in  whom  Nicolas  saw  the  purest  and 
loftiest  personality,  and  whose  family  he  generously  supported 
later.  By  the  verdict  five  men  were  sentenced  to  be  quartered 
—  Nicolas  mitigated  this  by  hanging ;  thirty-one  men  were 
sentenced  to  ordinary  execution,  i.e.,  to  be  shot  —  Nicolas  com- 
muted this  to  hard  labour  for  life,  in  some  cases  for  fifteen  or 
twenty  years.  In  the  same  proportion  he  commuted  all  sen- 
tences; but  most  of  the  accused  were  exiled  to  Siberia  (some  of 
them  after  long  years  of  imprisonment  in  fortresses),  and  only 
a  very  few  were  reduced  to  soldiers  for  life  —  the  mildest 
penalty. 

For  the  subsequent  course  of  the  Government  another  side  of 
that  trial  had  been  of  no  small  importance.  In  his  desire  to 
fathom  the  sedition,  Nicolas  made  the  investigation  extremely 
exhaustive.  He  wished  to  find  out  all  the  causes  of  dissatis- 
faction, to  discover  all  the  hidden  springs,  and  thanks  to  this 
there  was  revealed  to  him  a  complete  picture  of  the  disorders  in 
Russian  social  and  official  life,  the  dimensions  and  significance 
of  which  he  had  not  before  suspected.  He  understood  at  length 
that  these  disorders  were  enormous,  that  the  dissatisfaction  of 
many  had  good  foundations,  and  he  early  admitted  the  need  for 


EXECUTION  OF  THE  DECEMBRISTS        235 

radical  reforms.  "  I  have  distinguished,  and  shall  always  dis- 
tinguish," he  said  to  the  French  Ambassador,  "  those  who  desire 
just  reforms  and  expect  them  to  emanate  from  the  legal  author- 
ity, from  those  who  want  to  undertake  them  by  themselves, 
employing  God  knows  what  means." 

By  Nicolas'  order,  one  of  the  secretaries  of  the  Investigating 
Committee,  Borovkov,  worked  out  a  special  memorandum  of  all 
the  plans  and  notes  received  from  the  Decembrists  during  the 
inquiry,  some  of  which  were  written  by  the  imprisoned  men 
upon  their  own  initiative,  some  by  request  of  Nicolas.  The 
Tzar,  then,  quite  consciously  borrowed  from  the  Decembrists 
everything  that  might  serve  as  useful  material  for  the  State- 
activity. 

Borovkov 's  memorandum  had  in  the  end  definite  conclusions 
only  a  few  of  which  were  inspired  by  the  testimony  of  the 
Decembrists,  while  most  of  them  were  drawn  directly  from  the 
general  state  of  internal  affairs  as  revealed  to  Nicolas.  Borov- 
kov made  the  following  resume  of  the  essential  needs  for  the 
state-management:  "It  is  necessary  to  grant  clear,  positive 
laws;  to  establish  justice  through  fastest  court  proceedings;  to 
elevate  the  moral  education  of  the  clergy ;  to  support  the  nobility 
which  has  deteriorated  and  become  completely  ruined  by  loans 
in  credit-associations;  to  resurrect  commerce  and  industry  on 
immutable  foundations;  to  direct  education  in  accordance  with 
the  status  of  the  pupils;  to  improve  the  conditions  of  the 
farmers;  to  abolish  the  humiliating  sale  of  men;  to  rebuild  the 
navy;  to  encourage  private  persons  for  sea-faring;  in  short,  to 
rectify  the  innumerable  disorders  and  abuses."  Nicolas  had 
selected  for  consideration  those  facts  and  conclusions  that  most 
astonished  him. 

At  any  rate  he  saw  among  the  Decembrists  not  a  majority  of 
inexperienced  youths  infatuated  with  dreams,  but  a  large  num- 
ber of  persons  who  had  been  connected  before  with  the  local  or 


236  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

central  administration.  Such  was  N.  I.  Turgeniev,  state- 
secretary  of  the  State  Council  and  director  of  one  of  the 
departments  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance;  Krasnokutsky  — 
Super-Procurator  of  the  Senate;  Batenkov  —  one  of  the  close 
assistants  of  Speransky,  and  one  time  of  Arakcheiev;  Baron 
Steingel  —  Chief  of  the  chancery  of  the  Moscow  Gover- 
nor-General. Needless  to  say,  Nicolas  saw  the  opportunity  of 
making  use  of  such  extraordinary  minds  as  Pestel  and  Nikita 
Muraviov. 

After  the  end  of  the  trial  of  the  Decembrists  and  the  execu- 
tion of  the  five  men  who  were  considered  the  chief  conspirators, 
Nicolas  hinted  as  to  his  views  and  intentions  in  the  Coronation 
Manifesto  of  July  13,  1826:  "  Not  by  impertinent,  destructive 
dreams,  but  from  above,  are  gradually  perfected  the  statutes  of 
the  land,  are  corrected  the  faults,  are  rectified  the  abuses.  In 
this  order  of  gradual  improvement,  every  modest  desire  for  the 
better,  every  thought  for  the  strengthening  of  the  power  of  the 
law,  for  the  spread  of  true  enlightenment  and  of  industry,  in 
reaching  us  by  a  legal  way,  open  for  all  —  will  always  be  re- 
ceived by  us  with  grace :  for  we  have  not,  cannot  have  any  other 
desire  but  to  see  our  country  on  the  highest  grade  of  happiness 
and  glory,  by  Providence  predestined." 

The  Manifesto,  issued  immediately  after  the  punishment  of 
the  Decembrists,  showed  undoubtedly  the  Monarch's  intention 
of  introducing  a  series  of  reforms,  the  nature  of  which  de- 
pended upon  his  views  on  the  essence  and  aims  of  the  Sovereign's 
power.  These  views  were  made  clear  to  him  at  his  very  acces- 
sion by  the  aid  of  Karamzin  who  appeared  at  the  difficult  mo- 
ment as  the  true  guide  and  intimate  counsellor  of  the  young, 
inexperienced  ruler.  If  from  the  Decembrists  Nicolas  had  re- 
ceived the  first  surprising  information  about  the  disorder  and 
abuses  in  the  administration,  he  owed  to  Karamzin  a  general 
programme  for  his  reign,  which  pleased  his  taste  so  much  that  he 


KARAMZIN  AND  THE  TZAR  237 

was  willing  to  do  everything  for  that,  in  his  eyes  unequalled, 
counsellor  who  stood  already  with  one  foot  in  the  grave.1 

Karamzin,  as  you  know,  had  not  occupied  any  official  post 
under  Alexander,  which  did  not  prevent  him  from  coming  out 
at  times  as  a  sharp  critic  of  the  Government's  undertakings,  as 
at  the  moment  of  the  energetic  reforms  of  Speransky,  or  later, 
when  he  openly  opposed  the  Polish  policy,  the  Military  Colonies, 
the  obscurantist  activity  of  the  Magnitzkys  and  the  Runiches 
in  the  sphere  of  popular  education  and  censorship.  At  the  ac- 
cession of  Nicolas,  Karamzin's  days  were  drawing  to  an  end; 
on  the  day  of  December  14  he  caught  a  cold  while  on  the  Palace 
Square,  and  although  he  struggled  on  for  two  months,  he  finally 
became  confined  to  his  bed,  and  died  half  a  year  later,  unable 
to  make  use  of  the  frigate  that  was  furnished  by  the  Tzar  to 
take  the  sick  historian  to  Italy.  From  the  first  day  of  the 
interregnum  which  began  on  November  27,  1825,  Karamzin 
appeared  daily  at  the  Palace  to  consult  with  the  Monarch,  whom 
he  tried  to  imbue  with  his  views  on  the  role  of  the  autocrat,  and 
on  the  national  problems  of  the  moment.  Karamzin's  talks 
made  a  profound  impression  on  Nicolas.  Preserving  deep  re- 
spect and  even  admiration  for  the  recently  deceased  Tzar,  Kar- 
amzin at  the  same  time  mercilessly  criticised  his  governmental 
policy,  so  mercilessly  that  the  Empress  Marie,  who  had  been 
present  at  all  those  conversations  and  who  was  probably  re- 
sponsible for  their  taking  place,  exclaimed  once  during  Kar- 
amzin's attacks  on  the  measures  of  the  former  reign :  "  Have 
mercy,  have  mercy  on  the  heart  of  a  mother.  .  .  ."  To  which 
Karamzin  answered :  "  I  am  speaking  not  only  to  the  mother 
of  the  deceased  Monarch,  but  also  to  the  mother  of  the  Monarch 
who  is  going  to  reign." 

1  Not  long  before  his  death  Karamzin  was  granted  a  pension  of 
fifty  thousand  rubles  a  year,  to  be  continued  after  his  death  for  his 
family. 


238  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

We  know  what  Karamzin  thought  of  the  role  of  Russian 
autocracy  from  his  memorandum  "  On  Ancient  and  New 
Russia,"  presented  to  Alexander  in  1811.  Nicolas  could  not 
have  known  that  memorandum,  since  its  only  copy  was  given 
by  Alexander  to  Arakcheiev,  among  whose  papers  it  was  found 
after  his  death,  in  1836.  But  Karamzin  had  developed  the 
same  views  later  (1815),  in  his  introduction  to  the  "  History  of 
the  Russian  Dominion,"  which  was  certainly  known  to  Nicolas. 
Karamzin's  views  had  not  changed  to  his  very  death;  he  had 
borrowed  them  from  Catherine  who  considered  that  autocracy 
was  necessary  for  the  country,  that  without  autocracy  Russia 
would  perish. 

At  the  same  time  he  considered  the  role  of  the  autocrat  as  a 
sacred  mission,  as  a  constant  service  for  Russia.  He  was  far 
from  exempting  the  Monarch  from  obligations,  and  strictly  con- 
demned such  actions  of  the  Tzars  as  did  not  correspond  with 
the  interests  of  Russia,  but  were  based  on  personal  despotism, 
whims,  or  even  on  ideological  dreams  (Alexander).  It  ap- 
peared to  Karamzin  that  the  subject  in  an  autocratic  state  should 
be  not  a  mute  slave,  but  a  brave  citizen  who  owes  absolute 
obedience  to  the  Monarch,  but  is  at  the  same  time  obliged  to 
declare  freely  and  frankly  his  opinions  and  views  concerning 
the  affairs  of  the  state.  Karamzin's  political  views,  with  all 
their  conservatism,  were  undoubtedly  Utopian,  but  were  never- 
theless not  devoid  of  a  certain  exaltation  and  noble  feeling ;  they 
endeavoured  to  lend  autocracy  some  idealism  and  beauty,  and 
allowed  absolutism,  towards  which  Nicolas  had  been  inclined  by 
nature,  to  base  itself  on  a  lofty  ideology.  The  immediate,  half- 
conscious  aspirations  of  Nicolas  had  gained  a  principle  and  a 
system  perfectly  fitting  the  young  Monarch's  tastes  and  in- 
clinations. On  the  other  hand,  Karamzin's  practical  conclu- 
sions were  so  elementary  and  simple  that  they  appealed  to  the 
direct,  militaristic  mind  of  Nicolas. 


KARAMZIN'S  VIEWS  239 

Karamzin's  views  did  not  exclude  the  possibility,  even  the 
necessity  of  undertaking  the  rectification  of  the  abuses  and  mis- 
management in  Russian  life,  that  had  become  clear  to  Nicolas 
through  his  contact  with  the  Decembrists.  With  all  his  con- 
servatism, Karamzin  was  neither  a  reactionary  nor  an  obscuran- 
tist. After  December  14  he  said  to  one  of  his  friends  (Serbino- 
vich)  that  he  was  "  an  enemy  of  revolutions,"  but  admitted  the 
necessity  of  peaceful  evolutions  which  in  his  opinion  were  "  most 
convenient  under  a  monarchical  regime." 

Nicolas'  confidence  in  Karamzin's  wisdom  was  so  great  that 
he  had  evidently  intended  to  give  him  a  permanent  post ;  but  the 
dying  historian  was  unable  to  accept  any  appointment,  and  in 
place  of  himself  he  recommended  to  the  Tzar  younger  exponents 
of  his  ideas  from  the  former  members  of  the  literary  society 
"  Arzamas  " :  Bludov  and  Dashkov,  to  whom  soon  was  added 
a  third  prominent  Arzamasian,  Uvarov,  who  later  definitely 
formulated  that  Nationalism,  of  which  Karamzin  was  the 
father.2 

2  Pushkin,  one  of  the  former  Arzamasians,  was  recalled  from  his 
village  to  the  capitals,  and  did  complete  penance  in  1826.  He  was 
recalled  to  Moscow  during  the  Coronation,  and  was  allowed  to  come 
in  his  own  carriage,  i.e.,  not  as  one  under  arrest.  The  Emperor  re- 
ceived him  personally,  and  was  favourably  impressed  with  Pushkin's 
frank  and  straightforward  talk.  Nicolas  undoubtedly  wished  to  utilise 
Pushkin's  great  mind  for  the  good  of  the  State.  He  requested  him  to 
prepare  a  memorandum  about  the  means  for  the  improvement  of 
popular  education.  Pushkin  undertook  the  work  reluctantly,  only  after 
the  repetition  of  the  request  through  Benckendorff.  The  poet  was 
unaccustomed  to  such  work,  yet  he  performed  it,  and  promulgated 
the  idea  that  education  might  be  useful  even  for  the  establishment  of 
"  desirable "  tendencies,  but  that  for  its  development  some  freedom 
was  necessary.  Nicolas  did  not  like  it  evidently,  as  is  seen  from 
BenckendorfTs  note  to  Pushkin:  "One  should  prefer  morality,  dili- 
gence, loyalty,  to  inexperienced,  immoral,  and  useless  education.  On 
such  principles  should  well-intended  education  be  based." 

(NOTE.  Pushkin,  the  greatest  Russian  poet,  had  to  submit  his  works 
to  Nicolas  and  Benckendorff  for  approval.  Upon  reading  Pushkin's 
drama,  "Boris  Godunov,"  Nicolas  inscribed  on  the  MS.:  "Mr.  Push- 


240  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

kin  would  achieve  his  aim  if  he  wrote  a  historical  novel,  in  the  style 
of  Sir  Walter  Scott."  Happily  Pushkin  did  not  go  too  far  in  his 
compromising,  and  refused  to  prostitute  his  art.  But  minor  artists 
were  not  strong  enough  to  hold  their  own  during  that  depersonalising 
regime,  and  the  situation  was  well  characterised  in  the  naively-earnest 
admission  of  a  popular  contemporary  writer,  Kukolnick:  "If  the 
Government  so  orders  — I  shall  be  a  midwife."—  TR.) 


CHAPTER  XV 

KARAMZIN'S  views  served  as  the  basis  of  Nicolas' 
internal  policy.  He  considered  himself  the  first  serv- 
ant of  the  state,  and  devoting  his  person  entirely  to 
the  state  he  felt  justified  in  demanding  the  same  of  others,  ex- 
pecting them  to  follow  his  directions.  From  his  militaristic 
point  of  view  he  could  not  conceive  of  a  service  not  regulated  by 
a  supreme  authority  and  directed  by  a  strict  discipline  and  an 
official  hierarchy.  This  conviction  formed  the  foundation  for 
his  absolutism  which  developed  crescendo  during  his  reign,  be- 
coming more  and  more  sheer  despotism. 

In  this  respect  we  may  divide  his  reign  into  three  periods ;  the 
first,  from  1826  to  1831,  the  second  —  from  1831  to  1848,  and 
lastly,  the  third  —  from  1848  to  1855.  This  division  one 
should  make  only  for  the  demarcation  of  the  consecutive  changes 
in  the  course  of  Nicolas'  governmental  activity,  but  in  regard 
to  the  history  of  the  Russian  people  and  society  the  whole  reign 
presents  one  important  stage  during  which  the  moving  factors 
of  the  socio-political  process  had  accumulated  and  grown  acute, 
and  had  found  expression  partly  in  the  epoch  of  the  Great  Re- 
forms, during  the  next  reign,  partly  in  an  incomplete  form  in 
our  own  days. 

The  first  period  may  be  characterised  as  ^Haw-reformatory, 
and,  at  least  externally,  not  opposed  to  Progress.  But  the  very 
personality  of  Nicolas,  his  personal  tastes,  character,  and  grow- 
ing absolutism,  proved  an  essential  obstacle  for  any  progressive 
action,  however  moderate.  He  had  evidently  struggled  with 
himself,  trying  to  subdue  his  character  and  meet  the  urgent  needs 
that  had  been  so  palpably  revealed  to  him,  but  he  succeeded 

241 


242  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

rather  poorly,  and  for  this  reason  that  period  was  full  of  as- 
tonishing contradictions  and  vacillations  caused  not  by  the  lack 
of  decisiveness  on  the  part  of  the  redoubtable  ruler  of  Russia  — 
his  character  was  quite  decisive  —  but  by  the  inner  contrast 
between  his  nature  and  tastes,  and  the  measures  he  undertook. 
Those  vacillations  were  noticeable  in  his  internal  as  well  as  in 
his  foreign  policy. 

Many  of  Nicolas'  biographers  present  his  situation  at  that 
time  as  very  difficult,  since  he  did  not  inherit  from  Alexander 
any  adequate  assistants,  aside  from  Arakcheiev.  This  is  not 
true.  In  the  first  place  Arakcheiev  resigned  his  post  of  Reporter 
for  the  Committee  of  Ministers  as  early  as  December  10,  1825 ; 
for  some  time  he  still  managed  the  Military  Colonies,  but  soon 
he  went  abroad,  and  definitely  abandoned  even  his  pet  Colonies. 
In  the  second  place,  under  the  influence  of  Karamzin  and  per- 
haps of  Zhukovsky  who  had  become  an  intimate  member  of  his 
family  circle  from  the  year  1817,  Nicolas  determined  to  have 
no  connection  with  the  reactionaries  of  the  preceding  reign. 
Beside  setting  aside  Arakcheiev,  Nicolas  treated  the  obscurantists 
of  the  Ministry  of  Education  severely ;  Magnitzky  was  removed 
from  the  post  of  Curator  of  the  Kazan  university,  and  later  in 
view  of  his  intrigues  against  the  new  Curator,  he  was  arrested 
and  transported  to  Reval.  The  Curator  of  the  Petrograd  uni- 
versity was  also  discharged  and  brought  to  trial  for  financial 
abuses.  The  influential  Fotiy  received  a  set-back,  and  was  for- 
bidden to  leave  his  monastery.  Of  Alexander's  reactionaries 
there  remained  only  the  Minister  of  Education,  Shishkov,  who 
in  the  absence  of  Magnitzky  and  Runich,  was  quite  harmless. 
Of  greater  importance  for  the  future  was  the  retainment,  and 
even  promotion  of  one  of  Arakcheiev's  worst  assistants,  General 
Kleinmichel,  a  rude,  cruel,  hypocritical  person. 

On  the  whole,  in  the  main  spheres  of  administration  a  greater 
role  was  played  by  the  representatives  of  the  more  moderate 
Conservatives,  of  the  Karamzin  type.  Of  Alexander's  chief 


NICOLAS'  ASSISTANTS  243 

assistants  who  continued  their  activity  under  Nicolas  we  should 
mention  Count  (later  Prince)  Kochubey,  and  Mikhail  (later 
Count)  Speransky.  But  Kochubey  had  grown  old  and  had 
changed  many  of  his  former  liberal  views;  yet  in  1814  in  the 
memorandum  he  presented  to  Alexander  he  expressed  views 
very  akin  to  those  of  Karamzin,  and  definitely  stated  that  the 
conservation  of  autocracy  was  indispensable  for  Russia.  Sper- 
ansky  had  also  changed  many  of  his  views  since  the  catastrophe 
of  1 8 12.  He  was  no  longer  an  ideologue  of  political  liberalism, 
but  decisively  entered  the  road  of  political  opportunism,  de- 
voting all  his  gifts  and  diligence  for  secondary  technical  im- 
provements of  the  existing  order  instead  of  advocating  its  radical 
reorganisation.  At  the  accession  of  Nicolas  Speransky  was  no 
more  the  opponent  of  Karamzin,  but  his  modest  co-worker,  and 
the  two  worked  out  by  the  order  of  the  Tzar  the  first  manifesto. 
Somewhat  later  Nicolas'  confidence  in  Speransky  wavered  for  a 
moment  in  view  of  his  information  about  the  plans  of  the  North- 
ern Society  for  appointing  in  case  of  the  success  of  the  revolution 
a  temporary  government  with  Speransky,  Mordvinov,  and 
Yermolov  at  the  head.  Soon,  however,  Nicolas  convinced  him- 
self that  these  persons  knew  nothing  about  their  candidatures, 
and  had  no  relations  with  the  revolutionary  organisations.1 
Speransky  regained  Nicolas'  complete  trust  in  him  after  a  long, 
frank  conversation;  the  Tzar  wrote  about  it  to  Dibich,  and 
mentioned  in  his  letter  that  Speransky  had  "  done  penance  "  for 

1  For  Yermolov,  however,  Nicolas  always  preserved  a  hostile  feeling. 
This  was  caused  by  a  letter  of  Prince  S.  G.  Volkonsky  to  Pestel,  found 
during  the  searches.  Volkonsky  expressed  his  view  on  the  state  of 
mind  among  the  Caucasian  Corps  under  the  command  of  Yermolov, 
which  he  had  visited ;  he  asserted  that  the  revolutionary  mood  was  so 
general  in  that  Corps  that  one  might  hope  for  its  joining  the  uprising 
in  a  body.  Nicolas  took  the  information  seriously,  and  even  feared 
that  the  Caucasian  Corps  would  not  take  the  oath.  Although  this  did 
not  happen,  and  after  a  careful  investigation  the  words  of  Volkonsky 
had  proved  unfounded,  the  Tzar  retained  an  unfriendly  attitude  to- 
ward Yermolov. 


244  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

his  former  views.  It  is  not  known  for  what  he  repented,  but 
in  any  case  Nicolas'  momentary  mistrust  had  disappeared,  and 
as  early  as  January,  1826,  Speransky  was  appointed  head  of  the 
Commission  of  Laws  which  was  soon  reorganised  into  the  Second 
Department  of  His  Majesty's  Own  Chancery. 

Nicolas  did  not  allow  Admiral  Mordvinov  to  partake  in  his 
activities.  Although  he  understood  that  there  was  no  basis  for 
suspecting  Mordvinov  in  having  had  any  relations  with  the 
Secret  Society,  he  could  not  agree  with  the  Admiral's  views  and 
policy.  During  Nicolas'  reign  Mordvinov  with  his  always  in- 
teresting and  original  opinions  seldom  appeared  in  the  State 
Council. 

Another  person  inherited  by  Nicolas  from  the  preceding  reign 
was  Yegor  Kankrin,  a  man  of  great  originality  and  statesman- 
ship, who  then  occupied  the  post  of  Minister  of  Finance.  He 
was  a  man  of  a  firm  will  and  definite  principles;  his  financial 
system  consisted  mainly  in  handling  economically  the  people's 
money,  and  he  always  opposed  most  bitterly  such  of  Nicolas' 
plans  as  required  considerable  expenditures.  Later  Nicolas 
jocosely  remarked  to  his  last  Minister  of  Finance,  the  incapable 
and  submissive  Brock,  that  it  was  very  agreeable  to  have  such 
an  obedient  Minister,  "  Whereas  Kankrin,"  recalled  the  Tzar, 
"would  come  to  me  in  his  slippers  (he  suffered  from  rheuma- 
tism), warm  his  back  at  the  fireplace,  and  interrupt  me  every 
minute :  '  Impossible,  your  Majesty,  absolutely  impossible.'  .  .  ." 

To  Nicolas'  credit  we  should  mention  that  he  kept  Kankrin 
at  his  post  for  seventeen  years,  until  he  considered  himself  suf- 
ficiently trained  by  his  Minister  to  manage  the  finances  per- 
sonally. 

From  letters  of  contemporaries  we  learn  that  from  the  very 
beginning  Nicolas  had  shown  great  diligence  and  readiness  to 
devote  himself  unreservedly  to  the  service  of  the  state,  but  at 
the  same  time  he  demonstrated  an  utter  incapacity  for  selecting 
assistants,  a  fault  that  played  great  importance  as  an  obstacle  for 


THE  COMMITTEE  OF  6  DECEMBER,  1826     245 

the  promulgation  of  those  moderate  changes  that  appeared  neces- 
sary in  his  own  eyes. 

Beside  the  persons  recommended  to  him  by  Karamzin,  Nicolas 
employed  for  the  management  of  internal  affairs  those  who  had 
distinguished  themselves  in  the  organisation  of  the  Process  of  the 
Decembrists.  Foremost  among  them  was  General  BenckendorfT 
who  had  tried  in  vain  since  1821  to  call  Alexander's  attention 
to  the  spread  and  growth  of  secret  societies  in  Russia.  Along 
with  him  were  promoted  Generals  Chernyshev  and  Levashov, 
investigators  in  the  case  of  the  Decembrists. 

In  the  military  sphere  the  young  Tzar  respected  the  authority 
of  Generals  Dibich  and  Paskevich.  The  first  had  been  the 
Chief  of  Staff,  and  at  the  moment  of  Alexander's  death  all  the 
threads  of  the  Conspiracy  were  concentrated  in  his  hands.  His 
energetic  activity  in  investigating  the  affair  inspired  Nicolas  with 
confidence  for  him.  Paskevich  had  been  an  old  friend  and  direct 
superior  of  Nicolas  since  1814.  Both  were  considered  by 
Nicolas  as  highly  gifted  generals,  although  their  military  talents 
were  later  questioned  by  military  writers. 

For  the  working  out  of  a  general  plan  for  the  intended  re- 
forms, a  special  Committee  was  formed  under  the  chairman- 
ship of  Kochubey,  on  December  6,  1826.  Speransky,  Prince 
A.  N.  Golitzin,  and  Generals  Count  P.  A.  Tolstoy,  Dibich,  I. 
V.  Vassilchikov,  entered  the  Committee;  the  young  state-secre- 
taries, Bludov  and  Dashkov,  were  appointed  as  secretaries.  In 
a  short  memorandum  given  to  Kochubey  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Committee's  work,  Nicolas  pointed  out  that  this  should  consist 
first  of  all  in  the  examination  of  the  papers  found  in  the  chancery 
of  the  late  Emperor,  secondly  in  the  revision  of  the  statutes  of 
the  existing  state,  and  thirdly  in  expressing  their  opinions  as  to 
what  had  been  planned  during  the  preceding  reign,  what  had 
been  accomplished  and  what  remained  to  be  finished,  and  finally 
what  was  good  in  the  existing  order  and  what  was  not  to  be 
retained,  and  in  that  case  by  what  it  should  be  supplanted. 


246  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

Such  were  the  indefinite  features  of  the  proposed  work  of  the 
Committee  which  carried  on  its  regular  activity  from  December 
6,  1826,  to  April,  1830;  in  the  two  years  following  there  were 
a  few  sporadic  sessions,  and  although  the  Committee  was  not 
officially  closed,  its  work  was  discontinued  in  1832. 

The  mission  of  the  Committee  was  so  broadly  outlined  that  its 
work  could  apparently  acquire  the  same  character  as  the  famous 
.Unofficial  Committee  at  the  beginning  of  Alexander's  reign.  As 
a  matter  of  fact  there  was  nothing  in  common  between  the  two 
institutions:  Alexander's  Committee  consisted  of  idealistic  rep- 
resentatives of  the  advanced  tendencies  of  the  age,  whereas 
Nicolas'  secret  Committee  contained  men  of  the  older  generation, 
sated  and  disappointed  with  life  (as  Speransky,  Kochubey, 
Golitzin),  or  young  career-hunters  and  doctrinaires  (as  Bludov 
and  Dashkov),  who  did  not  even  propose  any  novel  measures, 
and  whose  whole  activity  was  reduced  to  the  examination  of  the 
statutes  of  the  central  and  provincial  institutions,  and  of  the 
then  existing  "  class-laws "  in  which  they  suggested  some 
changes  in  the  status  of  the  nobility  and  the  middle  class,  in  the 
elections  among  the  nobles,  and  in  the  management  of  the  Fiscal 
peasants.  In  passing  they  touched  upon  the  peasant-question, 
but  so. hesitatingly  and  indolently  that  the  Emperor  remained 
utterly  displeased  with  their  work  in  that  field. 

In  the  peasant-question,  the  importance  of  which  Nicolas  ad- 
mitted after  the  first  peasant-disturbances  that  took  place  during 
his  reign,  he  proved  more  progressive  and  firm  than  in  all  his 
other  undertakings.  The  question  was  constantly  under  dis- 
cussion till  the  year  1848;  ten  consecutive  Committees  were 
instituted  for  the  exhaustive  investigation  of  the  problem,  and 
we  may  say  that  during  his  reign  was  done  more  for  the  peasant- 
question  than  during  that  of  the  liberal  Alexander  I.  We  shall 
discuss  this  in  the  exposition  of  the  second  period  of  Nicolas' 
reign,  when  the  question  received  most  attention  from  the  Gov- 
ernment. 


HIS  MAJESTY'S  OWN  CHANCERY  247 

From  the  very  beginning  Nicolas  regarded  the  Military 
Colonies  sceptically,  but  he  was  unable  to  liquidate  at  once  so 
great  an  undertaking,  and  unwilling  to  undermine  the  authority 
of  his  late  brother,  so  that  the  Colonies  not  only  continued  to 
exist  to  the  end  of  his  reign,  but  were  even  enlarged  on  various 
occasions.  Their  final  liquidation  took  place  under  Alexander 
II. 

His  particular  ideas  about  the  role  and  duties  of  an  autocrat, 
on  one  hand,  and  his  mistrust  for  the  public  and  for  the  officials, 
on  the  other  hand,  were  reflected  in  Nicolas'  treatment  of  meas- 
ures that  appeared  to  him  especially  important  and  difficult,  and 
which  he  desired  to  exclude  from  the  ordinary  matters  entrusted 
to  his  regular  Ministers.  For  this  purpose  Nicolas  from  the 
very  beginning  of  his  reign  established  separate  departments  of 
his  own  Chancery,  at  the  head  of  which  he  placed  persons  in 
whom  he  had  special  confidence;  he  ranked  them  as  Ministers, 
and  .they  were  officially  known  as  Chief  Directors.  The  first 
new  Department  was  opened  in  January,  1826,  and  was  named 
the  Second  Department  of  His  Majesty's  Own  Chancery,  under 
the  directorship  of  Speransky  who  was  transferred  from  the 
Commission  of  Laws  which  was  abolished ;  the  secretary  of  the 
Department  was  State-Secretary  Balugiansky.  The  codifica- 
tory  work  concentrated  in  that  Department  was  quite  success- 
ful, as  we  shall  see,  and  was  accomplished  in  1832  and  1833. 

In  the  same  way  Nicolas  desired  to  organise  the  management 
of  the  political  and  secret  police.  After  the  insurrection  of  De- 
cember 14  he  considered  this  activity  as  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant in  the  state.  He  decided  to  leave  the  general  overt 
police-work  in  the  hands  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior,  but  for 
the  observation  of  the  state  of  mind,  opinions  and  tendencies  of 
the  population  he  created  a  special  Corps  of  Gendarmes,  with 
Adjutant  General  Benckendorff  as  its  Chief  (June  25,  1826) ; 
a  few  days  later  (July  3)  the  special  Chancery  of  the  Minister 
of  Interior,  in  which  had  been  concentrated  the  affairs  of  the 


248  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

Secret  police,  was  abolished,  and  its  former  jurisdiction  trans- 
fered  to  the  newly  organised  Third  Department  of  His 
Majesty's  Own  Chancery,  the  Chief  of  which  was  the  same 
General  Benckendorff. 

The  following  matters  were  included  in  the  sphere  of  activity 
of  the  Third  Department  which  subsequently  acquired  such  a 
dark  reputation : 

(i)  All  orders  and  information  about  matters  of  Higher 
Police  (political  matters)  ;  (2)  intelligence  as  to  the  number  of 
existing  sects  and  dissents  in  the  state;  (3)  information  about 
discoveries  of  assignation-forgers,  coin-forfeiters,  etc.,  the  find- 
ing and  further  care  of  whom  remained  in  the  hands  of  the 
Ministers  of  Finance  and  of  the  Interior;  (4)  information  and 
orders  about  persons  under  police-surveillance;  (5)  exile  and 
transportation  of  suspicious  and  harmful  persons;  (6)  super- 
vision of  all  "political"  prisons;  (7)  all  regulations  regarding 
foreigners;  (8)  information  about  all  events  and  occurrences, 
without  exception;  statistical  information  of  concern  to  the 
police.2 

2  Here  are  some  of  Benckendorff 's  views  as  to  the  purpose  of  that 
institution,  with  which  Nicolas  undoubtedly  fully  agreed: 

..."  The  Chief  of  Gendarmes  will  be  able  to  make  use  of  opinions 
of  honest  persons  who  may  desire  to  warn  the  Government  about 
some  conspiracy,  or  impart  some  interesting  news.  Criminals,  in- 
triguers, and  simple  persons,  having  repented  of  their  sins  and  being 
desirous  of  redeeming  their  guilt  by  giving  information,  will  at  least 
know  where  to  turn. 

"  Toward  the  Chief  will  flow  information  from  all  Gendarmes-Of- 
ficers scattered  throughout  Russia  and  in  the  army:  this  would  enable 
us  to  fill  those  places  with  honest  and  capable  men  who  often  despise 
the  role  of  secret  spies,  but  when  wearing  the  uniform  of  governmental 
officials  will  zealously  perform  their  function. 

"  Rank,  decorations,  crosses,  serve  as  higher  rewards  than  money 
for  an  officer,  but  for  secret  agents  they  are  of  no  importance,  and 
thus  frequently  they  work  as  spies  for  and  against  the  Government. 

"  The  Chief  will  have  to  travel  every  year,  to  visit  the  big  fairs, 
where  he  could  contract  connections  and  attract  persons  avariciously 
inclined. 


THE  QUESTION  OF  EDUCATION  249 

From  the  very  beginning  Nicolas  had  given  particular  atten- 
tion to  the  question  of  popular  education.  With  the  view  of 
eradicating  the  spirit  of  "  sedition,"  he  intended  to  direct  the 
education  of  the  people  in  such  a  way  that  it  should  form  de- 
sirable citizens,  loyal  and  meek  servants  of  the  state  among  all 
classes,  and  should  thus  guarantee  a  firmer  stability  to  the  order 
of  things  than  the  one  that  had  existed  theretofore.  The  lead- 
ing principle  was  to  give  each  class  such  education  as  would  not 
arouse  any  hopes  and  aspirations  for  rising  from  one  class  into  a 
higher  class.  It  was  proposed  first  of  all  to  limit  the  education 
of  peasant  children,  lest  they  develop  ideas  about  changing  their 
conditions.  Nicolas  had  intended  to  issue  a  law  concerning 
this  even  before  the  formation  of  the  Committee  of  December 
6,  but  Kochubey  opposed  the  idea,  considering  that  such  a  law 
would  lower  the  Government  in  the  opinion  of  the  foreign 
Powers ;  instead  he  recommended  that  a  rescript  on  the  name  of 
the  Minister  of  Education  be  published  in  which  he  should  be 
directed  to  accept  peasant  children  only  into  primary  schools. 
Nicolas  consented  and  issued  such  a  rescript  on  the  name  of 
Minister  Shishkov,  in  May,  1827.  The  Ministry  of  Education 
proceeded  to  act  in  this  way  in  the  future.  In  1828  under  the 
chairmanship  of  Shishkov  a  committee  was  formed  for  the  re- 
vision of  the  statutes  and  programmes  of  all  primary  and  sec- 
ondary schools ;  among  the  members  of  that  committee  were  two 
subsequent  Ministers  of  Education:  Prince  Lieven  and  S.  S. 
Uvarov. 

In  December,  1828,  a  new  Statute  for  District-schools  and 
Gymnasia  was  carried  through.  The  Statute  separated  the 
District-schools  from  the  Gymnasia ;  before  that  time,  the  former 
served  as  preparatory  schools  for  the  latter,  but  by  the  new 

"  His  shrewdness  should  warn  him  against  trusting  even  the  di- 
rector of  his  office;  not  even  he  must  know  all  his  assistants  and 
agents.  .  .  ." 

General  (later  Count)  Benckendorff  enjoyed  to  his  very  death  the 
complete  confidence  and  favour  of  Nicolas. 


250  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

Statute  the  Municipal  and  District-schools  were  made  separate 
primary  schools  with  no  connection  with  the  Gymnasia  which 
were  open  thenceforward  only  to  children  of  nobles  and  officials. 
Strict  measures  were  undertaken  for  the  prohibition  of  education 
by  means  of  private  teachers,  since  it  had  been  observed  that  a 
large  number  of  the  Decembrists  had  been  educated  by  private 
French  teachers. 

In  closing  our  exposition  of  the  main  events  and  circumstances 
of  the  first  period  of  Nicolas'  reign,  we  must  mention  his  attitude 
towards  Poland.  The  Tzar  had  to  act  as  a  constitutional 
monarch  and  comply  with  the  Constitution  of  1815;  it  went 
much  against  his  grain,  yet  he  forced  himself  to  overcome  his 
personal  aversion,  and  in  1829  came  to  Warsaw  where  he  took 
the  oath  in  a  Catholic  church,  and  assembled  the  Diet  —  as  soon 
as  the  cessation  of  hostilities  with  Turkey  permitted  him  to  do 
so.  On  the  whole  we  may  say  that  up  to  the  insurrection  of 
1830  Nicolas,  in  spite  of  his  personal  tastes,  conducted  himself 
more  correctly  as  a  constitutional  monarch  than  did  Alexander, 
the  creator  of  the  Constitution  of  1815. 

In  his  international  relations  Nicolas  demonstrated  in  the  first 
years  of  his  reign  the  same  vacillation  that  characterised  his  in- 
ternal policy.  Obeying  the  voice  of  the  people  he  found  it 
necessary  to  defend  the  Greeks  from  the  atrocities  of  the  Turks, 
while  in  his  letters  to  Constantine  he  called  the  Greeks  base  and 
impertinent  rioters  who  deserved  no  sympathy  and  should  have 
been  forced  to  submit  to  the  Sultan.  But  the  forced  champion- 
ship of  the  Greeks  brought  him  to  war  with  Turkey.  The 
Russian  fleet  together  with  the  British  and  French  fleets  de- 
stroyed the  Turkish  fleet  at  Navarino,  and  the  Sultan  con- 
sidered Russia  chiefly  to  blame.  In  the  war  that  broke  out  in 
1828  Nicolas  strove  to  make  Turkey  accept  his  demands,  but  he 
tried  not  to  bring  upon  her  any  crushing  defeats,  since  he  did 
not  wish  the  destruction  of  the  Turkish  monarchy.  Owing  to 
this  hesitation  the  first  year  of  the  war  ended  quite  unfavourably, 


and  only  in  1829  when  Nicolas  took  the  advice  of  General 
Vassilchikov  and  did  not  go  to  the  theatre  of  war,  but  granted 
freedom  of  action  to  the  new  commander-in-chief,  Dibich,  was 
the  campaign  ended  successfully.  But  the  world  was  astonished 
by  the  moderateness  of  the  conditions  of  peace  presented  to 
Turkey. 

This  first  period  of  Nicolas'  reign  came  to  an  end  after  the 
first  days  of  the  July  revolution  in  France.  The  banishment  of 
his  friend,  Charles  X,  from  France,  and  the  subsequent  fall  of 
the  Netherlands  monarchy  (where  the  queen  was  Nicolas's 
sister,  Anna  Paulovna),  inspired  Nicolas  to  stand  rigorously  for 
legitimistic  principles  in  European  affairs.  As  early  as  1830  he 
was  about  to  send  his  army  to  the  Rhine  in  defence  of  those 
principles;  but  instead  he  was  forced  to  use  it  for  the  suppression 
of  the  Polish  uprising.  That  insurrection  brought  an  end  to 
any  toleration  of  liberal  ideas  on  the  part  of  the  Tzar,  and  was 
the  cause  of  the  abolition  of  the  Constitution  of  1815. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

AFTER  the  July  revolution  in  France  and  the  Polish 
insurrection  of  1830-1831,  the  first,  quasi-reiorma- 
tory  period,  of  Nicolas'  reign  came  to  an  end.  Hav- 
ing abandoned  all  attempts  to  reorganise  the  state-institutions, 
the  Tzar,  one  may  say,  found  himself.  He  took  a  new,  strictly 
conservative  course,  from  which  he  never  deviated.  Thence- 
forth he  considered  it  his  main  task  to  fight  against  revolutionary 
ideas  in  Western  Europe  as  well  as  at  home,  although  Russia 
seemed  to  have  given  no  reasons  for  such  activity,  since  every- 
thing had  been  quiet  and  obedient  after  the  cruel  punishment  of 
the  members  of  the  secret  societies. 

The  new  firm  course  in  international  affairs  appeared  defi- 
nitely in  1833,  after  the  meeting  of  the  Tzar  with  the  Austrian 
emperor,  Franz,  at  Munchengratz,  where  there  were  established 
those  good  relations  between  the  two  countries  that  so  heavily 
impressed  the  entire  course  of  European  affairs  to  the  very  time 
of  the  Crimean  Campaign.  Before  that  meeting  a  favourable 
moment  had  come  for  Russia's  relations  in  the  East,  when 
Turkey  was  on  the  verge  of  destruction  as  a  result  of  the  revolt 
of  the  Egyptian  Pasha,  Mehmed  Ali,  whose  son,  Ibrahim,  had 
crushed  the  Turkish  army.  The  fall  of  Turkey  was  averted  at 
that  moment  through  the  intervention  of  Russia.  Nicolas  of- 
fered Turkey  military  help  and  sent  her  a  corps  under  General 
Muraviov.  The  Russian  ships  were  permitted  to  enter  the  Bos- 
phorus,  and  the  Unkiar-Skelessi  Treaty  was  concluded,  which 
gave  Russia  a  protectorate  over  Turkey  —  one  of  the  most  dis- 
tinguished achievements  of  Russian  diplomacy.  The  Tzar  en- 
deavoured to  keep  decaying  Turkey  alive,  desiring  to  have  such 

252 


CONSERVATIVE  FOREIGN  POLICY          253 

a  weak  neighbour  under  his  protectorate.  Austria,  however, 
looked  upon  that  protectorate  with  suspicion,  but  she  could  not 
interfere  in  the  East  since  after  the  July  revolution  considerable 
fermentation  was  going  on  among  the  various  nationalities  of  the 
Hapsburg  monarchy. 

In  the  meantime  Nicolas,  fearing  a  general  revolutionary 
movement  in  Europe  under  the  influence  of  liberal  England  and 
revolutionary  France,  sought  a  close  alliance  with  Austria  and 
Prussia  in  order  to  counteract  the  free  aspirations  of  the  West. 
Metternich  was  the  gladder  to  meet  the  proposal  of  Nicolas,  since 
Austria  by  herself  was  quite  impotent.  The  position  of  Russia 
in  Europe  at  that  time  was  well  characterised  later  by  Ivan 
Aksakov  who  named  the  period  the  epoch  of  Russia's  "  police- 
chiefery "  in  Europe.  Indeed,  Nicolas  with  his  army  of  a 
million  strong  firmly  occupied  a  position  threatening  any  popular 
movement  against  the  status  quo  established  at  the  Vienna 
Congress ;  it  was  with  his  support  that  Austria  and  Prussia  were 
able  to  carry  on  their  reactionary  policy  until  1 848. 

In  his  internal  policy  Nicolas  gave  up  all  liberal  reforms 
after  the  revolution  of  1830,  and  his  slogan  became  the  safe- 
guard of  the  original  Russian  order  based  on  "  Orthodoxy, 
Autocracy,  and  Nationality  " —  the  formula  invented  by  Uvarov 
who  was  then  Minister  of  Education,  and  which  was  in  com- 
plete accord  with  Karamzin's  programme.  Nicolas  endeavoured 
to  preserve  the  Russian  order  from  any  political  temptations, 
and  blocked  all  connections  with  the  revolutionary  West. 

Yet  the  repair  of  some  institutions,  of  especially  crying  need, 
continued  without,  of  course,  any  radical  reorganisation.  Thus 
the  issue  of  a  legislative  code,  a  century  old  problem,  was  safely 
brought  to  an  end  during  this  period. 

This  matter,  as  I  have  mentioned,  was  handed  over  to  Speran- 
sky  in  the  year  1826,  and  he  started  upon  the  work  with  more 
practical  aims  than  he  did  during  his  earlier  activity,  when  he 
worked  on  the  basis  of  theoretic  principles  of  foreign  legislations. 


254  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

Now  he  carefully  consulted  the  old  Russian  codes,  beginning 
with  the  Ulozhenie  of  Tzar  Alexis.  In  a  few  years  he  per- 
formed the  colossal  work  of  collecting  and  issuing  all  the  laws 
that  had  been  promulgated  by  the  Government  since  1649 ;  under 
his  direction  that  task  was  accomplished  in  1832,  and  published 
in  forty-seven  large  volumes  of  the  Complete  Collection  of  Laws. 

On  the  basis  of  this  Collection,  after  a  careful  comparison, 
expurgation,  and  scientific  classification,  the  Code  of  Laws  was 
issued  in  1833  in  fifteen  volumes.  There  was  nothing  reforma- 
tory, in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word,  in  that  work,  but  it  was 
beyond  doubt  an  event  of  extraordinary  importance.  The 
absence  of  such  a  Code  had  been  one  of  the  main  sources  of 
abuses  by  various  court  officials  and  archaic  solicitors  in  the 
epoch  when  the  folk-saying  was  formed:  Zakon  chto  dyshlo: 
kuda  poverniosh  tuda  y  vyshlo  (the  law  is  like  a  wagon-tongue, 
wherever  you  turn  it,  there  it  goes) . 

Another,  still  more  important  question  which  had  not  been 
definitely  solved  during  that  whole  reign,  was  the  peasant- 
problem.  It  had  uninterruptedly  occupied  the  mind  of  the 
Government  till  the  year  1848.  Nicolas  was  first  moved  to  at- 
tempt its  solution  by  the  peasant-uprisings  which  broke  out  in 
the  first  year  of  his  reign,  and  had  constantly  recurred,  not 
allowing  the  Government  to  nap  or  to  close  their  eyes  on  the 
crying  wounds  in  the  institution  of  serfdom. 

The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  by  that  time  there  were  formed 
in  the  internal  national  life  such  material  conditions  which  un- 
dermined serfdom  and  prepared  the  way  for  its  downfall  more 
forcibly  than  any  idealistic  demands.  First  of  all  such  a  cir- 
cumstance was  the  increased  density  of  the  population,  especially 
in  some  of  the  central  black-soil  provinces,  which  rendered  the 
bondage-labour  under  the  barshchina  system  very  unprofitable 
for  the  landowners,  since  there  was  a  surplus  of  hands  for  the 
primitive  farming  of  those  days,  while  the  forced  labour  did  not 
allow  any  real  intensification  of  the  productivity  of  the  soil. 


THE  PEASANT  QUESTION  255 

The  growth  of  the  bonded  population  increased  particularly  in 
the  period  between  1816  and  1835.  By  the  fifth  census  of  the 
entire  bonded  population,  including  Siberia  and  the  Ostsee  re- 
gion, there  were  nine  million  eight  hundred  thousand  male 
persons;  by  the  seventh  census  —  nine  million  seven  hundred 
and  eighty-seven  thousand  (owing  to  the  human  loss  during  the 
Napoleonic  wars) ;  and  from  1816  to  1835  the  bonded  popu- 
lation increased  to  ten  million  eight  hundred  and  seventy-two 
thousand,  i.e.,  by  more  than  a  million  souls,  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  during  that  period  four  hundred  and  thirteen  thousand 
Ostsee  serfs  were  freed.  The  superabundance  of  serfs  greatly 
embarrassed  the  landowners  who  could  do  nothing  but  transfer 
the  peasants  into  the  class  of  house-serfs  whose  number  had  been 
always  greater  than  necessary. 

The  barshchina-estate  presented  not  only  an  agricultural  unit, 
but  a  sort  of  a  domestic  factory,  for  every  landowner  endeavoured 
to  buy  only  such  commodities  as  iron  or  salt,  and  to  have  all  other 
necessaries  produced  on  the  estate  by  bondage-labour.  For  this 
reason  the  number  of  house-serfs  reached  in  those  days  enormous 
dimensions:  before  the  ninth  census  out  of  ten  million  bondmen 
there  was  over  one  million  house-serfs,  i.e.,  a  landless  population 
occupied  either  with  house  work  or  with  work  in  the  domestic 
factories.  By  the  tenth  census  the  number  of  house-serfs  had 
reached  one  million  four  hundred  and  seventy  thousand.  The 
landowners  treated  them  without  any  ceremonies:  in  poor  years 
many  of  them  drove  their  serfs  out  to  beg.  Some  landowners 
tried  to  employ  their  surplus  hands  in  the  estate-factories  which 
had  developed  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  but  in  this 
direction  the  landowners  met  with  the  insurmountable  compe- 
tition of  the  growing  and  developing  merchant-factories.  The 
technical  improvements  in  the  latter  factories  were  inaccessible 
for  the  landowners,  first  because  of  absence  of  capital,  and  second 
because  it  was  quite  difficult  to  adapt  forced  labour  to  the  im- 
proved means  of  production.  The  professional  factory-owners 


256  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  forced  labour  was  not  profitable, 
and  even  owners  of  Possessional  factories  began  to  reject  Posses- 
sional  peasants,  so  that  in  1847  a  law  was  issued  permitting 
those  factory-owners  to  liberate  their  peasants.  No  wonder  that 
the  estate-factories  were  unable  to  cope  with  that  competition, 
and  that  during  the  Thirties  and  Forties  many  of  them  had 
closed. 

But  outside  of  the  increased  density  of  the  population,  the 
landowners  suffered  from  the  enormous  indebtedness  that  had 
hung  over  them  since  1812.  The  voluntary  and  involuntary 
contributions  and  sacrifices  during  the  wars  amounted  to  hun- 
dreds of  millions,  and  if  we  consider  that  the  entire  income  of 
the  estates  did  not  exceed  one  hundred  million  rubles  a  year, 
we  shall  be  able  to  form,  some  idea  of  the  enormous  indebtedness 
of  the  landowners.  By  1843  more  than  fifty-four  per  cent,  of 
the  estates  were  mortgaged  to  credit-institutions.  The  average 
indebtedness  of  the  landowners  was  sixty-nine  rubles  per  bonded 
peasant,  while  the  average  value  of  a  serf  was  not  above  one 
hundred  rubles,  so  that  the  greater  part  of  the  serfs  did  not  in 
reality  belong  to  the  landowners.  The  mortgage-loans  required 
high  interest,  and  to  this  we  should  add  that  the  majority  of  the 
land-owners  had  accumulated  also  "  private "  debts  on  which 
they  paid  much  higher  interest. 

Acquaintance  with  the  life  of  Western  Europe  during  the 
Napoleonic  wars  had  brought  big  changes  in  the  status  of  the 
landowners:  they  were  no  longer  satisfied  with  the  standard  of 
living  that  existed  under  patriarchal  natural  conditions,  but  had 
acquired  new  tastes,  habits,  and  required  a  more  luxurious  and 
comfortable  life  which  demanded  a  buying  capacity.  This  cir- 
cumstance necessitated  new  loans. 

All  these  conditions  combined  caused  increasing  deficits  in 
the  landowners'  budgets,  and  their  deteriorating  affairs  were 
reflected  mainly  on  the  situation  of  their  serfs,  greatly  aggravat- 


SERFDOM  257 

ing  the  relations  between  the  peasants  and  their  masters.  In  the 
black-soil  provinces,  particularly  in  the  densely  populated  ones, 
conditions  became  unbearable.  During  the  Forties  among  many 
landowners,  especially  in  the  provinces  of  Tula,  Riazan,  Oriol, 
the  idea  had  grown  that  such  conditions  could  not  endure,  and 
that  the  liquidation  of  serfdom  with  the  retention  of  the  land 
by  the  gentry  would  be  more  profitable  than  the  existing  state. 
These  ideas  were  expressed  in  various  declarations  presented  to 
the  Government  in  the  Forties.  Some  landowners  of  Tula,  fol- 
lowed later  by  some  of  Riazan  and  Smolensk,  were  willing  to 
liberate  their  serfs,  and  even  to  allot  them  one  desiatin  per  soul 
on  condition  that  the  peasants  took  over  a  large  portion  of  the 
landowners'  debts.  A  lengthy  correspondence  took  place  with 
the  Government,  a  Committee  was  formed,  deputations  were 
sent  to  the  Tzar,  but  after  1848  all  talk  about  changing  the 
order  of  things  had  to  stop  in  view  of  the  severe  reaction  that 
had  come  to  reign. 

Such  were  the  circumstances  that  had  been  in,  so  to  speak,  an 
inner,  organic  way  undermining  the  institution  of  serfdom,  and 
made  its  liquidation  inevitable  even  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
nobles.  On  the  other  hand,  the  peasants  had  not  remained  quiet. 
There  were  five  hundred  and  fifty-six  peasant-disturbances  dur- 
ing Nicolas'  reign,  uprisings  of  whole  villages  and  volosts,  not 
ordinary  local  misunderstandings.  Of  them  forty-one  disturb- 
ances took  place  during  the  first  four  years  of  his  reign,  before 
1830;  their  highest  number  occurred  in  the  period  between  1830 
and  1849  (three  hundred  and  seventy-eight  disturbances)  ;  the 
last  seven  years  of  his  reign  saw  one  hundred  and  thirty-seven 
disturbances.  About  half  of  those  uprisings  had  to  be  quelled 
not  by  ordinary  police  measures,  i.e.,  by  the  arrival  of  a  police 
squad  for  a  mere  flogging  of  the  rioters,  but  by  military  force, 
with  frequent  bloodshed.  The  peasant-question  demanded  the 
attention  of  the  state,  and  it  occupied  a  prominent  place  in  the 


258  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

discussions  of  the  Committee  of  December  6,  1826;  the  work 
of  the  Committee,  though  it  had  some  significance,  did  not  bring 
any  substantial  results. 

For  example,  in  connection  with  the  work  of  the  Committee 
there  was  issued  a  law  in  1827  prohibiting  the  landowners  from 
depriving  their  peasants  of  soil  by  selling  out  lands  without  serfs. 
Earlier  the  question  had  been  put  about  the  sale  of  serfs  without 
land,  but  now  it  was  required  that  the  estates  were  big  enough 
to  possess  a  minimum  of  four  and  a  half  desiatins  per  soul.  In 
practice  this  law  had  no  substantial  value,  for  it  was  not  carried 
through,  but  it  received  a  legal  sanction:  in  theory  if  a  land- 
owner sold  more  land  than  the  law  permitted,  his  estate  could 
be  confiscated  by  the  state. 

Another  law  connected  with  the  work  of  the  Committee  of 
December  6,  1826,  was  the  prohibition  of  transferring  serfs  to 
mines,  which  had  been  one  of  the  heaviest  forms  of  serf-exploita- 
tion. At  the  same  time  renting  serfs  to  persons  who  did  not 
have  the  right  to  own  them  was  forbidden.  These  were  all  the 
measures  of  the  Committee  for  the  regulation  of  serfdom.  After 
the  cessation  of  its  work  the  most  important  factor  in  regulat- 
ing the  conditions  of  the  serfs  was  the  publication  of  the  Code 
of  Laws.  Its  importance  lay  in  the  fact  that  all  the  various 
decrees  and  orders  concerning  the  limitation  of  the  landowners' 
power  over  their  peasants  had  been  normalised  as  general,  ob- 
ligatory laws. 

In  the  ninth  volume  of  the  Code  these  laws  were  expounded  in 
detail ;  on  one  hand  they  limited  the  authority  of  the  landowners 
over  their  peasants,  and  on  the  other,  they  placed  certain  obli- 
gations upon  the  landowners.  In  this  respect  is  important  the 
prohibition  —  mentioned  above  —  of  selling  too  much  land  in 
congested  estates.  There  was  furthermore  a  series  of  regula- 
tions placing  on  the  landowners  the  care  for  provisioning  their 
serfs.  This  was  an  important  measure,  for  during  Nicolas' 
reign  several  failures  of  crops  had  taken  place.  But  in  practice 


THE  SECRET  COMMITTEE  OF  1835         259 

the  landowners  tried  to  evade  the  provisioning  law,  and  let  the 
peasants  starve.  There  was  a  law  in  the  Code,  punishing  the 
landowners  for  begging  on  the  part  of  their  peasants  (one  and 
a  half  ruble  for  every  case  of  begging  discovered).  This  law 
also  existed  only  in  theory.  The  crop  failures  occupied  the  at- 
tention not  only  of  the  landowners,  but  of  the  Government,  as 
they  led  in  places  to  sheer  famine  which  at  times  took  on  devas- 
tating dimensions  owing  to  the  bad  roads.  In  1833  the  increase 
of  the  population  in  some  districts  was  half  of  the  normal,  owing 
to  a  recent  famine.  In  the  western  provinces  there  were  numer- 
ous disturbances  in  those  years  on  account  of  lack  of  provisions. 
The  Government  gave  out  considerable  subsidies,  at  times  mil- 
lions, to  the  landowners  for  provisioning  the  peasants,  but  in 
most  cases  those  subsidies  were  made  use  of  for  the  needs  of  the 
landowners  rather  than  for  the  starving  peasants.  The  attempt 
of  the  Government  to  control  the  distribution  of  those  subsidies 
was  frustrated,  since  the  local  authority  was  in  the  hands  of 
officials  elected  by  the  nobles. 

After  the  publication  of  the  Code  of  Laws,  the  next  important 
step  of  the  Government  in  regard  to  the  peasant-question  was 
the  formation  of  the  Secret  Committee  of  the  year  1835.  The 
question  was  posed  there  categorically  —  to  examine  the  means 
for  the  liquidation  of  the  serfdom  relations.  The  sessions  of  the 
Committee  were  held  in  strict  secrecy,  and  only  recently  did  their 
minutes  become  accessible  in  the  Archives.  The  Committee 
found  it  convenient  to  divide  the  course  of  solving  the  serfdom 
problem  into  three  tentative  stages,  without  indicating  the  time 
for  the  succession  of  the  stages.  The  first  stage,  then  in  exist- 
ence, presented  the  regulation  of  the  serfdom-rights  by  the 
statutes  introduced  into  the  Code  of  Laws.  During  the  second 
stage  was  to  enter  the  system  of  "  Inventories,"  or  the  regulating 
of  the  economic  and  legal  conditions  of  the  peasants  without 
however  abolishing  serfdom ;  this  situation  would  correspond  to 
that  of  the  Ostsee  provinces  in  the  years  1804-5,  before  the  new 


260  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

statutes  of  1816-19.  The  third  stage  was  presented  by  the 
Committee  as  the  period  of  personal  liberation  of  the  serfs,  with- 
out soil. 

The  work  of  the  Committee  brought  no  practical  results. 
Among  its  members  was  Kiselev,  the  same  Kiselev  who  as  Chief 
of  Staff  in  the  Southern  Army  had  been  friendly  with  some 
Decembrists  —  with  Pestel  among  them  —  for  which  reason  he 
did  not  at  first  inspire  Nicolas  with  confidence.  Soon,  how- 
ever, at  a  personal  meeting  with  the  Tzar,  Kiselev  explained 
straightforwardly  and  loyally  his  political  convictions,  after 
which  Nicolas  no  longer  suspected  him.  In  1829  he  was  ap- 
pointed head  of  the  temporary  management  of  the  Principalities 
of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  then  occupied  by  the  Russian  troops 
(until  the  payment  of  the  war-contribution  by  Turkey).  The 
peasant-question  came  there  to  the  front;  the  relations  between 
the  boyars  and  the  peasants  became  extremely  acute.  Kiselev's 
method  of  dealing  with  the  problem  —  a  method  similar  to  the 
Ostsee  statute  of  1804  —  pleased  Nicolas  greatly,  and  after 
reading  Kiselev's  report  on  the  management  of  the  Principalities 
he  decided  to  make  use  of  him  for  the  solution  of  the  peasant- 
question  in  Russia.  He  appointed  him  member  of  the  State 
Council  in  1834,  and  told  him  that  since  he  did  not  hope  for  the 
sympathy  of  his  Ministers  in  the  matter,  he  would  personally 
take  care  of  the  peasant-question,  and  invited  Kiselev  to  become, 
so  to  speak,  his  Chief  of  Staff  on  peasant-affairs. 

Kiselev  gladly  undertook  the  work,  for  the  question  had  in- 
terested him  from  his  youth,  and  even  as  an  Adjutant  of  Alex- 
ander he  had  presented  to  the  Tzar  a  memorandum  about  the 
peasant-question.  At  first  he  occupied  himself  with  the  Fiscal 
peasants  who  were  under  the  management  of  the  Department  of 
State  Domains,  subject  to  the  Minister  of  Finance;  the  Com- 
mittee of  December  6,  1826,  already  approved  of  Speransky's 
idea  that  the  Government  should  show  an  example  to  private 
owners. 


KANKRIN  AND  KISELEV  261 

The  Minister  of  Finance  was  Kankrin  whose  attitude  to- 
wards the  peasants  was  not  less  favourable  than  that  of  Kiselev. 
Although  Kankrin  was  not  a  Physiocrat  and  opposed  the  prin- 
ciple of  Laissez  faire,  he  could  also  have  inserted  in  his  coat-of- 
arms  the  words :  pauvre  pay  son  —  pauvre  royaume;  pauvre 
royaume  —  pauvre  rot.  His  main  purpose  had  been  to  improve 
the  condition  of  the  population,  by  regulating  the  finances,  lessen- 
ing expenditures,  avoiding  loans  and  other  national  burdens. 
We  shall  have  later  to  speak  of  his  economical  and  cultural  ac- 
tivity. In  regard  to  the  Fiscal  peasants  Kankrin  intended  to 
regulate  the  system  of  collecting  their  dues  and  save  them  from 
the  abuses  of  the  police-officers  who  acted  as  locusts  in  their  re- 
lations with  the  people.  As  an  experiment  he  proposed  to  sepa- 
rate the  Fiscal  peasants  of  the  provinces  of  Petrograd  and  Pskov 
from  the  general  administration,  and  to  establish  Districts  (as 
in  the  case  of  the  Tzar's  peasants)  under  the  management  of 
special  officers  appointed  by  the  Minister  of  Finance.  Of  course 
that  reform  was  a  purely  bureaucratic  palliative:  the  peasants 
were  transferred  from  the  jurisdiction  of  one  class  of  officials  to 
that  of  another,  but  Kankrin  had  undoubtedly  desired  to  come 
in  closer  contact  with  the  peasants  and  try  to  alleviate  their  con- 
ditions. In  1834  Kankrin  proposed  to  expand  the  new  order 
on  ten  more  provinces.  But  Nicolas,  dissatisfied  with  the  slow- 
ness of  the  work,  and  ascribing  it  to  the  fact  that  Kankrin  had 
too  many  other  cares,  handed  the  work  over  to  Kiselev  who  was 
appointed  Chief  of  the  new,  Fifth,  Department  of  His  Majesty's 
Own  Chancery,  for  the  management  of  peasant  affairs.  Kiselev 
first  of  all  inspected  the  position  of  the  Fiscal  peasants  in  four 
provinces,  and  revealed  a  mass  of  abuses  not  only  on  the  part  of 
the  local  administration,  but  on  the  part  of  the  Department  of 
State  Domains,  whose  Chief,  Senator  Dubensky,  was  put  on 
trial.  Then,  after  a  few  collisions  with  Kankrin,  Kiselev  de- 
clared that  he  felt  uncomfortable  in  managing  the  affair  in  the 
name  of  the  Tzar,  while  it  remained  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the 


262  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

Minister  of  Finance,  who  was  unable  to  devote  much  time  to  the 
peasant-question.  As  a  result,  a  new,  independent  institution 
was  founded,  the  Ministry  of  State  Domains,  which  was  to  take 
care  of  all  fiscal  estates,  forests,  and  mines. 

The  new  Ministry  was  founded  in  1837,  with  Kiselev  as  its 
head.  He  followed  the  way  indicated  by  Kankrin :  established 
local  Chambers  of  State  Domains,  and  District  Boards.  The 
Fiscal  peasants  received  some  autonomy  in  their  Communes  and 
Volosts,  but  they  were  under  the  care  of  District  Chiefs  who  had 
an  unlimited  right  to  interfere  with  their  agricultural  and  do- 
mestic affairs.  True  Kiselev  endeavoured  to  select  good  men 
for  District  Chiefs,  but  in  the  long  run  it  became  apparent  that 
the  new  system  had  placed  the  peasants  under  a  worse  bondage 
than  before,  for  whereas  the  former  dishonest  officials,  the  Rural 
Commissaries,  could  but  seldom  visit  the  Fiscal  estates,  having 
many  other  duties  to  perform,  the  new  officials  had  only  one  spe- 
cial function  to  perform  —  the  "  protection  "  of  the  peasants. 
That  system  brought  no  good  results. 

Although  Kiselev  was  given  the  management  only  of  Fiscal 
peasants  he  actually  remained  what  Nicolas  called  him —  Chief 
of  his  Staff  for  peasant-affairs,  and  took  active  part  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  whole  question. 

The  Committee  of  1835  achieved  nothing,  and  by  1839  a  new 
Committee  was  formed,  with  more  modest  aims,  and  as  a  result 
of  its  work  a  new  Statute  about  "  Obligatory  peasants "  ap- 
peared in  1842.  The  Statute  allowed  landowners  to  free  their 
peasants  from  personal  bondage  and  transfer  them  into  the  class 
of  Obligatory  peasants ;  by  mutual  agreement  between  the  land- 
owners and  their  former  bondmen  the  latter  were  given  some 
land,  not  in  property  but  in  use,  for  which  they  "  obliged  "  them- 
selves either  to  bear  a  certain  barshhina  or  to  pay  a  definite 
money-obrok,  the  amount  of  those  obligations  to  remain  un- 
changed. Some  degree  of  self-government  was  given  with  it  to 
the  village,  of  the  kind  that  had  already  existed  in  some  obrok- 


INVENTORY  REGULATIONS  263 

estates.  The  peasants  thus  came  into  a  situation  similar  to  that 
of  the  Ostsee  peasants  in  1804-5.  The  Statute  in  itself  was  not 
bad,  but  the  fact  that  the  initiative  was  granted  only  to  the  land- 
owner reduced  the  act  to  next  to  nothing. 

When  this  reform  was  discussed  in  the  State  Council,  Prince 
D.  V.  Golitzin,  Governor-General  of  Moscow,  told  Nicolas  that 
in  his  opinion  the  measure  might  have  some  sense  only  in  case  the 
transfer  of  the  serfs  into  Obligatory  peasants  became  obligatory 
upon  the  landowners.  Nicolas  replied  that  although  he  was  an 
autocratic  ruler,  he  could  not  decide  to  violate  the  privileges  of 
the  landowners  in  such  a  way.  This  answer  shows  how  far 
peasant-reform  could  have  been  carried  under  Nicolas.  But  he 
acted  more  determinedly  in  the  western  provinces  where  the 
gentry  was  Polish,  and  the  peasants  Russian,  and  where,  after 
the  insurrection  of  1831  he  considered  himself  justified  in  not 
being  over  scrupulous  about  the  property  of  the  Polish  nobles. 
There  his  policy  was  in  complete  accord  with  the  principle: 
"  Orthodoxy,  Autocracy,  Nationality." 

And  so  in  the  Forties  quite  severe  "  Inventory  Regulations  " 
were  issued  for  the  landowners  of  the  West;  they  were  based 
on  the  ideas  of  Kiselev,  and  were  ardently  upheld  by  the  Gov- 
ernor-General of  Kiev,  Bibikov,  who  had  shown  himself  as  a 
rabid  Russificator.  The  Regulations  defined  the  amount  of  land 
that  the  landowners  had  to  allot  to  the  peasants,  and  the  amount 
of  the  peasants'  dues.  In  1847  those  Regulations  were  intro- 
duced in  the  provinces  of  Kiev,  Volhynia,  and  Podolia,  and  later 
in  Lithuania  and  White  Russia.  In  Lithuania  similar  rules  had 
existed  for  a  long  time,  but  the  landowners  had  had  more  free- 
dom; the  Lithuanian  nobles  vigorously  protested  against  the 
new,  Bibikovian,  Regulations,  and  the  question  was  alive  until 
the  Fifties.  In  1849  Bibikov,  then  Minister  of  the  Interior, 
wanted  to  introduce  the  Regulations  by  force,  but  the  Lithuanian 
nobles  found  a  defender  in  the  person  of  the  Heir  (subsequently 
Alexander  II),  who  had  become  reactionary  after  the  revolu- 


264  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

tions  of  1848,  and  considered  that  it  was  necessary  to  uphold  the 
"  sacred  "  rights  of  the  gentry.  Thus  the  Inventory  Regula- 
tions were  not  introduced  in  Lithuania  and  White  Russia  during 
Nicolas'  reign. 

In  1846  an  analogous  structure  was  established  in  the  King- 
dom of  Poland.  The  Polish  peasants  had  been  personally  freed 
by  a  decree  of  Napoleon  in  1807,  but  they  had  not  received  any 
land.  The  landowners  did  not  drive  the  peasants  away,  and 
allowed  them  to  work  on  their  former  lands  for  barshchina  or 
obrok.  They  occupied  large  tracts  of  land,  but  legally  the  land- 
owners could  expel  them  at  any  moment,  and  making  use  of  this 
advantage  they  exploited  the  peasants  not  less  than  if  they  were 
bondmen.  In  the  same  year,  1846,  a  terrible  slaughter  of  land- 
owners took  place  in  adjacent  Galicia,  which  terrified  the  gentry 
of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  and  the  Viceroy,  Prince  Paskevich. 
Improvement  of  the  conditions  of  the  peasants  was  admitted  to 
be  urgently  needed.  On  May  26,  1846,  a  ukase  was  issued,  in- 
troducing Tables,  perfectly  analogous  to  the  Inventory  Regula- 
tions in  the  western  provinces.  The  agrarian  relations  that  had 
existed  before  were  confirmed,  and  the  landowners  were  forbid- 
den to  diminish  the  peasants'  allotments  or  to  increase  their 
obligations. 

Finally  in  1847  upon  the  proposal  of  Baron  M.  A.  Korf  a 
ukase  was  published  permitting  the  peasants  in  Russia  (as  it  had 
been  earlier  permitted  in  Gruzia)  to  buy  themselves  out  with 
land  by  whole  villages  in  cases  when  landowners'  estates  were 
sold  by  auction  for  debts.  The  peasants  thus  received  a  loop- 
hole through  which  to  creep  out  of  bondage,  the  more  so  since, 
owing  to  the  terrible  indebtedness  of  the  landowners  their  es- 
tates were  frequently  sold  by  auction.  Among  the  nobility  arose 
bitter  protests  against  that  ukase;  Governors  reported  that  it 
disturbed  the  public.  After  1848  it  was  actually  annulled 
through  the  addition  of  numerous  amendments.  From  that  year 


POLISH  LAW  OF  MAY  26,  1846  265 

on  Nicolas  acquired  an  uncompromising  reactionary  attitude  to- 
wards any  novelties,  and  all  attempts  to  regulate  serfdom  ceased. 
Such  were  the  peasant-measures  undertaken  during  the  second 
period  of  Nicolas'  reign. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

IN  outlining  the  second  period  of  Nicolas'  reign  we  must 
consider  alongside  with  the  course  of  the  peasant-question 
the  development  of  industry  and  commerce  during  the 
Thirties  and  Forties  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  also  in  this 
connection,  the  policy  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance. 

As  I  have  already  mentioned,  the  cotton  industry  had  de- 
veloped most  rapidly  in  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury and  this  has  been  ascribed  by  many  to  the  influence  of  the 
tariff  of  1822,  which  had  launched  the  Russian  customs  policy  on 
the  road  of  constant  protectionism.  The  profoundest  investi- 
gator of  that  question,  Professor  Tugan-Baranovsky,  has  shown 
that  the  situation  was  due  not  so  much  to  the  protectionist  tariff 
as  to  the  changes  in  the  cotton  industry,  which  had  taken  place 
in  England  during  the  very  time  of  its  development  in  Russia. 

Up  to  the  Forties  the  Russian  cotton-spinning  industry  had 
existed  mainly  on  English  yarn;  true,  during  the  Continental 
System,  when  all  connections  with  England  had  ceased  the  Rus- 
sian factory-owners  made  an  attempt  to  utilise  Central-Asiatic 
cotton  for  the  production  of  yarn,  but  still  until  the  Forties  the 
larger  part  of  yarn  came  ready-made  from  England,  because  the 
arrangement  of  cotton-mills  was  not  an  easy  matter.  The  cus- 
tom dues  on  cotton  were  not  very  high,  while  the  prices  of  yarn 
and  tissue  had  been  falling  continually  in  England,  in  connection 
with  the  recurring  crises.  It  has  been  statistically  proven  that 
every  crisis  in  England  was  followed  by  technical  improvements 
which  immediately  caused  a  fall  in  the  value  of  the  product.  For 
this  reason  the  cost  of  cotton-stuffs  had  been  decreasing  also  in 
Russia,  thus  increasing  the  spread  of  cotton-mills.  The  vacilla- 

266 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  INDUSTRY  267 

tions  in  the  English  cotton  industry  had  aroused  vacillations  in 
Russia,  in  view  of  the  cheapening  of  the  imported  products  and 
fabrics.  The  competition  induced  Russian  manufacturers  also 
to  introduce  improvements  which  consisted  mainly  in  buying  new 
costly  machines,  a  measure  possible  only  to  large  capitalists. 
Owing  to  these  peculiarities  in  the  development  of  Russian  cotton 
industry,  during  the  Forties  many  small  and  mediocre  cotton- 
mills  had  perished,  and  production  had  become  concentrated  in 
the  hands  of  the  big  manufacturers. 

As  an  important  consequence  of  the  development  of  the  cotton 
industry  came  the  fall  of  the  hemp  and  canvas  industry,  particu- 
larly in  the  Forties.  The  development  of  those  factories  which 
had  mainly  supplied  the  English  fleet,  had  had  the  following 
course:  in  1762  their  number  was  one  hundred  and  thirty-five, 
in  1804  —  two  hundred  and  seventy-five,  and  by  the  time  of  the 
accession  of  Alexander  II  the  number  fell  to  one  hundred.  The 
cheapening  of  the  production  of  cotton  had  made  competition 
impossible  for  hemp  and  harl  producing  regions,  as  in  the  prov- 
ince of  Kaluga,  where  the  number  of  such  factories  had  fallen 
from  seventeen  to  four. 

As  to  cloth  factories,  their  number  began  to  increase  con- 
siderably after  the  removal  of  restrictions  from  the  Possessional 
factories,  but  toward  the  Forties  that  industry  began  to  fall, 
owing  to  the  competition  of  the  Polish  manufacturers.  The 
Polish  cloth  industry  was  better  situated  because  sheep-raising 
was  more  highly  developed  there,  and  because  they  had  no  custom- 
tariff  for  Silesian  wool,  so  that  having  an  abundance  of  cheap 
raw  material  they  were  able  to  produce  cloth  cheaper  than  the 
Russian  manufacturers.  Later  Prussian  manufacturers  suc- 
ceeded in  obtaining  privileges  for  the  import  of  their  cloth,  and 
when  those  privileges  were  withdrawn,  many  Prussians  migrated 
with  their  factories  to  the  Kingdom  of  Poland,  in  order  to  sell 
their  products  to  Russia  and  through  Russia  to  China ;  thus  the 
cloth  industry  in  Poland  was  still  further  enhanced.  This  com- 


268  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

petition  of  Poland  played  a  big  role  in  the  tariff  measures  of  the 
Government. 

In  the  cotton  industry  there  was  marked  a  concentration  of 
production,  owing  to  the  fact  that  only  big  manufacturers  were 
able  to  compete  with  foreign  imports.  But  during  the  Forties 
there  began  to  appear  a  reverse  situation  not  only  in  cotton  in- 
dustry, but  in  all  manufacturing  industry.  Statistics  show  that 
although  the  number  of  factories  continued  to  grow,  the  increase 
in  workingmen  began  to  slacken,  and  if  we  should  estimate  the 
number  of  workingmen  in  each  factory  it  will  appear  that  pro- 
duction was  becoming  smaller.  This  was  caused  by  the  de- 
velopment not  of  the  middle-sized  industry,  but  of  small  kus- 
tarny  (home  work)  production.  I  have  already  said  that  in 
the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  in  view  of  the  greater 
productivity  of  hired  labour  in  comparison  with  bonded  labour, 
and  because  of  other  conditions  unfavourable  for  the  landown- 
ers, estate-factories  began  to  disappear ;  but  the  merchants'-f actor- 
ies  unexpectedly  created  a  new  competitor  for  themselves  in  the 
rural  population.  With  the  spread  of  cotton-spinning  industry 
the  manufacturers  were  not  satisfied  with  the  number  of  looms 
that  they  could  put  up  in  their  factories,  but  in  addition  they 
gave  out  work  for  the  peasants  to  do  at  home.  But  when  the 
peasants  found  that  they  could  easily  buy  (for  cash  or  in  credit) 
looms  and  yarn,  they  started  an  independent  spinning  industry, 
thus  competing  with  the  factories,  and  quite  successfully,  owing 
to  the  inexpensiveness  of  home  production.  This  explains  the 
fact  that  the  number  of  factories  grew,  while  the  number  of  their 
workingmen  diminished. 

Let  us  observe  that  the  kustarny  industry,  which  originated  in 
times  immemorial,  developed  very  rapidly  in  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury in  those  productions  that  do  not  require  particular  outputs, 
as  in  the  textile  industries  —  cotton,  hemp,  silk,  wool,  etc.  The 
kustarny  production  has  been  developing  alongside  with  big  in- 
dustries, in  contrast  to  conditions  in  other  countries.  The  di- 


TARIFF  LEGISLATION  269 

mansions  of  the  kustarny  production  were  so  large  in  the  Forties 
that  in  the  province  of  Vladimir,  for  instance,  in  the  district 
of  Shuisk,  there  were  one  thousand  two  hundred  looms  in  the 
factories,  while  in  the  peasant-huts  there  were  about  twenty 
thousand  of  them;  and  throughout  the  province  of  Vladimir 
there  were  eighteen  thousand  looms  in  the  factories  and  eighty 
thousand  in  the  villages.  The  manufacturers  complained  to  the 
Government,  and  petitioned  for  the  curtailment  of  the  petty  in- 
dustry. But  the  Government  was  not  inclined  to  heed  the  com- 
plaints, since  it  sided  with  the  gentry  who  were  glad  to  see  their 
bondmen  earning  considerable  money,  thus  enabling  the  masters 
to  raise  high  obroks. 

In  the  history  of  the  tariff-legislation  during  that  period  the 
most  active  worker  had  been  the  Minister  of  Finance,  Count  Y. 
F.  Kankrin,  whom  we  have  mentioned  before,  and  who  had 
occupied  his  responsible  post  almost  twenty-one  years  (from 
1823  to  I844).1 

1  Kankrin  was  a  man  of  an  original  and  remarkable  mind.  He  was 
German  by  origin ;  his  father  was  invited  by  Catherine  to  come  to 
Russia  and  manage  the  salt  business.  The  young  Kankrin  was  edu- 
cated in  a  good  German  university,  and  had  arrived  in  Russia  by  the 
end  of  the  eighteenth  century.  For  some  time  he  had  no  definite  oc- 
cupation, but  during  the  Napoleonic  wars  he  came  to  the  front,  when,  as 
an  officer  in  the  Commissariat  he  appeared  to  be  an  unusual  phenome- 
non, since  he  was  perhaps  the  only  honest  and  educated  person  there. 
On  one  hand  he  naturally  attracted  bitter  opposition  and  attacks,  but 
on  the  other  hand  he  won  the  attention  of  the  superior  authorities  and 
even  of  Alexander. 

The  Tzar  soon  appreciated  the  value  of  Kankrin  who  proved  to  be 
well  informed  not  only  in  the  provision  of  the  army,  but  in  military 
administration,  in  general.  In  1812  Kankrin  was  made  General- 
Provision-Master  of  one  army,  and  then  of  the  entire  army.  He 
showed  extraordinary  ability  not  only  in  that  branch  of  activity,  but 
also  in  military  tactics,  and  in  the  Council  of  War  he  greatly  in- 
fluenced the  author  of  the  Scythian  plan,  General  Pful.  Later  Kankrin 
published  a  book  on  the  theory  of  war,  which  again  attracted  the  at- 
tention of  Alexander. 

When  the  war  was  transferred  to  Western  Europe,  Kankrin  soon 
distinguished  himself  even  there  as  the  most  resourceful  and  efficient 


270  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

On  the  very  eve  of  Kankrin's  appointment  as  Minister  of 
Finance  the  liberal  tariff  of  1819  was  annulled,  and  the  Govern- 
ment returned  for  a  long  time  to  protectionism.  The  new  tariff 
of  1822  was  worked  out  with  Kankrin's  aid.  The  protectionist 
system  remained  in  power  during  his  entire  administration,  which 
led  the  public  to  believe  that  he  was  a  rabid  and  narrow  protec- 
tionist, and  hated  free  trade.  This  view  is  not  just.  Kankrin 
understood  well  the  advantages  of  free  trade,  but  he  claimed 
that  at  the  given  moment  Russia  was  in  need  of  national  inde- 
pendence, that  with  its  low  stage  of  culture  the  country  would 
fall  an  easy  prey  to  foreign  industry  (particularly  to  the  inter- 
ests of  such  a  developed  and  aggressive  country  as  England) 
under  a  free  trade  system. 

From  this  point  of  view  he  considered  it  necessary  to  protect 

Provision-Master,  and  acquired  a  universal  reputation  as  the  most 
competent  of  war-economists. 

Upon  the  discovery  of  enormous  abuses  in  the  military  department  in 
Russia,  and  when  the  Minister  of  War,  Prince  Gorchakov,  was  ar- 
raigned before  a  court,  the  general  expectation  was  that  Kankrin 
would  succeed  to  his  place;  but  Alexander  evidently  had  forgotten 
him.  In  1818,  however,  Kankrin  once  more  came  to  the  Tzar's  notice, 
by  presenting  to  Alexander  a  capable  memorandum  about  the  libera- 
tion of  the  serfs,  a  memorandum  that  served,  in  the  opinion  of  many, 
as  the  impulse  that  caused  the  latter  to  commission  Arakcheiev  to  work 
out  a  plan  for  the  gradual  extinction  of  serfdom. 

In  1822  Alexander  finally  decided  that  he  could  no  longer  keep  in 
office  Minister  of  Finance,  Guriev,  the  secret  of  whose  influence  (he 
kept  his  position  eleven  years)  is  to  be  found  in  his  faculty  of  making 
friends  with  the  powerful  spheres  through  distributing  big  sums  of 
money  under  various  pretexts.  In  1822  there  was  a  famine  in  White 
Russia ;  Guriev  considerably  curtailed  the  sums  assigned  for  the  starv- 
ing peasants,  but  at  the  same  time  he  allowed  seven  hundred  thousand 
rubles  for  the  purchase  of  an  estate  from  an  influential  landowner 
who  was  in  need  of  money.  Upon  the  discovery  of  this  Guriev  was 
discharged,  and  by  Arakcheiev's  advice  Alexander  offered  the  post  to 
Kankrin. 

Even  earlier  than  Arakcheiev,  Kankrin  was  appreciated  by  Speran- 
sky,  who  said  during  his  exile  in  Perm  that  in  his  opinion,  Kankrin 
was  the  only  man  capable  of  managing  the  Russian  finances. 


KANKRIN'S  ACTIVITY  271 

the  development  of  Russian  production.  Yet  he  never  allowed 
too  high  privileges  for  native  manufacturers  by  the  aid  of  ex- 
orbitant custom  duties ;  on  the  contrary,  he  watched  to  see  that 
Russian  industry  did  not  fall  asleep,  and  he  constantly  regulated 
the  customs  system  in  order  to  force  the  Russian  manufacturers 
to  pay  attention  to  all  improvements  in  the  technique  of  pro- 
duction, under  the  threat  of  foreign  competition.  For  this  rea- 
son his  conditionally  protective  tariff  was  modified  many  times 
with  this  view  in  mind.  In  certain  commodities  the  custom  dues 
had  been  constantly  lowered,  especially  when  Kankrin  deemed  it 
necessary  to  encourage  Russian  industry  from  the  "  other  end," 
threatening  it  with  foreign  competition.  Thus  his  protectionism 
was  quite  moderate  and  wise. 

On  the  other  hand,  his  tariff  policy  was  dictated  also  by  fiscal 
considerations.  We  must  bear  in  mind  that  when  he  accepted 
the  portfolio  of  Minister  of  Finance,  the  finances  were  at  a  very 
low  ebb;  the  treasury  in  1822  was  almost  empty;  no  loans  could 
be  made  on  tolerable  conditions,  and  the  course  of  the  paper- 
money  did  not  rise  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  in  the  last  years  of 
Guriev's  administration,  owing  to  his  system  of  extinguishing 
the  assignation-debt,  that  debt  had  decreased  from  eight  hundred 
to  five  hundred  and  ninety-five  million  rubles.  This  decrease 
was  accomplished  at  the  price  of  loans  arranged  for  very  heavy 
interest,  so  that  the  non-interest-bearing  assignation-debt  had  be- 
come a  debt  with  the  obligation  of  paying  out  constant  high  in- 
terest. Kankrin  came  to  the  conclusion  that  under  such  condi- 
tions there  was  no  sense  in  extinguishing  the  assignations,  but  he 
strove  to  make  no  more  loans  and  to  issue  no  more  assignations. 
His  principle  was  that  the  aim  of  a  financial  policy  should  be 
not  the  growth  of  fiscal  income,  but  the  increase  of  national  wel- 
fare, under  which  he  understood  mainly  the  welfare  of  the 
masses. 

With  this  aim  in  view,  Kankrin  was  strictly  economical  and 
opposed  loans  and  heavy  taxation.  In  his  practical  activity  he 


272  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

avoided  the  increase  of  taxes,  but  tried  to  lower  the  budgets  of 
various  departments,  worrying  but  little  about  the  numerous  ene- 
mies that  he  made  among  the  higher  bureaucracy  by  such  meas- 
ures. I  have  already  mentioned  how  unrelenting  he  had  been 
even  with  Nicolas.  His  system  of  economy  gave  noticeable  re- 
sults in  the  very  first  years  of  his  administration,  and  created  on 
the  European  money-markets  a  far  different  attitude  towards  the 
Russian  credit  than  the  one  that  had  existed  during  Guriev. 

Kankrin  applied  the  same  principles  of  national  economy  to  the 
tariff  question.  He  considered  that  custom  dues  should  be  raised 
on  objects  of  luxury  and  on  commodities  consumed  by  the  richer 
classes,  and  in  this  direction  he  constantly  raised  the  tariff.  Un- 
der him  the  customs  income  rose  from  eleven  million  to  twenty- 
six  million  rubles,  i.e.,  two  and  a  half  times. 

In  order  to  bring  to  an  end  the  tariff  question,  we  shall  take 
up  the  history  of  the  Russo-Polish  commercial  and  customs  re- 
lations. Poland,  more  developed  culturally,  especially  in  respect 
to  industry  which  could  better  flourish  there  than  in  Russia  for 
the  reasons  cited  above,  looked  upon  Russia  as  a  desirable  market 
for  her  products,  and  moreover,  she  wanted  to  exploit  the  Asiatic 
markets,  which  could  be  made  possible  only  by  free  transit 
through  Russia.  In  1826  Prince  Lubetzky,  Minister  of  Fi- 
nance for  the  Kingdom  of  Poland,  arrived  at  Petrograd  with  the 
special  aim  of  obtaining  tariff  privileges  for  Poland ;  ignoring  the 
Constitution  of  1815,  he  pointed  out  that  Poland  was  in  fact  a 
part  of  Russia.  Kankrin  put  forth  weighty  arguments  against 
the  Prince.  In  his  opinion  even  the  existing  customs  system 
between  the  two  countries  was  detrimental  for  the  Russian 
population.  At  the  formation  of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  it  was 
agreed  that  the  raw  materials  of  both  countries  were  to  be  ex- 
changed free  of  duty ;  as  to  manufactured  commodities,  those  pro- 
duced from  native  raw  material  were  taxed  with  a  negligible 
duty,  not  more  than  one  per  cent,  of  the  cost  of  the  ware,  while 
for  manufactures  from  foreign  material  there  was  a  three  per 


THE  MILITARY  BUDGET  273 

cent,  duty  ad  valorem,  but  for  certain  commodities  special  duties 
were  arranged,  for  instance,  products  of  the  cotton  industry  were 
taxed  at  fifteen  per  cent.,  sugar  at  twenty-five  per  cent.  The 
chief  commodity  of  Polish  manufacturing  industry  —  cloth  — 
was  taxed  at  three  per  cent.,  while  Russian  cotton  manufactures 
were  taxed  at  fifteen  per  cent. 

The  Moscow  manufacturers  naturally  complained  vehemently 
against  such  an  order  of  things,  and  Kankrin  in  his  arguments 
against  Lubetzky  indicated  that  not  only  did  he  not  consider  the 
abolition  of  internal  customs  possible,  but  that  he  intended  to 
raise  the  duties  on  certain  commodities  the  competition  of  which 
hurt  Russian  manufacturers.  After  the  insurrection  of  1831, 
when  Poland  had  ceased  to  exist  as  an  independent  state,  and  the 
Government  considered  the  complete  incorporation  of  Poland, 
the  custom-tariff  between  Russia  and  Poland  appeared  to  be  an 
anomaly.  The  question  aroused  lengthy  discussions  and  was 
settled  only  toward  the  Fifties,  after  the  death  of  Kankrin,  by  a 
special  Commission.  Trengoborsky,  the  learned  Polish  econo- 
mist, who  was  recommended,  it  appears,  by  Lubetzky,  took  active 
part  in  the  work  of  that  Commission.  In  the  Fifties  the  fron- 
tier line  between  Russia  and  Poland  was  abolished,  while  in 
regard  to  foreign  trade  differentiated  duties  were  introduced, 
which  were  adapted  to  the  conditions  of  both  countries,  and 
varied  according  to  whether  the  imported  goods  were  sent  to  Po- 
land or  to  Russia. 

An  important  question  of  the  financial  policy  at  that  time,  as 
it  is  also  at  present,  was  the  military  budget.  Kankrin  had  at- 
tained a  considerable  economy  in  the  ordinary  expenses  on  the 
army  during  the  first  twelve  years  of  his  administration.  But 
during  that  period  alongside  with  the  decrease  in  the  ordinary 
expenses  Russia  had  gone  through  a  number  of  wars  which  de- 
manded extraordinary  expenses;  these,  in  spite  of  Kankrin's  op- 
position, had  to  be  covered  by  loans.  The  war  with  Persia  broke 
out  soon  after  the  accession  of  Nicolas,  and  in  1828-29,  came 


274  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

the  war  with  Turkey,  which  cost  over  one  hundred  and  twenty 
million  rubles  in  silver;  then  finally  the  Polish  campaign  of  1831 
proved  quite  expensive.  The  war-loans  in  the  first  years  reached 
four  hundred  million  rubles  in  silver.  But  we  must  say  that 
those  loans  were  much  better  than  the  former  assignations-issues. 
In  general,  as  I  have  said,  the  reputation  of  Russian  finances  so 
improved  under  the  management  of  Kankrin,  that  in  the  Thirties 
Russian  papers  were  quoted  on  foreign  exchanges  almost  at  par, 
which  had  never  happened  before. 

Almost  all  investigators  of  the  history  of  Russian  finances  re- 
proach Kankrin  for  the  indisputably  negative  measure  which  he 
carried  through  in  1826  —  the  Beverage  Reform.  As  we  re- 
member, under  Guriev  private  contracts  were  abolished,  and  a 
system  of  fiscal  beverage-monopoly  was  introduced,  which  con- 
tinued to  exist  also  under  Kankrin  until  1826.  The  wine-in- 
come increased  in  the  beginning,  but  soon  began  to  fall  tre- 
mendously, owing  to  disorders  in  the  fiscal  management  and  to 
the  unbelievable  thievery  that  reigned  there. 

It  had  become  clear  that  it  was  impossible  to  carry  on  the 
business  in  the  absence  of  a  staff  of  officials  who  would  be  to 
some  extent  honest  and  prepared.  In  1826  Nicolas  ordered  Kan- 
krin to  prepare  a  report  about  the  regulation  of  the  wine-income. 
This  report  was  very  objective.  It  expounded  the  ways  existing 
in  various  countries  of  exploiting  the  wine-income,  and  indicated 
the  possibility  of  three  systems:  the  fiscal  system,  then  in  exist- 
ence in  Russia,  which  monopolised  all  wine-trade;  the  system 
of  wine-contracts,  which  had  existed  till  the  beginning  of  the 
Twenties,  and  consisted  in  giving  over  to  private  contractors  the 
right  to  exploit  the  wine-monopoly ;  and  lastly,  the  system  of  free 
trade  in  wine  under  an  excise  collected  from  every  bottle  or  other 
vessel.  The  last  system  was  upheld  by  Mordvinov,  but  Kankrin 
pointed  out  that  it  might  be  good  in  theory,  while  in  practice  it 
required  some  culture,  and  mainly  an  organisation  under  strict 
control,  which,  in  the  absence  of  efficient  officials,  was  impos- 


CURRENCY  REFORM  275 

sible.  For  the  same  reason  he  considered  the  existing  fiscal  sys- 
tem impracticable.  He  indicated  the  possibility  of  a  fourth  sys- 
tem—  the  distribution  of  the  wine-income  among  provinces 
which  would  be  taxed  with  a  certain  amount  and  would  collect 
it  by  the  aid  of  local  institutions.  But  Kankrin  mistrusted  the 
local  organs,  and  asserted  that  the  tempting  wine-income  would 
prove  the  nobility  to  be  as  easily  corrupted  as  the  officials. 

Since  the  State  could  not  relinquish  the  exploitation  of  the 
large  wine-income,  Kankrin  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  least 
detrimental  system  was  that  of  private  contracts;  he  admitted 
that  the  lessees  would  accumulate  enormous  sums  at  the  people's 
expense,  but  he  argued  that  if  such  accumulation  of  money 
should  be  allowed  at  all,  preference  should  be  given  to  the  con- 
tractors who  would  utilise  that  capital  for  industry,  to  the 
people's  advantage,  whereas  from  the  thievery  of  the  officials 
there  was  no  gain  even  for  industry. 

Such  were  the  considerations  which  led  him  to  restore  the 
contracts-system.  The  new  measure  proved  a  great  evil;  not 
only  did  the  contractors  wax  rich,  but  they  bribed  and  corrupted 
the  entire  local  administration.  All  the  provincial  officials  re- 
ceived from  the  contractors  additional  salary,  not  smaller  than 
the  regular  salary.  It  is  natural  that  when  the  interests  of  the 
contractors  collided  with  others,  the  interests  of  the  former  were 
always  given  preference  both  by  the  administrative  and  by  the 
judicial  authorities.  The  evil  of  that  system  was  not  redeemed 
by  the  considerations  of  Kankrin  in  1 826. 

Perhaps  the  most  significant  of  Kankrin's  undertakings  was 
the  currency-reform.  The  reform  brought  about  the  devalua- 
tion of  the  assignations  and  their  redemption  at  lowered  prices, 
but  its  chief  aim  was  not  in  fiscal  interests;  Kankrin's  idea 
was  to  facilitate  commercial  intercourse.  The  course  of  the 
paper-ruble  had  always  vacillated,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  sev- 
eral courses  existed :  there  was  a  bill-course  used  in  transactions 
with  foreign  merchants,  a  taxation-course  by  which  assignations 


276  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

were  accepted  by  the  Treasury,  finally  there  existed  a  common- 
people-course  used  arbitrarily  at  private  transactions.  The  last 
course  was  the  most  wavering;  at  the  very  same  time  it  might 
vary  in  places  from  three  hundred  and  fifty  to  four  hundred 
and  twenty  copecks  in  assignations  for  one  silver  ruble.  This 
was  caused  by  the  fact  that  in  view  of  the  constantly  falling 
course  of  the  assignations  it  had  become  customary  to  indicate 
a  much  lower  course  in  transactions  for  future  delivery  or  pur- 
chase, so  that  in  certain  cases  the  course  would  be  artificially 
lowered  to  four  hundred  and  twenty  copecks  per  ruble  instead 
of  the  normal  course  of  three  hundred  and  fifty  or  three  hundred 
and  sixty  copecks.  As  a  result  the  buying  public  (especially  peas- 
ants) had  often  to  pay  much  more  than  the  actual  course  re- 
quired, and  in  the  general  mistrust  of  the  unstable  assignations 
and  search  for  constant  metal-money,  it  had  become  customary  to 
import  foreign  coins  and  sell  them  to  the  people.  These  private 
transactions  brought  further  confusion.  In  view  of  these  con- 
ditions Kankrin  decided  to  have  a  law  issued,  calling  for  the 
conducting  of  all  transactions  in  silver,  for  which  purpose  the 
assignations  were  to  be  given  a  definite  obligatory  course  by 
which  the  Treasury  would  redeem  them.  After  an  exchange  of 
opinions  with  Speransky,  who  left  a  memorandum  on  this  ques- 
tion shortly  before  his  death,  Kankrin  determined  to  place  the 
course  at  three  hundred  and  fifty  copecks  per  ruble.  The  law 
was  issued  in  June,  1839,  and  it  had  splendid  results;  an  end 
came  to  all  the  frauds  and  confusions  in  the  common-people- 
course  transactions.  A  few  years  later  Kankrin  issued  the  so- 
called  depositki,  paper  certificates  for  twenty-five  rubles  given 
by  the  Treasury  as  receipts  for  deposited  metal-money  or  gold 
and  silver  bars ;  it  was  declared  that  the  deposits  would  be  kept 
intact  and  handed  back  upon  demand.  The  depositki  at  once 
acquired  popularity;  in  a  few  months,  toward  the  end  of  1842, 
more  than  twenty-five  million  rubles  in  coin  were  thus  deposited. 
In  two  years  the  Government  was  in  a  position  to  issue  more 


FINANCIAL  REFORM  277 

than  forty  million  rubles'  worth  of  paper-money,  at  par  with 
the  silver  course. 

Thus  the  national  system  had  three  kinds  of  circulating  money- 
coin,  depositki,  and  assignations.  Soon  Kankrin  decided  to  is- 
sue credit  bills,  as  in  other  countries,  which  would  not  be  secured 
by  an  equivalent  amount  of  metal-money,  but  only  by  a  certain 
fund  required  for  uninterrupted  exchange.  The  credit-bills 
were  issued,  with  a  fund  of  one-sixth,  of  their  amount  in  metal- 
money.  The  operation  proved  successful,  the  new  bills  circu- 
lated freely,  and  their  course  remained  at  par. 

Then  came  the  idea  of  supplanting  all  assignations  with  one 
form  of  paper-money  exchangeable  for  coin.  Kankrin  had  ap- 
prehensions that  with  the  introduction  of  paper-money  on  such 
a  scale  there  would  arise  in  the  course  of  time,  especially  after 
his  death  or  resignation,  a  temptation  to  overissue  such  money, 
and  in  the  result  the  old  assignation  story  would  repeat  itself. 
But  Nicolas,  at  his  accession  completely  ignorant  in  financial 
affairs,  had  gradually  acquired  from  Kankrin  some  knowledge 
of  the  subject,  and  considered  himself  an  experienced  financier; 
when  Kankrin  hesitated  Nicolas  presented  his  own  project  in 
which  he  argued  with  his  Minister,  and  advocated  the  possibility 
of  supplanting  all  assignations  and  depositki  with  credit-bills. 
At  this  he  proposed  to  redeem  all  assignations  at  the  price  fixed 
in  1839,  i-e->  at  three  hundred  and  fifty  copecks  per  silver  ruble. 
As  the  total  amount  of  assignations  was  equal  to  five  hundred 
and  ninety-five  million  rubles,  it  was  necessary  to  have  a  fund  of 
one  hundred  and  seventy  million  silver  rubles  for  their  redemp- 
tion ;  this  amount  required  in  security  for  an  equivalent  number 
of  credit-bills  one-sixth,  i.e.,  the  State  Treasury  was  to  have  a 
constant  sum  of  about  twenty-eight  and  a  half  million  rubles  in 
coin.  Nicolas  believed  in  the  possibility  of  realising  that  plan 
at  once ;  for  this  reason  he  determined  to  discontinue  the  further 
issue  of  depositki,  but  in  the  course  of  their  return  to  the  Treas- 
ury to  destroy  them,  take  a  corresponding  sum  from  the  depository 


278  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

fund,  and  issue  for  that  sum  new  credit-bills;  one-sixth  of  the 
metal  fund  should  be  kept  as  a  security  for  the  credit-bills,  and 
the  rest  should  be  placed  in  a  reserve  fund,  for  new  issues.  In 
Nicolas's  view  the  whole  operation  was  to  take  not  more  than 
five  years. 

Although  Kankrin  showed  a  stubborn  opposition,  Nicolas' 
views,  naturally  upheld  by  all  Ministers,  were  finally  adopted. 
The  operation  passed  very  successfully;  after  the  deposit  of 
twenty-eight  million  rubles  in  coin  as  the  fund  of  one-sixth  the 
amount  of  the  issued  credit-bills,  there  still  remained  in  the 
Treasury  about  sixty-six  million  rubles  in  coin,  which  sum  was 
solemnly  transported  to  the  fortress  of  Peter  and  Paul,  counted 
over  and  deposited.  Thus  the  Government  was  in  possession  of 
a  reserve-fund  that  held  up  the  course  of  the  paper-money  until 
the  war  of  1853. 

A  few  words  should  be  said  about  Kankrin's  general  cultural 
activity,  which  was  manifested  in  founding  educational  institu- 
tions for  the  spread  of  technical  knowledge.  In  1828  he  es- 
tablished the  Technological  Institute;  he  reorganised  and,  so  to 
speak,  put  on  their  feet  the  Forestry  and  Mining  Institutes.  He 
was  the  first  to  introduce  industrial  exhibitions  which  occurred 
periodically  at  Moscow.  An  agricultural  periodical  was  founded 
by  him,  which  he  supplied  with  his  articles,  and  an  Institute  of 
Agriculture,  in  Gory-Goretzk.  Petrograd  still  bears  the  stamp 
of  Kankrin's  activity  —  in  the  numerous  buildings  erected  by 
him,  like  the  Bourse,  and  other  governmental  and  educational 
edifices. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

WE  shall  now  examine  the  course  of  education  and 
the  development  of  the  mental  and  political  move- 
ment among  the  intelligentzia  during  the  Thirties 
and  Forties. 

Admiral  Shishkov,  inherited  by  Nicolas  from  the  preceding 
reign,  remained  at  his  post  as  Minister  of  Education  until  1828; 
from  1828  to  1833  the  post  was  occupied  by  the  Pietist,  Prince 
Lieven.  S.  S.  Uvarov,  the  most  famous  of  all  Russian  Min- 
isters of  Education,  retained  the  post  from  1833  till  the  begin- 
ning of  Nicolas'  third  period — 1849.  It  was  Uvarov  who 
had  laid  the  peculiar  Nicolaievian  stamp  on  the  educational  ac- 
tivity of  that  epoch,  although  in  fact  he  was  only  a  talented 
executor  of  Nicolas'  orders.  Uvarov's  role  in  the  Ministry  of 
Education  was  by  the  significance  of  his  reforms  as  important 
as  the  role  of  Kankrin  in  the  history  of  Russian  finances  and  as 
the  role  of  Kiselev  in  the  history  of  peasant-legislation. 

We  have  seen  that  from  the  beginning  Nicolas  had  turned  his 
attention  to  the  question  of  education  which  he  intended  to  base 
on  the  principle  of  preservation  of  the  youth  from  revolutionary 
tendencies.  The  conservative  programme  received  a  definite 
stimulus  after  1831,  and  the  chief  promulgator  of  those  views 
came  to  be  the  successor  of  the  weak  Lieven,  S.  S.  Uvarov,  rec- 
ommended by  Karamzin.  We  remember  Uvarov's  opposition  to 
the  reactionary  activity  of  Prince  Golitzin  before  the  Twenties, 
and  his  radical  utterances  about  freedom  and  education ;  Uvarov 
of  the  epoch  of  Nicolas  was  a  completely  changed  person.  He 
had  become  an  obedient  servant  of  his  master,  and  agreed  with 
him  that  the  population  needed  just  as  much  education  as  was 

279 


280  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

required  for  the  technical  needs  of  the  state,  and  that  the  pub- 
lic should  be  carefully  guarded  against  the  infiltration  of  perni- 
cious political  ideas. 

The  statutes  of  the  primary  and  secondary  schools  were  re- 
vised from  this  point  of  view  by  the  Committee  of  December  6, 
1826;  in  accordance  with  Nicolas'  views,  the  net  of  schools  in- 
troduced by  Yankovich  de  Mirievo  was  discarded,  and  new 
statutes  were  issued  December  28,  1828.  This  reactionary 
measure  was  carried  through  during  the  period  which  I  have 
characterised  as  not  opposed  to  Progress. 

When  Deputy  Minister  under  Lieven,  Uvarov  had  been 
ordered  to  investigate  the  University  of  Moscow  and  other 
provincial  institutions.  On  his  return  the  clever  careerist  pre- 
sented a  written  report,  in  which  his  views  so  skilfully  coincided 
with  those  of  Nicolas,  that  the  latter  was  bound  to  appoint  him 
Minister.  In  his  impressions  of  the  University  of  Moscow, 
Uvarov  indicated  the  pernicious  influence  of  Western  European 
ideas,  and  added :  "  I  firmly  believe  that  we  shall  be  able  to 
avoid  those  mistakes,  and  shall  succeed  in  gradually  capturing 
the  minds  of  the  youth  and  bringing  them  to  that  point  where 
there  must  merge  together  —  a  regulated,  fundamental  educa- 
tion with  a  deep  conviction  and  warm  belief  in  the  true-Russian 
conservative  principles  of  Orthodoxy,  Autocracy,  and  Nation- 
ality, which  present  the  last  anchor  of  our  salvation  and  the 
surest  pledge  of  the  strength  and  majesty  of  our  country." 

The  Emperor  saw  in  Uvarov  an  assuring  means  for  the  pro- 
mulgation of  those  ideas  which  he  considered  salutary  and  neces- 
sary for  the  young  mind.  As  Minister,  Uvarov  definitely  de- 
clared that  he  considered  the  main  purpose  of  his  Ministry  — 
the  damming  of  the  influx  of  new  ideas  into  Russia ;  he  wished 
to  prolong  Russia's  youthfulness,  and  if  he  could  keep  back  the 
development  of  the  country  for  about  half  a  century,  he  "  would 
die  in  peace." 

In  his  above  mentioned  Report  Uvarov  jesuitically  advocated 


POPULAR  EDUCATION  281 

the  "  multiplication  of  mental  dikes  for  the  struggle  with  de- 
structive notions."  This  principle  became  the  foundation  of  the 
subsequent  policy  of  the  Ministry  of  Education,  at  the  head  of 
which  stood  the  most  learned  man  of  his  age,  who  intended  to 
implant  "  true  enlightenment "  and  at  the  same  time  preserve 
the  youth  from  imported  revolutionary  ideas.  One  is  inclined 
to  presume  that  Uvarov  had  been  converted  to  profess  what  he 
used  to  mock  at :  to  believe  in  "  fire  which  does  not  scald." 

Discussions  had  been  going  on  yet  in  Shishkov's  Committee 
about  the  desirable  programme  for  Gymnasia.  It  was  decided  to 
introduce  the  Classical  method  with  Latin  as  a  compulsory  sub- 
ject, and  with  both  Latin  and  Greek  in  several  Gymnasia  in  the 
Capitals.  At  the  beginning  the  Classical  programme  did  not  ex- 
clude other  studies,  but  the  longer  that  system  lasted,  the  longer 
Uvarov  remained  Minister,  the  more  subjects  were  thrown 
overboard  from  the  curriculum;  in  1844  statistics  was  excluded, 
in  1 847  —  logic,  in  1 846  the  course  of  mathematics  was  abridged, 
and  by  the  end  of  the  Forties  the  programme  of  studies  for  sec- 
ondary schools  was  considerably  shortened. 

At  that  time  the  nobles  sent  their  children  quite  willingly  to 
the  Gymnasia.  This  was  conditioned  on  one  hand  by  the  ne- 
cessity of  having  a  diploma  for  State  service,  and  also  by  the 
exhaustion  of  the  contingent  of  domestic  teachers  that  had  been 
furnished  by  the  French  emigres.  Thus  the  Government  finally 
saw  its  plans  carried  out,  and  the  demand  for  Gymnasia  grew. 
Accordingly,  in  1826  there  were  forty-eight  Gymnasia,  while 
in  the  Fifties  —  seventy-four ;  at  the  beginning  of  Nicolas'  reign 
the  number  of  students  was  seven  thousand,  and  by  its  end, 
eighteen  thousand.  The  number  of  District  Schools  also  in- 
creased, but  the  quality  of  their  instruction  deteriorated.  This 
was  due  to  the  reorganisation  of  the  school-management.  By 
the  Statute  of  1804,  which  had  signified  the  most  brilliant  epoch 
in  the  history  of  Russian  education,  the  universities  stood  at  the 
head  of  the  provincial  school-management.  But  the  Statute  was 


282  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

radically  changed  in  1835,  the  organisation  of  the  universities 
was  greatly  modified,  and  the  primary  and  secondary  schools 
passed  from  their  jurisdiction  to  that  of  the  District  Curators, 
who  were  now  in  many  cases  local  Governor-Generals,  and  in 
Siberia  —  Governors. 

The  Statute  of  1835  deprived  the  universities  of  autonomy. 
True  they  preserved  the  right  to  elect  Rectors  and  place  pro- 
fessors in  vacancies,  but  at  the  same  time  the  Minister  of  Edu- 
cation had  the  right  not  to  approve  of  the  elected  functionaries, 
and  to  appoint  his  own  candidates.  We  must,  however,  men- 
tion that  there  still  existed  a  tendency  toward  developing  good 
professors,  and  during  the  Thirties  it  was  a  practice  to  send 
young  candidates  abroad,  the  results  of  which  were  splendid. 
During  the  Forties  a  whole  pleiad  of  young  Russian  scholars 
who  had  been  abroad  appeared,  and  they  contributed  greatly 
to  the  education  of  the  following  generation  of  the  intelligentzia. 
To  mention  a  few  names :  Granovsky,  Riedkin,  Kriukov,  Bus- 
laiev  (in  Moscow),  Meyer  (Kazan),  Nievolin,  Kutorga  (Petro- 
grad).  The  Moscow  Curator,  Count  S.  G.  Stroganov,  a  well 
educated  man,  made  many  efforts  to  improve  the  quality  of  the 
personnel,  but  he  liked  to  interfere  with  the  system  of  instruc- 
tion and  even  with  the  programmes  of  individual  professors,  dic- 
tated desirable  tendencies  to  them,  and  in  general  managed  the 
university  as  an  exemplary  boss. 

The  number  of  universities  did  not  increase;  the  University 
of  St.  Vladimir,  opened  in  Kiev  in  1834,  took  the  place  of  the 
University  of  Vilna,  which  was  closed  after  the  insurrection  of 
1831. 

As  to  the  position  of  the  intelligentzia,  their  ranks  were  greatly 
depleted  after  December  14,  1825.  The  flower  of  the  intelli- 
gentzia, if  we  understand  by  it  the  independently  thinking  so- 
ciety, was  cut  down  by  the  ruthless  hand  of  the  victor,  and 
exiled  to  Siberia.  Those  who  remained  were  terrorised  and 
prevented  from  expressing  their  ideas. 


THE  INTELLIGENTZIA  283 

"  Thirty  years  ago,"  wrote  Herzen  in  the  Fifties,  "  Russia  of 
the  future  existed  exclusively  among  a  few  boys  who  had  just 
passed  their  childhood;  in  them  lay  the  heritage  of  universal 
knowledge  and  of  purely  national  Russ.  This  new  life  vege- 
tated as  grass  trying  to  grow  on  the  lips  of  a  crater  which  has 
not  yet  cooled."  When  those  boys  grew  up,  the  young  genera- 
tion was  split  in  the  same  two  currents  by  which  Western  ideas 
had  been  flowing  into  Russia  since  the  days  of  Catherine.  Again 
there  appeared  on  one  side  those  who  had  absorbed  the  French 
ideas  of  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  ideas  of  the  French 
Revolution,  and  the  ideas  of  the  Decembrists  who  had  also  been 
brought  up  on  the  French  ideology;  on  the  other  side  there  ap- 
peared the  followers  of  German  thought,  German  Idealism,  and 
of  the  Post-Kantian  metaphysics  which  had  deeply  penetrated 
the  Russian  thinking  society  of  the  Twenties  and  Thirties.  The 
followers  of  the  second  current  were  now  in  the  majority,  as 
was  clearly  demonstrated  by  the  nature  of  the  university  circles 
around  which  the  young  generation  of  the  Thirties  concentrated. 
At  the  end  of  Alexander's  reign  the  French  ideas,  reflected  in 
the  plans  of  Pestel  and  Nikita  Muraviov,  were  undisputably 
dominant ;  but  even  then  followers  of  German  philosophers,  par- 
ticularly of  Schelling  began  to  form  circles.  Already  in  1804 
an  ardent  expounder  of  Schelling's  philosophy  appeared  in  Petro- 
grad  in  the  person  of  Vellansky,  a  professor  at  the  Medical 
Academy.  Schelling's  monistic-idealistic  philosophy  which  tried 
to  reconcile  the  objectivity  of  the  existence  of  nature  with  the 
possibility  of  its  speculative  contemplation,  had  brought  him  to 
his  Naturphilosophie,  which  appealed  to  natural  scientists  and 
medical  students.  This  explains  the  fact  that  in  Russia  Schel- 
lingianism  was  first  introduced  by  Vellansky,  Professor  at  the 
Medical  Academy,  and  by  M.  G.  Pavlov,  professor  of  physics 
and  mineralogy  at  the  University  of  Moscow.  Herzen  relates 
in  his  Past  and  Meditations  the  significance  of  Pavlov's  lectures 
for  his  (Herzen's)  student-generation  during  the  first  course  in 


284  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

the  Physico-Mathematical  department.  Pavlov  would  at  once 
startle  his  students  with  the  question:  "You  want  to  know 
Nature,  but  what  is  Nature,  and  what  is  To  know  ?  "  Thus  be- 
fore expounding  physics  he  would  explain  the  theory  of  Con- 
sciousness according  to  Schelling.  Later,  however,  that  philoso- 
phy was  preached  by  professors  of  the  history  of  philosophy 
(Galich),  of  the  theory  of  literature  and  aesthetics  (Davidov, 
Nadezhdin),  and  others,  and  also  in  literature  where  the  fore- 
runners were  grouped  around  the  circle  of  the  Moscow  "  Lovers 
of  Wisdom,"  founded  in  the  Twenties  by  Prince  D.  V.  Odoiev- 
sky  and  D.  V.  Venevitinov,  who  began  to  issue  in  1824  a  literary 
almanach,  Mnemozina,  with  the  co-operation  of  Wilhelm 
Kuchelberg  and  Professor  Pavlov.  To  the  "  Lovers  of  Wis- 
dom "  belonged  also  the  future  Moscow  Slavophiles,  the  brothers 
Kireievsky  and  Khomiakov,  also  Pogodin  and  Shevyrev,  who 
undertook  in  1826  the  publication  of  the  Moscow  Messenger. 
Through  Venevitinov  and  Kiichelberg  Pushkin  was  attracted 
to  the  publications  of  the  "  Lovers  of  Wisdom." 

Mnemozina  was  devoted  to  the  struggle  with  the  ideas  of  the 
French  Encyclopedists  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  to  the 
spread  of  the  ideas  of  German  Idealism.  The  direct  successor 
of  Mnemozina  was  the  Moscow  Messenger,  but  in  spite  of  its 
gifted  contributors  this  publication  soon  died,  owing  to  the  in- 
experience of  its  young  editors.  In  1831  the  chief  organ  of 
Schellingianism  in  Russia  was  the  Telescope,  published  by 
Nadezhdin,  Professor  of  ./Esthetics  at  the  University  of  Mos- 
cow. Parallel  with  this  strictly  philosophical  magazine  there 
had  been  published  at  Moscow  since  1825  the  Moscow  Tele- 
graph, founded  by  the  many-sided  journalist,  N.  A.  Polevoy  1 
at  first  with  the  close  co-operation  of  Prince  P.  A.  Viazemsky, 
one  of  the  Arzamasians.  The  Moscow  Telegraph  was  char- 

1  The  first  Russian  writer  in  the  nineteenth  century  who  was  not 
a  nobleman  by  birth.  Pushkin,  in  one  of  his  virulent  epigrams,  called 
him  "  plebeian."— TR. 


P.  T.  CHAADAIEV  285 

acterised  by  its  publishers  as  an  Encyclopedic  organ ;  it  preached 
Romanticism,  and  struggled  with  the  Pseudo-Classicism  of  the 
old  European  Messenger  that  was  edited  then  by  Professor 
Kachenovsky. 

In  spite  of  their  theoretic  differences,  both  the  Telescope  and 
the  Moscow  Telegraph  were  progressive  organs,  and  advocated 
the  liberal  views  then  predominant  in  Western  Europe.  But 
the  Telegraph,  an  eclectic  and  more  superficial  publication,  was 
more  acceptable  to  the  unprepared  readers,  while  the  Telescope 
had  a  more  select  audience,  among  the  university  intelligentzia. 
For  this  reason  the  Censorship  Department,  whose  actual  head 
had  been  Uvarov,  as  Deputy  Minister,  since  1832,  looked  with 
suspicion  on  Polevoy's  popular  magazine,  and  stopped  its  pub- 
lication in  1833.  Nadezhdin's  Telescope,  in  view  of  its  smaller 
circle  of  readers,  was  treated  by  the  Government  with  more 
tolerance,  and  it  appeared  unmolested  until  1836,  when  the 
famous  "  Philosophical  Letter  "  of  Chaadaiev  appeared. 

The  author  of  that  letter,  P.  J.  Chaadaiev,  was  a  remarkable 
personality,  and  has  left  an  important  impression  in  the  history 
of  the  Russian  intelligentzia.  Although  his  activity  belonged  to 
the  Thirties  and  Forties,  by  his  age,  and  particularly  by  his  edu- 
cation and  connections,  he  belonged  to  the  preceding  generation, 
which  was  removed  from  the  scene  after  December  14,  1825. 
Together  with  Pushkin  they  were  the  only  fragments  of  that 
generation  of  Russian  intelligentzia  saved  by  accident  from  the 
catastrophe.  A  brilliant  Guard-officer,  an  aristocrat  by  birth 
(he  was  a  grandson  of  the  historian,  Prince  Shcherbatov), 
brought  up  as  most  of  his  contemporaries  on  the  ideas  of  the  end 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  he  nevertheless  early  separated  him- 
self from  his  friends,  and  lived  a  solitary  life.  After  the  famous 
incident  in  the  Semionovsky  regiment,  when  he  was  sent  with  a 
report  to  Alexander  at  Leibach,  he  resigned,  lived  alone,  and 
concentrated  his  thoughts  on  Mysticism.  In  his  infatuation 
with  Christian  Mysticism  (in  its  Catholic  form),  Chaadaiev  re- 


286 

jected  Hegel  whose  system  did  not  agree  with  Christian  revela- 
tion, but  became  an  ardent  adherent  of  Schelling,  when  the  lat- 
ter came  in  his  second  period  to  the  reconciliation  of  the  con- 
clusions of  the  Idealistic  philosophy  with  the  dogmas  of  the 
Christian  faith ;  in  this  respect  Chaadaiev  agreed  perfectly  with 
the  subsequent  founder  of  the  Slavophil  doctrine,  1. 1.  Kireievsky. 
He  had  another  point  of  contact  with  his  later  opponents,  the 
Slavophils,  in  that  he  also  admitted  a  radical  difference  between 
the  development  of  Western  Europe  and  Russia,  on  a  religious 
basis;  but  that  difference  was  not  in  his  opinion  in  favour  of 
Russia.  In  the  Catholicism  of  Western  Europe  he  saw  a  mighty 
and  faithful  guard  of  the  principles  of  Christianity  and  Chris- 
tian civilisation,  while  Russia  appeared  to  him  in  the  gloomiest 
light,  a  mediocrity  which  stood  on  the  parting  of  the  ways  be* 
tween  East  and  West,  and  had  neither  great  traditions  nor  a 
strong  religious  foundation  for  her  development.  Russia's  only 
salvation  he  saw  in  her  immediate  and  complete  adoption  of  the 
religious  and  cultural  principles  of  the  West.  He  undertook 
the  mission  of  propagating  his  views  among  the  Moscow  salons 
of  the  Thirties;  he  could  not  appear  in  the  press  because  of  the 
censorship  conditions.  His  "  Philosophical  Letter,"  which  be- 
longed to  a  series  of  other  Letters  (they  were  published  recently, 
with  the  exception  of  a  few  that  have  been  lost) ,  had  not  been  in- 
tended for  publication,  but  was  written  to  a  private  person.  He 
read  those  letters  to  his  acquaintances,  however,  and  Nadezhdin 
asked  him  to  place  them  in  his  Telescope.  The  appearance  of 
the  first  Letter  produced  the  impression  of  an  exploded  bomb. 

It  was  the  sharpest  and  most  daring  protest  against  the  system 
of  "  official  Nationalism  "  that  had  been  proclaimed  by  the  Gov- 
ernment with  the  aid  of  Uvarov.  In  contrast  to  the  Govern- 
ment's praise  of  Russian  historical  principles  and  Russian  reality, 
Chaadaiev's  view  on  Russian  history  was  stated  thus:  "  At  the 
very  beginning  we  had  savage  barbarism,  later  rude  superstition, 
then  a  cruel,  humiliating  domination  of  the  conquerors,  a  domina- 


CHAADAIEV'S  LETTER  287 

tion  the  traces  of  which  have  not  been  erased  from  our  mode 
of  living  to  this  day.  Such  is  the  sad  history  of  our  youth ;  we 
have  not  had  that  age  of  boundless  activity,  of  the  poetical  dis- 
play of  the  nation's  moral  forces.  The  epoch  of  our  social  life, 
corresponding  to  that  age,  was  filled  with  a  dark,  colourless 
existence,  without  power,  without  energy. 

"  We  have  no  charming  memories,  no  strong,  instructive  ex- 
amples in  popular  legends.  Cast  a  glance  at  all  the  centuries 
of  our  existence,  at  all  the  expanse  that  we  are  occupying  now, 
and  you  will  not  find  a  single  reminiscence  which  would  arrest 
you,  a  single  monument  which  would  tell  you  about  the  past  in  a 
strong,  vivid,  picturesque  way. 

"  We  live  in  indifference  to  all,  in  a  narrow  horizon,  with  no 
past  or  future  .  .  ." 

A  strange  fate  has  separated  Russia  from  the  universal  life 
of  mankind,  and  in  order  to  become  like  other  nations,  she  must 
—  according  to  Chaadaiev  — "  begin  over  again  the  whole  edu- 
cation of  man.  For  this  purpose  we  have  before  us  the  history 
of  nations  and  the  results  of  movements  of  ages.  .  .  ." 

The  impression  made  by  that  Letter  can  be  easily  imagined: 
the  Telescope  was  discontinued,  Nadezhdin  was  exiled  to  Vol- 
ogda, and  Chaadaiev  was  officially  declared  insane. 

In  the  Capitals  and  in  the  provinces  the  Letter  produced 
an  impression  of  a  scandal,  and  aroused  general  confusion. 
Even  the  most  progressive  minds  felt  offended  by  Chaadaiev's 
tone  of  utter  contempt  for  the  Russian  past.  In  the  Moscow 
circles  hot  discussions  took  place,  and  among  Chaadaiev's  main 
opponents  were  his  friends,  the  subsequent  Slavophils,  Kireievsky 
and  Khomiakov.  One  year  later  Chaadaiev  wrote  —  naturally 
not  for  publication  —  his  Apologia  of  an  Insane,  in  which  he 
practically  reiterated  his  former  views,  but  asserted  that  nobody 
loved  his  country  more  than  he  did,  and  that  the  voice  of  the 
people  is  not  always  the  voice  of  God.  His  decent  opponents, 
like  Kireievsky,  etc.,  refused  to  take  issue  with  a  man  whose 


288  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

teachings  were  officially  condemned;  but  the  former  publishers 
of  the  Moscow  Messenger,  Shevyrev  and  Pogodin,  did  not 
scruple  about  the  delicate  situation,  and  in  their  desire  to  gain 
the  favour  of  Uvarov  they  rudely  attacked  the  man  who  had 
been  ordered  to  keep  silence.  In  Pogodin's  Muscovite  for  the 
year  1841  there  appeared  an  article  under  the  title  "  A  view  of  a 
Russian  on  European  Education,"  in  which  Western  Europe 
was  diagnosed  as  a  decaying,  infectious  organism,  from  which 
Russia  should  be  guarded.  Accepting  Uvarov's  Trinity  — 
Orthodoxy,  Autocracy,  and  Nationality,  as  a  sound  foundation 
for  the  life  of  Russia,  the  author  of  the  article  declared  his  perfect 
agreement  with  the  views  of  the  Government,  and  ended  with 
the  following  exclamation:  "By  these  three  cardinal  feelings 
our  Russ  is  powerful,  and  our  future  is  sure.  A  man  of  the 
Tzar's  counsel,  to  whom  our  growing  citizens  are  intrusted,  has 
already  expressed  them  in  a  profound  thought,  and  has  made 
them  the  basis  of  the  education  of  the  people." 

Personally  Count  Uvarov  did  not,  however,  consider  his  posi- 
tion quite  firm,  and  he  was  well  aware  of  the  existence  among 
the  intelligentzia  of  living  forces  ready  to  fight ;  the  suppression 
of  those  forces  formed  his  main  purpose.  In  his  report  on  the 
decenary  of  his  management  of  the  Ministry  of  Education  he 
wrote  (in  1843):  "The  direction  dictated  by  Your  Majesty 
to  the  Ministry,  and  its  triple  formula  were  bound  to  arouse  the 
opposition  of  all  those  who  had  still  preserved  the  stamp  of 
Liberal  and  Mystical  ideas:  of  the  Liberals,  because  the 
Ministry,  proclaiming  Autocracy,  declared  its  firm  desire  to  re- 
turn to  the  Russian  Monarchical  principle;  of  the  Mystics  — 
because  the  word  Orthodoxy  clearly  indicated  the  intention  of 
the  Ministry  to  hold  fast  to  the  teachings  of  Christianity,  and 
to  do  away  with  all  the  Mystical  ghosts  that  had  often  obscured 
the  clarity  of  the  Holy  traditions  of  the  Church ;  finally  the  word 
Nationality  has  provoked  our  enemies'  animosity  for  the  daring 
assertion  that  the  Ministry  considered  Russia  mature  and  worthy 


A  NEW  WESTERNISING  MOVEMENT       289 

of  marching  not  behind,  but  at  least  alongside  with  the  other 
European  nationalities." 

Indeed,  about  that  time,  the  beginning  of  the  Forties,  a  new 
Westernising  movement  was  formed  among  the  public,  which 
opposed  the  "  official  Nationalism,"  rejected  the  point  of  view 
of  the  Slavophiles,  and  which  soon  became,  in  spite  of  repressions 
and  persecutions,  the  leader  of  the  young  generation.  This 
movement,  unlike  that  of  Chaadaiev  and  the  Slavophiles,  was 
based  not  on  theological  principles,  but  on  their  rejection.  In 
order  to  follow  through  the  origin  and  fate  of  that  movement, 
and  also  of  its  antipode  —  Slavophilism,  we  must  turn  to  the 
history  of  the  circles  of  the  Thirties,  in  which  lay,  in  the  words 
of  Herzen,  "  Russia  of  the  future." 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Thirties  the  thinking  students  of  the 
University  of  Moscow  were  grouped  around  two  circles:  that 
of  Stankevich  and  that  of  Herzen.  Stankevich's  circle  consisted 
of  persons  interested  chiefly  in  questions  of  philosophy  and  ethics, 
and  who  were  under  the  influence  of  Schellingians,  like  Pavlov 
and  Nadezhdin.  To  that  circle  belonged:  Bielinsky,  on  one 
end,  and  Constantine  Aksakov,  on  the  other.  Later  they  were 
joined  by  Bakunin,  Botkin,  Katkov,  Granovsky  (from  abroad), 
and  partly  Samarin  (with  the  aid  of  Aksakov) —  all  stars  of  first 
magnitude  in  the  subsequent  history  of  the  Russian  intelligentzia. 

The  men  of  Herzen's  circle  were  interested  mostly  in  political 
and  social  problems;  among  them  were  Ogarev,  Satin,  Ketcher, 
Passeck,  and  others.  The  most  brilliant  personality  in  the  circle 
was,  of  course,  Herzen,  who  remained  a  life  friend  of  Ogarev. 
The  circle  considered  themselves  direct  heirs  of  the  Decembrists 
and  through  them  of  the  ideas  of  French  philosophy  and  the 
French  Revolution.  Of  contemporary  thought  they  adhered 
most  of  all  to  the  socialistic  doctrines  of  Saint-Simon  and  his 
followers. 

The  circle  of  Herzen  was  soon  disbanded ;  the  members  sang 
revolutionary  songs  at  a  party  arranged  on  their  graduation  from 


290  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

the  university,  were  arrested,  spent  several  months  under  arrest, 
and  were  then  exiled  to  various  remote  provinces.  From  1833 
to  1839  Herzen  lived  in  Perm,  in  Viatka,  and  later  in  Vladimir. 
Upon  his  return  to  Moscow  he  found  Hegel's  philosophy  in  full 
domination  of  the  upper  intelligentzia  circles,  and  he  had  to  take 
up  its  study  and  join  the  men  who  had  been  brought  up  in  the 
circle  of  Stankevich  (the  latter  was  at  that  time  dying  abroad, 
in  his  twenty-seventh  year). 

Monistic  Idealism  in  Western  philosophy  had  passed  from 
Kant  through  Fichte  to  Schelling;  but  in  Russia,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  acquaintance  with  German  Idealism  began  with 
Schelling,  while  Kant  received  no  audience.  The  members  of 
the  circle  of  Stankevich  were  attracted  more  by  Fichte,  how- 
ever, especially  one  of  them,  Mikhail  Bakunin,  who  although 
he  received  only  a  domestic  education  and  was  a  graduate  of  the 
School  of  Artillery,  had  a  natural  gift  for  dialectic  reasoning 
and  philosophy  in  general.  He  had  become  interested  in  this 
when  still  in  the  Military  school  under  the  influence  of 
Venevitinov's  articles  and  of  La  Harpe's  "  History  and  Theory 
of  Rhetoric,"  at  the  end  of  which  were  expounded  the  theories 
of  Locke  and  Condillac.  Stankevich  and  Bakunin,  little  at- 
tracted by  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  became  interested 
in  the  conclusions  of  Fichte's  Idealistic  philosophy,  which  he 
applied  for  the  solution  of  German  and  universal  ethical  and 
political  problems  of  his  age.  Bakunin  imparted  his  interest  in 
Fichte  to  Bielinsky  who,  not  knowing  German,  absorbed  Schell- 
ing and  Fichte  from  discussions  with  his  friends.  Bielinsky's 
articles  in  the  Telescope  for  1836  bore  the  stamp  of  Fichte's 
exalted  Idealism  which  considered  moral  problems  of  paramount 
importance.  From  Fichte,  Bakunin,  Bielinsky,  and  their  friends 
soon  passed  to  Hegel,  and  the  advent  of  the  new  philosophy  had 
marked  the  end  of  the  Thirties. 

Bielinsky  had  also  to  depend  on  what  he  had  been  told  about 
Hegel  by  Bakunin  and  Katkov.  For  this  reason  Bielinsky  like 


BIELINSKY  291 

many  of  his  contemporaries  not  only  in  Russia,  but  even  among 
the  German  Hegelians,  misinterpreted  Hegel's  logical  maxim, 
"  All  reality  is  reasonable,"  as  "  everything  that  exists  has  a 
reasonable  purpose."  As  many  other  Hegelians,  Bielinsky  ob- 
served the  life  about  him  from  a  conservative  point  of  view,  tried 
to  justify  existing  institutions,  and  came  out  with  a  panegyric 
for  the  Russian  social  and  political  order  (his  articles  in  1838- 
1840). 

Of  course  such  a  sensitive  and  noble  mind  as  Bielinsky's  could 
not  long  remain  under  that  influence,  and  he  soon  passionately 
rejected  his  former  beliefs,  and  went  to  the  other  extreme:  in- 
stead of  examining  the  philosophy  which  he  misunderstood,  he 
decided  that  German  Idealism  was  bound  to  draw  one  to  absurd 
conclusions,  and  that  one  should  better  turn  to  the  positive 
political  teachings  of  the  contemporary  French.  This  new  turn 
in  Bielinsky  was  enhanced  by  his  meeting  with  Herzen  who 
had  recently  come  back  to  Moscow  from  his  exile.  Herzen's 
influence  was  reflected  in  Bielinsky's  subsequent  activity  which 
was  transferred  to  Kraievsky's  monthly  Annals  of  the  Fatherland 
in  Petrograd.  Soon  Bielinsky  was  glad  to  hear  that  Bakunin, 
with  whom  he  had  quarrelled  before  leaving  Moscow,  had 
changed  his  conception  of  Hegelianism  after  a  thorough  study 
of  his  philosophy  in  Berlin,  and  having  joined  the  Left  Wing 
of  the  Hegelians,  he  became  a  prominent  expounder  of  Mate- 
rialistic Monism. 

Bielinsky's  further  literary  activity  has  an  enormous  signifi- 
cance in  the  history  of  the  Russian  intelligentzia;  the  magazines 
Annals  of  the  Fatherland  and  the  Contemporary  became  the 
most  read  publications  in  the  country,  and  during  the  Forties 
Bielinsky  was  the  real  intellectual  leader  of  the  young  genera- 
tion. He  no  longer  advocated  the  ideas  of  German  philosophy, 
but  promulgated  the  ideas  of  those  social  and  political  doctrines 
which  he  had  adapted  with  the  aid  of  Herzen  from  French  litera- 
ture. His  attitude  became  sharply  hostile  to  the  "  official  Na- 


292  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

tionalism  "  which  was  expressed  by  the  Muscovite,  issued  by 
Pogodin  in  co-operation  with  Shevyrev;  but  the  Muscovite  was 
not  his  only  enemy  at  that  time. 

About  the  middle  of  the  Forties  the  Moscow  Slavophiles  defi- 
nitely formulated  their  views.  Some  of  them,  like  the  brothers 
Kireievsky,  Khomiakov,  Koshelev,  were  of  the  former  Lovers 
of  Wisdom ;  others,  like  Constantine  Aksakov  and  Yuriy  Sama- 
rin,  were  from  Bielinsky's  comrades  in  the  circle  of  Stankevich. 
They  were  all  pure,  noble  minds,  who  had  worked  out  an  or- 
iginal, solid,  and  well-proportioned  system,  their  own  histor- 
iosophy,  which  like  that  of  Chaadaiev  was  based  on  theological 
principles,  and  they  had  also  emphasised  the  contradictions  and 
contrasts  in  the  development  of  the  two  different  worlds  of  con- 
temporary mankind :  the  Western  —  Latin-German,  and  the 
Eastern  —  Byzantine-Slav,  or  Greco-Russian.  But  in  direct 
opposition  to  Chaadaiev  the  Slavophiles  idealised  extremely  the 
whole  course  of  development  of  the  Russo-Slavic  world,  and  re- 
garded negatively  the  entire  Western-European  culture. 

In  their  conception  the  Orthodox  faith  and  the  Russian  people 
had  preserved  the  ancient  principle  of  spiritual  Christianity  in 
all  its  purity,  while  in  the  West  it  had  been  distorted  by  the 
casuistry  of  Catholicism,  by  the  Papal  authority,  and  by  the 
prevalence  of  material  culture  over  spiritual.  The  consequent 
development  of  those  circumstances  had  brought,  in  their  opinion, 
at  first  Protestantism,  and  later  the  modern  Materialism,  and 
the  denial  of  the  Revelation  and  of  all  the  truths  of  the  Christian 
faith.  The  Slavophiles  asserted  that  in  Russia  the  state  and 
society  had  developed  on  principles  of  freedom,  on  the  domina- 
tion of  democratic,  communal,  elements,  while  in  the  West  the 
state  and  society  developed  on  principles  of  violence,  of  enslaving 
one  class  or  nation  by  other  classes  or  nations,  which  resulted 
in  the  Feudal,  aristocratic  form  of  personal  ownership  of  land, 
and  the  landlessness  of  the  masses. 

Although  there  were  points  of  contact  between  the  teachings 


BIELINSKY  AND  THE  SLAVOPHILES        293 

of  the  Slavophiles  and  the  "  official  Nationalism,"  they  also  had 
fundamental  differences;  the  Slavophiles  demanded  complete 
freedom  of  speech  and  of  creed,  and  full  independence  from  the 
state  of  personal,  communal,  and  church  life  —  the  ideas  that 
were  formulated  later  by  Constantine  Aksakov  in  his  Memo- 
randum to  Alexander  II,  in  which  he  proclaimed  the  famous 
Slavophile  political  formula :  "  The  power  of  government  — 
to  the  Tzar;  the  power  of  opinion  —  to  the  people." 

Bielinsky  attacked  the  Slavophiles  as  sharply  and  passionately 
as  he  did  the  representatives  of  "  official  Nationalism,"  especially 
after  the  attempt  (which  failed)  of  the  Slavophiles  to  take  over 
Pogodin's  Muscovite,  in  1845.  Regarding  the  Slavophiles  with 
utter  intolerance,  Bielinsky  reproached  his  comrades  —  the 
Moscow  Westerners,  Granovsky  and  Herzen  —  for  their  mild 
treatment  of  them,  and  particularly  for  their  willingness  to  con- 
tribute to  their  publications.  Bielinsky  himself  decisively  re- 
jected the  thought  of  such  participation  in  his  enemies'  organs, 
and  he  used  to  say :  "  I  am  a  Hebrew  by  nature,  and  will  not 
eat  at  the  same  table  with  a  Philistine." 

The  censorship  conditions  allowed  the  Westerners  to  carry  on 
their  ideals  only  between  the  lines,  and  the  Slavophiles  were  un- 
able to  organise  any  stable  organ  of  their  own,  so  that  most  of 
their  debates  took  place  either  in  private  houses  or  in  sporadic 
almanachs;  the  Moscow  Almanack  appeared  in  1846  and  in 
1847,  and  again  in  1852,  but  by  that  time  any  discussion  of 
political  and  social  questions  had  become  impossible.  In  this  re- 
spect the  revolutions  of  1848  had  played  a  decisive  role. 


With  the  accession  of  Nicolas  the  attitude  of  the  Government 
had  radically  changed  towards  the  Schismatics  and  particularly 
toward  the  Sectarians.  The  position  of  certain  sects  had  be- 
come worse  in  the  last  years  of  Alexander  under  the  influence  of 
the  bigoted  and  fanatic  tendencies  in  the  sphere  of  Public  Wor- 


294  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

ship,  expressed  by  Archimandrite  Fotiy  and  by  the  Metropolitan 
of  Petrograd,  Seraphim. 

Although  Fotiy  was  treated  unfavourably  by  the  new  Mon- 
arch who  in  general  did  not  sympathise  with  Orthodox  fanati- 
cism, Nicolas  from  the  very  beginning  regarded  the  Schismatics 
and  other  dissenters  very  negatively,  first  because  in  his  eyes 
they  were  rebels  against  the  established  Church,  and  secondly 
because  of  their  anti-governmental  tendencies.  From  the  latter 
point  of  view  the  Government  estimated  the  degree  of  pernicious- 
ness  and  dangerousness  in  various  sects.  At  the  same  time  the 
position  of  the  Spiritual  Christians,  the  Dukhobory  and  Molo- 
kane, whom  Alexander  had  protected,  and  settled  in  the  province 
of  Tavrida  (Crimea)  changed  to  the  worse.  Under  Nicolas 
the  Dukhobory  and  Molokane,  because  of  their  anti-state  ten- 
dencies, were  declared  pernicious  sects.  It  is  curious  that  these 
sects  were  regarded  by  the  Government  as  more  dangerous  than 
such  morbid  sects  as  the  Khlysty  and  the  Skoptzy;  the  reason  is 
that  the  latter  masqued  their  practices  behind  superficial  ad- 
herence to  the  Church,  and  not  only  prayed  for  the  Tzar,  but 
owing  to  their  wealth  they  were  able  to  buy  the  protection  of 
corruptible  officials.  Whereas  the  Dukhobory  and  Molokane 
refused  to  compromise,  led  an  irreproachably  pure  peasant  life, 
and  appearing  as  a  state  within  a  state  they  finally  drew  upon 
them  the  persecutions  of  the  Government,  in  which  the  agents 
of  the  Third  Department  of  His  Majesty's  Own  Chancery 
played  a  large  role.  Back  in  1826  Nicolas  expressed  his  belief 
that  the  Sectarians  (at  least  the  most  stubborn  and  active) 
should  be  transferred  as  soldiers  to  the  Caucasus,  and  those  in- 
capable of  military  service  should  be  exiled  to  Siberia.  These 
measures  were  executed  during  the  second  period  of  his  reign ; 
in  1839,  1840,  and  1841  the  settlements  of  the  Dukhobory  and 
Molokane  were  abolished,  and  they  were  transported  to  Trans- 
Caucasia,  while  the  most  active  of  them  were  exiled  to  Siberia 
and  put  into  military  service.  In  1841  Nicolas  announced  in 


THE  GOVERNMENT  AND  THE  SECTS      295 

an  Imperial  ukase  that  he  considered  the  safeguard  of  the  "  in- 
violability of  the  forefathers'  Orthodox  Church"  among  his 
subjects  as  one  of  the  duties  imposed  on  him  by  Providence,  and 
he  gave  warning  that  severe  repressions  would  be  inflicted  upon 
dissenters,  and  that  the  children  of  those  who  would  be  exiled 
for  religious  reasons  would  be  taken  care  of  by  the  Government. 
The  Government  had  become  convinced  by  that  time  that  in 
spite  of  all  repressions,  and  the  external  conversion  of  many  dis- 
senters to  the  Orthodox  creed,  the  number  of  sects  continued  to 
grow.  It  was  decided  to  make  a  special  study  of  the  Schism 
and  the  sects,  in  order  to  employ  more  adequate  measures  for 
their  eradication.  The  matter  was  entrusted  confidentially  to 
several  learned  persons,  among  whom  were  Yuriy  Samarin  (in 
Riga),  Ivan  Aksakov  (in  the  province  of  Yaroslavl  and  in  the 
South),  and  at  the  centre  of  the  work  was  placed  the  ex- 
Professor  Nadezhdin,  who  had  been  the  editor  of  the  Telescope, 
passed  through  a  period  of  exile  in  Vologda,  and  then  entered 
into  the  service  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  under  L.  A. 
Perovsky.  The  materials  collected  had  a  great  value,  as  for 
the  first  time  they  furnished  the  Government  with  more  or  less 
substantial  information.  Before  that  time  the  information  had 
been  accidental  and  quite  inaccurate.  For  instance,  in  the  for- 
mer records  the  number  of  Schismatics  in  the  province  of 
Yaroslavl  was  put  at  fourteen  to  fifteen  thousand,  whereas  the 
special  investigators  stated  that  about  one-half  of  its  population 
were  "  infected  "  with  Schism  and  various  sects ;  in  the  province 
of  Vologda  the  former  official  figures  of  the  Schismatics  showed 
about  three  and  a  half  thousand,  while  the  special  investigators 
counted  about  one-third  of  the  population  (nearly  two  hundred 
thousand),  who  had  dissented  from  Orthodoxy;  in  the  province 
of  Chernigov  numerous  towns  and  villages  were  discovered 
completely  belonging  to  the  Schism ;  in  the  province  of  Kostroma, 
in  addition  to  twenty  thousand  overt  Schismatics  twenty-seven 
thousand  four  hundred  and  eighty-five  secret,  and  fifty-seven 


296  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

thousand  five  hundred  and  seventy-one  "  infected  "  with  the 
Schism  were  found.  An  enormous  number  of  Molokane  and 
Spiritual  Christians  were  discovered  in  the  provinces  of  Tambov 
and  Saratov  —  about  two  hundred  thousand  in  the  first,  and 
tens  of  thousands  in  the  second. 

It  is  no  wonder,  then,  that  while  the  official  data  about 
Schismatics  and  Sectarians  showed  their  figures  between  the 
years  1826  and  1855  as  seven  hundred  to  eight  hundred  thou- 
sand, and  only  once  (in  1837)  tne  figures  showed  one  million 
and  three  thousand, —  a  competent  statistician  who  had  access 
to  confidential  governmental  data,  General  N.  N.  Obruchov,  as- 
serted that  their  number  could  not  be  less  than  eight  million 
persons.  According  to  the  Government's  classification  of  1842 
the  Schismatics  and  Sectarians  were  divided  into  most  pernicious, 
pernicious,  and  less  pernicious.  Less  pernicious  were  the 
Popovtzy,  i.e.,  those  who  accepted  priests;  their  numbers  were 
officially  larger  because  they  were  less  secret.  The  Bez- 
popovtzy,  i.e.,  those  who  did  not  accept  priests,  but  prayed  for 
the  Tzar  and  admitted  marriage  were  considered  pernicious.  In 
regard  to  both  those  groups  the  Government  decided  not  to 
destroy  them  but  to  prevent  their  further  spread.  Those 
Bezpopovtzy  who  refused  to  pray  for  the  Tzar  and  did  not  admit 
marriage,  and  all  sorts  of  sects,  like  the  Molokane,  Dukhobory, 
Ikonobortzy,  Khlysty,  Skoptzy,  and  others  were  considered  most 
pernicious.  The  number  of  Sectarians  in  the  Forties  was  prob- 
ably not  less  than  one  million.  In  spite  of  the  Government's 
decision  to  exterminate  the  "  most  pernicious,"  their  numbers  did 
not  diminish  and  their  hostility  against  the  Government  and  its 
agents  grew  stronger.  The  latter  phenomenon  was  true  also  in 
regard  to  the  "  least  pernicious,"  as  the  Popovtzy.  Catherine 
had  permitted  them  to  keep  their  own  monasteries  and  hermit- 
aries  along  the  river  Irghiz,  in  the  province  of  Saratov.  In  the 
absence  of  their  own  Bishops,  the  Popovtzy  had  difficulty  in 
obtaining  priests,  and  were  forced  to  make  use  of  "  fugitive  " 


PERSECUTION  OF  THE  SECTS  297 

priests  or  of  "  unfrocked  "  Orthodox  priests.  Nicolas  rigor- 
ously persecuted  the  "  fugitive "  priests.  Then  the  agitation 
grew  among  the  Schismatics  for  obtaining  their  own  Bishops  who 
would  ordain  priests  from  their  midst.  There  exists  a  story  that 
this  idea  v/as  suggested  or  hinted  to  them  by  the  Chief  of  Gen- 
darmes, BenckendorfT.  When  they  had  after  many  efforts  suc- 
ceeded in  obtaining  from  Constantinople  the  supernumerary 
Metropolitan,  Amvrosiy,  and  had  him  installed  with  the  per- 
mission of  the  Austrian  emperor  at  Bielaia  Krenitza,  in  Bukovina 
(1847),  the  Russian  Government  demanded  that  Austria  dis- 
miss and  banish  Amvrosiy  (at  that  time  Austria  had  respect  for 
Russian  demands),  and  had  the  Patriarch  of  Constantinople  de- 
pose him.  But  Amvrosiy  had  already  ordained  several  Bishops 
who  were  now  in  a  position  to  ordain  priests  for  the  Schismatics. 
The  Government  hunted  the  new  Bishops  and  priests  as  "  fugi- 
tives," and  imprisoned  them  in  monastic  prisons,  which  intensified 
the  hostility  of  the  Schismatics  towards  the  authorities,  and 
while  some  of  them  formally  joined  the  official  Church,  the  more 
stubborn  elements  joined,  on  the  contrary,  the  more  pernicious 
branches  and  sects.  The  persecutions  of  the  Schismatics 
brought  about  new,  irreconcilable  sects,  as  the  Pilgrims,  for  ex- 
ample, whose  principle  had  been  to  use  no  passports  and  to  show 
no  obedience  to  the  authorities,  whom  they  regarded  as  the  serv- 
ants of  Satan.  Thus  by  the  end  of  Nicolas'  reign,  owing  to  the 
ruthless  struggle  which  the  Government  had  carried  on  against 
the  Schismatics  and  Sectarians,  their  numbers  not  only  did  not 
decrease,  but  their  hostility  toward  the  authorities  and  toward 
any  sort  of  government  had  become  more  acute. 

The  number  of  trials  and  severe  penalties  inflicted  upon  dis- 
senters of  all  categories  grew  from  year  to  year;  according  to 
official  data,  between  1847  and  l%52  there  were  over  five  hun- 
dred verdicts  a  year  against  them,  and  the  number  of  persons 
tried  for  belonging  to  the  Schism  during  those  five  years  was 
twenty-six  thousand  four  hundred  and  fifty-six. 


298  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

The  gulf  between  the  ideology  of  the  Government  and  that 
of  the  people  grew  and  broadened  during  that  reign  in  perhaps 
greater  dimensions  than  even  the  gulf  between  the  Government 
and  the  intelligentzia. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  third  and  last  period  of  Nicolas'  reign  began  after 
the  revolution  of  February,  1848,  in  France  and  the 
subsequent  revolutionary  outbursts  in  other  European 
countries;  those  events  marked  the  third  period  with  a  ruthless 
reactionism. 

The  first  news  about  the  proclamation  of  a  republic  in  France 
greatly  disturbed  Nicolas.  A  contemporary  asserts  that  the 
Emperor  appeared  with  the  telegrams  in  his  hand  at  the  palace 
of  his  Heir,  where  a  ball  was  going  on,  and  coming  to  the  centre 
of  the  salon  stood  amidst  the  dancing  couples,  and  exclaimed: 
"  Saddle  your  horses,  gentlemen :  a  republic  has  been  proclaimed 
in  France."  At  the  same  time,  however,  he  rejoiced  at  the  fall 
of  Louis  Philippe  whom  he  considered  a  justly  punished  usurper. 
"  Serves  him  right.  .  .  .  Fine,  splendid,"  he  uttered  to  his 
entourage  in  the  study  of  his  Heir.  To  prevent  an  attack  on 
the  part  of  the  French  upon  the  neighbouring  states,  and  in  order 
to  restrain  the  German  Communists  and  Socialists  who  might 
emulate  the  French,  Nicolas  wanted  on  the  spur  of  the  moment 
to  move  an  army  three  thousand  strong  to  the  Rhine.  He  was 
supported  in  his  bellicose  mood  by  Paskevich  who  was  then  in 
Petrograd.  But  his  other  advisers  (Volkonsky,  Kiselev)  proved 
to  him  without  difficulty  that  even  if  he  had  enough  troops,  he 
did  not  have  enough  money.  Hence  the  pugnacious  and  in- 
dignant mood  of  Nicolas  had  to  be  relieved  at  first  merely  in  a 
queer  manifesto  issued  March  14,  1848,  which  was  full  of  threats 
for  the  Western  enemies  and  rebels  (although  there  was  no  evi- 
dence of  an  attempted  attack  against  Russia),  and  ended  with 

299 


300  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

this  self-reliant  outburst:  "God  is  with  us!  Take  heed,  O 
nations,  and  submit,  for  God  is  with  us !  " 

Soon,  however,  events  in  Austria  where  part  after  part  of 
the  Empire  had  begun  to  break  off,  and  the  appeal  of  the  youth- 
ful Franz  Joseph  to  Nicolas,  induced  the  Tzar  to  employ  more 
vigorous  action  which  saved  the  Monarchy  of  the  Hapsburgs 
from  what  generally  appeared  its  inevitable  decomposition  and 
ruin.  Some  assert  that  Nicolas  extended  his  aid  to  Franz 
Joseph  not  only  out  of  a  desire  to  uphold  legal  authorities  against 
revolting  nationalities,  but  also  out  of  practical,  selfish  considera- 
tions which  were  supported  especially  by  Paskevich  who  in- 
sisted that  unless  the  Hungarian  revolt  were  suppressed  it  would 
inevitably  spread  over  the  Kingdom  of  Poland,  and  in  that  case 
the  events  of  1831  would  be  repeated.  The  Hungarian  up- 
rising was  quickly  quelled  by  the  much  superior  Russian  forces 
led  by  Prince  Paskevich  whose  stupid  actions,  however,  had 
considerably  shaken  his  reputation  of  a  talented  general. 

After  the  suppression  of  the  Hungarian  uprising  Nicolas  be- 
came for  a  time  the  supreme  dictator  of  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe.  He  forced  the  weak,  vacillating  king  of  Prussia  to 
reject  all  plans  about  a  "  United  Germany  "  and  about  the  an- 
nexation of  the  Danish  provinces  which  Nicolas  considered 
belonged  by  right  to  Austria.  At  the  same  time  he  demanded 
from  Friedrich  Wilhelm  more  rigorous  penalties  for  the  revo- 
lutionary elements  in  Prussia,  especially  in  Prussian  Poland.  By 
his  constant  interference  in  German  affairs  and  by  his  threats 
to  all  enemies  of  the  established  order,  Nicolas  acquired  such  a 
reputation  that  German  mothers  frightened  their  children  with 
the  name  of  the  Tzar. 

The  revolutionary  outbursts  of  1848  aroused  an  extreme  re- 
actionism  not  only  in  the  Emperor,  but  in  all  his  family  and  court 
circle.  The  Heir  particularly  was  imbued  with  that  spirit;  he 
agreed  perfectly  with  the  views  his  father  expressed  in  the  mani- 
festo of  March  14,  1848,  and  even  approved  of  the  tone  in  which 


THE  HUNGARIAN  UPRISING  301 

it  was  composed.  Immediately  upon  its  publication,  Tzesare- 
vich  Alexander  called  all  the  commanders  of  the  Guard-regi- 
ments together  and  read  the  manifesto  to  them;  this  was  met 
with  enthusiastic  ovations.  The  officers  of  that  time  little  re- 
sembled those  of  the  last  years  of  Alexander  I  —  in  this  respect 
the  twenty-five  years'  labours  of  Nicolas  had  been  crowned  with 
great  success;  but  one  can  not  fail  noticing  that  the  eradication 
of  liberal  ideas  among  the  army  was  accompanied  with  a  con- 
siderable lowering  of  its  quality.  The  mechanical  weeding  out 
of  all  independent  thought  caused  the  Russian  army,  when  it 
had  to  fight  with  European  troops,  to  feel  a  dire  lack  of  chiefs 
with  an  initiative,  of  educated  officers  and  generals  capable  of 
independent  thinking.  .  .  . 

The  reactionary  mood  was  immediately  reflected  on  the  in- 
ternal policy.  The  Government  tried  to  concentrate  all  con- 
servative forces.  In  receiving  a  deputation  of  Petrograd  nobles 
on  March  21,  1848,  the  Tzar  said:  "Let  us  forget  mutual 
grievances.  Give  your  hand  to  one  another,  as  brothers,  as 
children  of  our  mother-country,  so  that  the  last  hand  may  reach 
me,  and  then,  under  my  leadership,  rest  sure  that  no  earthly 
power  can  disturb  us."  Articles  about  the  firmness  of  the 
Bondage-Right  began  to  appear  in  Governmental  publications, 
and  Kiselev  himself  said  to  his  nephew,  Miliutin,  that  "  the 
peasant-question  had  burst."  The  same  was  categorically  stated 
to  a  representative  of  the  Smolensk  nobility  by  Olsufiev,  Court- 
Marshal  of  the  Heir. 

Entirely  different  was  the  reaction  of  the  intelligentzia  to- 
ward the  stormy  events  of  1848.  By  that  time  the  propaganda 
carried  on  under  the  direction  of  Bielinsky  in  Kraievsky's  An- 
nals of  the  Fatherland,  and  from  1847  —  in  the  Contemporary 
of  Panaiev  and  Nekrasov,  had  shown  considerable  results.  In 
the  Capitals,  especially  in  Petrograd,  and  partly  in  the  provinces, 
circles  of  progressive  young  men  began  to  appear,  peculiar  salons 
where  political,  literary,  and  social  problems  were  discussed ;  the 


302  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

discussions  could  not  take  place  in  the  press.  Such  were  the 
famous  Fridays  at  the  home  of  M.  B.  Butashevich-Petrashevsky, 
the  evenings  at  the  homes  of  Durov,  Kashkin,  Mombelli,  Plesh- 
cheiev,  and  others.  Petrashevsky's  Fridays  since  1845  served  as 
a  meeting  place  for  numerous  young  men  from  the  provinces  and 
capitals,  and  they  were  the  most  popular  gatherings  among  the 
intelligentzia,  Petrashevsky  himself  was  a  Socialist  (a  Fou- 
rierist),  but  at  his  evenings  all  varieties  of  questions  were 
brought  up,  most  often  the  peasant-question,  also  questions  of 
the  judiciary  —  juries,  publicity  and  independence  of  courts,  of 
the  Censorship  and  freedom  of  press,  in  a  word,  the  very  ques- 
tions that  were  solved  a  few  years  later,  during  the  epoch  of  the 
Great  Reforms;  at  the  same  time  they  discussed  literary  and 
political  news  from  Western  Europe,  and  read  such  productions 
as  could  not  appear  in  the  press,  as,  for  instance,  the  famous  let- 
ter of  Bielinsky  to  Gogol  concerning  the  latter 's  Selections  from 
the  Correspondence  with  My  Friends. 

At  Kashkin's  assembled  persons  especially  interested  in  social 
problems,  young  Socialists  and  Communists,  followers  of  Saint- 
Simon,  Leroux,  Lamennais,  Louis  Blanc,  Cabet,  and  particularly 
of  Fourier.  At  Durov's  more  moderate  thinkers  gathered. 

All  those  circles  were  known  to  one  another,  and  kept  up 
mutual  relations.  In  the  provinces  embryos  of  similar  organisa- 
tions existed  among  admirers  of  Annals  of  the  Fatherland,  the 
Contemporary,  and  of  their  inspirer  —  Bielinsky.  It  is  interest- 
ing that  Ivan  Aksakov  who  travelled  through  all  Russia  in  the 
Forties,  taking  part  in  various  revisions  and  investigations,  and 
often  serving  in  provincial  courts,  testified  in  his  letters  that  on 
the  gloomy  background  of  the  provincial  life,  amidst  the  society 
that  consisted  of  all  sorts  of  grafters,  cheats,  serf-drivers,  scoun- 
drels, and  trivial  nonentities, —  the  only  bright  exceptions  were 
the  followers  of  Bielinsky,  the  readers  and  admirers  of  the 
progressive  Petrograd  magazines.  The  Slavophils  were  little 
known  in  the  provinces,  their  Almanachs  were  not  read;  pro- 


THE  INTELLIGENTZIA  303 

vincial  book-sellers  directly  declared  to  Aksakov  that  they  did 
not  buy  those  Almanachs  because  the  Annals  of  the  Fatherland 
and  the  Contemporary  did  not  praise  them.  "  Both  Polevoy  and 
Bielinsky,"  wrote  Aksakov  in  1856,  "  had  an  enormous  influence 
on  the  public,  though  a  bad,  harmful  influence  (from  his  Slavo- 
phil point  of  view).  I  have  been  all  over  Russia:  the  name  of 
Bielinsky  is  known  to  every  youth  who  does  any  thinking,  to 
every  one  who  craves  fresh  air  amidst  the  stagnant  mire  of 
provincial  life.  There  is  not  one  Gymnasium  teacher  who  does 
not  know  Bielinsky 's  letter  to  Gogol  by  heart;  in  the  remote 
corners  of  Russia  his  influence  only  begins  to  penetrate,  increas- 
ing the  number  of  proselytes.  ...  '  We  owe  our  salvation  to 
Bielinsky,'  honest  young  men  in  the  provinces  tell  me.  .  .  . 
And  if  you  want  an  honest  man,  capable  of  compassion  for  ills 
and  misfortunes,  an  honest  physician,  an  honest  coroner  who 
would  fight  for  truth,  look  for  such  in  the  provinces,  among  the 
followers  of  Bielinsky.  Here  one  does  not  hear  about  Slavo- 
philism, and  if  one  hears  —  it  is  from  a  hostile  side.  .  .  ." 

This  testimony  is  valuable,  as  it  comes  from  Ivan  Aksakov 
who,  although  he  had  some  differences  with  his  brother,  Con- 
stantine,  about  that  time,  was  yet  a  devoted  member  of  the 
Slavophils,  and  personally  regarded  Bielinsky  quite  negatively. 

It  can  be  understood  how  the  progressive  Russian  society  at 
the  end  of  the  Forties,  who  were  for  the  most  part  Bielinsky 's 
followers,  were  agitated  and  moved  at  the  first  news  about  the 
revolution  of  1848.  Aksakov  himself  admitted  that  the  year 
1848  "  threw  him  out  of  his  rut."  Bakunin  and  Herzen  were 
then  abroad  and  were  taking  active  part  in  the  formidable  events. 
Bakunin  played  a  distinguished  part  in  the  popular  insurrection 
at  Dresden  and  in  the  Slav  movement  directed  against  the  empire 
of  the  Hapsburgs. 

The  Government  regarded  the  state  of  mind  of  the  Petrograd 
intelligentzia  with  alarm,  and  doubtless  exaggerated  its  political 
significance  and  possible  consequences.  It  pounced  first  of  all 


304  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

upon  the  press.  Had  Bielinsky  not  died  in  May,  1848,  he 
would  have  been  arrested  and  punished  not  less  severely  than 
the  Petrashevsky-circle  were  a  year  later.1  With  the  first  alarm- 
ing news  from  the  West  the  authorities  took  notice  of  the  radical 
magazines.  Admiral  Prince  Menshikov  called  the  attention  of 
the  Heir  to  the  bad  influence  of  the  universities  and  the  press, 
and  under  his  chairmanship  a  secret  committee  for  the  investiga- 
tion of  the  matter  was  formed.  Soon  additional  declarations  in 
the  same  direction  were  received  from  Count  Stroganov  who  was 
in  disagreement  with  Uvarov,  and  from  Baron  Korf  who  had 
his  eye  on  Uvarov's  post.  The  secret  committee  was  trans- 
formed into  a  permanent  institution,  under  the  chairmanship  of 
the  rabid  reactionary  and  obscurantist,  Count  Buturlin ;  this  so- 
called  Buturlin-Committee  was  authorised  by  Nicolas  to  keep  a 
watchful  eye  upon  the  press,  and  to  call  his  attention  to  unde- 
sirable works  even  though  they  had  passed  the  preliminary 
censorship.  Buturlin  had  made  the  position  of  the  press  unen- 
durable. Uvarov  himself  was  regarded  with  suspicion,  and 
when  he  inspired  Professor  Davidov  to  write  an  article  in  favour 
of  the  universities,  in  view  of  the  rumours  in  circulation  con- 
cerning their  possible  closing,  Buturlin's  Committee  officially  de- 
manded his  explanation  for  having  let  such  an  article  pass 
through.  Uvarov  had  to  resign  in  October,  1849. 

For  some  time  Nicolas  hesitated  about  the  choice  of  his  suc- 
cessor. In  January,  1850,  the  Deputy-Minister,  Prince  Shirin- 
sky-Shikhmatov  presented  a  Memorandum  to  the  Tzar  in  which 
he  advocated  the  view  that  instruction  in  the  universities  should 
be  based  on  religious  truths,  in  connection  with  theology,  and 
not  on  "  philosophising."  On  reading  that  Memorandum 
Nicolas  exclaimed :  "  Why  look  for  a  Minister  of  Education  ? 

1  Bielinsky  was  breathing  his  last,  surrounded  with  his  friends  and 
wife,  when  a  gendarme  appeared  at  his  rooms  with  an  order  for  his 
arrest.  Benckendorff  raged  when  he  found  that  his  victim  had  escaped 
him. —  TR. 


DISMISSAL  OF  UVAROV  305 

Behold,  he  has  been  found."  Jokers  whispered  on  the  occasion 
of  his  appointment  that  he  would  give  education  not  only 
"check,"  but  "mate"  (a  play  of  words  in  chess  terms  — 
Shikhmatov:  shakh,  i.e.,  check,  and  mat  —  mate). 

But  it  was  not  a  matter  of  joking  for  the  universities.  "  It 
drives  one  insane,"  wrote  Granovsky  in  1850.  "  Good  for  Biel- 
insky  who  died  in  time."  As  early  as  May,  1849,  the  number 
of  students  in  every  university  was  limited  to  three  hundred, 
outside  of  the  medical  and  theological  departments.  Shirinsky- 
Shikhmatov  opined  that  "  the  use  of  philosophy  has  not  been 
proven,  while  its  harm  is  probable,"  hence  philosophy  and  meta- 
physics were  eliminated,  and  the  teaching  of  logic  and  psychology 
was  handed  over  to  professors  of  theology. 

The  censorship  raged  mercilessly,  but  the  Buturlin-Committee 
was  not  satisfied  with  the  present,  and  endeavoured  to  discover 
past  sins  on  the  part  of  individual  censors,  in  which  cases  they 
were  put  under  arrest,  regardless  of  age,  rank,  and  profession. 
Thus  Professor  Kutorga,  who  was  no  longer  a  censor,  was  ar- 
rested for  having  long  before  passed  some  ambiguous  German 
verses.  Signs  of  "  sedition  "  were  discovered  not  only  in  the 
universities,  but  even  among  privileged  institutions,  like  the 
School  of  Law,  or  the  Alexandrine  Lyceum,  whose  suspected 
pupils  were  recruited  into  the  army,  expelled,  severely  penalised. 
In  those  years  many  writers  suffered  punishment.  Saltykov  was 
exiled  to  Viatka,  to  serve  with  the  Governor.  Turgeniev  was 
arrested  in  1852  and  kept  at  a  police-station  for  a  successful  at- 
tempt to  evade  the  watchfulness  of  the  censor.  Yuriy  Samarin 
was  imprisoned  for  a  few  days  in  a  fortress  for  sharp  remarks 
about  the  actions  of  the  Ostsee  administration,  while  Ivan 
Aksakov  for  certain  expressions  in  a  letter  to  his  relatives  con- 
cerning the  arrest  of  Samarin,  was  arrested  at  the  Third  De- 
partment. The  arrests  of  Samarin  and  Aksakov  ended  quite 
graciously  for  both.  Nicolas  had  a  personal  "  instructive  "  con- 
versation with  Samarin,  and  wrote  out  some  curious  "  resolu- 


306  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

tions  "  for  Aksakov  in  a  laconic  order  to  Prince  Orlov:  "  Call 
(him),  read  (this),  exhort  (him),  release  (him)."  But  the 
mild  ending  of  those  affairs  did  not  prevent  the  Government  from 
forbidding  Ivan  Aksakov  from  editing  any  publications,  after 
the  appearance  of  the  most  innocent  Slavophil  "  Almanach  "  in 
1852,  and  enjoining  the  contributors  of  the  Almanach,  Con- 
stantine  Aksakov,  Yuriy  Samarin,  Khomiakov,  Koshelev,  and 
others,  from  submitting  their  writings  for  publication.  The 
Government  acted  considerably  more  severely  and  ruthlessly  in 
cases  of  outspoken  "  sedition,"  as  in  the  case  of  the  Petrashevsky- 
group,  twenty  men  of  which  were  sentenced  to  hard  labour,  exile 
to  Siberia,  and  reduction  of  rank  to  private;  for  the  purpose  of 
"  frightening  "  them  they  had  to  go  through  fictitious  prepara- 
tions for  execution.  Yet  the  affair,  although  called  a  "  con- 
spiracy," offered  no  grounds  for  incriminating  the  members  with 
any  actions,  so  that  even  Baron  Korf  who  bitterly  disliked  the 
Petrashevsky-circle,  said  that  it  was  a  "  conspiracy  of  ideas." 
Among  those  condemned  in  that  process  was  F.  M.  Dostoievsky 
who  was  sentenced  to  hard  labour.  The  Government  punished 
the  members  of  the  Kiev  "  Society  of  Cyril  and  Methody," 
which  had  shown  federalistic  tendencies,  with  equal  severity; 
among  them  were:  Shevchenko,  Kostomarov,  Kulish,  Bielozer- 
sky,  Markovitch,  and  others. 

Beside  the  obscurantist  measures  of  the  Government  in  the 
field  of  popular  education,  against  the  press  and  the  universities, 
we  may  mention  the  following  of  its  reactionary  undertakings: 
the  prohibition  to  go  abroad  without  the  personal  permission  of 
the  Tzar,  which  was  given  only  in  very  rare  cases,  and  the  in- 
troduction of  the  so-called  Third  paragraph  into  the  Civil  Serv- 
ice Statute,  by  which  the  authorities  were  empowered  to  dismiss 
officials  considered  "  untrustworthy  "  (politically),  without  trial 
or  even  explanation. 

"  The  heart  aches  at  the  thought  of  what  we  had  been,  and 
what  we  have  become  now,"  wrote  Granovsky  to  Herzen  in 


DARK  REACTION  307 

1853.  The  public  prostration  and  the  consciousness  of  their 
impotence  in  face  of  the  terrible  oppression  of  the  reaction  were 
so  strong  among  the  educated  classes,  that  even  such  patriots  as 
the  Slavophil  Koshelev  admitted  later  that  the  defeats  of  the 
Russian  troops  in  the  war  with  Turkey,  which  broke  out  in 
1853,  did  not  grieve  them  much.  On  the  contrary,  they  felt 
that  the  graver  the  foreign  situation  became  the  weaker  grew 
the  oppression  at  home. 

When  in  1853  the  war  with  Turkey  began,  which  was  un- 
successful from  the  very  start,  and  later  complicated  by  the  in- 
tervention of  France,  England,  and  Sardinia,  and  by  the  constant 
threats  of  ungrateful  Austria,  though  she  had  been  saved  by 
Nicolas  only  five  years  before;  when  Russia's  backwardness  and 
unpreparedness,  and  complete  lack  of  faithful  and  talented 
generals  were  revealed  —  the  self-reliance  of  the  Tzar,  so 
defiantly  expressed  in  his  manifesto  of  March  14,  1848,  and  in 
his  address  to  the  Petrograd  nobility,  began  to  flag,  and  his 
proud  spirit  was  unable  to  bear  the  unprecedented  humilia- 
tion. 

The  foreign  storm  gradually  softened  the  iron  regime  within 
Russia.  Although  all  the  reactionary  measures  promulgated 
after  1848  remained  intact  to  the  very  end  of  the  reign,  sensi- 
tive men  felt  even  in  1853  the  approach  of  a  thaw.  "  It 
seemed,"  A.  I.  Koshelev  wrote  in  his  memoirs,  "  as  if  out  of  a 
depressing,  dark  dungeon  we  were  emerging  if  not  into  God's 
light,  at  least  into  an  ante-chamber  where  we  could  sense  re- 
freshing air." 

In  society,  even  among  conservative  circles  an  indicting,  op- 
positional  attitude  toward  the  Government  awakened,  and  even 
Pogodin,  who  in  the  Forties  had  edited  the  Muscovite,  now 
wrote  daring  letters  of  challenge  addressed  to  the  Tzar. 
Khomiakov  wrote  his  virile  poems  breathing  with  religious  de- 
nunciation of  the  sinful  Government.  The  mood  of  the  masses 
was  also  alarming.  On  one  hand,  the  people  showed  heroic  self- 


308  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

sacrifice  in  the  struggle  with  the  enemy,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
mobilised  militia,  considering  that  service  for  the  Tzar  and  the 
country  freed  them  from  bondage  (by  the  very  statutes  recruits 
were  excluded  from  the  class  of  bondmen),  refused  to  obey  their 
landowners  and  police  officials,  and  committed  disturbances  and 
riots. 

For  many  it  had  become  evident  that  the  hour  for  the  abolition 
of  serfdom  had  struck,  and  that  the  entire  system  had  inevitably 
to  be  reorganised.  It  is  uncertain  what  would  have  been  the 
policy  of  Nicolas  after  the  unfortunate  Crimean  War  of  1853- 
1856.  He  did  not  live  to  see  its  end.  Death  delivered  him 
from  the  necessity  of  liquidating  his  own  governmental  policy, 
the  inefficiency  of  which  had  been  amply  demonstrated  by  the 
time  of  his  passing  away. 

In  summarising  these  remarkable  thirty  years,  we  must  admit 
that  the  governmental  system  of  Nicolas  I  was  one  of  the  most 
consequential  of  attempts  to  realise  the  idea  of  enlightened  ab- 
solutism. Nicolas  did  not  in  his  views  resemble  Louis  XIV;  he 
would  not  have  said,  L'etat  —  cest  moi;  on  the  contrary,  he 
declared  many  times  that  he  considered  himself  the  first  servant 
of  the  state;  but  to  the  will  of  the  first  servant  all  others  had 
unreservedly  to  submit.  In  his  intentions  Nicolas  was  rather 
akin  to  such  representatives  of  enlightened  despotism  as  Joseph 
II  and  Friedrich  the  Great.  He  endeavoured,  as  we  have  seen, 
to  realise  the  system  recommended  by  Karamzin  in  his  Memo- 
randum, "  On  Ancient  and  New  Russia."  If  Karamzin  had 
lived  through  the  reign  of  Nicolas,  he  would  have  had  to  admit 
that  his  system  had  been  given  a  trial,  and  he  would  have  become 
convinced  to  what  that  system  inevitably  led,  especially  in  such 
an  enormous,  sparsely  populated,  and  rapidly  developing  country 
as  Russia. 

To  Nicolas'  mind  every  Governor  should  have  been  the  master 
of  his  province,  and  he,  the  Emperor,  the  master  of  the  empire ; 


SUMMARY  OF  NICOLAS'  REIGN 


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MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 


SUMMARY  OF  NICOLAS'  REIGN  309 

just  such  a  master  as  Friedrich  the  Great  had  been  in  his  com- 
paratively diminutive  Prussia,  where  he  was  able  to  know  how 
almost  every  peasant  lived  and  worked. 

For  the  very  size  of  the  Russian  Empire,  and  because  of  the 
relatively  meagre  means  in  the  hands  of  the  Government,  in 
spite  of  its  apparently  full  authority,  such  a  task  could  not  pos- 
sibly be  realised.  As  a  brilliant  illustration  of  the  impotence 
of  the  bureaucratic  administration,  take  the  famous  story  about 
a  certain  order  of  the  Tzar,  which  had  not  been  fulfilled  despite 
the  twenty-three  confirmations  it  had  received.  The  weaker 
and  slower  the  means,  the  cruder  were  the  forms  in  which  the 
authorities  expressed  their  power,  and  the  more  striking  their 
abuses.  The  best  Ministers  of  Nicolas'  reign  —  Kankrin  and 
Kiselev  —  particularly  resemble  the  men  of  the  epoch  of  en- 
lightened despotism;  but  the  majority  of  his  other  assistants, 
especially  those  of  his  later  years,  were  incapable  men,  often 
covetous  and  false  lackeys,  with  no  convictions  or  views  of  their 
own. 

At  the  same  time  it  was  one  of  the  most  important  epochs  in 
the  development  and  ripening  of  national  life  in  Russia.  The 
rapidly  increasing  density  of  the  population  in  the  central  black- 
soil  provinces,  the  destruction  of  the  former  foundations  of  the 
landowners'  bondage-estates  after  the  Napoleonic  wars,  the 
growing  antagonism  between  the  bondmen  and  their  masters,  the 
new  demands  and  needs  of  commerce  and  industry  in  connection 
with  the  altered  universal  conjunctures  —  all  these  placed  before 
the  Government  a  number  of  difficult  tasks  which  required  for 
their  fulfilment  not  only  the  presence  of  remarkable  statesmen, 
but  the  broad  participation  of  the  entire  intelligentzia  of  the 
country,  and  the  free  and  fast  growth  of  education  in  the  land. 
This  was  prevented  by  the  administrative  system  that  had  de- 
veloped in  a  consequential  crescendo  during  the  whole  reign  of 
Nicolas. 


310  MODERN  RUSSIAN  HISTORY 

The  wounds  of  Russia,  revealed  by  the  Crimean  Campaign, 
became  so  evident,  that  the  advent  of  an  epoch  of  reforms  ap- 
peared inevitable.  It  fell  upon  the  shoulders  of  Alexander  II  to 
realise  those  reforms. 


END   OF   VOLUME  I 


ADDENDA 

On  pages  74,  I2th  line  from  the  bottom;   75,  lines  9  and  12  from  the  top; 
78,  lines  13,  21  from  top  and  line  4  from  bottom,  read  Pahlen  for  Palen. 

On  page  147,  line  6  from  the  bottom,  read  Gotorp  for  Hotorp. 

On  pages  189,  line  7  from  top;  225,  line  12  and  line  22  from  top;  233,  line 
15  from  bottom,  read  Philaret  for  Filaret. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY,  LOS  ANGELES 

COLLEGE  LIBRARY 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


DA 


Book  Slip — Series  4280 


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v.l 


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